ORLEANS, afterwards; that the plaintiffs procured the trunks of Sweet Riddle v. Ames. were in the habit of doing business with Sweet & Co., and these trunks were purchased in the ordinary way of their business, at a less price than their ordinary retail price; that plaintiffs commenced this suit on the 5th day of February, 1841, but never charged the trunks to the defendant until the 10th day of February, 1841, under which date the trunks were charged at five dollars, and, at the same time, the plaintiffs entered the trunks to the credit of Sweet & Co. at $4.50; that sometime in the summer of 1840, the plaintiff, Riddle, saw the defendant at Irasburgh, and then told him the plaintiffs had procured the trunks, and that they were ready for him;-that the defendant then told Riddle that he (defendant) had made other arrangements in his business, and the trunks would then be useless to him, and wished the plaintiffs to sell them for him if they could, but if they did not sell them, he would call in a few weeks and pay for them and take them away; that the trunks were not afterwards sold by the plaintiffs, and the defendant never called nor paid for them ;-that the transaction between the parties was regarded in the first instance as a contract for the sale of the trunks at the ordinary retail price, supposed to be about five dollars, without reference to the price which the plaintiffs should pay Sweet & Co., and that the retail price of such trunks was two dollars and fifty cents each. If from these facts the county court should be of the opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, then the auditor found for the plaintiffs to recover five dollars, and interest thereon, to balance book accounts between the parties; otherwise he found nothing due to either party on book. The county court accepted the report and rendered a judgment thereon for the plaintiffs, and the defendant excepted. W. H. Martin, for defendant. In order to sustain an action on book, the articles charged must pass into the actual possession of the defendant. The action cannot be sustained upon matter that rests in contract merely. Barlow v. Read, 1 Vt. R. 97. Barlow v. Read, ORLEANS, 1 Aikens' R. 145. J. A. Paddock, for plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' right of action accrued when they procured the articles agreeably to their undertaking with the defend ant. The case of Barlow v. Read, relied upon by the defendant, is not in point. The action, in that case, was brought to recover for articles alleged to have been sold, but not delivered; this is to recover for the performance of a certain service for the defendant, at his request. His neglect to avail himself of the benefit of that service is no reason why the plaintiffs should not receive the stipulated reward. If it is contended that some recognition or acceptance, on the part of the defendant, of the doings of the plaintiffs in the matter, would be necessary, the request made by defendant to Riddle, that he would sell the trunks, if he had an opportunity, as defendant then had no use for them, and remarking, if he could not sell them, defendant would call in a few days and take them, is a virtual acceptance of the articles, or at least shows that the defendant as well as the plaintiffs considered them his. But it is contended by the defendant that if the plaintiffs have a right of action, it should have been assumpsit, and not book account. It has long been settled by this court that assumpsit and book account are concurrent remedies in the class of cases to which the case at bar belongs. Fry v. Slyfield, 3 Vt. R. 266. Hall & Chase v. Pecks, 10 Vt. R. 476. Property passes from vendor to vendee when nothing more remains for the vendor to do. Rugg et al. v. Minot et al., 11 East's R. 210. The opinion of the court was delivered by REDFIELD J.-We think the action of book account will well lie in the present case. It has been decided by this court, that where one orders an article manufactured at a mechanic's shop, and it is made according to the order, it may be charged and recovered for in this form of action, whether it is ever delivered or not. When the order is ex March, 1842. Paddock & Riddle v. Ames. ORLEANS, March, 1842. Woods v. Scott et al. ecuted, so that nothing more remains to be done, the title to the thing passes to the vendee, and thereafter it remains at his risk, and he becomes debtor to the vendor for the price, and that is the proper time to make the charge on book. The same course of reasoning precisely, it is obvious, will apply to the present case. After the plaintiffs had purchased the articles, for the defendant, according to his request, and given him proper notice, (and this must depend upon the contract between the parties,) the title passed to the vendee, and they might well be charged on book against him. They would then remain at his expense and risk, and he would become debtor for the price to the plaintiffs. Judgment affirmed. JOHN L. WOODS v. JAMES SCOTT, Bezaleel Gillett, and (In Chancery.) A debtor takes a bond to a third person, for a deed of certain lands, on his paying a sum therein mentioned, and erects buildings thereon. The interest of the debtor in the land may be levied on, unless such third person shows some legal or equitable claim thereto. An attachment of such land is notice to the obligor in the bond of the claim of the creditor, and after that he could only be justified in deeding to the obligee. When, after such attachment, the obligor deeds the land to another for the benefit of the debtor, and