Delusion - Declarations. State v. John, 8 Ired. (L.) 330 Evidence - Adultery of Wife of Prisoner-Insanity Should not be Inferred Evidence of Subsequent Acts and Conduct. Com. v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 143 799 Evidence Temper of Prisoner - Fits of Passion - Eccentricities - Con- duct of Trial-Remarks of Judge. Sindram v. People, 88 N. Y. 196 802 Right of Jury to Consider Prisoner's Appearance on the Trial. Bowden v. Evidence Irrelevant on Question of Responsibility - Declarations of De- ceased Drunkenness - Deliberation. Warren v. Com., 37 Pa. St. 45 809 Evidence of Acts Showing Sanity. U. S. v. Shults Delirium Tremens- Temporary Insanity- No Presumption of Continu- - Test. State v. Sewell, 3 Jones (L.) 245 Hereditary Insanity - Evidence must be Notorious. State v. Christmas, 6 Mental Condition of Relatives. Hagan v. State, 5 Baxt. 615 Special Charge - Burden of Proof-Experts - New Trial. Webb v. State, SECTION 76. Barbarity of Crime does not Raise Presumption of Insanity 77. Evidence of Wife's Adultery Relevant, When 78. Declarations not Res Gesta Inadmissible Where Judge is Satisfied of Sanity Jury Un- necessary. Bonds v. State, Mart. & Yerg. 143; 17 Am. Dec. 795 THE ADJUDGED CASES ON INSANITY AS A DEFENCE TO CRIME. WITH NOTES. CHAPTER I. THE LEGAL TEST OF INSANITY. TEST OF INSANITY— DEMENTIA - RESPONSIBILITY. STATE v. RICHARDS. [39 Conn. 591.] In the Superior Court of Windham County, Connecticut, August Term, 1873. Before Hon. ORIGEN STORRS SEYMOUR. Dementia. - Test of Responsibility for Crime. - An imbecile ought not to be held responsible criminally unless of capacity of ordinary children under fourteen years of age-i.e., children of humble life and of only ordinary training. Information for burning a barn; brought to the Superior Court for Windham County and tried by a jury, at its August term, 1873, on the plea of not guilty, before SEYMOUR, J. The defence was that the prisoner had not sufficient mental capacity to be criminally responsible for the act. The charge of the judge, which sufficiently states the facts. of the case, was as follows: JUDGE SEYMOUR'S CHARGE. The evidence seems ample to warrant you in finding that the burning complained of was caused by the prisoner. Your attention has been turned mainly to the question whether the act was done with the felonious intent charged, and this question depends mainly upon another, (1) 1 State v. Richards. whether the accused has sufficient mental capacity to warrant us in imputing to him a felonious intent. That he is considerably below par in intellect is apparent to us all. This is indicated by his countenance and general appearance. The same thing is indicated by his extraordinary conduct at the fire, as the flames were bursting out he was seen on all fours crawling back from under the burning barn, with no clothing upon him except his shirt and trowsers. The day was excessively cold. He remained some half hour thus scantily clothed, gazing stolidly at the blaze, until ordered into the house. All this took place in broad daylight, in plain view of Mr. Gallup's house. But it is undoubtedly true, as the attorney for the State contends, that mere inferiority of intellect is no answer to the prosecution. We are, therefore, called upon in this case to decide an interesting and difficult question, to-wit, whether the accused has sufficient mind to be held responsible as a criminal. He is not a mere idiot, nor does he appear to be a lunatic. He suffers from want of mind rather than from derangement or delusion, and the question is whether the want of mind is such as to entitle him to acquittal on the ground of what in law is termed dementia. This inquiry is attended with inherent difficulties. Our knowledge of our own minds is imperfect; our knowledge of the precise mental condition of another is necessarily still more imperfect. We, as triers, are obliged to rely upon the evidence furnished us by witnesses whose means of knowledge are limited and who find great difficulty in communicating to us, on a subject of this nature, what they do know. Our principal embarrassment arises, however, from the want of a definite measure of mental capacity. Eminent judges and learned commentators have attempted to furnish rules and tests for the guidance of triers of cases of this kind; but upon examination these rules and tests turn out to be imperfect and unsatisfactory. It was formerly thought that the jury might properly convict if the accused had any sense of right and wrong, or if he was aware that punishment would follow the commission of an offence. But children of very tender years have some sense of right and wrong, and fully understand that punishment will follow transgression. Such children are subjected by their parents to discipline, and are by gentle punishments restrained from wrong-doing; but our sense of humanity would be greatly shocked at the thought of subjecting children to the penalties of statute law because some sense of right and wrong and fear of punishment had been developed in them. So, again, it is often said in the |