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III. THE PREMISES.

A. Rights growing out of the Description or Nature of these or Incident thereto.

The general rules governing the construction of the description in conveyances are applied in the case of mining leases. Where there is any doubt as to what has been demised, the question is one of intention which must be determined by construing all parts of the lease together. Where boundaries are given with reference to fixed and known objects, they control courses and distances.

Whenever disputes occur because of some ambiguity arising out of a vague description of the premises which are to be mined upon, or from the peculiar nature of these, the Courts endeavor to effectuate the intention of the parties at the time of making the lease.

But on the other hand, when it is plain from the written clauses that operations are to be conducted upon certain designated and described sites, the lessee will be made to carry on his operations within these boundaries, and parol evidence is inadmissible to show the contrary in the absence of fraud or mistake. In the case of oil leases, however, where the lessee is restricted to operating at designated sites on the premises, he has the protection of the entire premises; no one else may bore thereon. Sometimes such a protection outside of the premises is conferred in terms by the lease. The extent of the demise often becomes a question of fact for the jury, but only when the meaning of the language cannot be determined from the instrument itself, but can be arrived at only by ascertainment of surrounding circumstances. Then the question is one not of construction, but of the solution of a latent ambiguity, existing in words which of themselves are plain in meaning.

Pierce v. Tidwell, 81, 299 (1886). The Tidwells agreed Alabama. with Pierce for the consideration of $20 per month, to give him, his heirs and assigns, "the exclusive right to possession of all minerals that underlie their land which forms part of the mine called and known as the P. W. Coal Mine," and to all the timber growing thereon suitable for mining purposes; also a right of way to and from the mines whenever required. It was further agreed that "the said $20 shall be paid only as long as the said mine is worked to advantage." Held, the words "said mine" mean the P. W. Coal Mine, and not merely the part of it upon the Tidwell tract.

P. mined on three tracts, the Tidwell being one, his whole operation being known as the "P. W. Coal Mines." Having exhausted the coal on the Tidwell tract, he continued to use the right of way over it, but refused to pay the sum of $20 per month agreed. Held, he was bound to do so, so long as he worked the P. W. Coal Mine to advantage or profit.

Dietz v. Mission Transfer Co., 95, 92 (1892).

A deed

California. of a part of a tract of land excepted "all oils, petroleum, asphaltum, and other kindred mineral substances," and the right to erect machinery, sink wells, bore, tunnel, dig for, work on and remove the same from the premises," also rights of way, and to lay pipes.

The grantee of the balance of the tract and the reserved minerals was not confined to those portions where there were surface indications of oil, but might go upon the land to develop it and ascertain whether oil exists.

Kamphouse v. Gaffner, 73, 453 (1874). Where boundaries Illinois. are given with reference to fixed and known objects, they

control courses and distances.

A lease of a one-half interest in that part of the lands of the estate of K., between G.'s "sand level and the range he is working now. Said claim is seventy-five feet wide, and is known as the old B. and R. Range. The ground hereby leased fronts on the slough, . . . and shall run from thence east on all the lands of said K. estate." "East" does not necessarily mean due east, but is controlled by the previous words designating the location. Evidence is admissible to show the location and course of the range already being worked by the lessee, for the purpose of applying the lease to its proper subject-matter, and explaining a latent ambiguity. The mines involved in this case were lead mines, upon the sides of a series of bluffs, the usual mode of mining which was by running levels or drifts horizontally from the slough into the bluffs, the ore being found in crevices in the rocks running back from the base of the bluffs. The position which seems to have the approval of the court is, that G., who started from a point on the bluff within the frontage named in his lease (in general form as above), might thence follow the crevice or range in an easterly direction though it crossed beyond a due east and west line extending from the point of the lessee's frontage nearest G.'s possession.

Indianapolis N. G. Co. v. Kibbey, 135, 357 (1893). The Indiana. owner of a tract of eighty acres granted to K.'s assignor twenty feet square of the same "for the purpose and exclusive right of a gas well on said twenty-foot square tract," with rights of way over and through the entire tract. The grantor further covenanted "not to drill or suffer or permit others to drill or put down any other gas well or wells on any part of said entire eighty-acre tract," except a single well for residence purposes for himself or his neighbors.

