is like unto the statute which prefers laborers' and servants' claims in certain instances, like unto the statute which provides that no personal property shall be exempt from execution issued for the collection of the wages of any laborer or servant, and like unto the statute which provides that in a suit brought by "a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, or servant or employee" for his or her "wages" earned and due, the plaintiff may, under certain conditions recover, in addition to the wages, an attorney's fee for the prosecution of the suit. It is to be observed that these statutes all pertain to wages, and not salaries. The statute last above referred to is the act of June 1, 1889. (Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, p. 192, c. 13, § 13.) Its validity has been assailed upon the ground that it is special legislation, conferring a right upon persons therein specified to attorney's fees that was not given to other persons; but this court held that the enumer ation, which is broad enough to include all wage-earners, and which includes none but wage-earners, is an enumeration of persons composing a class, upon which the right given by the statute might be conferred without violation of the constitution. (Vogel v. Pekoc, 157 Ill. 339, 42 N. E. 386, 30 L. R. A. 491.) We have recently referred to that case with approval. (Manowsky v. Stephan, 233 II. 409, 84 N. E. 365.) The reasoning of the Vogel case would seem to lead to the conclusion that wage-earners are the proper objects of legislation which would tend to protect them from the evil which this statute is designed to obviate. Such an act would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it placed reasonable regulations upon the right to assign wages to secure an indebtedness and prescribed a reasonable method to be pursued in making the assignment effective. It has been recently so held by the supreme court of Massachusetts in reference to the sections of a statute regulating the assignment of "wages." (Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell (filed January 6, 1909), 200 Mass. 482, 86 N. E. 916.) It is true that many persons who are salaried receive compensation not greater in amount, by the month or year, than the compensation received by many wage-earners. Whether a statute protecting a salary not greater in amount than a certain sum per week or month, or protecting a portion of a salary which portion is not greater than a certain sum per month or week, would be valid, is a question not here presented.

The statute now under consideration is invalid because it violates the provisions of our constitution which has been invoked by limiting the right of persons earning the higher salaries to assign or transfer their salaries in such manner as they see fit; there being nothing in the public policy of the State requiring or warranting such abridgment of their right, and nothing requiring or warranting a statute giving to such persons the benefit that might with entire propriety be given to wage-earners by an act in reference to the assignment of wages. The third section of this statute is unconstitutional for the further reason that it makes the assignment given as security for a loan tainted with usury void, while the law of the State makes no such provision with reference to other instruments or other conveyances given to secure usurious debts. We also point out the fact that it is extremely doubtful whether the act in its entirety could in any event be made effective in the city of Chicago, for the reason that it requires the assignment to be acknowledged before a justice of the peace in and for the township in which the assignor resides

and entered by such justice upon his docket; there being now no justices of the peace in that city and no law requiring the keeping of such a docket as that which the justice of the peace formerly kept.

CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD-REPAYMENT OF ADVANCES-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE- Wells v.

State, Court of Appeals of Georgia, 64 Southeastern Reporter, page 494.Jasper Wells was convicted in the city court of Reidsville of procuring money and supplies on a contract of employment, with intent to defraud. The act on which the proceeding was based provides punishment by fine or imprisonment for making a contract to render services with the intent of procuring money or other things of value and afterwards failing to perform the service, "to the loss and damage of the hirer."

The facts in the case appear in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Powell, reversing the judgment of the court below. The opinion follows:

The defendant was charged with cheating and swindling under the act of 1903 (Acts 1903, p. 90). The State's contention, supported by the testimony of the prosecutor, was that the defendant contracted with the prosecutor to work for him as an ordinary farm laborer at $16 per month until he should pay and return to him the sum of $30.85, which the prosecutor had paid to another person at the defendant's request; that in addition to paying this $30.85 the defendant was to work on until he had repaid all advances that the prosecutor might make him in the meantime. The defendant went to work, and worked three months and six days, and then moved away. At the time he left the prosecutor's place the defendant still owed him the $30.85, after crediting him with his wages, and also owed a balance of $16.66 for supplies advanced to him pending the performance of the labor.

