As the decided cases upon this subject involve no general principle, but are concerned only with questions of construction, a general discussion of them is impossible. The cases themselves are collected below in the arrangement by States adopted in this work.

The question of the constitutionality of these statutes has been decided affirmatively in a Pennsylvania case.

Daniels v. Hilgard, 77, 640 (1875). The legislature has Illinois. power, under the Constitution, to establish reasonable police regulations for the operating of mines and collieries, and the "act providing for the health and safety of persons employed in coal mines," which requires the owner or agent of every coal mine or colliery employing ten men, or more, to make or cause to be made an accurate map or plan of the workings of such coal mine or colliery, is not unconstitutional. Under section 2 of this act the inspector of mines may, on default of the owner or agent, prepare such a map through his deputy, and may recover the cost thereof in an action in his own name. It is no defence to such an action that the map is not such as the law requires.

Sholl v. People, 93, 129 (1879). Under sec. 9, ch. 93, Rev. Stats. 1874, as amended by act May 11, 1877, the person whose duty it is made to report any accident in any mine causing loss of life or serious personal injury to the mine inspector is the one who has the immediate charge of the mine. The owner and operator, or his agent, is not subject to the penalty, unless he has the personal charge of the mine. Loose v. People, 11 Ap. 445 (1882). Act of May 28, 1879, requires that mines worked through a shaft, slope, or drift should have escapement shafts. The owner of a mine having no escapement shaft of its own had effected a communication with a contiguous mine, and contended that this was a compliance with the law. The adjoining owner denied his right to use this means of egress, and claimed the right to close it up. Held, this question could not be adjudicated in a proceeding against the foreman by the mine inspector, although he made the latter a party.

Hamilton v. State, 102, 367 (1882). The act of 1879, relating to the health and safety of persons employed in coal mines, repealed all of the act of 1877 on the same subject, except such parts as were kept in force by the proviso to section 3 of the former. By this the then existing law which prescribed the time within which escapement shafts should be constructed in mines that were in operation on July 1, 1877, was continued and was not altered.

Beaucoup Co. v. Cooper, 12 Ap. 373 (1883). The agent of a coal company who superintends the mining of coal, failed to put the brakes and catches on the cages, required by section 6 of the act of 1879, providing for the safety of persons employed in coal mines, and in consequence of such failure was killed. Held, his widow and heirs cannot recover damages from the owner of the mine for his death. It was as much the duty of the agent as of the owner, under the statute, to see

that brakes and catches were provided. By failing to do so they were in pari delicto.

Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones, 19 Ap. 365 (1885). Secs. 4 and 6, ch. 93, Rev. Stats. 1874, as amended by act of June 21, 1883, requiring that in all mines where fire damp is generated, every working place where fire damp is known to exist shall be examined every morning with a safety lamp, by a competent person, before any other persons are allowed to enter, applies not only to opened and worked mines, but also to a shaft in process of sinking preparatory to opening up and working a mine or stratum of coal.

Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones, 127, 379 (1889). Coal Co. v. Jones, 19 Ap. 365, reversed, on ground that gas was not being generated at the working place" when the accident occurred.

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Sangamon C. M. Co. v. Wiggerhaus, 122, 279 (1887), affirming s. c. 25 Ap. 77 (1886). Sec. 8, ch. 93, Rev. Stats., requiring ** all underground, self acting or engine planes or gangways on which coal cars are drawn and persons travel" to be provided with signals, applies to all underground gangways on which coal cars are run, whatever the motive power may be.

Springside Coal M. Co. v. Grogan, 53 Ap. 60 (1892). Ch. 93, Rev. Stats., applies only to coal mines. A pit which is being dug, and which, when completed, is to be used as a shaft of a coal mine which it is designed to open, is not a coal mine within the meaning of the statute.

Commonwealth v. Bonnell, 8 Phila. 534 (1871).

Pennsylvania. In cutting the second opening required by the third section of the act of March 3, 1870, the production of coal for market by the men authorized to be employed for the purpose of cutting the said opening is not permitted by the act, except so far as it is incident to driving on through a seam or stratum towards a second outlet.

Commonwealth v. Tompkins, 1 L. L. R. 341 (1872); s. c. 4 Legal Gazette, 238. A mine is not free from danger within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1870, when gas actually exists within the mine, simply because its source is beyond the boundary lines thereof. The act deals with its presence, not its origin.