K. was entitled to an injunction against a stranger who had entered upon the eighty-acre tract and was sinking a gas well. He had a right to all the gas under the eighty-acre tract that could be obtained by boring within the twenty-foot square, save that which might be obtained from one well for the domestic use of the owner and his neighbors.

Oskaloosa College v. Western Union Fuel Co., 90, 380 (1894). Iowa. Where a mining lease preserves from mining the ground east and south of a building, mining is precluded in the square lying between southeast corners of the land lying directly east and south.

Massachusetts.

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Chester Co. v. Lucas, 112, 424 (1873). This was

an action of trespass to recover the value of emery and iron ore alleged to have been removed from plaintiff's land. Plaintiff was the grantee of the metals and minerals in a tract of land bounded beginning at the centre of the vein of iron ore, on the line between Wright and Dewey," thence, etc. At the trial, the location of the grant being in dispute, there was conflicting evidence whether there was any such vein, and whether there were not more veins than one, and whether the parties agreed upon a line of rocks as marking the place of a supposed vein, and whether the vein, if any existed, was a vein of emery and not of iron. The judge charged, in substance, that if there was one vein of iron on the line between Wright and Dewey, that vein would be the starting point in the description of the deed, and parol evidence would not be admissible to affect it; but if there were more than one such vein, parol evidence would be admissible to show which vein was intended; if there was no vein, and the parties agreed upon certain rocks as marking the location of a vein, those rocks would be the starting point; if there was not a vein of iron ore, but was a vein of mineral supposed by the parties to be iron ore, and called in the deed a vein of iron ore, that vein would fix the starting point of the location. Held, that this charge appeared to be adapted to and sufficient to meet the different aspects of the case.

Spencer v. Kunkle, 2 Grant, 406 (1855). Where Pennsylvania. there were two leases, the first of coal mines, and the second of miners' houses, on a certain tract, and the latter by its express terms was made part of first, the two leases constitute but one entire demise, and goods and chattels on any part of the premises are liable to distress for rent of houses.

Tiley v. Moyers, 43, 404 (1862). Where a lease described the premises as their coal bank and its appurtenances," and there was a dispute as to the extent of the demise, it was a question of fact for the jury.

Allison's Ap., 77, 221 (1874). In a lease of a lot of land "for the sole and only purpose of mining and excavating for petroleum, coal, rock, and carbon oil," and "a protection of ten rods on the east side" and "eight rods on the north side" of the lot, the "protection" includes the area on the northeast corner included by the extension of the outside lines of the "protections.' The lessor or his assignee will be enjoined from boring for oil within this area, and a court of equity will award damages for the trespass and waste of so doing.

Mays v. Dwight, 82, 462 (1876). D. & A. leased to M. a tract of oil land, describing it, with one partly bored well thereon. M. agreed to sink this well deeper, and to deliver to the lessors one-fourth of its product. Both parties supposed this well to be upon the leased tract. It was afterwards discovered to be on an adjoining tract leased by S. to M., who thereupon offered to deliver possession of the premises leased to D. & A., and refused to pay the royalty. D. & A. filed a

bill for an account against M. As this was a case of mutual mistake against which equity will relieve, the bill was dismissed.

Freck v. Locust Mt. Coal Co., 86, 318 (1878). Where the lessor not only gives his tenant the power but makes it his duty to explore and mark a theoretical line upon his own premises, the tenant cannot be treated as a trespasser if in an honest attempt to ascertain the line he should chance to pass over it.

Rounsley v. Jones, 2 Walker, 112 (1883). A reservation of the ore on the west side of a tract which extends in a northwesterly direction, no division line being adopted, means the ore on the west of a line drawn through the middle of the tract in the direction of its greatest length, and not of a north and south line dividing it into two equal parts.

In this case, if the latter construction had been given, all the ore in the tract would have been "on the west side."

