undertake to hold you not responsible even if the fish is spoilt or stolen by your own servants.' I can understand that to be a perfectly reasonable proposal for him to make and for the company to accept. It seems to me perfectly idle, and I cannot understand how it could have been supposed necessary, that it should be referred to a judge to say whether an agreement between carriers, of whose business he knows nothing, and fishmongers, of whose business he equally knows nothing, is reasonable or not. If it is a question, it is one of fact; and evidence should be given to show that the fishmonger and carrier did not understand their business, but made an unjust and unreasonable contract. However, so it is, and I repeat that I am for my own part prepared to hold, not that an agreement between two people which has been voluntarily entered into by them cannot be unreasonable, but that the fact that it has been voluntarily entered into by them is the strongest possible proof that it is a reasonable agreement, and that I should require the strongest possible evidence, or something more even than a possibility, to show me that that was an unreasonable agree

ment.

Now, in my opinion, this was a voluntary agreement. That is the question which we have to consider, and the fact that there was an alternative is only of importance as showing that the agreement was voluntary; because if there is no alternative then, although the agreement is come to in terms, yet in truth in a sense it is no agreement between the parties, because there is a compulsion on one of them to enter into it. Therefore, it becomes of importance to see whether there was an alternative, for the purpose of seeing whether the agreement was a voluntary one. there was most obviously an alternative. The plaintiff might have sent his fish, if he had liked, paying 20 per cent more than he did; that is to say, paying £100 where he paid £80. If he had liked he might have sent his fish, paying that ratio with liability in the carrier; or he might have sent it upon the terms upon which he did send it, and he chose the latter.

Now

Really, it is difficult for me to express the opinion which I entertain upon this question with a sufficient appearance of the respect I have for the opinion of those who have thought differently, namely, the learned judges in the court below. They seem to say that there is no option because the terms are too good-the benefit given to the plaintiff is too great; that if a less benefit were given to him and to all the other senders of fish, if, instead of 20 per cent being taken off the price it were 10, or peradventure 5 (for 10 might be too much for aught I know), then indeed there would be an option, but as it is it is such an irresistible temptation to him, I suppose, it is so good a thing for him, that he has no choice but to take it. The argument comes to this: the allowance is so just and reasonable to all fish dealers that it is unjust and

unreasonable to each of them. Well, one has heard a great many discussions about free will, but I protest this is a novelty-I never heard anything like it before—it is the most extraordinary proposition that I ever heard in my life. The assumption that he is obliged to do it because he cannot otherwise compete with his fellow fishmongers is the most gratuitous one that was ever invented in this world. He says that he has put £20 into his pocket; but suppose that his profit was twenty times £20, or two hundred times £20 in the course of the year, which for aught we know it might be, there is not the slightest proof that it is not so it is said that because he has put £20 into his pocket we are to infer that he could not carry on his trade unless he could put that £20 into his pocket, and therefore that the thing is of a compulsory nature, and that he has no option, no choice, and that consequently his agreement is not voluntary. I repeat that I really do not understand how such a conclusion could have been come to, except by some generous feeling that railway companies ought to be kept in order for the benefit of fishmongers.

Now, just let me ask this question-"Just and reasonable”—Is it just? If it is not, it is unjust. Is it unjust? Will any human being say that this man has been unjustly treated? Well, but justice alone is not sufficient; you must not only be just, but yon must be reasonable, which, by the way, rather imports that you may be one without the other. I should think that that was an extremely difficult thing. However, if it is just, is it reasonable? Why its very justice shows its reasonableness.

I must say that I really do think this is about the plainest case that ever came before your Lordships' house.

LORD FITZGERALD.-My Lords, I concur. The question for our consideration is whether the conditions expressed in the special contract signed by the plaintiff are just and reasonable. Such a question always involves matters of fact as well as legal considerations, and probably was made a question for judicial decision in order to afford some protection to parties dealing with carriers and public companies against injustice and oppression, and insure for them freedom of contract. The true construction of the special contract has been raised before us, and I think that its conditions must be read according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the language used, and that your Lordships would not be justified in importing or implying any limitation not expressed. Read in that light the language is large enough to protect the defendants from the negligent conduct of their servants, but I am not inclined to go further. If your Lordships were to interpret it as protecting the defendants from wilful misconduct, then a large and important question would arise for determination, namely, whether a contract which wholly relieved the company from liability for loss

or damage and exonerated them from all the obligations of duty, was not in itself unjust and unreasonable, and contrary to the policy of the law.