If we should hold that the act of 1903 covered such a transaction as this, no court having jurisdiction to do so would hesitate to declare the act unconstitutional and void, for its repugnancy to the Federal Constitution and the peonage statutes enacted thereunder, as well as for its repugnancy to our own state constitution. It has been held, too often to require the citation of any authority, that this statute is applicable only where the cheating and swindling has been accomplished through the fraudulent procurement of money, under a definite contract of employment. It may be that under the testimony in the record the contract between the prosecutor and the defendant as to the time of its beginning is definite enough; but when was it to end? The defendant was to work until he repaid not only the $30.85, but also all further advances. After three months had elapsed, the defendant owed the $30.85 and also $16.66 more; and at this rate the defendant, though he were a young man at the beginning, and though he might live to the ripest old age, would go down to his grave with his contract still unperformed. Under every decision rendered by this court, and by the supreme court upon the application of this statute, the defendant is not guilty.

DISCHARGE OF EMPLOYEES STATEMENT OF REASON FOR DISCHARGE-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company v. Brown, Supreme Court of Kansas, 102 Pacific Reporter, page 459.-A. W. Brown had secured a judgment in the district court of Lyon County, against the company above named on account of its refusal to furnish written statement of the cause of his discharge, as is required by section 2422 of the General Statutes of Kansas, 1901. The company brought the case before the supreme court on the question of the unconstitutionality of the law referred to and secured a reversal of the judgment of the lower court on the ground that the law was unconstitutional. The grounds on which this decision was based are set forth in the following extracts from the opinion of the court, as delivered by Judge Smith:

The statute required the employer, upon the request of a discharged employee, to furnish in writing the true cause or reason for such discharge. The railroad company did not meet this requirement. Its "service letter," as it is called, stated only that Brown was discharged "for cause." This is not a statement of "the cause" or of

any cause,

It is also alleged that the service letter was issued in furtherance of a conspiracy existing between the defendant and other railroad companies to prevent employees of one company from getting employment in another company without the consent of the former employer. This claim is not supported by any evidence. "To constitute a conspiracy the purpose to be effected by it must be unlawful, either in respect of its nature or in respect of the means to be employed for its accomplishment.' (People v. Willis, 24 Misc. Rep. 537, 54 N. Y. Supp. 129, 133; People v. Olson (Super. Buff.) 15 N. Y. Supp. 778, 779; Payne v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 507, 521, 49 Am. Rep. 666; 2 Words and Phrases Judicially Defined, 1460.) There was nothing in the evidence to show that there was an unlawful purpose contemplated, or that unlawful means were to be used. All that is shown, in substance, is that, upon Brown's application to two other railroad companies, request was made for his service letter when he informed the employment agent that he had worked for the defendant company, and that, upon the presentation of his letter, employment was refused him. Probably he could have secured employment only upon the presentation of a letter recommending him as a desirable employee, and that a letter stating the true cause of his discharge, which appears to have been sufficient in the mind of the employment agent of the defendant company to remove him from the employment, would not have availed him. If so, he was not damaged by the failure of the defendant to state the true cause of his discharge.

It may be said that if the law is valid the company need have no concern as to the effect of its compliance with the letter of the law. This leads us to the principal contention of the company that the law is unconstitutional; that it is repugnant to the eleventh section of the bill of rights of the State of Kansas, which provides that: "All persons may freely speak, write or publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right." It is also

contended that the law is repugnant to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." It has been conceded in argument that, in the absence of a contract of employment for a definite term, the master may discharge the servant for any reason or for no reason, and that the servant may quit his employment for any reason or for no reason. Such action on the part of the employer or the employee, where no obligation is violated, is as [an] essential element of liberty in action. Can one, then, be compelled to give a reason or cause for an action for which he may have no specific reason or cause except perhaps a mere whim or prejudice? Again, is not the freedom to remain silent, to neither write nor publish anything on a certain subject involved as an element in the guaranteed right to "freely speak, write or publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right?" It would seem that the liberty to remain silent is correlative to the freedom to speak. If one must speak, he can not be said to freely speak.

