peace, citizens of adequate talents and respectability of character to enter and remain in the military service of the country, so that the government may have officers at its command, who, to the requisite experience, would add the public confidence. The correctness of this principle can scarcely be doubted, for, surely, if it is worth having an army at all, it is worth having it well commanded.

These are the general principles upon which I propose to form the organization of the army, as proposed to be reduced under the resolution. By reference to tables A and B, which contain the proposed and present organizations, it will be seen, that the principal difference between them is in the reduction of the rank and file. The present organization of the staff, with its branches, is retained, with slight alterations. The principal changes in it are, in that of the commissary general of purchases, and the judge advocates, by which it is intended that they should conform more exactly to the principles on which the other branches are now formed. It is believed that the true principle of its organization is, that every distinct branch of the staff should terminate in a chief, to be stationed, at least in peace, near the seat of government, and to be made responsible for its condition. It is thus that the government may at all times obtain correct knowledge of the condition of the army in every particular, and be enabled to introduce method, order, and economy, in its disbursements. It is, at present, with slight exceptions, thus organized, and the beneficial effects of it have already been strikingly exemplified by experience. Since the passage of the act of the 14th of April, 1818, which gave the present organization to the staff, the expense of the army has been greatly reduced, while, at the same time, the various articles supplied have been improved in quality, and the punctuality with which they have been issued; and while the movements of the army have, at least for the present, been rendered more expensive by occupying the distant frontier posts at the mouth of the St. Peter's and at the Council Bluffs. By a statement from the adjutant and inspector general, and the books of the second auditor, marked C, containing the army disbursements from 1818 to 1820 inclusive, it appears that the expense of the army in 1818, the year in which the present organization commenced, amounted to three millions seven hundred and forty-eight thousand four hundred and forty-five dollars and one cent, while the amount of warrants isstred for current disbursements to the first of November this year, has amounted only to two millions six hundred and sixteen thousand five hundred and twenty-six dollars and eleven cents, and the disbursements of the whole year will, probably, not exceed two millions seven hundred thousand dollars. In the year 1818, the aggregate average number of the military establishment, including the cadets, amounted to eight thousand one hundred and ninety-nine, and that of this year to nine thousand six hundred and eleven. It is admitted, that, during the same period, a considerable reduction has taken place in many of the articles which constitute the supplies of the army, the effect of which has been to reduce its expense; but, on examination, it will appear

that the diminution on this account is much less than what on the first impression might be supposed. Many of the more considerable items, which constitute the expenses of the army, are fixed by law, and do not fluctuate with the change of prices, such as the pay of the officers and men, the subsistence of the former, and the allowance to them for servants, forage, transportation of baggage, &c. All of the items estimated for, by the paymaster general, excepting clothing for servants, which is of small amount, partake of this character; to which, if we add those in the quartermaster general's estimates, which, although the price of some of them have in the period under consideration been reduced, yet that has been at least balanced in the increased expenditure of that department for the two last years, by the extension and increased number of the military posts; it will result, that the reduction in the expense of the army by the diminution of prices is substantially confined to the clothing, medical, and subsistence departments. Some pains have been taken to ascertain this diminution, in the various articles supplied by them, and it has resulted in the belief, that the average of those supplied by the clothing and medical departments were, in the year 1818, about seven per cent. higher than in this, and in the subsistence about forty per cent. With this data, it is ascertained, (see table D,) that the expense of the army this year, had no diminution in price since 1818 taken place, would have amounted, deducting for the difference of the average number of the two years, and allowing for the expenditure of the Seminole war in 1818, to about two millions seven hundred and ninety-one thousand and thirty-eight dollars and fifty-five cents. This sum, deducted from three millions seven hundred and forty-eight thousand four hundred and forty-five dollars and one cent, the expense of the army in 1818, gives for the actual saving, after allowing for the diminution of prices, the sum of nine hundred and fifty-seven thousand three hundred and fifty-six dollars and forty-six cents, (see table D,) which has been effected through the organization of the present staff, by enabling the department to superintend, in its minute details, as well the various disbursements of the army, as the measures taken to prevent the waste of public property. The amount of saving may appear to be very great, but it is confidently believed, that it cannot be materially reduced by any just mode of calculation of which the subject is susceptible.

