The bill of exceptions recited that to the giving of the instruction the plaintiff in error, by its counsel, then and there duly excepted, but it did not state that the specific objection was made immediately upon the conclusion of the charge and before the jury retired. It has been settled by many decisions that we will look into the opinion of the Appellate Court for the purpose of learning the questions considered and how they were disposed of. Chicago City Railway Co. v. Mead, 206 Ill. 174; Penn Plate Glass Co. v. Rice Co. 216 id. 567; Ohio Oil Co. v. Scott, 241 id. 448.

In the case of Fuller v. Bates, 96 Ill. 132, the Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed a judgment of the circuit court of Grundy county and granted an appeal to this court. The amount involved was less than $1000 and the Appellate Court failed to make any certificate of importance. It was held that the opinion of the Appellate Court stating the grounds upon which the appeal was allowed could not take the place of the certificate required by the statute, and that the opinion could not be regarded as any part of the record, because in cases where the Appellate Court affirmed judgments the statute did not require any opinion to be filed.

In Coalfield Co. v. Peck, 98 Ill. 139, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court of Will county without remanding the cause and without any finding of facts different from the finding of the circuit court. The statute required the court to recite in its final order of judgment the facts as found if they differed from the facts as found by the trial court, and it was held that the finding must be part of the judgment, and the opinion could not be considered to show that the Appellate Court took a view of the facts different from the circuit court. Afterward, in 1885, section 34 of the act to establish Appellate Courts was amended so as to require all opinions or decisions of the court upon the final hearing of any cause to be reduced

to writing by the court, briefly giving therein the reasons for such opinion or decision, and requiring such written opinions to be filed in the cases in which they were rendered. After that amendment an appeal was taken from the Appellate Court where the amount involved was less than $1000. The appeal was dismissed because this court had no jurisdiction, but it was said to be improper for an order of the Appellate Court dismissing an appeal to refer to the opinion of that court for the reasons. The discussion about the opinion was beside the question before the court and the amendment was not noticed. Moore v. Williams, 132 Ill. 591.

The opinion of the Appellate Court in every case is a part of the files of the case, and while there has been no occasion, since the amendment, to consider its relation to the record, and error cannot be assigned upon it, it is the source from which to determine the reasons for the decision and judgment.

Section 29 of article 6 of the constitution declares: "All laws relating to courts shall be general, and of uniform operation; and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings and practice of all courts, of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and effect of the process, judgments and decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform." Any provision of a statute affecting the procedure or practice of the Appellate Court or this court, in conflict with that provision of the constitution, is void. (People v. Hibernian Banking Ass'n, 245 Ill. 522; Lassers v. North-German Lloyd Steamship Co. 244 id. 570; Clowry v. Holmes, supra.) Neither the Appellate Court nor this court takes judicial notice of the rules of practice from time to time in force in any other court than the municipal court, (Anderson v. McCormick, 129 Ill. 308,) and that is the rule of other courts. (3 Cyc. 179; 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,—2d ed.—923; Rout v.

Ninde, 118 Ind. 123; Cherry v. Baker, 17 Md. 75.) The Appellate Court, in all cases coming from any court except the municipal court, cannot, under established rules of practice, take judicial notice of the rules of the trial court, but they must be made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions and cannot be shown to the court in any other manner. By section 20 an attempt was made to destroy uniformity in the procedure and practice of the Appellate Court and this court in cases coming from the municipal court, and the provision is in conflict with the constitution. In City of Chicago v. Williams, 254 Ill. 360, the decision was that a statute declaring that a court shall take judicial notice of some fact relates to the practice in that court, from which it would necessarily follow that section 20 is a regulation of practice in the Appellate Court. But whether a statute, such as section 20, relates to practice or procedure in the Appellate Court or this court, it is void if it creates a want of uniformity in either, since both are within the constitutional provision.

The charge was upon a single question and is printed in the abstract in a single sentence, so there was no necessity of pointing out some particular part of the charge which was excepted to. The plaintiff in error having duly excepted to the charge of the court in the manner required under the practice as to all other courts, was entitled to consideration by the Appellate Court of the errors assigned.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court, with directions to consider the errors assigned without regard to section 20, which is herein held to be in violation of the constitution.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

THE CHICAGO TITLE AND TRUST COMPANY, Appellant, vs. THE NATIONAL STORAGE COMPANY, Appellee.—Same Appellant vs. THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, Appellee. Same Appellant vs. HENRY W. ROGERS & BRO. Appellee.

Opinion filed October 28, 1913—Rehearing denied Dec. 3, 1913.

1. BANKRUPTCY—jurisdiction over the bankrupt's property depends upon question of possession. If property is not in the possession of the bankrupt at the time he files his petition but is in other persons claiming adverse rights therein, the bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction of the property as a part of bankrupt's estate.

2. SAME when determination of question of possession operates as an estoppel by verdict. Where the bankruptcy court, under special pleadings questioning its jurisdiction, must determine the question of possession of the property, and finds that neither the bankrupt nor his trustee has had possession and that the court is therefore without jurisdiction, the finding as to possession may be relied upon as an estoppel by verdict in a suit between the same parties in another court, notwithstanding the bankruptcy court dismissed the petition without prejudice to the right of the trustee to litigate in a proper court.

3. SAME a trustee in bankruptcy has no greater rights than the bankrupt. A trustee in bankruptcy stands in the shoes of the bankrupt and has no better title to the property of the bankrupt than the latter had at the time of the filing of the petition, and he does not occupy the position of an innocent third person having a judgment or other lien against the bankrupt's property.

4. SAME when substitution of property for that pledged does not destroy the lien of warehouse receipts. Where, at the time a bankruptcy petition was filed, warehouse receipts for certain quantities of timothy seed, placed in storage by the bankrupt, were in the hands of purchasers for value, the lien of such receipts, as against the bankrupt, the trustee and general or unsecured creditors, is not lost by the fact that there has been an unauthorized substitution of other seed of like quality and quantity for that upon which the receipts were issued.

5. ESTOPPEL BY VERDICT-doctrine applies to a fact determined by court in deciding question of its own jurisdiction. The doctrine of estoppel by verdict applies to questions arising upon an

issue of fact as to the jurisdiction of the court as fully as to questions arising upon the trial of a cause upon its merits, and is not affected by the circumstance that the court may ultimately determine that it has no jurisdiction to proceed further.

'APPEAL from the Branch "B" Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. THOMAS G. WINDES, Judge, presiding.

NEWTON WYETH, for appellant.

ORVILLE PECKHAM, EDWARD EAGLE BROWN, and JOHN N. OTT, for appellee the First National Bank of Chicago. CARNAHAN, ELsdon & SlusseR, for the other appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court: The Chicago Title and Trust Company, as trustee in bankruptcy of Alexander Rodgers, brought separate actions of assumpsit against the National Storage Company, the First National Bank of Chicago and H. W. Rogers & Bro. to recover the proceeds from the sale of certain seed, based on the theory that the seed in question was a part of the estate of the bankrupt and had been sold and the proceeds wrongfully retained by the defendants. The cases were consolidated for trial before the court without a jury, and being so tried, judgments were rendered in favor of the defendants below. The trustee prosecuted an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgments below were affirmed. The trustee having obtained a certificate of importance, the cases have been removed to this court, where they have been consolidated and taken for decision as one case.

The declarations contain special counts, which allege that Alexander Rodgers, a seed merchant, became a bankrupt and that the plaintiff was appointed trustee of his