of students, rather by examples, than in the form of general principles."* How far Mr. Stewart was able to overcome the 'Idols' of his own mind, and keep himself consistent with the principle above laid down, his book must decide.

There is a wide difference between the rules of inquiry, by which we are to proceed to the study of a science, and the principles of that science, after we have already begun to make acquisitions in it. But if the former should be taught by examples, the reasons are much stronger, why the latter should. It would be much easier to understand by a maxim, in what direction the science lays; than it would be to understand by the same means, all the particulars or facts of that science, when the inquirer has arrived upon the ground. The mind does not perceive a general truth, till it has perceived the particular truths, from which it has been derived. If any thing more than our own experience were necessary to settle this point, passages might be selected from various authors, to add the weight of their authority. But it is not the custom to question this position; and it is quite as little the custom to pay any attention to it. It is to this point, attention is now invited; in the hope it may have, not only a speculative belief, but a practical influence upon our principles, and systems of instruction.

But this is dealing too much in generals; or falling precisely into the error to be controverted. To *Philosophy of the Human Mind. Introd. Part 2d. Sec. 2d.

be consistent, a particular example must be taken, to illustrate what is meant by inductive instruction. I must even be so consistent, as not to give a definition. For unless our experience upon the particular subject has been altogether similar, there would be great danger of being misunderstood, or not understood at all; till an example explained the meaning, and then a definition would be unnecessary. After a few examples of the application of the principle, it will be easy for any one to make a correct definition for himself.

In selecting the example of languages, I shall probably meet more objections, and encounter more skepticks, than in any other example, which could be taken. But principles are always best tested by extreme cases. And there is no necessity for availing myself of the advantage of the happiest application I could select.

In our most approved schools, the method of teaching languages has been, to put into the hand of the pupil a grammar of the language to be taught; and require him to learn, as it is improperly called, the general principles of the language. This is done commonly at the expense of from three to six or twelve months' time, and a thorough disgust to the whole subject. This disgust very naturally arises from being kept so long, on what he does not in the least understand.* At the end of this time, if the teacher

* To counteract in some degree, this baneful effect, artificial stimulants are applied. And these are increased to so intense a degree, as to produce a perfect phrenzy in the pupil, to seem to

has been inflexible in his purpose, and the pupil not unreasonably stupid, he will have committed to memory his grammar from end to end, including all rules and all exceptions; to which he probably attaches equal importance. He may have fixed perfectly in his memory, all the subtle refinements of all the philosophers, who have spent their lives in studying the principles and anomalies of the language; but he has made but a small approximation to a knowledge of it. This is studying the philosophy of the language before the pupil is acquainted with the facts , of it.

This system of teaching proceeds upon the supposition, that the language was invented and formed by the rules of grammar. Nothing is more false. A grammar can never be written till a good knowledge of the language is attained; and then, contrary to what the pupil supposes, the grammar is made to suit the language. Now why invert this natural method in teaching language to young learners? have learned all, that could be expected from him. Under the strong excitement of hope or fear, the young learner will spare no pains to accomplish his task. But it must be remembered, that under the influence of these motives, the object is only to convince the instructer the task is accomplished. And oftentimes the craftiness of the pupil will invent some more expeditious method for this purpose, than really to possess himself of the knowledge he is expected to gain. These short cuts to the approbation of the instructer, it is feared, are not always consistent with that ingenuousness, which it is so desirable to cultivate in the youthful heart.

Must not the facts be learned, before they can be classed under general principles? What are the rules and principles, which the pupil has learned at so dear a rate? They are no more than the verbal generalisation of facts. How have they themselves been formed? By the experience of those whose attention has been directed to the observation of the facts. They are abstract principles, the truth of which can neither be perceived, understood, nor believed, till some single instance, within the comprehension of the principle or rule, presents itself to the learner. And then he will perceive the fact in the particular case, long before he discovers its identity with the rule, if he is ever so fortunate as to discover it.

In learning the peculiarities of a language, which is but imperfectly known, the philosopher does not (although he might to much better advantage than a young learner) go to the grammar of that language; he selects the best authors and makes a careful analysis of their sentences; and thus discovers, what constructions are common with other languages, and what are peculiar to the one to be learned. At the end of his researches, he forms into general principles, the result of his experience. The rule, therefore, is obtained by a patient induction of particular instances, and is put in words, not to teach us anything, but to classify what has already been learned, and put it in a form convenient to be referred to, as occasion requires. As we assort our papers by

examination of each particular one, and put together the letters of correspondence, the promissory notes, and the deeds of conveyance; and then put on each collection a label, with the title of the class, as a convenience for reference only, not because that alters the nature of the papers, on which it is put.

The analogy pursued illustrates my meaning farther. He, who has committed to his memory all the principles of a language, before he has had experience of the particular cases, from which those principles have been derived, will be no wiser in respect to his language, than he, who should collect the labels of his papers, and take this for a knowledge of their nature. The abstract principles of a language give no more adequate idea of the particulars, from which they have been formed, than the labels give of the nature and obligation of a note, or a deed, before those papers have been separately and individually examined.

And

The facts of a language must be first learned, and they always are first learned, all the arrangements to the contrary notwithstanding. The rules in the learner's memory are perfectly useless, till he has learned the particulars or facts of the language; because he cannot till then understand them. when the pupil is learning the language by experience, he will make rules for his own convenience, precisely as a philosopher does; and always make them as general as his experience will allow. As he makes farther progress, and becomes acquainted with more