Assuming, then, that the special contract, if it stood alone and without more, might have been unreasonable, it may become fair and reasonable if a proper alternative was offered to the plaintiff. The alternative in my judgment was a fair and reasonable one. It was to carry at a rate which we must deem to have been reasonable as it was less than the parliamentary rate, and subject to all the liabilities of carriers at common law. The defendants at the same time offered to carry at a reduction of 20 per cent if relieved from certain common law liabilities.

The plaintiff deliberately rejected the first and accepted the second—and signed a contract to that effect. He now asks to be relieved from it, alleging that it was unjust as imposing on him unreasonable conditions, and that in effect he was coerced to adopt it, having no option. The Court of Appeal seems to have been of that opinion, and two of the Lord Justices seem to rest their decision on the ground that the plaintiff was not a free agent.

Thus Baggallay, L. J., after giving his impression on what I cannot help thinking was the main question, is represented to have said: "But I do not think it necessary to express a definite opinion upon that point now; because it appears to me that, having regard to the circumstances of this case, there really was no option as between the two modes of carriage which the plaintiff could adopt. I think, therefore, that this appeal must be allowed." And Lindley, L. J., thus expresses his final opinion: "It follows from the foregoing reasoning that in my opinion such a contract as the one before us might be reasonable under other circumstances; and I cannot go to the length of my brothers Baggallay and Brett and say that such a contract must be unreasonable in all cases. I should consider it reasonable in all cases in which the customer was not practically compelled to adopt the lower rate. Under such circumstances I should concur with Lords Blackburn and Bramwell, and with the decision in Simons v. Great Western Ry. Co.

In that view I am unable to follow the Lords Justices, but though differing from them with hesitation I prefer the opinion of Mathew, J., in the Divisional Court, when he says: "It is perfectly clear here that the customer was free if he chose to have gone to the company and demanded that they should have carried his goods as common carriers. In that state of things they would be liable in the ordinary way for all the risks of the carriage. But the company, in lieu of that contract which rendered them liable for all the risks of the journey, proposed to the customer the terms which I have just read, and in consideration of his accept

ing those terms they proposed to carry his goods at one fifth less than the ordinary rate; and the customer agrees to those terms.” Why should the plaintiff be relieved from the contract he has deliberately accepted? There was full and ample consideration, there is an absence of any fraud, and he has not been overreached. He elected to send his goods at the lower rate-the alternative offered to him was fair, and I can discover no ground on which we can treat this special contract as a fraud on the statute or relieve the plaintiff from its consequences.

Order appealed from reversed; order of the Queen's Bench Division restored; the respondent to repay (according to the undertaking given) the costs in the court below; and to pay the appellants their costs in the Court of Appeal and their costs of this appeal; cause remitted to the Queen's Bench Division.

English Railway and Canal Traffic Act.-By the terms of this act all limitation of liability on the part of carriers by mere notice is prohibited. Their liability may, however, be limited by special contract provided the conditions thereof are in the opinion of the court "just or reasonable." A contract which is on its face apparently unjust and unreasonable may be considered valid if the party forwarding the goods had an option which he has declined to forward them on just and reasonable terms. Gallagher v. Great Western R. Co., 18 Irish C. L. (N. S.) 326.

It will be observed therefore that every case stands to a great degree upon its own merits.

