Delirium Tremens. difficulty, whether this homicide was committed while the prisoner was suffering under that marked and settled disease of delirium tremens, or in a fit of drunken madness. My instruction to you is, that if the prisoner, while sane and responsible, made himself intoxicated, and while intoxicated committed a murder by reason of insanity, which was one of the consequences of that intoxication, and one of the attendants on that state, then he is responsible in point of law, and must be punished. This is as clearly the law of the land as the other rule, which exempts from punishment acts done under delirium tremens. It may sometimes be difficult to determine under which rule, in point of fact, the accused comes. Perhaps you will think it not easy to determine it in this case. But it is the duty of the jury to ascertain from the evidence on which side of the line this case falls, and to decide accordingly. It may be very material for you to know on which party is the burden of proof in this part of the case. I have already told you, that it is incumbent on the prisoner to satisfy you he was insane when he struck the blow; for the reason that, as men in general are sane, the law presumes each man to be so till the contrary is proved. But if the contrary has been proved, if you are satisfied the prisoner was insane, the law does not presume his insanity arose from any particular cause; and it is incumbent on the party which asserts that it did arise from a particular cause, and that the prisoner is guilty, by law, because it arose from that cause, to make out this necessary element in the charge to the same extent as every other element in it. For the charge then assumes this form, that the prisoner committed a murder, for which, though insane, he is responsible, because his insanity was produced by, and accompanied, a state of intoxication. In my judgment, the government must satisfy you of these facts, which are necessary to the guilt of the prisoner in point of law, provided you are convinced he was insane. You will look carefully at all the evidence bearing on this question, and if you are convinced that the prisoner was insane, to that extent which I have described as necessary to render him irresponsible, you will acquit him; unless you are also convinced his insanity was produced by intoxication, and accompanied that state; in which case you will find him guilty, The prisoner was acquitted. State v. Jones. NO LEGAL TEST OF INSANITY. STATE V. JONES. [50 N. H. 369; 9 Am. Rep. 242.] In the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, June, 1871. HON. HENRY A. BELLOWS, Chief Justice. JONATHAN E. SARGENT, 1. There is no Legal Test of Insanity in a criminal case. Question is, Was Crime the Result of Mental Disease? - On the trial of an indictment for murder, the jury were instructed that if the prisoner committed the act in a manner that would be criminal and unlawful if he was sane, the verdict should be “not guilty by reason of insanity,” if the killing were the offspring or product of mental disease in the prisoner. Held, correct. The defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, upon an indictment charging him with having murdered his wife. Defence, insanity. There was evidence tending to show that defendant believed his wife guilty of adultery with one French, and that he killed her for that reason. This belief was alleged, on the part of the defendant, to have been an insane delusion. The defendant excepted, to the several refusals of the court to give the jury each of the following instructions: 1. Under the indictment the defendant cannot be convicted of murder in the first degree. 2. If the defendant was diseased in mind to any extent whatever, and the mental disease, under which he labored, had any influence whatever in leading him to kill his wife, he was not responsible. 3. Any degree of insanity or delusion, and especially such insanity or delusion as would render the defendant incompetent to make a will, makes him also incapable of crime, and not responsible, though the jury may be unable to trace any connection between the partial insanity and the act complained of. 4. Delusion is the legal test of insanity. 5. If the defendant was under the influence of any insane delusion whatever, or any insane delusion connected with the killing of his wife, he was not responsible. 6. Knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the act in question, is the legal test of insanity. Charge of the Court. 7. If the defendant killed his wife under the control of an irresistible impulse, he is not legally responsible. The defendant excepted to the following instructions given to the jury: "If the defendant killed his wife in a manner that would be crimina and unlawful if the defendant were sane, the verdict should be 'not guilty by reason of insanity,' if the killing was the offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant. "Neither delusion nor knowledge of right and wrong, nor design or cunning in planning and executing the killing, and escaping or avoiding detection, nor ability to recognize acquaintances, or to labor or transact business, or to manage affairs, is, as a matter of law, a test of mental disease; but all symptoms and all tests of mental disease are purely matters of fact, to be determined by the jury. Whether the defendant had a mental disease, and whether the killing of his wife was the product of such disease, are questions of fact for the jury. "Insanity is mental disease, disease of the mind. An act produced by mental disease is not a crime. If the defendant had a mental disease which irresistibly impelled him to kill his wife, if the killing was the product of mental disease in him, he is not guilty; he is innocent-as innocent as if the act had been produced by involuntary intoxication, or by another person using his hand against his utmost resistance. Insanity is not innocence unless it produced the killing of his wife. "If the defendant had an insane impulse to kill his wife, and could have successfully resisted it, he was responsible. Whether every insane impulse is always irresistible is a question of fact. Whether, in