Defence Must Raise a Reasonable Doubt.

mine whether or no the defendant's testimony has been overcome, in their minds, by adequate proof, if they think the testimony of insanity is thus overcome, it is difficult to conceive how they can further regard it, or how they could entertain a reasonable doubt on the case if convinced of the falsehood of the only ground on which the defence rested. It certainly is not true that the introduction of testimony of such insanity necessarily throws any burden on the prosecution; for the jury may not regard such testimony of any weight whatever, and may not believe the opinions of the witnesses. It is only where the testimony creates a reasonable doubt, that there is any occasion to remove the doubt. We do not understand the charge as at all designed or calculated to qualify what had been before said on the general question of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing but the defence of insanity had any bearing on the question of malice, which without this could not- as we judge from the record - have been open to any controversy. We must take the whole charge together in construing it, and we cannot conceive that there was any likelihood of the jury being led to a wrong conclusion concerning the meaning of the judge. The particular request which it is complained he did not give is not so explained by facts in the record as to show that there would have been any impropriety or necessity for it after what actually was given.

We are not disposed to criticise with any great nicety the omission of courts to give requests which tend to distract the minds of jurors by calling special attention to metaphysical subtleties or to particular testimony. A jury knows without instruction that it has a right to consider any testimony which has been allowed to go before it, and to draw such inferences as naturally are drawn by each one of the body. When a court calls attention to bits of evidence, or to particular witnesses, more than others, there is some danger that undue prominence will be given to what is so designated. It is at least quite as safe to avoid this practice, unless circumstances appear to require it.

While, as before suggested, we might find it difficult even if the charge appeared to involve doubtful theories of law- - to hold it error without a more full showing of its bearing than we can gather from this record, we think that taking the whole charge together there is no reason to believe the jury were misled to the prejudice of the respondent. We think judgment should be rendered on the verdict.

The other justices concurred.

State v. Brandon.

MORAL INSANITY DISAPPROVED-TEST OF INSANITY.

STATE v. BRANDON.

[8 Jones (L.) 463.]

In the Supreme Court of North Carolina, June Term, 1862.

1. Moral Insanity Disapproved. - The law does not recognize any moral power compel. ling a man to do what he knows to be wrong.

2. Particular Right and Wrong Test.-The insanity which takes away the criminal quality of an act must be such as amounts to a mental disease, and prevents the accused from knowing the nature and quality of the act he was doing.

Indictment for murder tried before BAILEY, J., at Fall Term, 1861, of Caswell Superior Court.

The defendant was indicted for the murder of one William J. Connelly, his father-in-law. His counsel contended that though he knew it was wrong to kill the deceased, yet if he was impelled to the act by a moral power which he could not resist, he was excusable. Verdict guilty, and judgment of death. The prisoner appealed.

The Attorney-General and Winston, Sr., for the State. appeared for the prisoner.

MANLY, J.

made upon

No one

(After passing on other points.) The third and last question the record arises out of proofs, in respect to the mental condition of the prisoner. The record states the prisoner's counsel insisted that, although the prisoner knew it was wrong to kill the deceased, yet, if he was impelled to the act by a moral power, which he could not resist, he was excusable The words "moral power" may mean threats, duress of imprisonment, or an assault imperilling life, which is the usual sense of the phrase, or it may mean, some supernatural agency. The former construction would make the position of the counsel entirely inapplicable to the case; we therefore adopt the latter. The position thus interpreted, does not fall within any approved definition of a non compos mentis. It assumes that the accused knew the nature of his act and that it was wrong. The law does not recognize any moral power compelling one to

Right and Wrong Test.

do what he knows is wrong. "To know the right and still the wrong pursue," proceeds from a perverse will brought about by the seductions of the evil one, but which, nevertheless, with the aids that lie within our reach, as we are taught to believe, may be resisted and overcome, otherwise it would not seem to be consistent with the principles of justice to punish any malefactor. There are many appetites and passions which by long indulgence acquire a mastery over men more or less strong. Some persons indeed deem themselves incapable of exerting strength of will sufficient to arrest their rule, - speak of them as irresistible, and impotently continue under their dominion; but the law is far from excusing criminal acts committed under the impulse of such passions. To excuse one from criminal responsibility the mind must, in the language of the judge below, be insane. The accused should be in such a state from mental disease as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong, and this should be clearly established. This test, a knowledge of right and wrong, has long been resorted to as a general criterion for deciding upon legal accountability, and with a restricted application to the act then about to be committed, is approved by the highest authorities. But we do not undertake to lay down any rule of universal application. It seems to be chimerical to attempt to do so from the very nature of things, for insanity is a disease and, as is the case with all other diseases, the fact of its existence is not established by a single symptom, but by a body of symptoms, no particular one of which is present in every case. Imperfect as the rule may be, it covers a great variety of cases and may aid the tribunals of the country in judging of this most difficult subject. The case put of a criminal act committed under the belief that it was commanded by God, would fall under the rule. The perpetrator in such would not know he was doing what was wrong, but on the contrary, believe he was doing what was right in obeying a power who had a right to command him. This condition of mind would constitute insane delusion in respect to the particular act committed, and if clearly established by proof of preexistent facts, would excuse from responsibility.

