IN few of the relations of master and servant has the legislature so prescribed the manner of the performance of the obligations arising from the contract, and limited the capacity of the weaker party to contract to his own injury, as in the matter of the payment of the wages of miners. As a class, these men seem to be regarded by the law maker as particularly obnoxious to oppression and injury by their employers. The statutes looking toward their protection in this regard seek to accomplish this end by three means. First, by prescribing in what payment must be made, or by forbidding payment in certain enumerated articles or obligations.1 Second, by prescribing the time when payment of wages must be made. Third, by prescribing regulations and inspection of the weighing of coal in those mines where weight is the measure of wages.3

1 Indiana, Horner's Rev. Stats. 1896, sec. 3878 f, g; Iowa, Laws 1888, ch. 55, secs. 1, 2; Rev. Code 1888, tit. xi., ch. 8, pp. 595-6; Missouri, Gen. Stats. 1889, secs. 7058-60; New Mexico, Act Feb. 17, 1897, ch. 11, p. 27; Pennsylvania, Act June 29, 1881, P. L. 147; Act May 20, 1891, P. L. 96; Act June 9, 1891, P. L. 256; West Virginia, App. Code 1891, p. 1002, pars. 1, 2; Wyoming, Laws 1890, ch. 82, secs.

1-4.

2 Indiana, Horner's Rev. Stats. 1896, sec. 3878 e; Iowa, Act April 14, 1894, p. 95; Kansas, Act March 10, 1893, p. 270;

Maryland, Act April 4, 1896, p. 221; Missouri, Gen. Stats. 1889, sec. 7059; Act April 20, 1893, p. 183; Ohio, Act May 4, 1891, 88 O. L. 553; New York, Laws 1895, ch. 791, p. 556; Pennsylvania, Act May 20, 1891, P. L. 96; Wyoming, Laws 1890-91, ch. 82, secs. 1-4.

3 Alabama, Act Dec. 17, 1894, p. 245; Illinois, Hurd's Rev. Stats. 1895, ch. 93, secs. 20-25; Indiana, Horner's Rev. Stats. 1896, sec. 5480 a, b; Iowa, Laws of 1888, chs. 53, 54; Rev. Code 1888, tit. xi., ch. 8, pp. 594-5; Kansas, Act March 13, 1893, p. 271; Kentucky, Barb. & Car. Stats

The constitutionality of all these acts is more or less in question. The discussion of this point is not within the scope of this work, but the cases in which it has been raised in regard to the statutes enumerated are collected below.

Reinecke v. People, 15 Ap. 241 (1884). The act of Illinois. June 14, 1883, "to provide for the weighing of coal at the mines," which provides that every mine owner shall furnish a standard track scale upon which all coal hoisted from the mine shall be weighed before it is loaded on the cars, and that the weight so determined shall be considered the basis upon which the wages of persons mining coal shall be computed, and which authorizes the miners to employ a check weigher to keep an account thereof, does not apply to a mine which is operated by machinery and where the men are paid by the day.

Jones v. People, 110, 590 (1884). Act of June 14, 1883 (see Reinecke v. People, ante), does not apply where the mine owner has contracted to pay his employees in some other way than according to the weight of the coal dug, e. g. when the miners were paid, as in this case, so much for each box of coal mined.

Millett v. People, 117, 294 (1886). The act of June 14, 1883, as amended by the act of June 29, 1885, which, among other things, provides that all coal produced in the State shall be weighed as provided in the act of 1883, and that a correct record of the same be kept in a prescribed manner, at the expense of the owner, agent, or operator, is unconstitutional. It deprives mine operators of the liberty of contracting. If the purpose of the statute is to furnish needful information to the public, it is void, as taking property for a public use without compensation. Sec. 29, art. 4, of the Constitution, enjoining legislation in the interest of miners, applies only to their personal safety.

Frorer v. People, 141, 171 (1892). Sections 1 and 2 of the act of May 28, 1891, entitled "An act to provide for the payment of wages in lawful money and to prohibit the truck system, and to prevent deductions from wages except for lawful money actually advanced," which attempts to prohibit persons engaged in mining and manufacturing from keeping a truck store, or being interested in or controlling any store for the furnishing of supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries to their employees while so engaged in mining or manufacturing, is unconstitutional. It violates the provision that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, the privilege of contracting being both a liberty and a property right.