Hughes v. Coal Co., 104, 207 (1883). A conveyance of coal provided as follows: "The said party of the second part does agree to pay as follows: For each acre of good merchantable coal contained in that portion of the land which lies along the west side of the ravine on the east side of the S. property the sum of $140 per acre, and for that upon the remainder the sum of $70 per acre." The evidence showed that east of the S. property, beginning at the northern part and running south, there was only one ravine, but that this ravine separated into two about opposite the middle of the S. property, No. 1 running southeast, and No. 2 southwest. Held, that the deed presented no latent ambiguity, and that the construction thereof was for the court, which rightly decided that ravine No. 2, being the one nearest the S. property, and in such a position that it must be crossed by a line running east from said property to ravine No. 1, was the one intended in the conveyance.

Ashman v. Wigton, 20 W. N. C. 280 (1887). An agreement that one of the parties is to have the right to take coal on the north side of a gangway, to be run as provided in the agreement, does not mean that the line of the gangway is to be extended and become the boundary, but that the gangway itself is to be the dividing line, thus giving the right to mine only on the part of the tract which is bounded on the southwest by the gangway, and on the southeast by a line drawn from the south end of the gangway at right angles to its general direction to the eastern line of the tract.

Duffield v. Hue, 129, 94 (1889). Where the premises in a printed oil lease are described, but it is plain from the written clauses that the operations are to be conducted only on certain designated and described sites, the lessee is restricted to these sites. And parol evidence to the contrary is inadmissible in the absence of fraud or mistake.

Duffield v. Hue, 136, 602 (1890). The lessee in the above lease, however, has the protection of the entire premises, and equity has jurisdiction to restrain the lessor or others acting under him from drilling wells thereon outside of the designated sites, and thereby lessening the production of wells drilled by the lessee, such injury being destructive of his rights, and incapable of adequate remedy at law.

Lulay v. Barnes, 172, 331 (1896). By recorded articles of agreement R. sold to L. a tract of 128 acres, described by adjoiners, and also "the coal right in the northern hill, as far as the centre, between the southern and northern boundary," with a right of way. This passed a fee in the coal, the location of which could be established by parol evidence. It was error to hold that the conveyance failed because of the vagueness and uncertainty of the description.

Sobey v. Thomas, 39, 317 (1876). An oral lease of Wisconsin. the exclusive right to mine the "Watkins range or works" upon the lessor's land conveys a right not only to mine said range so far as it had been actually opened and worked, but also to follow it to the limits of the land. But such lease did not give the right to work a vein on another portion of the land between which and the former no connection was shown to exist within the said tract, although a connection had been traced by a circuitous course through the adjoining land of another. The "Watkins range" was a flat opening, the ores being found in a horizontal instead of a vertical seam. Though the original opening might have been connected with the second vein by drifting in a direction across the range, yet in the absence of proof this will not be presumed merely from the nature of the opening.

Ross v. Heathcock, 52, 557 (1881). For a consideration named defendant conveyed to a company for the purpose of mining and digging the mineral thereon, certain described tracts of land. These were described by government subdivisions, followed by the words "and known as the Heathcock range." This did not give the grantees the right to follow this range and mine thereon when it was traced or developed subsequently on other land belonging to the defendant. Nor is this affected by the fact that the parties at the . time of entering into the contract were mistaken in the course of the range.

Nor is this right gained by the following subsequent conveyances or

contracts:

1. A lease of the right to construct a dam and maintain a watercourse on the said land.

2. An adit lease giving the privilege of opening an adit or level thereon, with the privilege of sinking the necessary shafts to run said adit, and of following and digging after any mineral that the company might discover in running said adit or sinking said shafts, "but not to follow such mineral further east than where the said adit or level commences."

B. Fixtures and Appurtenances.

There is nothing peculiar to the law of mining on these subjects. For the principles involved, the reader must refer to the books on Real Estate Law, Conveyancing, and Landlord and Tenant. The plan of this work does not contemplate a discussion of them, but the principal cases in which these principles are

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