United States v. Guiteau. One caution, in regard to this point, it is proper to give. Even where the medical or other professional witnesses have attended the whole trial, and heard the testimony of the other witnesses, as to the facts and circumstances of the case, they are not to judge of the credit of the witnesses or of the truth of the facts testified by others. It is for the jury to decide whether such facts are satisfactorily proved, and the proper question to be put to the professional witness is this: if the symptoms and indications testified to by other witnesses are proved, and if the jury are satisfied of the truth of them, whether in their opinion, the party was insane; and what was the nature and character of that insanity; what state of mind did they indicate; and what they would expect would be the conduct of such a person in any supposed circumstances. 1 The jury, after being in consultation several hours, came into court and asked instructions upon these two questions: "Must the jury be satisfied, beyond a doubt, of the insanity of the prisoner, to entitle him to an acquittal? And what degree of insanity will amount to a justification of the offence.” In answer to the first of these questions, the chief justice repeated his former remarks on the same point and added, that if the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of the insanity of the prisoner, the jury would be authorized to find him insane. In answer to the second question the chief justice added nothing to the instructions which he had previously given. The jury returned a verdict of "not guilty, by reason of insanity." INSANE DELUSION - DISTINGUISHED FROM ERRONEOUS OPINION— BURDEN OF PROOF-TEST OF INSANITY - EVIDENCE. -- UNITED STATES v. GUITEAU. [10 Fed. Rep. 161.] In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 1881. Before MR. JUSTICE Cox. 1 Burden of Proof of Insanity on Prisoner. - Where the defence of insanity is set up as an excuse for crime, the burden of proving it is on the person alleging it. The presumption is that he is sane. 1 See 1 M. & R. 75. United States v. Guiteau. 2. Insanity-Evidence. - On the trial of the sanity of a person, evidence of his previous and subsequent condition is admissible. 3. Insanity of Relations. - And in connection with evidence of his own insanity, testimony showing insanity of his parents or immediate relatives, is relevant. 4. The Enormity of the Crime, or the absence of motive, is no evidence of insanity. 5. The Test of Responsibility where the defence of insanity is interposed, is whether the accused had sufficient use of his reason to understand the nature of the act, and that it was wrong for him to commit it. 6. Declarations of Prisoner - Evidence. - The prisoner's unsworn declarations are not admissible in his favor, though admissible as against him. 7. Insane Delusion-Defence. An insane delusion is an unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the existence of facts which are either impossible absolutely, or impossible under the circumstances of the individual. 8. Opinions or Beliefs founded on reasoning and reflection are not insane delusions nor within the law regarding them. The prisoner, Charles J. Guiteau, was indicted for the murder of James Abram Garfield, President of the United States, on July 2, 1881. The assassination was admitted, and the plea of insanity set up. After a long and tedious trial, Judge Cox on this day (January 25, 1882), charged the jury as follows: Gentlemen of the Petit Jury: - The Constitution of the United States provides that"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; * to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence." These provisions are deemed the indispensable safeguards of life and liberty. They are intended for the protection of the innocent from injustice and oppression. It is only by their faithful observance that guilt or innocence can be fairly ascertained. Every accused person is presumed innocent until the accusation be proved, and until such proof no court dare to prejudge his' cause or withhold from him the protection of this fundamental law. With what difficulty and trial of patience this law has been administered in the present case, you have been daily witnesses. After all, however, it is our consolation that not one of these sacred guarantees has been violated in the person of the accused. If he be guilty, no man deserves their protection less than he does. If he be innocent, no man needs their protection more, and no man's case more clearly proves their beneficence and justice. At length the long chapter of proof is ended; the task of the advocate is done; and the duty now rests with you of determining, with Public Opinion Irrelevant. such aid as I can afford you, the issue between public justice and the prisoner at the bar. No one can feel more keenly than I do the grave responsibility of my duty; and I feel that I can only discharge it by a close adherence to the law as it has been laid down by its highest authorized expounders. Before proceeding, I wish to interject a remark here upon an episode. in the trial pending the last argument. The prisoner has taken repeated occasions to proclaim that public opinion, as evidenced by the press and by his correspondence, is in his favor. As you well know, these declarations could not have been prevented except by resorting to the process of gagging him. Any suggestion that you could be influenced by this lawless babble of the prisoner, would have seemed to me simply absurd, and I should have felt that I had almost insulted your intelligence if I had warned you not to regard it. The counsel for the prosecution have been rebuked for allowing these declarations to go to you without contradiction, and in the course of the final argument they felt it necessary to interpose a contradiction to these declarations of the prisoner, and the latter's counsel excepted to the form in which the contradiction was made. For the sole purpose of purging this record of any apparently objectionable matter, I would simply say, here, that nothing that has been said in reference to public sentiment or newspaper opinion, on either side, is to be regarded by you, although I really feel that such an admonition from me is totally unnecessary. This indictment charges the defendant with having murdered James A. Garfield. It becomes my