Just and Reasonable Conditions. In the following cases the conditions contained in the special contract of carriage have been held to be just and reasonable: Aldridge v. Great Western R. Co., 15 C. B. (N. S.) 582; Simons v. Great Western R. Co., 18 C. B. 805; Lewis v. Great Western R. Co., 5 H. & N. 867; Beal v. South Devon R. Co., 3 H. & C. 337; White v. Great Western R. Co., 2 C. B. (N. S.) 7; McClure v. London, etc., R. Co., 7 H. & N. 477; Harrison v. London, etc., R. Co., 2 B. & S. 12; Wise v. Great Western R. Co., 1 H. & N. 63; Robinson v. Great Western R. Co., 35 L. J. (C. P.) 123; Lord v. Midland R. Co., L. R. 2 C. P. 339; Pardington v. South Wales R. Co., 1 H. & N. 392; Lewis v. Great Western R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 195; Moore v. Great Northern R. Co., 8 L. R. N. 95.

Unjust and Unreasonable Conditions. In the following cases the conditions contained in the contract of carriage have been held unjust and unreasonable: Gregory v. West Midland R. Co., 2 H. & C. 944; Rooth v. Northeastern R. Co., L. R 2 Exch. 173; Gaston v. Bristol, etc., R. Co. 1 B & S. 112; Allday v. Great Western R. Co., 5 B. & S. 903; McManus v. Lancashire R. Co., 4 H. & N. 327; Doolan v. Midland R. Co., L. R. 2 App. Cas. 792; Lloyd . Waterford, etc., R. Co., 15 Ir. C. L. (N. S.) 37; Peek v. North Staffordshire R. Co., 10 H. L. Cas. 473; Ashenden v. London & B. R. Co., L. R. 5 Exch Div. 190; Carigan v. Great Northern, etc., R. Co., 6 L. R. Ir. 90; Hill v. London & N. W. R. Co., 42 L. T. 513; McNally v. Lancashire & Yorkshire R. Co., 8 L. R. Ir. 81.

ISAACSON

v.

NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER R. R. Co.

(94 New York Reports, 278.)

A carrier of passengers, by the sale of a passenger ticket, as incident to the contract, without any specific agreement or separate compensation, becomes obligated to carry the baggage of the passenger to a reasonable amount, and to deliver it at the end of the route to the passenger or his duly authorized agent.

The courts may take judicial notice of the system of checking baggage by railroad companies, and of the general practice, in case of through pas sengers having tickets for an entire route over roads owned and operated by separate but connecting lines, for the first company to check the baggage to its final destination, and to deliver it at the end of its route to the next succeeding carrier, and so on until it reaches the possession of the last carrier.

It is within the apparent authority of a baggage-master so to check baggage, and where he receives it and agrees to check it through by a particular route the company is bound, although in fact he had no authority to check it by that route; at least it is a question of fact for a jury.

It seems that a baggage-master, in the absence of special authority, cannot bind his company by a contract to carry baggage beyond the terminus of its road, or fixing a special or unusual mode of delivery, as at a place other than the depot of the company.

The usual baggage-check delivered to a passenger is not regarded as embodying the contract of carriage, but only as a voucher or token to enable him to identify and claim his baggage at the end of the route.

In an action to recover for loss of baggage these facts appeared. Plaintiff held passage tickets for himself and family over defendant's road from New York to Niagara Falls, and also tickets from the latter place to New Orleans by the "Mobile route," in which route it did not appear that defendant had any interest, but it. in connection with defendant's road, formed a continuous line between New York and New Orleans. Plaintiff presented these tickets with his baggage to the baggage-master at defendant's baggage-room in New York city and requested him to check the baggage from New York to New Orleans by the route indicated. The baggage-master examined the tickets, assented to the request and gave plaintiff checks for his trunks, which he put in his pocket without examination. Upon the checks were the words "New Orleans and New York," and also certain letters and abreviations which, as explained by experts, indicate the several roads forming the "Great Jackson route. Defendant delivered the baggage to the agent of the Great Jackson route at Niagara Falls, and while in transit it was destroyed by an accident. Held, that the undertaking of the baggage-master to check by the Mobile route was the undertaking of defendant, and included an agreement to deliver at the end of its road to the next succeeding carrier; that by the delivery to another carrier, in the absence of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, it remained liable as insurer; also that the omission of plaintiff to examine the checks was not such contributory negligence as prevented a recovery; that at least it was a question for the jury as to whether he had a right to repose upon the representation of the baggage-master without examining the checks, also as to whether an inspection of the