palpable exponents in the persons of those who are in their several departments the organs of the societies, and in every member of them according to the sphere of action which each may fill in virtue of his membership. Now I am to argue, that the powerful and separate moral agency which is thus established, requires the application to it of a consecrating principle of religion, as the moral agency of the individual requires to be consecrated by his individual worship. Wherever in the universe there is power, connected with that moral and reflective consciousness which is the condition of agency, it both is the property of God, the King of that universe, His rightful property, however for a time withholden or abused; and it can only be as it were realised, it can only fulfil the laws under which He gave it, when it is used for the purposes He has ordained, and in the temper of mercy, justice, truth, and faith, which He has inculcated. But these principles never can be truly, never can be permanently, entertained in the human breast, except by a continual resort to their fountain above, and the supply of the Divine grace, sought and obtained through a solemn worship. And this reasoning applies to moral agency as such, whether it be public or individual.

35. These general positions are alike tenable, as I apprehend, whatever theory we may adopt as to the origin of political power. If it be founded on the consent and will of the majority, that consent and will must themselves act subject to the obligation to sanc

tify its exercise. The function of choice in the legislature is yet more clear, where government is founded on paternal principles, and the fiction of popular sovereignty is discountenanced.

So, also, is it to be observed, that the conclusion we have reached seems properly to belong to pure Theism, and capable of being supported in argument even without reference to the more peculiar doctrines of Christianity; although it be undeniable that but for the revelation of the Gospel it never could have been clearly contemplated by the human understanding. But before it can reach to its minuter forms among the details of our conduct, it must be compared with many considerations. We are met at once by the fact, that while our duty as creatures to the Creator requires that all our acts should be done with regard to Him as their centre and to His law as their rule, the structure of our mind seems physically to preclude the possibility of maintaining without interruption a conscious reference to Him even while, nay, it may be even because, we are earnestly seeking to obey His will. Ought, then, all the combinations of men, by which new personalities are created, and a common life composed; ought all these, or, if not all, ought any of them, to be specifically consecrated by solemnity of religion appropriated distinctly to themselves?

36. In order to the successful pursuit of this inquiry, let us endeavour to examine strictly into the nature and degrees of personality in societies. Now, although it be true that there is generally in societies a real and

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substantial personality, care must be taken to keep the idea which the term conveys distinct from that of individuality. The latter signifies not only actual unity of life, but that unity attended with universal indivisibility; whereas, moral personality, while it implies unity for certain purposes, is compatible with divisibility in the subjects whose composition goes to form that unity. This personality is recognised by the laws of every civilised nation, and by the law of nations, under which bodies of men associated for the purposes of religion, of learning, of government general or municipal, of science, of art, even of economical and material improvement, are regarded as persons, are dealt with, that is to say, as being in every practical] sense agents, with the liabilities of agents; as discharging the functions, and as bearing the character, of individuals quoad certain purposes.

37. But, it will be asked, how do we see that to this limited and qualified individuality, religious responsibilities can in any case belong? I answer, because it may fulfil these three conditions: the first, to be living; the second, to be active; the third, to be moral; therefore it is capable of, and subject to, religious responsibility.

38. Let us then inquire narrowly what it is that renders the individual, properly so called, a capable subject of religious responsibility. It is plain that it is not merely his individuality; for a man is not more nor more truly an individual than a brute, and yet a brute is not bound by a religious responsibility. May it not

be something which he has in common with the great moral person of a society of men? And if it be something which characterises him in common with such a complex person, then it follows that the complex person is as capable of the religious relation as the simple one.

39. Imagine the spark of life, under any form in which it merely exists, and discharges no function beyond that (if it be one) of self-maintenance. By the very terms of the hypothesis, there is nothing here but the bare stationary unit, incapable of movement either forward or retrograde, of growth or of decay, of reflection or of habit. Here there is individuality, but no capability of religion.

40. Now, again, imagine that spark of life endowed with power, enabled not merely to be, but to act, to move, to grow, to advance, to decay, to recede; possessing that which we term a vegetative life; individuality remains, and something is added, but we have not yet filled up the conditions of moral responsibility.

41. Once more, add something further to the last predicament, and suppose a power not only of expansion and contraction in the life itself, but also of extrinsic action, of affecting for detriment or for advantage other lives elsewhere situated; and suppose that the being whose action was now endowed with this fertility, this capacity of production, should not only exercise the capacity upon other objects but upon himself, should mould and modify his own being, not by mere growth, but through the medium of action, by the formation of

habits, that is to say, of modified states of his own nature, arising out of his acts; we have now an active, as well as a merely vegetative individuality, but we are as clearly as ever wanting in the elements of the character of moral agency.

42. One stage in addition, and we have done. Superadd to the foregoing conditions a capacity of reflection, that is to say, of intelligence and consciousness, whose reach shall embrace the whole sphere of action to which the given powers are applicable; a faculty of perceiving the law by which means are adjusted to ends, and the higher law by which ends are chosen and rejected; and a free function of choice, of adoption or refusal, upon the view either of ends or means; and we have now all the conditions which are requisite to fill the conception of a moral person, a being morally responsible, the subject upon whom, if there be truth in our fundamental conceptions of right and wrong, may be justly administered a system of reward and punishment, of praise and blame.

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43. Now there is no one of these conditions which is wanting, I do not here say whether or not in all combinations of men, but in that peculiar combination which we term State. No one doubts that a State lives in the first and lowest form which I have described: no one doubts that it is capable of progression and retrogression in physical or in intelligent power: no one doubts that it is capable of producing great results, great moral as well as great material results, great results of positive good and evil, whether upon itself