of its property for the purpose of valuation pursuant to § 19 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Held: 1. Appellant is a "common carrier" within the meaning of § 1 (3) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act; and the Commission's order requiring appellant to file an inventory of its property for purposes of valuation pursuant to § 19 (a) is authorized by the Act. Pp. 32-34. (a) Section 1 (3) (a) of the Act defines the term "common carrier" as including "all pipe line companies" and not merely those engaged in the business of common law carriers for hire. Pp. 33, 34. (b) Appellant's operation is "transportation" within the meaning of § 1 (1) (b), which provides that the Act shall apply to "common carriers" engaged in the "transportation of oil or other commodity... by pipe line. ." P. 34. 2. As so construed, the Act does not exceed the commerce power of Congress or violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 34, 35. (a) The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is not dependent on a technical common carrier status but is quite as extensive over a private carrier. P. 35. (b) It is adequate to support a requirement that appellant furnish information as to facilities being used in interstate marketing of its products-whether appellant be considered a private carrier or a common carrier: P. 35. (c) A mere requirement that appellant provide information about a subject within the power possessed by Congress and delegated to the Commission cannot be considered a taking of property. P. 35. 59 F. Supp. 978, affirmed. A three-judge District Court denied an injunction against an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring appellant to file an inventory of its pipe line property for purposes of valuation pursuant to § 19 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 59 F. Supp. 978. Affirmed, p. 35. Dan Moody argued the cause for appellant on the original argument. With him on the briefs was Harry O. Glasser. Both argued the cause on reargument. Edward Dumbauld argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appel 29 Opinion of the Court. lees. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath, Assistant Attorney General Berge, Daniel W. Knowlton and Nelson Thomas. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The Interstate Commerce Commission, acting under § 19 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act,' ordered the appellant to furnish certain inventories, schedules, maps and charts of its pipe line property.2 Champlin's objections that the Act does not authorize the order, or if it be construed to do so is unconstitutional, were overruled by the Commission and again by the District Court which dismissed the company's suit for an injunction.3 These 1 "... the commission shall . . . investigate, ascertain, and report the value of all the property owned or used by every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act. . . . The commission shall make an inventory which shall list the property of every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act in detail, and show the value thereof as hereinafter provided, and shall classify the physical property, as nearly as practicable, in conformity with the classification of expenditures for road and equipment, as prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission." 37 Stat. 701, 49 U. S. C. § 19a. 2 On May 15, 1941, the Interstate Commerce Commission, by letter addressed to the president of the Champlin Refining Company, requested that the company prepare and file with the Commission "a complete inventory of the pipe line property of the Champlin Refining Company, except land, showing the quantities, units, classes, kinds, and condition thereof." The Commission enclosed with its letter copies of its Valuation Orders Nos. 26 and 27, with which the inventory was to comply. The Champlin company did not respond to the request in a manner satisfactory to the Commission, and on June 12, 1944, the Commission made the order of which the company here complains. It directed the company to comply with the provisions of Valuation Orders Nos. 26 and 27 within ninety days of the service of the order. In response to the Commission's letter of May 15, 1941, the Champlin company filed with the Commission information and charts which it believed would satisfy the Commission's request. The Com Opinion of the Court. 329 U.S. questions of law are brought here by appeal. Judicial Code § 238, 28 U. S. C. § 345. Champlin owns and operates a line of six-inch pipe five hundred and sixteen miles in length lying in five states. Originating at Champlin's Enid, Oklahoma refinery, it crosses Kansas, Nebraska, a part of South Dakota, and ends in Iowa. It is used only to convey the company's own refinery products to its own terminal stations at Hutchinson, Kansas; Superior, Nebraska; and Rock Rapids, Iowa, at each of which the line connects with storage facilities from which deliveries are made. The statute, so far as relevant, says that it shall apply "to common carriers engaged in" "transportation of oil or other commodity" by pipe line from one state to another. It provides also that "common carrier" includes "all pipeline companies." This language on its face would seem to cover the appellant's operation. mission, however, returned