this case, the defendant had an insane impulse to kill his wife, and whether he could resist it, are questions of fact. "Whether an act may be produced by partial insanity, when no connection can be discovered between the act and the disease, is a question of fact. "The defendant is to be acquitted on the ground of insanity, unless the jury are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not produced by mental disease." The defendant was sentenced, and filed this bill of exceptions. Wm. C. Clarke, attorney-general, for the State; Hatch & Wiggin, for defendant. LADD, J. (after deciding some minor questions). — The remaining and most important questions in the case arise upon the instructions given by the court to the jury, and the refusal to give instructions requested by defendant's counsel. State v. Jones. When, as in this case, a person charged with crime. admits the act, but sets up the defence of insanity, the real ultimate question to be determined seems to be, whether at the time of the act, he had the mental capacity to entertain a criminal intent; whether, in point of fact, he did entertain such intent. In solving that problem, as in all other cases, it is for the court to find the law, and for the jury to find the fact. The main question for our consideration here is, what part of this difficult inquiry is law, and what part fact? It will be readily agreed, as said by SHAW, C. J., in Com. v. Rogers,1 that if the reason and mental power of the accused are either so deficienl that he has no will, no conscience, or controlling mental power, or ift through the overwhelming violence of mental disease, his intellectua, power is, for the time, obliterated, he is not a responsible agent and, of course, is not punishable for acts which otherwise would be criminal. But experience and observation show that in most of the cases which come before the courts, where it is sufficiently apparent that disease has attacked the mind in some form and to some extent, it has not thus wholly obliterated the will, the conscience, and the mental power, but has left its victim still in possession of some degree of ability in some or all these qualities. It may destroy, or it may only impair and becloud the whole mind; or it may destroy or only impair the functions of one or more faculties of the mind. There seem to be cases where, as ERSKINE said in Hadfield's Case, reason is not driven from her seat, but where distraction sits down upon it along with her, holds her trembling upon it, and frightens her from her propriety. The term, "partial insanity," has been applied to such cases by writers and judges, from Lord HALE to Chief Justice SHAW, where, as has been said: "The mind may be clouded and weakened, but not incapable of remembering, reasoning, and judging;" and it is here that the difficulty of the subject begins, and that confusion, and contradiction in the authorities make their appearance. "No one can say where twilight ends or begins, but there is ample distinction between night and day.” We are to inquire whether a universal test has been found wherewith to determine, in all cases, the line betweeen criminal accountability and non-accountability between the region of crime and innocence-in those cases which lie neither wholly in the darkness of night nor the light of day. If such a test exists, or if one can be found, it is of the utmost importance that it be clearly defined and broadly laid down, so that, when it is given to a jury, it may aid rather than confuse them. 17 Metc. 500. The Early Cases Reviewed. To ascertain whether a rule has hitherto been found, we must look to the authorities; and so far as we have been able to examine them, the leading and familiar English cases and authorities are substantially as follows: Lord HALE said the mental capacity ordinarily possessed by a child fourteen years old was the test. Mr. Justice TRACY, in Arnold's Case (1723), said: "A man must be totally deprived of his understanding and memory, so as not to know what he is doing, no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast; "' and the same doctrine, substantially seems to have been acted on in Ferrer's Case.2 The next prominent case in the books is Hadfield's Case (1800); and all I desire to say of that case, in this connectiou is, that it seems to stand by itself. It was clear that Hadfield knew right from wrong; it was clear that he knew the nature of the act he was about to commit; it was clear he manifested design, foresight, and cunning in planning and executing it; and it was clear he knew it would subject him to punishment, which was, indeed, his motive in committing it. The most that can be said of it is, that everybody saw he was insane, and that his insanity produced the act. Next come three cases tried in the year 1812, Parker's Case,3 Bowler's Case, and Bellingham's Case; in each of which a more humane rule than that of Mr. Justice TRACY was adopted, namely, that knowledge of right and wrong, considered as abstract qualities, was the test; although in Bowler's Case, Mr. Justice LE BLANC added a further test, clearly suggested by, and growing out of, the facts of that particular case, and designed to furnish the rule by which the jury should be guided in deciding it, rather than by the formula in respect to right and wrong, namely, that it was for the jury to determine whether the prisoner was under any illusion in respect to the prosecutor, which rendered his mind, at the moment, insensible of the nature of the act he was about to commit. And in Bellingham's Case, Sir JAMES MANFIELD, C. J., took the extraordinary liberty of changing the whole scope and meaning of the rule, by telling the jury, in addition, that "It must be proved beyond all doubt, that at the time he committed the atrocious act, he did not consider that murder was a crime against the laws of God and nature.' It can hardly be contended that these three cases go far toward establishing a rule; for there is not much reason in calling that a rule, which the judge at the trial may feel at liberty to change, for the pur 1 16 How. St. Tr. 764. 19 How. St. Tr. 947. 3 Reported in Collinson on Lun. 477. 4 Id. 673. |