State v. McCoy. BURDEN OF PROOF. STATE v. McCoy. [34 Mo. 531.] In the Supreme Court of Missouri, March Term, 1864. The Burden of Proof is on the defendant to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged. APPEAL from St. Louis Criminal Court. Jecko, Gantt & Johnson, for appellant. Voullaire, for respondent. BAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. At the May term, 1863, of the St. Louis Criminal Court, the defendant was indicted for the murder of Catherine Moran, alleged to have been committed on the 20th of April, 1863. Upon the trial the killing was admitted and the plea of insanity set up by the prisoner's counsel. Being convicted of murder in the first degree, a motion was made for a new trial, which was overruled, and the defendant now appeals to this court. The main ground relied upon by defendant's counsel for a reversal of the judgment is the giving by the court below of the second, third, and thirteenth instructions, which are as follows: "The law presumes every man who has arrived at the years of discretion to be sane and capable of committing crime, until the contrary is shown; so that the State, after proving the unlawful act, need offer no evidence whatever of the sanity of the defendant, but may rest upon the legal presumption of sanity until the defendant shows the contrary." "This defence of insanity is emphatically one which the defendant must make out, and it must be made out to the satisfaction of your minds; for if the evidence merely shows a case of doubt when the defendant might not be insane, this is not sufficient to authorize an acquittal on that ground only. If the evidence shows merely that the defendant might have been insane at the time of the commission of the act, but does not show satisfactorily to your minds that defendant was insane at that time, this is not sufficient to warrant an acquittal.” "The jury are instructed that the onus or burden of proof of defendant's insanity at the immediate time of the killing rests upon the defend State v. McCoy. ant; and if the same be not established to the entire satisfaction of the jury, then they will find her guilty of murder in the first degree." The theory of the defence as urged in this court, and shown in the instructions asked and refused, is that it is incumbent upon the State to show by positive and affirmative testimony that the defendant was sane at the time of the killing; and if the jury entertain a doubt as to the sanity or insanity of the prisoner at such time, the jury must give her the benefit of such doubt and acquit her. It is true that it is incumbent upon the State to prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime of murder, which necessarily includes the sanity of the prisoner; but the burden of proving such sanity is fully met by the presumption of law that every person is of sound mind until the contrary appears; and he who undertakes to escape the penalty of the law by means of the plea of insanity must rebut such presumption by proof entirely satisfactory to the jury. It is a defence. to be made out by the prisoner, and by proof that will satisfy the jury that he was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. In Bellingham's Case, which was an indictment for murder, the defence set up was insanity, and MANSFIELD, C. J., in charging the jury, told them: "That in order to support such a defence it ought to be proved by the most distinct and unquestionable evidence that the prisoner was incapable of judging between right and wrong; that, in fact, it must be proved beyond all doubt that at the time he committed the atrocious act with which he stood charged, he did not consider that murder was a crime against the laws of God and nature, and that there was no other proof of insanity which would excuse murder or any other crime." This doctrine, founded in reason, has been fully recog nized by the courts of this country. The idea, therefore, advanced by the prisoner's counsel that it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the accused was sane at the time she committed the act, by evidence in addition to and independent of the presumption of law above referred to, is not sustained by authority. The first instruction asked by defendant and refused, required the jury to acquit if they entertained a doubt as to the sanity or insanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the homicide. The doctrine of this instruction was repudiated by this court in the case of the State v. Iuting, and very properly, for it virtually requires the jury to acquit if they entertain a doubt as to whether the defendant has succeeded in maintaining the defence. The true rule in our opinion 1 21 Mo. 464. State v. Klinger. was laid down by C. J. SHAW, in Commonwealth v. Rogers,1 which was a case of murder and the defence insanity. The jury received a very elaborate charge from the learned judge, and after being in consultation several hours, came into court and asked the opinion of the court upon the following question: "Must the jury be satisfied beyond a doubt of the insanity of the prisoner to entitle him to an acquittal?" To which the chief justice replied: "That if the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of the insanity of the prisoner, the jury would be authorized to find him insane." The second, third, and fourth instructions asked by defendant are embraced in those given by the court, and it was unnecessary therefore to give them again. As no other ground of error has been suggested, the judgment of the Criminal Court will be affirmed; the other judges concurring. BURDEN OF PROOF-PARTICULAR RIGHT AND WRONG TEST. STATE V. KLINGER. [43 Mo. 127.] In the Supreme Court of Missouri, October Term, 1868. 