Ramsey v. People, 142, 380 (1892). The act of June 10, 1891, which requires owners and operators of coal mines, when the miner is paid on the basis of the amount of coal mined and delivered by him, to weigh the coal on pit cars before it is screened, and to pay on such weights,

1896, secs. 2722-39; Missouri, Gen. Stats. 1889, secs. 7054-6; Act March 26, 1895, p. 229; New Mexico, Act Feb. 28, 1889, p. 299; Ohio, Rev. Stats. 1890, sec. 305; Pennsylvania, Act March 30, 1875, P. L. 38; Act June 1, 1883, P. L. 52; Act May

18, 1878, P. L. 67; Act June 13, 1883, P. L. 113; Tennessee, Act of Term 1887, ch. 206, p. 336; Washington. Gen. Stats. 1891, secs. 2243-4; West Virginia, App. Code 1891, p. 999 sq., pars. 1-7.

is in violation of the Constitution, as depriving a class of persons of the liberty and property right of making contracts without due process of law.

Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147, 66 (1893). The act of April 23, 1891, prescribing that mining and certain other corporations shall make weekly payments to employees, is unconstitutional, as interfering with the liberty of contracting.

Harding v. People, 160, 459 (1896). The act in force July 1, 1887, as amended by the act in force July 1, 1891, providing for the weighing of coal at the mines, is unconstitutional. It is class legislation, and deprives the miner and the mine owner of the right of contracting. Martin v. State, 143, 545 (1896). The act of March 2, Indiana. 1891, sec. 5, provides that all coal mined under contract for payment by quantity shall be weighed before being screened, and the full weight thereof credited to the miner; provided "that nothing in this act shall be so construed as to compel payment for sulphur, rock, slate, black jack, or other impurities, including dirt, which may be loaded with or amongst the coal."

The evidence in this case showed that these impurities could only be separated from the coal by screening, and it was therefore held not to be a violation of the act not to weigh before screening.

Beecher v. Dacey, 45, 92 (1881). A mercantile firm deMichigan. livered goods to the laborers of a mining company upon orders in the following form: "Due J. D. for labor from the M. & P. Rolling Mill Co., four dollars, in goods, at the store of E. H. Mead & Co., W. W. W., Treasr., by C. S. W. R. ;" and on the delivery of goods to the amount called for, stamped each order "paid." It was apparently understood that M. & Co. should receive and honor the orders of the company, and that the latter should settle with them every month and pay the amount of the orders taken by them. The firm became insolvent, having among its assets a large number of these orders, upon which suits were brought against a stockholder of the corporation as for labor debts. Held, the action would not lie. The orders could not be treated as having been merely assigned to the firm by those in whose favor they were drawn; and the use of the words " for labor" in the orders was simply to indicate the nature of the service for which they were given, and not to keep them alive as against stockholders.

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Berringer v. Cobb, 58, 557 (1885). A mining superintendent sued for wages, and his employers claimed as set off the rent of a house occupied by him. Held, that unless there was proof of a custom that the superintendent should have his house free of charge, the set off must be allowed. But it seems that plaintiff's evidence that he never heard of a superintendent's paying rent for his house was enough to leave the question with the jury.

State v. Loomis, 115, 307 (1893). Secs. 7058 and 7060, Missouri. Rev. Stats. 1889, making it a misdemeanor for any corporation, person, or firm engaged in manufacturing or mining to issue in payment of wages of its laborers any order, check, memorandum, token or evidence of indebtedness, payable otherwise than in lawful money of the United States, unless the same is negotiable and redeemable at its par value in cash or in goods or supplies, at the option of the holder,

at the store or other place of business of the corporation, person or firm, is unconstitutional, in that it deprives the citizens of the liberty of contracting without due process of law.

Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113, 431 (1886). 66 Pennsylvania. first, second, third and fourth sections of the act of June 29, 1881, are utterly unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been made by the legislature to do what, in this country, cannot be done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts. The act is an infringement alike of the right of the employer and the employee; more than this, it is an insulting attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States.

"He may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or coal, and any and every law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious and void." Gordon, J.