The act does not require that the mine be kept absolutely clear of gas, but that by the introduction of pure air the gas, as fast as evolved, be diluted, rendered harmless and expelled, so as to avoid its accumulation as standing gas.

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Commonwealth v. Connell, 2 L. L. R. 1 (1872). The act of March 3, 1870, by its terms, applies to mines worked by or through a shaft or slope." It consequently does not apply to a mine worked through a tunnel.

Commonwealth v. Wilkesbarre Coal Co., 29 Leg. Int. 213 (1872); Commonwealth v. Bonnell followed. A slope had been driven in a seam or stratum of coal which was in communication with a second outlet at the point where the mining was carried on, and a field of coal there had been exhausted. From that point a slope was continued, following the pitch of the seam down several hundred feet, and at the bottom thereof extensive mining was carried on, but there was no second outlet communicating therewith. The mine is within the legis

lative inhibition, and an injunction will be granted to restrain the owners from thus working it.

Northumberland County v. Zimmerman, 75, 26 (1873). The act of April 12, 1867, "for the better protection of person, property, and life in the mining regions of this Commonwealth," so far as it provides for the appointment by the Governor of police officers to preserve the peace, and for their payment at the rate of compensation fixed by the Governor, out of the county treasury, is constitutional, and an officer appointed thereunder may recover his compensation from the county.

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 1 Kulp, 218 (1886). Under the law of 1870 a mining boss has no discretion in the performance of his duties. His opinion that an appliance required by the act is unnecessary does not excuse his neglect to have it provided. He cannot delegate his powers and duties.

Whether a door is a main or "check" door within the meaning of the act is a question of fact.

Haddock v. Commonwealth, 103, 243 (1883). Section 3 of the act of March 3, 1870, does not prohibit the mining of coal for market in those seams of a coal mine which have two openings or outlets, as required by the act, at the same time that work is being carried on by not more than twenty men in another seam, for the purpose of making a gangway from said last mentioned seam to a second opening or outlet. A coal mine containing five strata or seams of coal was operated through a shaft extending from the surface through the various seams of coal, and the entrance to the shaft was covered by the breaker. In the first and third seams fifty or more miners were employed, mining coal for market. The second and fourth seams were not being worked. In the fifth seam a number of miners, not exceeding twenty, were engaged in working a gangway to connect with a second opening which had been completed to that seam, although said opening or outlet was already connected with the first and third seams, in accordance with the requirements of the act.

Under sections 3 and 5 of said act the inspector of mines filed a bill in equity to restrain the working of the first and third seams, at the same time that work was being carried on to make a second opening or outlet in the fifth seam. A demurrer to said bill was overruled by the court below, and the injunction granted. Held, to be error, and that under the proviso to said third section the work might be carried on as above stated.

Commonwealth v. Coonrad, 3 Kulp, 381 (1885); s. c. 14 L. L. R. 311. Under the act of June 30, 1885, if by reason of noxious gases, or any cause whatever, an anthracite mine has become dangerous, it is the duty of the "mine foreman" (mining boss) to compel all workmen to retire from the mine until a proper examination of its condition has been made. Failure to do this is a disobedience of the law. It was such disobedience to allow men to remain in and enter the mine after the ventilating apparatus, by reason of a break, ceased to work, and the fires under the boilers were still kept up, the mine being one which was dependent upon artificial means for ventilation. The foreman should have been acquainted with the danger.

Commonwealth v. Richmond, 2 Com. Pleas Rep. 189 (1885). In

order to convict a mine superintendent of a criminal offence under the act of June 30, 1885, art. xi., secs. 1-3, and art. xvii., sec. 4, for not furnishing props, it must be shown that a specific demand had been made at least one day in advance, giving the length of the props or timber required. A general demand by a committee of workmen, and a refusal generally to cut and prepare, is not sufficient. This prosecution arose out of a dispute as to whose duty it was to cut the props of the proper length. The court said it was the duty of the operator to cut props into proper length, and to take them into the chambers to the men employed in the mines, and deliver them there, leaving to the men the duty only to set them up.