1. Burden of proof. The burden of establishing the insanity of the prisoner is on the defence. But it is not necessary that it be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; it is sufficient if the jury are satisfied by the weight and preponderance of the evidence, that the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the act. 2. Particular right and wrong test. To establish insanity as a defence, it must be proved that at the time of committing the offence, the prisoner was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, such as not to know that he was doing wrong. APPEAL from St. Louis Criminal Court. The prisoner was indicted in the St. Louis Criminal Court for the murder, on November 25th, 1867, of Henry Wider. He was found guilty of murder in the first degree. W. H. H. Russell, for the appellant. 17 Metc. 500. Burden of Proof. C. P. Johnson, circuit attorney, for the State. The only defence set up by the accused was insanity; and it is urged by his counsel that the court committed error in its instructions on that question. It would subserve no useful purpose to go into a labored or lengthy review of the authorities on that subject, as they will be found. diverse and irreconcilable. Recent researches in medical science have eliminated rules, going very far to mitigate the doctrines laid down by the old authors. It may be said that it is now universally conceded that insanity is a disease of the brain of that mass of matter through and by which the powers of the mind act. There are different kinds of insanity, and different degrees of the same kind, and it has been found exceedingly difficult to furnish any sure test for the guidance of courts and juries. The question of insanity is always one of fact; but how much proof shall be required and where the onus ends, is involved in perplexity. The defence may be made out by circumstances; but every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to b responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is shown; and to establish the defence it must be proved that at the time of committing the offence he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, such as not to know that he was doing wrong. The instruction mainly complained of is the following: "The law presumes that every man is sane until the contrary is established by the evidence to the satisfaction of the jury; and when insanity in any form is set up as a defence, it is a fact which must be proved like any fact. The burden of proving such insanity is upon the defendant, and he is not entitled to the benefit of a mere doubt whether he was or was not insane." It is now insisted that if the evidence was sufficient to raise a mere doubt in the minds of a jury concerning the defendant's sanity, that doubt inured to his benefit, and would have authorized his acquittal, and that the court should have so directed. The instruction given is in entire consonance with the previous decisions of this court, and has been considered the established law of this State for many years. In State v. Huting, it was declared in explicit terms that a party charged with murder, who admits the killing and relies upon the defence * 21 Mo. 464. State v. Klinger. of insanity, must make it out to the satisfaction of the jury, and that he is not entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to his sanity. The subject was not much considered, but the rule was announced as one considered well settled. In the case of the State v. McCoy,1 the same question was again presented, and the ruling in Huting's Case reaffirmed. But there are some recent cases in which the doctrine contended for by the appellant receives strong support.2 In Hopps v. Peoples it was held by a majority of the court that it was not necessary that the insanity of the accused should be established by even a preponderance of roof; but if, upon the whole evidence, the jury entertain a reason1 able doubt of his sanity, they should acquit. Bartlett's Case is to the 4 same effect. In the former of these cases, Judge Breese took the strong position that the burden of proof was on the government throughout. I should be very reluctant to give this proposition my unqualified assent. Both observation and experience show that insanity is easily simulated; and if a bare doubt, which may be created in the minds of a jury by slight circumstances, is permitted to control and produce an acquittal, the guilty will often go unpunished, and the interests of society suffer great injury. Mr. Bishop, a writer of great accuracy on criminal law, remarks: "Sanity, as observed by a learned judge, is presumed to be the normal state of the human mind, and it is never incumbent on a prosecutor to give affirmative evidence that such state exists in a particular case. But, suppose this normal state is denied to have existed in the particular instance, then, if evidence is produced in support of such denial, the jury must judge of it and its effect on the main issue of guilty or not guilty; and if, considering all the evidence, and considering the presumption that what a man does is sanely done, and suffering the evidence and the presumption to work together in their mind, they entertain a reasonable doubt whether the prisoner did the act in a sane state of mind, they are to acquit; otherwise they are to convict." 5 I think that the safest and most reasonable rule is that, as the law presumes every person who has reached the age of discretion to be of sufficient capacity to be responsible for crimes, the burden of establishing the insanity of the accused affirmatively to the satisfaction of the jury on the trial of a criminal case, rests upon the defence. It is not 34 Mo. 531. 2 People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385; State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224. 3 Supra. 443 N. H. 224. 51 Bish. Crim. Prac., sect. 534. |