It will thus be seen that instructions, in conformity with the argument of prisoner's counsel, ought not to have been given. If the prisoner knew that what he did was wrong, the law presumes that he had the power to resist it, against all supernatural agencies, and holds him amenable to punishment. There is no error in the instructions actually given upon this subject, and in the absence of any prayer for other specific

Lynch . Commonwealth.

instructions, there is no omission of which the prisoner has a legal right to complain.

There being no error found upon the record this must be certified to the superior court of law for Caswell, that the said court may proceed again to pronounce the judgment of the law.

Per Curiam.

Judgment affirmed.

MORAL INSANITY — BURDEN OF PROOF - SANITY PRESUMED TO CON

1. Anger and Wrath must not be confounded with actual insanity.

2. The Burden of Proving Insanity to the satisfaction of the jury is on the prisoner.

3. Sanity Presumed to Continue. - Where a person is sane shortly before and after an act, the presumption is that he was sane at the time.

ERROR to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Alleghany County. Ambrose E. Lynch was indicted for the murder of William Hadfield. The evidence was that the prisoner lived with his sister, who was a married woman, in Allegheny City; that on the 11th or 12th of June, 1872, about midnight, the deceased was found by George Smithson in a street in Allegheny City, wounded; shortly afterwards the defendant came up with a knife in his hand; said he had killed that man; he had cut him; he said "if he had had a larger knife he would have put him through faster." To an officer of the peace who took him to the mayor's office, the prisoner said whilst going there, I was only at home a few minutes when I heard a noise, I listened and heard a creaking, took out my knife, and said that they can't fool me on that business." Prisoner said he then took out his knife and opened it; he put his shoulder to the door and shoved it; it did not go in the first time; he put his shoulder to it the second time and it went in; just as the door went open, his

Evidence and Instructions.

sister was getting out of bed undressed; he struck the deceased twice with the knife whilst on the bed; deceased got up and "went for me on the floor," and prisoner gave him another stroke in the breast. To another witness prisoner said, he had "given it to him twice in the bed and once afterwards;" he said he had found the deceased in his sister's bed.

These statements were all made on the night of the killing. The deceased was taken to the mayor's office, and died about one o'clock of the same night.

The sister, examined by the Commonwealth, testified that her husband had been away about five weeks; that she and the deceased were sitting in the room together, but denied that there was any impropriety between them. Whilst sitting there the prisoner burst into the room and knocked her down; when she came to the deceased was gone. Her brother asked her if she was in bed with a man; her brother was clear crazy; he acted more like a crazy man than a drunken one." The defendant's points were:

1. If on the night of the killing the defendant found or supposed he found, the deceased in bed with defendant's married sister, and was thereby so much excited as for the time to overwhelm his reason, conscience and judgment, and cause him to act from an uncontrollable and irresistible impulse, the law will not hold him responsible. The court, Starrett, P. J., answered: "As this point seems to amount to the proposition, that if the prisoner was temporarily insane at the time he did the cutting, he is not guilty of any legal offence, it is affirmed as an abstract proposition of law. If the defendant was actually insane at the time this, of course, relieves him from any criminal responsibility from whatever cause the insanity arose. But the jury must not confound anger or wrath with actual insanity, because however absurdly or unreasonably a man may act when exceedingly angry, either with or without cause, if his reason is not actually dethroned, it is no legal excuse for the violation of law."

2. If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to the condition of the defendant's mind at the time when the act was done, he is entitled to the benefit of such doubt, and they cannot convict. The court answered: "The law presumes sanity when an act is done if no insanity is shown by the evidence; and when it appears that a man was sane shortly preceding the act, and shortly after, the presumption exists of sanity at the time of the act, and no jury has a right to assume otherwise, unless the evidence in connection with the act fairly convinces them that the