with a view to profit, he is liable; as, if a man purchase the whole impression of a daily newspaper, to sell again, with a view to profit, and risks the loss of such as remain unsold, it is a sufficient trading, Gimmingham v. Laing, 2 Marsh. 236, 6 Taunt. 532; and "a farmer's servant buying commodities of his master, and selling them, would be a trader;" p. Gibbs, C. J. ib. If a man buy horses to sell again, with a view to profit, he is liable to be a bankrupt, ex. p. Gibbs, 2 Rose, 38, Wright v. Bird, 1 Price, 20; but, if he sell only such as he reared himself, he is not, ib. And, if a butcher buy sheep and cattle, and kill and sell them with a view to profit, he is liable to be made a bankrupt, Dally v. Smith, 4 Burr. 2148; but, if he kill and sell only such as he reared himself, he is not; ib. If a fisherman be in the habit of purchasing fish from others to sell again, with a view to profit, it is a sufficient trading, Mannay v. Birch, 3 Camp. 233; but it is not, if he merely sell the fish he has caught; ib. Where a person buys coals, for the purpose of again selling them, it is a trading, Cooke, 48, 73; but not, if such person merely sell those which are produced from his own mines; or, if such person rents a mine, works it, and sells the ore, it is not a trading, as he does not buy: Port v. Turton, 2 Wils. 169. *Where it appeared that the party had ordered goods, for the [*217] purpose, as he alleged, of exporting them abroad, and had promised to give other goods in exchange for them, and it was objected that this was an insufficient proof of trading, as it was proof of buying, but not of selling, Abbott, C. J., observed, "I cannot say, that if a man buys, and represents himself as a dealer, and offers goods in exchange, that he does not buy to sell again; at least I must leave it to the jury:" Milliken v. Brandon, 1 C. & P. 380. Buying and selling horses, with an avowed intention to take out a license and become a dealer, is sufficient to constitute a trading within the bankrupt laws, however limited the trading, and though no license has been actually taken out: Wright v. Bird, 1 Price, 20. And, where A. was a horse-dealer, and livery-stable keeper, and, after his death, his widow carried on the business of the livery-stable, and bought horses to let, which she occasionally sold to customers, it was held a sufficient trading: Martin v. Nightingale, 3 Bing. 421. An executor disposing of his testator's stock is not a trader, though he purchase articles to make it marketable, unless he increase the stock, and continue to sell: ex. p. Nutt, 1 Atk. 102, Eden, 5. Where a party purchases goods for his own use, that will not make him a trader within this section of the statute, though he afterwards sell such as he may have no occasion for, as he does not seek his living by buying and selling: Parker v. Wells, 1 T. R. 34. Where a man makes bricks for his own use, merely from earth on his own land, it is not a trading, though he sell some of them which he has no occasion to use, ib.; but if he makes them of earth dug from the waste, for which he afterwards pays the lord, it will: ex. p. Harrison, 1 Bro. C. C. 173; ex. p. Ridge, 1 Rose, 316. If a man sells the milk of his own cows, and and the cows too, occasionally, when unfit for milking, it is no trading, Carter v. Dean, 1 Swanst. 64; nor is it a trading, if a person sell only the cheese which he has made from the milk of his own cows, or the cider which he makes from the fruit of his own trees, Parker v. Wells,

1 T. R. 34; but, if he buy the cheese or cider to sell again, it will:

ib.

A person who makes a purchase and sale ancillary to a business which is not itself a trading, does not constitute a sufficient act of trading; therefore, a person who buys an article for the purpose of mixing it with his own produce, with a view to sell the mixture more advantageously than his own produce could be sold unmixed, does not thereby become a trader: Patten v. Browne, 7 Taunt. 409. So, if a man make bricks from his own land, as a mode of enjoying the profits of it, even though he make the bricks entirely for sale, and purchase sand and fuel, &c. for the purpose of making them, he is not a trader within the meaning of the bankrupt laws: Parker v. Wells, Cooke, 52-63; Sutton v. Weely, 7 East, 442. And a farmer who occasionally buys hay, corn, horses, &c., with a view to sell again for profit, the buying and selling being incident to the occupation of the farm, does not thereby become a trader, Stewart v. Ball, 2 N. R. 78; but, where a farmer bought horses unfit for farming, and resold them, and avowed his intention to take out a license and become a horse-dealer, these facts were held to be evidence of trading: Wright v. Bird, 1 Price, 20; Martin v. Nightingale, 3 Bing. 421.