that report to the company, because in it the company had not recognized that it was a statutory common carrier and had not compiled the report from that viewpoint. The company then requested a hearing before the Commission to determine its status. On December 14, 1942, and on reargument, June 12, 1944, the Commission decided that appellant is a common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act. After the Commission had issued its supplementary order of June 12, 1944, appellant petitioned the district court for an injunction against the order. In accordance with §§ 46 and 47 of Title 28, U. S. C., the district judge convened a three judge court, which heard the case and dismissed appellant's petition. § 1. "(1) That the provisions of this Act shall apply to common carriers engaged in by pipe "(b) The transportation of oil or other commodity line. . . from one State . . . to any other State . . . "(3) (a) The term 'common carrier' as used in this Act shall include all pipe-line companies; express companies; sleeping-car companies; and all persons, natural or artificial, engaged in such transportation as aforesaid as common carriers for hire." 41 Stat. 474, as amended, 48 Stat. 1102, 49 U. S. C. § 1. The last words of § 1 (3) (a), "engaged in such transportation as aforesaid as common carriers for hire," do 29 Opinion of the Court. Champlin contends, however, that the "transportation" mentioned in the Act does not refer to the carriage of one's own goods. The District Court has found that Champlin is the sole owner of the products transported through its pipe line; it has never transported, offered to transport, or been asked to transport any products belonging to any other company or person; its pipe line does not connect with any other pipe line but only with storage tanks at the three terminal points; there are no facilities for putting any petroleum product into the line other than at the Enid refinery; delivery of the products at the three terminal points is made from Champlin's storage tanks by means of truck racks or railroad tank car racks and is not made directly from the pipe line in any instance; no tariffs stating transportation charges have been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission or with any state commission or regulatory body. Because of these facts the appellant suggests that the language and holding of this Court concerning the Uncle Sam Oil Company in The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, approved in Valvoline Oil Company v. United States, 308 U. S. 141, govern this case. The Uncle Sam Company operation is described as "simply drawing oil from its own wells across a state line to its own refinery for its own use, and that is all . . . ." The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 562. The Court considered this was not "transportation" within the meaning of the Act. But we think it would expand the actual holding of that case to apply its conclusion to Champlin. The controlling fact under the statute is transporting commodities from state to state by pipe line. Admittedly Champlin is not a common carrier in the sense of the common law carrier for hire. However, the Act does not stop at this but "not affect the generality of the first clause as to pipe-line companies." Valvoline Oil Co. v..United States, 308 U. S. 141, 146. Opinion of the Court. 329 U.S. goes on to say that its use of the term "common carrier" is to include all pipe line companies—a meaningless addition if it thereby included only what the term without more always had included. While Champlin technically is transporting its own oil, manufacturing processes have been completed; the oil is not being moved for Champlin's own use. These interstate facilities are operated to put its finished products in the market in interstate commerce at the greatest economic advantage. Examination of Champlin's pricing methods supports the view that appellant is engaged in transportation even though the products are still its own when moved. The District Court found that price at the terminal points includes f. o. b. price at the Enid refinery and an additional sum called a differential. The differential is the through railroad freight rate from Enid to the final destination (usually the purchaser's place of business), less the carrying charges from the pipe line terminal to final destination. The District Court found, however, that competitive and other conditions "sometimes cause departures from the prices arrived at in accordance with the formula above described." Appellant states that as to some deliveries "rail rates were used merely as a basis for calculating a delivered price, not as a charge for transportation." Even so, and even though departures from the calculated differential are substantial and frequent, we think this practice points up a significant distinction from the Uncle Sam case. We hold that Champlin's operation is transportation within the meaning of the Act and that the statute supports the Commission's order to furnish information. Appellant further contends that, as so construed, the Act exceeds the commerce power of Congress and violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because, it is argued, this interpretation converts a private pipe line into a public utility and requires a private carrier to |