UNITARIANISM VINDICATED AGAINST THE CHARGE OF SKEPTICAL TENDENCIES. BY JAMES WALKER. 1794 PRINTED FOR THE American Unitarian Association. BOSTON: JAMES MUNROE & Co. 134 WASHINGTON STREET. APRIL, 1839. Price 4 Cents. UNITARIANISM VINDICATED. MEN may take their religion on trust, or make it a matter of inquiry and rational conviction. Unitarians prefer and adopt the latter course; holding it to be their privilege and duty to do so, and essential to consistent Protestantism. With them it is not enough that the church has decided in favor of a particular doctrine; or that the doctrine belongs to the religion established by law; or that it was held by their ancestors, and is still held by the majority. On the infinitely important subject of religion, and with the Bible in their hands, they do not feel themselves at liberty to waive the right to read for themselves, and judge for themselves. One of the consequences of acting on this principle is, as might be expected, that they come to some conclusions differing materially from those commonly received; and also that they do not agree exactly with one another; nor the same man with himself at different times, for of course as he continues his inquiries he may receive more light. This circumstance, however, has afforded occasion for one of the most common and serious objections urged against them. Their way of proceeding, it is said, has a tendency to unsettle men's minds, and introduce a general skepticism; and the whole system has been branded as the half-way house to infidelity. We propose to take up this single charge, and give it a careful and thorough examination. After a few preliminary remarks on the nature of faith, and the history and present state of the particular question at issue, we shall be prepared to demonstrate, that there is nothing in Unitarianism itself, nor in its rejection of certain popular doctrines, nor in the general manner in which it has been, or is, defended and maintained, to warrant the suspicions and imputations just named. It does not follow necessarily that a man believes a particular doctrine, merely because he thinks he does; for he may be mistaken in regard to this fact, as well as in regard to any other. To know whether we believe a particular doctrine, we must know, in the first place, what the doctrine is; in the second place, we must know what our own ideas on the subject really are; and in the third place, we must compare the doctrine and our own ideas together, and see whether they agree. Now we hazard nothing in saying, that many never think of going through this process; and those who undertake it, are liable to mistake at every step, and of course may be mistaken in the conclusion. The truth is,-and why should men try or affect not to see it?-most persons adopt the religious phraseology which happens to prevail where they are brought up; and as they do this in early childhood, they do it before they can be expected to use such phraseology understandingly, and a habit of using it vaguely and mechanically is formed and perpetuated. It is no sufficient evidence, therefore, that a man believes the popular doctrines in religion, merely because he uses the popular language; for he may use this language in a different or qualified sense, or, which is still more probable, he may use it in no determinate sense. As a general rule, indeed, we suspect that conversions to Unitarianism, especially when they take place among serious and devout people, do not imply any material change in their convictions, but only that they have ascertained what their real convictions are, and are not restrained by considerations either of interest or fear from avowing them. Again, it does not follow necessarily, that a man believes a particular doctrine, merely because he wishes he did, and is willing to take it for granted. It may be for his interest to believe; he may be persuaded or frightened into the opinion that he ought to believe; he may honestly think that believing would make him a better man; but, after all, he cannot believe, until he is convinced. Faith is not a simple act of the will; nor can it be strengthened or weakened, or changed or in any way modified, by a simple act of the will. It is the involuntary yielding of the mind to a preponderance of evidence as it strikes us at the time. True, in some states of mind we are much more likely to believe, than in others; but it is because in different states of mind the same evidence strikes us differently, being viewed under different aspects; and not because the will, simply considered, has any control over our convictions. In all cases without exception, let our state of mind be what it may, belief is the involVOL. XII. — NO. 141. 1 * |