Commonwealth v. Hutchison, 4 C. C. R. 18 (1887). If a vein of coal is known to generate explosive gases at any point, any mine on that vein will be considered "a mine generating explosive gases,' under the act of June 30, 1885, providing for a daily inspection of such mines by the mine foreman. But if there is doubt whether the foreman knew that explosive gases had ever been generated in his mine, he should not be found guilty of violating the provisions of the act.

Under the provisions of that act it is the duty of the mine foreman to see that the ventilation required thereby is furnished. This duty cannot be delegated. Neglect to perform this duty is a violation of the act, and subjects the offender to its penalties. That the amount of ventilation required by the act is unnecessary, or difficult to supply, is no excuse. The foreman has no discretion as to the amount. That is fixed by the legislature.

Commonwealth v. Wigton, 12 C. C. R. 55; s. c. 2 Dist. Rep. 51 (1893). Under the provisions of the act of June 30, 1885, requiring "the owner or agent of every coal mine to employ a competent and practical inside overseer, to be called a mining boss," owners or agents of mines are not required to employ a certified mining boss for every working drift or opening, where the mine, although worked through one or more drifts, consists of territory compactly adjacent, and in its working constitutes but a single operation. Under this act, where the operations are so extensive that the mining boss cannot personally perform all his prescribed duties, he may employ assistants who are not "certified."

Opinion of Attorney-General, 14 C. C. R. 96 (1893).

The powers of a mine inspector under the act of May 15, 1893, are purely statutory, are in derogation of the rights of employers and of private contract, and must be strictly construed.

He has power only to order workmen to cease work until the law is complied with, and to prevent them from working, or their employer from working them, in the meantime. So long as they are not working, the operator may abandon the mine; he cannot be compelled to comply with the act, and the reinstatement of the men is not within the inspector's control.

The act does not apply to a mine employing nine persons in any one period of twenty-four hours.

Commonwealth v. Vipond, 14 C. C. R. 357 (1893). Where a colliery was erected prior to the passage of the act of June 2, 1891, and is destroyed by fire, leaving foundations and boilers standing intact,

the breaker may be erected on the old foundation and the boilers maintained as they formerly existed, though less than one hundred feet from the breaker. See art. v., sec. 2, of said act.

Mine inspection. Appointment of foremen. 4 Dist. Rep. 666 (1895). Under the act of June 2, 1891, P. L. 176, the word "miner" includes all classes of miners who have had practical experience in working in a "mine,” as defined by the act of Assembly. And the right of examination for certificates of qualification for the positions of mine foreman and assistant should be limited only in accordance with the above definition. Where a mine foreman cannot personally superintend the entire mine, he has authority to employ a sufficient number of competent persons to act as his assistants. It is in the interest of the public good, and the law is to be so construed, that all assistants should have a certificate of qualification before they are employed as "competent persons" to act under the provisions of the act.

Durkin v. Kingston Coal Co., 171, 193 (1895). "We are not prepared to hold the act of 1891 to be unconstitutional as a whole. It relates to all anthracite coal mines and defines what shall be regarded as such mines. Coal may be taken out of the ground by farm owners for their own use, or it may be taken in such small quantities and for such local purposes as to make the application of the mining laws to the operations so conducted not only unnecessary, but burdensome to the extent of absolute prohibition. Such limited or incipient operations are not within the mischief to remedy which the mining laws were devised. They are ordinarily conducted for purposes of exploration or for family supply, and ought not to be classed with operations conducted for the supply of the public. The business of coal mining, like that of insurance or banking, may be defined by the legislature. The definition found in the act of 1891 seems to us reasonable, to be within the fair limits of a legislative definition, and to exclude only such operations as are too small to make the general regulations provided by the act applicable to them." 1

Coal Creek M. Co. v. Davis, 90, 711 (1891). The

Tennessee. statutory prohibition against the use of a furnace inside.

coal mines for ventilation purposes contained in the act of 1881, ch. 170, sec. 7, applies to mines worked by shafts, not to those worked by horizontal entries.

III. HEALTH AND SAFETY STATUTES IN THEIR RELATION TO THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE.

Those statutes for the protection of the lives, the health and the safety of miners, which are enumerated in the preceding division, generally contain a provision for the recovery of damages for injuries occurring through failure to comply with their requirements.

The obligation of the mine owner is by them enlarged and 1 The constitutionality of the act of May 15, 1893, is upheld in Commonwealth v. Jones, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 362 (1897).