duty, in the first place, to explain to you the nature of the crime charged. With us, murder is committed where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills a reasonable creature in being, and in the peace of the United States with malice aforethought. It must of course be proved, first, that the death was caused by the act of the accused. It must be further shown that it was caused with malice aforethought; but this does not mean that the government must prove any special ill will, hatred, or grudge, on the part of the prisoner, towards the deceased. Whenever a homicide is shown to have been committed without lawful authority and with deliberate intent, it is sufficiently proved to have been done with malice aforethought. And this evidence is not answered and malice is not disproved by showing that the accused had no personal ill will against the deceased, but killed him from some other motive, as for purpose of robbery, or by mistaking him for another, or, as alleged in this case, to produce a public benefit. If it could be shown that the killing occurred in the heat of passion and on sudden quarrel, and under provocation from the United States v. Guiteau. deceased, then it would appear that there was no premeditated intent, and consequently no malice aforethought; and this would reduce the crime to manslaughter. But it is hardly necessary to say that there is nothing of that kind in the present case. You will probably see that either the defendant is guilty of murder or he is innocent. But, in order to constitute the crime of murder, the assassin must have a responsibly sane mind. The technical term, "sound memory and discretion," in the old common-law definition of murder, means this. An irresponsibly insane man can no more commit murder than a sane man can do so without killing. His condition of mind cannot be separated from the act. If he is laboring under disease of his mental faculties - if that is a proper expression to such an extent that he does not know what he is doing, or does not know that it is wrong, then he is wanting in that sound memory and discretion which make a part of the definition of murder. In the next place, I instruct you that every defendant is presumed innocent until the accusation against him is established by proof. In the next place, notwithstanding this presumption of innocence, it is equally true that a defendant is presumed to be sane and to have been so at the time when the crime charged against him was committed; that is to say, the government is not bound, as a part of its proofs, to show, affirmatively, that the defendant was sane. insanity is the exception, and most men are sane, the law presumes the latter condition of everybody until some reason is shown to believe the contrary. The burden is therefore on the defendant, who sets up insanity as an excuse for crime, to bring forward his proofs, in the first instance, to show that that presumption is a mistake as far as it relates to him. As The crime, then, involves three elements, viz.: The killing, malice, and a responsible mind in the murderer. But after all the evidence is in, if the jury, while bearing in mind both these presumptions that I have mentioned, — i.e., that the defendant is innocent till he is proved guilty, and that he is and was sane, unless evidence to the contrary appears, and considering the whole evidence in the case, still entertain what is called a reasonable doubt, on any ground (either as to the killing, or the responsible condition of mind), whether he is guilty of the crime of murder, as it has been explained and defined, then the rule is that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that doubt and to an acquittal. But here it becomes important to explain to you, in the best way that I can, what is a reasonable doubt. I can hardly venture to give you an exact definition of the terms, for I do not know of any successful attempt to do so. As to questions The Phrase Defined. relating to human affairs, a knowledge of which is derived from testimony, it is impossible to have the same kind of certainty which is created by scientific demonstration. The only certainty you can have is a moral certainty, which depends upon the confidence you have in the integrity of witnesses, and their capacity to know the truth. If, If, for example, facts not improbable are attested by numerous witnesses who are credible, consistent, and uncontradicted, and who had every opportunity of knowing the truth, a reasonable or moral certainty would be inspired by their testimony. In such case, a doubt would be unreasonable, or imaginary, or speculative, which the books say it ought not to be. And it is not a doubt whether the party may not possibly be innocent in the face of strong proof of his guilt, but a sincere doubt whether he has been proved guilty, that is called reasonable. And even where the testimony is contradictory, so much more credit may be due to one side than the other, that the same result will be produced. On the other hand, the opposing proofs may be so nearly balanced that the jury may justly doubt on which side lies the truth, and, in such case, the accused party is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. As certainty advances, doubt recedes. If one is reasonably certain, he cannot, at the same time, be reasonably doubtful, i.e., have a reasonable doubt, of a fact. All that a jury can be expected to do is to be reasonably or morally certain of the fact which they declare by their verdict. As Chief Justice Shaw says, in Com. v. Webster: "For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one, arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it." With regard to the evidence in this case, very little comment is required from the court, except upon one question, the others being hardly matters of dispute. That the defendant fired at and shot the deceased President is abundantly proved, if you believe the testimony. That the wound caused the death has been testified to by the surgeons most competent to speak on that subject, and they are uncontradicted. That the homicide was committed with malice aforethought, if the defendant was capable of criminal intent and malice, can hardly be gainsaid if you will bear in mind what I have already said. It is not necessary to prove that any special and express hatred or malice was 15 Cush. 320. |