which fall within the jurisdiction of the Prize Court. Stowell was never more at home than in deciding between the rival claims of gallant seamen, to whom his decision was often of no little pecuniary importance; for a share in a rich prize meant that a substantial sum of money passed into the pocket of the commander of a ship, of a ship of the Royal Navy, and lesser amounts into those of his subordinates. In these cases Stowell always endeavoured, as was his wont, to enunciate some principle, so that a single decision frequently governed other disputes arising on somewhat similar facts. A case called the Forsigheid is an excellent illustration. This vessel was actually captured by a ship of war called the Dictator and other vessels; another detachment of the Admiral's fleet was eight miles distant, but, owing to fog, was not in sight of the actual captors when the enemy vessel surrendered. Still they claimed to be entitled to a share of the booty. The Judge laid down that when vessels are associated together by public authority the whole fleet is entitled to share in the proceeds of the capture, although some of them might be out of sight at the time. "The fleet so associated is considered as one body, unless detached by orders, or entirely separated by accident, and

1 3. C. Robinson, 311.

what is done by one, continuing to compose in fact a part of that fleet, enures to the benefit of all." No accidental separation was suggested in the Forsigheid, and Stowell decided that the whole fleet was therefore entitled to share, as well as those in sight at the time of capture. Decisions such as this made the name of Stowell a familiar word in every British ship of war; for the judgments that he gave on the thorny subject of joint capture were based on principles of equity and on common sense, so that they commanded general approval in the fleets.

These decisions have now lost their legal value, but they are still interesting reading; for they are concise descriptions of stirring, if forgotten, incidents in the maritime warfare at the end of the eighteenth century, the smaller details of which have been necessarily overshadowed by great encounters. They tell, in fact, of the constant encounters which made up the daily life of the Navy in time of war. They are not less illustrative of Stowell's judicial sagacity. They were, too, of commercial importance; for privateers were fitted out by the merchants of Liverpool and of Bristol as business speculations, and the result of a judgment of Stowell might, therefore, make all the difference between a fortunate and a disastrous venture. They had some

times even a larger application; for a decision, for instance, which stated a general rule that the being in sight by a privateer of a capture by a ship of war did not entitle a privateer to share in the prize, settled the claims of many owners and crews of private ships of war, and prevented a maritime practice by small privateers of hanging on His Majesty's ships to pick up the crumbs of the captures. In fact, Stowell had to act as a kind of dispenser of discipline over the numerous brave and not too scrupulous privateers.

CHAPTER VI

THE STOWELL CASE LAW AND THE

DECLARATION OF LONDON

IT has already been observed (ante, p. 38) that one important result of Stowell's work was to assimilate British prize law in form and in character with English municipal law, and to impress on it some marked national features. During the Crimean War of 1854 this body of law, formulated by Stowell, was tested, approved, and enlarged by a later generation of lawyers, so that at the beginning of this century Great Britain was the only Power which possessed a complete system of prize law at once reasoned, definite and well tried-one which was in harmony with the national traditions of English jurisprudence, and easy of application to facts.

One must now mention that in 1907 there had assembled at the Hague an official international gathering known as the second Peace Conference, which approved the creation of an international Court of Appeal.

The seventh article of the Convention, which was a result of this meeting, states that when, in any particular case brought before the International Court, the question at issue is not governed by a treaty binding upon the parties, the Court "shall apply the rules of international law. If no generally recognized rules exist, the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity." A stipulation of this nature was unanimously decided by all the Powers represented at the second Peace Conference to be an essential feature of any system of international jurisdiction in matters of prize which could have practical value.1

Though obviously a Court composed of jurists of different nationalities needed some definite code of law, if it was to be of practical use, yet it was equally clear that this miscellaneous Court would not be guided by British prize law, which was in effect the only systematic and authoritative prize law in existence. Thus, rightly or wrongly from a British point of view, the next step was to formulate the rules of international law relating to prize, and to arrive "by common agreement at a uniform definition of the main principles of the existing law to whose spirit

1 Correspondence and Documents respecting the International Naval Conference, held in London, December 1908–February 1909, p. 20.