As great as this result is, it is only in war that the benefits of a proper organization of the staff can be fully realized. With a complete organization, and experienced officers, trained in time of peace to an exact and punctual discharge of their duty, the saving in war (not to insist on an increased energy and success in our military movements) would be of incalculable advantage to the country. The number of deputies and assistants in each branch ought to be regulated by the exigency of the service, and this must obviously depend much more on the number of posts, than on the number of troops; and as no material change can, consistently with the public interest, be made as to the posts, under the proposed reduction, little diminu

tion can be made in the number of subordinate officers belonging to the staff.

It is also proposed to retain the two major and four brigadier generals. Although it is not probable that there will be concentrated, in time of peace, at any one point, a force equal to the command of a single major, or even a brigadier general, yet it is conceived that it is important to the service that they should be retained. As two regiments, with a proper proportion of artillery and light troops, constitute, in our service, one brigade, and two brigades a division, the command of a major general, the number of regiments and battalions, under the proposed organization, thus gives a command equal to that of two major and four brigadier generals. But a more weighty, and, in my opinion, decisive reason, why they should be retained, may be found in the principle already stated, that, the organization of the peace establishment ought to be such as to induce persons of talent and respectability to enter and continue in the military service. To give to the officers of the army the necessary skill and acquirements, the military academy is an invaluable part of our establishment; but that alone will be inadequate. For this purpose, respectability of rank and compensation must be given to the officers of the army, in due proportion to the other pursuits of life. Every prudent individual, in selecting his course of life, must be governed, making some allowance for natural disposition, essentially by the reward which attends the various pursuits open to him. Under our free institutions, every one is left free to make his selection; and most of the pursuits of life, followed with industry and skill, lead to opulence and respectability. The profession of arms, in the well established state of things which exist among us, has no reward but what is attached to it by law; and if that should be inferior to other professions, it would be idle to suppose individuals, possessed of the necessary talents and character, would be induced to enter it. A mere sense of duty ought not, and cannot, be safely relied on. It supposes that individuals would be actuated by a stronger sense of duty towards the government, than the latter towards them.

If we may judge from experience, it would seem that the army, even with these important commands, which, from their rank and compensation, must operate strongly on those who have a military inclination, does not present inducements to remain in it, stronger than, nor even as strong as, those of most of the other respectable pursuits of life.

The number of resignations has been very great, of which many are among the most valuable officers. Should the number of generals be reduced, the motive for entering or continuing in service must also be greatly reduced; for, like the high prizes in a lottery, though they can be obtained by a few only, yet they operate on all those who adventure; so those important stations which they occupy are, with those the best qualified to serve their country, the principal motive to enter or remain in the army. To retain them is, in fact, the cheapest mode of commanding such talents; for, to pursue the meta

phor, if the high prizes were distributed among all of the tickets, there would be but few adventurers, so, if the compensation attached to the general officers were distributed proportionably among the other officers, the inducement which the army now holds out for a military profession, to individuals of suitable character, would be almost wholly lost. If the generals were reduced to one major, and two brigadiers, the saving would not exceed $14,432 annually, which, distributed among the officers in proportion to their pay, would give to a lieutenant but $25 59 additional pay, and to a captain $30 87 annually, a sum too inconsiderable to have much effect.