The Quantum of the Dealing, or the Smallness of the Profit, is immaterial, if it be proved that it was the party's intention to deal generally, in which case evidence of one act of buying and selling is sufficient to constitute a trader within the bankrupt laws: Newland v. Bell, Holt, 221, p. Gibbs, C. J. And the purchase of one lot of timber, with intent to sell again, will make a man a trader, even if the timber be standing at the time of the purchase: Holroyd v. Gwynne, 2 Taunt. 176; Patman v. Vaughan, 1 T. R. 572; Gale v. Halfknight, 3 Stark. 56; Eden, 3. But, if a person is not in a line of life to subject him to the

bankrupt laws, he will not be deemed a trader by occasional [*218] acts; as, where a schoolmaster *sells books to his own scholars, only, Valentine v. Vaughan, Pea. Rep. 76; or where a contractor for victualling the fleet, sells off the surplusage, Gibbins v. Thompson, 1 Vent. 270; so a colonel of a fencible regiment occasionally selling horses at an auction; or a person who keeps hounds, buying dead horses, and selling their skins and bones, Summersett v. Jarvis, 3 B. & B. 2, 6 Moore, 56; or a person, finding that he has bought more of an article than he wants, selling the residue, such parties will not be traders: Bolton v. Sowerby, 11 East, 276. And, where a cow-keeper, who lived by selling milk, occasionally sold such cows as were unfit for use, such sale was held not to be a trading: Carter v. Dean, 1 Swanst. 64. It will, however, be a question, in such cases, for the jury, whether it affords evidence of an intention to deal generally: Martin v. Nightingale, 3 Bing. 421; Eden, 4. And a declaration by the party of the object of his buying, Gale v. Halfknight, 3 Stark. 56; or his representing himself as a dealer, and buying goods, and offering them in exchange for others, Milliken v. Brandon, 1 C. & P. 380, will be received as evidence of his intention in this respect.

The Legality or Illegality of the Buying and Selling, &c., makes no difference. Smuggling may constitute a trading, and the person carrying it on may be a trader, within 21 Jac. 1, c. 15, s. 2, as being a person who seeks his trade or living by buying and selling: Cobb v. Symonds, B. & A. 516; 1 D. & R. 111. But, when there is distinct proof that a person bought goods in conjunction with others, to carry on a system of fraud, by making away with the goods, and never selling any of them, is no trading: Milliken v. Brandon, 1 C. & P. 380. A trader may become a bankrupt, although he has not taken out a license, to render his trading legal: Sanderson v. Bowles, 4 Burr. 2066.

The Buying and Selling should be of "Goods or Commodities," within the meaning of this section of the act. Buying and selling land, or any interest in land, is not trading, Port v. Turton, 2 Wils. 169. Nor is buying and selling government stock, or other public stocks or securities: Colt v. Netterville, 2 P. Wil. 308.

By the above section, the Buying and Letting for Hire of "goods and commodities," or buying them with intent to let them for hire, is sufficient to constitute a trading, and render a party liable to the bankrupt laws. It would now probably be held, that a person having a share in a ship, which is let out on charter, may be considered as a trader, ex. p. Bowes, 4 Ves. Eden, 8. This provision will include a large class of persons, such as job-masters, livery-stablekeepers, hackneymen, furniture-brokers, &c., Deacon, 27. In this respect, the repealed acts differ from the present, and it was formerly held, that buying horses for the purpose of letting them out to hire, was not deemed a trading; as there was no selling, nor intent to sell: Martin v. Nightingale, 3 Bing. 421; 1 Vent. 29.

Workmanship of "Goods and Commodities."] Purchasing the raw materials of trade, and selling them again under another form, or improved by the labour of manufacture, as in the case of bakers, who buy the flour, of which they make bread, 3 Mod. 330; butchers, who purchase cattle, and kill them for the purpose of sale, Dally v. Smith, 4 Burr. 2148; shoemakers, who purchase the leather, of which they make shoes, Crampe v. Barne, Cro. C. 31; smiths, Cooke, 48; tanners, 3 Mod. 330; tailors, &c., Parker v. Wells, Cooke, 56; have always been held to be traders, subject to the bankrupt law. The above section of the present act, however, "extends the description still further, so as to comprehend those manufacturers, on an extended scale, who are not excluded from its operation by the subsequent proviso as to "common labourers or workmen for hire," Eden, 8; and the words are of so extensive a *meaning, "as not to imply a buying to be neces- [*219] sary, but, on the contrary, are put in contradistinction to the words buying and selling in a preceding part of the clause; and it would, therefore, seem that all persons who manufacture goods for sale, with a view to profit, are within it, whether they purchase the raw materials, or have it from their own land, &c., without purchase:" Arch. B. L. 29; Deacon 27. But it is necessary, in this case, as in that of

buying and selling, that it should be the general practice of the party, or that there should have been a commencement of it coupled with an intention to continue it, as an occasional act would be insufficient: ante, 217.

Secondly, what Person is a Trader using the particular Trade specified in the act. Bankers.] A person may be deemed a banker if he act as such, and it is not necessary that he keep an open shop; and one who receives money as a banker, although his books are kept in a manner different from that in which bankers' books usually are, and although on receiving any large sum, he pay it to his own established banker, upon whom he gives drafts for the payment of large bills upon him, he only keeping cash to answer small drafts, is a banker within the statute: ex. p. Wilson, 1 Atk. 218. But an army or navy agent is not deemed a banker: Eden, 6, 1 Mont. 12.