The statute in question, like its companion statute (chapter 120,. page 226, Laws 1897), was the outgrowth of the financial and business depression preceding that session of the legislature. Employers sought to recoup their loss of incomes by scaling the wages of the employees, and laborers sought to resist the decrease in wages or to compel an advance by uniting in labor organizations. The remarks of the late Mr. Justice Greene in holding the provisions of chapter 120, Laws 1897, unconstitutional are equally applicable to the pro-visions of the law in question. An excerpt from the opinion in Brick Co. v. Perry, 69 Kans. 297, 76 Pac. 848, reads:

"Before approaching a discussion of the question, let us exclude any notion that the act in question is a police regulation. It will be observed that it does not affect the public welfare, health, safety, or morals of the community, or prevent the commission of any offense or other manifest evil. Where the object of the act can not be traced to the accomplishment of some one of these purposes, it is. not a police regulation. Besides, the legislature has no power to impair or limit the reasonable and lawful exercise of a right guaranteed by the constitution, under the guise of a police regulation. It must also be remembered that the right which the plaintiff claimed was violated did not originate in contract, but was purely statutory. Therefore the determination of the question whether he has any remedy depends entirely upon the validity of this statute." When the relation of employer and employee has ceased by discharge or by quitting the employment, if the employee has been efficient and. trustworthy, the employer may be under a moral obligation to benefit the employee by giving him a statement to that effect. On the other hand, if the employee has been inefficient or untrustworthy it may be the employer's moral duty to furnish a prospective employer, upon request, or perhaps without request, a statement of these facts; but the former employer is under no legal obligation. so to do either to his ex-employee or to the prospective employer.

16752-No. 84—10—16

The public has no interest in the matter, and in neither case can such a duty be imposed as a police regulation, and the attempt by statute to impose the furnishing of such a statement is an interference with personal liberty.

The mere matter of time requisite to comply with the requirement of the statute is perhaps a matter of trifling consideration, yet, if the State may compel the sacrifice of a few minutes of the time of one person for another, may it not compel the sacrifice of a few days of time? Where and upon what principle shall the limit be placed? Again, if the employer can be compelled to state the true cause of discharge, it implies that he should state the facts as he understands them, and the facts may be in dispute and may be regarded by the employee as libelous. Litigation may result therefrom which might be a great burden to the employer, although successfully defended. We think the State can impose no such possi

ble burden.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-ACTIONS FOR INJURIES CAUSING DEATHRIGHTS OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS-TREATIES-Fulco et al. v. Schuylkill Stone Co., United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 169 Federal Reporter, page 98.-This was an action in which the plaintiffs, residents of Italy and subjects of the King of Italy, sought to recover damages for the death of their son who was killed through the alleged negligence of the company named above in its quarry in Montgomery County, Pa. The right to recover damages for injuries resulting in death is granted in general terms by the acts of 1851 and 1855.

Section 18 of the Pennsylvania act of April 15, 1851 (P. L. 674), provides:

No action hereafter brought to recover damages for injuries to the person by negligence or default shall abate by reason of the death of the plaintiff; but the personal representatives of the deceased may be substituted as plaintiff, and prosecute the suit to final judgment and satisfaction.

Section 19 of the same act, among other things, provides:

Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence and no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus caused.

Section 1 of the Pennsylvania act of April 26, 1855 (P. L. 309), provides:

The persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death, shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased, and no other relatives, and the sum recovered shall go to them in the proportion they would have taken his or her estate in case of intestacy and that without liability to creditors.