I will proceed next to make a few remarks on that portion of the organization which proposes to reduce the rank aud file, without a correspondent reduction of the battalions and regiments. By a reference to the table A, it will be seen that it is proposed to add the rifle regiment to those of the infantry, and unite the ordnance, and the light and heavy artillery into one corps of artillery, which, when thus blended, to form nine regiments of infantry, and five battalions of artillery, from the latter of which the corps of ordnance is to be taken, to consist of one colonel, and lieut. colonel, two majors, seven captains, and as many lieutenants as the President may judge necessary. This organization will require all the officers of the line of the present army to be retained. The reasons for the union of the corps, as well as the other details, will be found explained in the proper place in the annexed tables.

No position connected with the organization of the peace establishment is susceptable of being more rigidly proved, than that the proportion of its officers to the rank and file ought to be greater than in a war establishment. It results immediately from a position, the truth of which cannot be fairly doubted, and which I have attempted to illustrate in the preliminary remarks, that the leading object of a regular army in time of peace ought to be, to enable the country to meet with honor and safety, particularly at the commencement of war, the dangers incident to that state; to effect this object, as far as practicable, the peace organization ought, as has been shown, to be such, that, in passing to a state of war, there should be nothing either to new model, or to create; and that the difference between that, and the war organization ought to be simply in the greater magnitude of the latter. The application of this principle has governed in that portion of the formation of the proposed military establishment, now under consideration. The companies, both of the artillery and infantry, are proposed to be reduced to their minimum peace formation, the former to consist of sixty four prîvates, and non commissioned officers, and the latter of thirty seven, which will give to the aggregate of both corps thus formed six thousand three hundred and sixteen, non commissioned officers, mu sicians and privates. Without adding an additional officer, or a single company, they may be augmented, should a just precaution, growing out of our foreign relations, render it necessary, to eleven thousand five hundred and fifty eight; and, pending hostilities, by adding 288

officers, the two corps, on the maximum of the war formation, may be raised to the respectable force of 4,545 of the artillery, and 14,490 of the infantry, making in the aggregate 19,035 officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates (see table E.) The war organization, thus raised on the basis of the peace establishment, will bring into effective operation the whole of the experience and skill of the latter, which, with attention, would, in a short period, be communicated to the new recruits, and the officers recently appointed, so as to constitute a well disciplined force. Should the organization of full companies, on the contrary, be adopted for the peace establishment, this process could be carried to a very limited extent. Six thousand men so organized can be augmented on the full war establishment only to 9,115 by doubling the battalions. (see table E.) Any additional force, beyond that, must be obtained by adding new regiments and battalions, with all of the disadvantages of inexperience in the officers and men, without the means of immediate instruction. This was the fatal error at the commencement of the late war, which cost the country so much treasure and blood. The peace establishment, which preceded it, was very imperfectly organized, and did not admit of the necessary augmentation; nor did the government avail itself of even its limited capacity in that respect. The forces rais ed were organized into new corps, in which, consequently, every branch of military duty was to be learned by the officers as well as men. But, with all of these disadvantages, the experience and discipline of the old establishment was of immense use, and has not been duly appreciated. The officers belonging to it gradually diffused their military knowledge through the army, and contributed much to the brilliant results of the campaign of 1814. For the truth of this assertion, I might with confidence appeal to those officers, who then acquired so much glory for themselves and their country.

Another reason remains to be urged, why, in the peace establishment, the number of officers ought to be great compared with the actual force. At the commencement of war an adequate number of experienced officers is of greater importance than that of disciplined troops, even were it possible to have the latter without the former; for it is not difficult to form in a short time well disciplined troops by experienced officers, but the reverse is impossible. The qualifications of the officers are essentially superior to those of the soldiers, and are more difficult to be acquired. The progress of military science has not added much to the difficulty of performing the duty of the soldier, or of training him, but it has greatly to that of the officer. No government can, in the present improved state of the military science, neglect with impunity to instruct a sufficient number of its citizens in a science indispensable to its independence and safety, and to perfect which instruction, it is necessary that some portion of them (the number to be regulated by the resources of the country and its relation with other governments) should make arms their profession. Table F exhibits the estimate of the saving which will be made by the proposed organization.