Brokers.] This term includes not only brokers concerned in the purchase and sale of merchandise, but also stock-brokers, Cott v. Nettervil, 2 P. Wil. 308, Cullen, 68; pawnbrokers, Rawlinson v. Pearson, 5 B. & A. 124. See infra, as to insurance-brokers.

Scriveners.] "In order to make a man a money-scrivener, he must carry on the business of being trusted with other people's moneys, to lay out for them, as occasion offers: p. Gibbs, C. J., Ralph v. Malkin, 3 Camp. 534; Hamson v. Harrison, 2 Esp. Rep. 555. Where money is usually lodged in the hands of an attorney by his clients and others, for the purpose of being invested in securities, and upon his so investing the money, he charged, not only for the conveyances, but also a certain bonus or compensation for himself, and he were a conveyancer, as well as an attorney, then, it seems, he would be deemed a scrivener within the above statute: Hutchinson v. Gascoigne, 1 Holt, 507. But a man who had money of other persons in his possession, and who discounted bills with it for his own emolument only, was holden not to be a scrivener : Hamson v. Harrison, 2 Esp. Rep. 555. So it has been holden, that an attorney purchasing and selling estates, negotiating loans, &c., for his clients, in the common course of his profession, and making only the regular professional charges for the conveyance, &c. was not a scrivener within the statute of Jac. 1, above-mentioned: ex. p. Malkin, 1 Rose, 406; 2 East, 27, 28; re Lewis, 2 Rose, 59; Hurd v. Brydges, 1 Holt, 554.

Persons Insuring Ships or Freight, or other Matters, against Perils of the Sea.] Underwriters, the description of persons here alluded to, could not, previously to the new act, be made bankrupts in that character: ex. p. Bell, 15 Ves. 355. Insurance-brokers are not within this section of the act: 4 Mad. 256.

Warehousemen, Wharfingers, Packers, are named in the act.

Builders.] These were not considered traders within the former

bankrupt laws: Blake v. Lawrence, 4 Esp. Rep. 147; Williams v. Stevens, 2 Camp. 300.

Carpenters, Shipwrights.] This seems to mean such a person as purchasers *timber and other materials, which he [*220] works up as a carpenter, and not a person who is merely a labourer or workman for hire: Kirney v. Smith, 1 Ld. Raym. 741.

Victuallers, Keepers of Inns, Taverns, Hotels, or Coffee-Houses.] There was formerly a distinction, that neither victuallers nor innkeepers could be made bankrupts, so long as they confined themselves to supplying their guests in the house, unless they showed an intention to deal out of doors: Crisp v. Pentt, Cro. C. 549; Eden, 8.

Dyers, Printers, Bleachers, Fullers, Calenderers, Cattle and Sheep Salesmen, are named in the act. Any doubt which might formerly have been entertained as to their liability to be bankrupts, is now removed: Mills v. Hughes, Willis, 588.

Persons acting as agents or factors for others, seeking their living by buying and selling, are within the act.

Persons who may or may not be made Bankrupts.] Sec. 135 of the act, extends "to aliens, denizens, and women, both to make them. subject thereto, and to entitle them to all the benefits given thereby."

Aliens and Denizens.] Under 21 J. 1, c. 19, s. 15, which is in substance the same as the above section, it has been held that aliens or subjects trading to and from this country, buying goods here, and sending them abroad for sale, or buying them abroad, and sending them here for sale, may, if they come here and commit an act of bankruptcy, be made bankrupts, though they may have formerly been residing in Scotland, Alexander v. Vaughan, Cowp. 398; Dodsworth v. Anderson, T. Raym. 375; in the British Colonies, ex. p. Smith, cited by Ld. Mansfield, Cowp. 402; in the Isle of Man, Allen v. Cannon, 4 B. & A. 418; or in any foreign country, Bird v. Sedgwick, 1 Salk. 110.

Women.] A married woman can only be made bankrupt in those cases, which, according to the principle laid down in Marshall v. Rutton, 8 T. R. 546, she can be sued, and taken in execution for her debts, or where she cannot plead her coverture; ante, 6: viz., where the husband has abjured the realm, become an exile, been transported, &c., ib., post, "Husband and Wife." Therefore, where a feme sole, being a trader, marries, a commission issued after the marriage cannot be supported, the creditors, upon the wife's marriage, becoming the creditors of the husband, ex. p. Mear, 2 Bro. C. C.; Preston v. Green, Cooke, A feme coverte, who is a sole trader according to the custom of London, may be a bankrupt: Lavie v. Phillips, 3 Burr. 1776; 1 W. Bl. R. 570; ex. p. Carrington, 1 Atk. 206.

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