Plymouth Co. v. Kommiskey, 116, 365 (1887). A custom that the owners of a mine shall pay the laborers employed by a contractor out of the funds due the contractor, upon the laborers' time being turned in by him, does not create any liability on the part of the mine owner to the laborers beyond the amount in his hands to the credit of the contractor, and none whatever if the time is not turned in. Whether this has been done or not is a question for the jury.

Fairfield v. Wyoming V. Coal Co., 142, 397 (1891). The employees of a coal company, mining coal for it with the assistance of laborers employed by them, "turned in" to the company monthly statements of the time made and wages earned by their laborers, and on its regular pay-days the company paid such wages directly to the laborers, out of the moneys in its hands due the miners who employed them.

Such being the established usage and method of conducting the business, the "turning in" of the laborer's time by the miner was in legal effect an order on the company to pay to the laborer the amount due him from the miner, and the acceptance thereof was an undertaking to pay at the regular pay-day. As the rights of a laborer, under such an order, are not superior to those of his employer, the miner cannot maintain an action for its amount against the coal company prior to the pay-day on which the moneys of the miner, out of which it is to be paid, become due, even though he may have quit the service of the miner nearly twenty days before such pay-day.

Hamilton v. Jutte, 16 C. C. R. 193 (1895). An employee may waive his right under the act of May 20, 1891, to receive his wages in cash, and may validly consent to receive his pay in store orders. "No act of assembly can prevent a man from making a contract to accept payment in any way he pleases."

Commonwealth v. Isenberg, 4 Dist. Rep. 579 (1895). The semimonthly pay law of May 20, 1891, P. L. 96, is unconstitutional. It infringes the following clauses of the Constitution: "No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed."

Art. I. sec. 17. "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." Art. I. sec. 1.

Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 5 Dist. Rep. 148 (1895). The third section of act of June 1, 1883, P. L. 52, providing penalties for weighing coal with an incorrect scale, is unconstitutional in that the subject of the section is not clearly expressed in the title, which is as follows: "An act to protect miners in the bituminous coal regions of this Commonwealth."

Sally v. Berwind-White C. M. Co., 5 Dist. Rep. 316 (1896). The plaintiff was employed by the defendant in its business of mining coal, and his wages were paid him under an arrangement with a general store kept in the vicinity of the mine, which furnished the plaintiff, from time to time, with provisions for himself and family, and, at plaintiff's request, presented the bills for the same to the defendant, which, at plaintiff's request, paid the same, and deducted the amounts paid from the wages due him. Held, that this was a valid payment by the defendant, and not contrary to any constitutional interpretation of the provisions of the act of May 20, 1891.

If the act of May 20, 1891, was intended to prevent persons competent to contract from making such contracts as they deem mutually advantageous, and which are not harmful in themselves or in conflict with the rights of others, it violates the Constitution.

Smith v. State, 90, 575 (1891). Indictment of weighTennessee. man under act of 1887, ch. 206, for knowingly and wilfully taking more pounds for a bushel and more pounds for a ton than provided by law. The proofs showed that the cars were run upon scales, and if under twenty-five hundred pounds, they were weighed, but if over, they were not weighed, and the miner was credited with twenty-five hundred pounds. The defence set up was that this was in accordance with a contract which was entered into between the miners and the company in 1888, and which had been signed by many of the miners. This manner of weighing had been in force a number of years, and must have been known to the prosecutor. He had not agreed to the system. Held, not a good defence.

State v. Jenkins, 90, 580 (1891). The threatening by a mine owner that if the miners do not discharge the check weighman employed by them, he would shut down the mine, is not interfering with or intimidating the check weighman, within the act of 1887, ch. 206.

State v. Goodwill, 33, 179 (1889). Sec. 3, Acts West Virginia. 1887, ch. 3, which prohibits persons engaged in mining and manufacturing from issuing for the payment of labor any order or paper except such as is specified in the act, is unconstitutional. It abridges the liberty of contracting; it restricts the privileges of certain classes, and not of others. It is not a valid exercise of the police power.

State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., 33, 188 (1889). Sec. 4, ch. 63, Acts 1887, which prohibits persons and corporations engaged in mining and manufacturing, and interested in selling merchandise and supplies, from selling merchandise and supplies to their employees at a greater per