receives notes or securities therefor, he holds them, after the payment of his own claims, for the benefit of the attaching creditor who has obtained a judgment and levied an execution on the lands attached. If the person, in whose name the bond is taken, neither claims nor sets up any right to the premises, and there is no proof that he has any legal or equitable right or claim thereto as against the debtor, a decree will pass that the obligor pay whatever sum may be in his hands to the creditor. THIS was an appeal from a decree of the court of chancery. The orator, in his bill, set forth and charged, in substance, March, 1842. Woods that on or about the first day of January, 1830, the defend- ORLEANS, ant, Scott, contracted to purchase of the defendant, Baxter, and Baxter agreed to sell and convey to Scott, about two acres of land, situated in Derby, in the county of Orleans, Scott et al. (describing it ;) that, in order to enjoy the benefit of said premises and avoid the payment of debts due from Scott to the orator, Scott took a bond from Baxter to the defendant, Gillett, conditioned that if Gillett should pay to Baxter $1719.00, and also the rent of said premises, annually, then Baxter should convey the premises to Gillett, and that said contract was for the sole use and benefit of Scott; that Scott immediately took possession of the premises, under said contract, and, at his own expense and cost and for his own use and benefit, erected and built a tavern house, and other buildings thereon, of the value of two thousand dollars; that Scott, at the time of making said contract with Baxter, was indebted to the orator, and the orator, in August, 1834, attached said land and buildings as the property of Scott, on two writs in the orator's favor against Scott, and recovered judgments in said suits, took out executions on said judgments, and, in May, 1835, caused them to be levied upon an undivided portion of said premises in satisfaction of said executions; that, after the attachment of the premises, and before levying the executions, to wit, on or about the first of February, 1835, Scott, to avoid the payment of said judgments and prevent the orator from collecting them, surrendered to Baxter the bond given to Gillett, as above stated, to be cancelled; that Baxter received the bond and paid Scott one thousand dollars for the improvements so made by him, retaining, at the same time, a large portion of the value of said improvements to await the event of, and as an indemnity against said suits in favor of the orator, or took an indemnity from Scott against said suits, and that Scott immediately afterwards left the state with his family and effects, and had not returned;-that six months had elapsed after said levies of said executions, and that the premises levied upon had not been redeemed, and praying that the defendant, Baxter, might be decreed to pay to the orator the amount of said executions and interest, together with the officer's fees, or deed to the orator the premises so set off on said executions; or that he deed to the orator the whole of said ORLEANS, March, 1842. Woods Ο. Scott et al. premises, except the portion levied upon, on the orator's paying to him the amount due to him at the time of the orator's attachment of said premises, and for further relief. The bill was filed December 7, 1836, and was taken pro confesso as to the defendants, Scott and Gillett. The defendant, Baxter, answered the bill, and, in his answer, alleged that sometime in October or November, 1829, one Myron Leslie, then of Derby in this state, now of Jacksonville in the state of Illinois, applied to this defendant on behalf of the defendant, Gillett, to contract for and purchase of him for said Gillett the premises called the tavern stand at Derby Line, stating that he was the agent and attorney of Gillett, and was by him authorized and requested so to do, which are the same premises described in the orator's bill of complaint; that sometime in January, 1830, this defendant contracted the said premises to Gillett, and then had, from Leslie, acting for and in behalf of Gillett, strong assurances that Gillett would pay this defendant the money for said premises within two years from that time, together with the annual rent hereinafter set forth; that, upon that occasion, this defendant then executed and delivered to Leslie, as the agent of Gillett, a bond to convey the premises to Gillett upon the condition that, when Gillett should pay this defendant the sum of $1400.00, and an annual rent therefor of $168.00 each and every year until the first named sum was fully paid, then this defendant would convey the premises to Gillett; that the bond was made directly to Gillett, and according to this defendant's best knowledge, information, and belief, was for the benefit of Gillett; that this defendant had no bargaining or dealing with Scott relative to said premises in any manner whatever, nor was Scott known to this defendant as taking any part or having any interest in the contract; that, sometime in the winter of 1830, Scott removed on to the premises, and, as this defendant understood and believed, under the said Gillett, and improvements were thereon made which were superintended and directed in part by Scott and in part by Leslie, both of whom resided thereon; that a new tavern house and other out-buildings, and a lawyer's office, were erected thereon, but at whose expense this defendant was ignorant and unable to state; that all the improvements put thereon were, in the estimation of this defendant, of the |