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§ 1001. Where there is any evidence to sup--authority of the agent to make the agreement port a verdict it cannot be disturbed on appeal. were immaterial.-Ellerd v. Campfield, 161 S. -(Mo.App.) Rubey Trust Co. v. Weidner, 161 W. 392. S. W. 333; (Tex.Civ.App.) Texas Midland R. R. v. Wiggins, 161 S. W. 445.

$1027 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in trespass to try title against a husband and wife, the judgment for plaintiff involved only a finding that § 1001 (Mo.App.) On evidence tending to sup- the property was community property, the erport the verdict, it could not be disturbed.-ror, if any, as to a wife's separate property, Sails v. Funk, 161 S. W. 1175. held not prejudicial.-Treadwell V. Walker County Lumber Co., 161 S. W. 397. § 1028 (Mo.App.) Where an action on an account was prematurely brought, held, that a judgment against defendant will be reversed. though he owed the account or a note given therefor; costs alone being a substantial right.

$1003 (Mo.App.) A verdict will not be disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial evidence, though against the preponderance of the evidence, and though the reviewing court would have found a different verdict.-Marts v. Powell, 161 S. W. 871.

§ 1031 (Ark.) Where it does not clearly appear from the record that an erroneous instruction was harmless, the judgment must be reversed.-Conway v. Coursey, 161 S. W. 1030.

$1003 (Tex.Civ.App.) A verdict may be over--Barton Lumber Co. v. Gibson, 161 S. W. 357. ruled on appeal, when it is so against the weight of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong.-Texas Midland R. R. v. Wiggins, 161 S. W. 445. § 1008 (Mo.App.) A finding of facts has the same force on appeal whether requested below or not.-Barton Lumber Co. v. Gibson, 161 S. W. 357.

§ 1008 (Mo.App.) In cases tried by the court, where no findings of fact are requested and no declarations of law given, the judgment will be affirmed, unless it is so manifestly erroneous that it cannot be sustained under the evidence. -Greisser v. Emmons, 161 S. W. 613.

§ 1009 (Ark.) The chancellor's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless against the preponderance of the evidence.-Prickett v. Williams, 161 S. W. 1023; Shackleford v. Campbell, Id., 1019.

§ 1009 (Ky.) A finding based on conflicting evidence will not be reversed, where the court is not convinced that the chancellor has erred to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the appellant.-McDowell v. Edwards' Adm'r, 161 S. W. 534.

$1009 (Mo.App.) Since a suit for separate maintenance by the wife is in the nature of an equitable proceeding, the trial court's findings are not binding on appeal, though they will be largely deferred to, where the evidence sharply conflicts.-Kindorf v. Kindorf, 161 S. W. 318. § 1010 (Mo.) In an action, under Rev. St. 1909, § 2535, to determine title to land, where there is nothing in it of an equitable character, the court's finding, if supported by substantial evidence, will be affirmed.-Thompson v. Stillwell, 161 S. W. 681.

§ 1010 (Mo.App.) Where the cause was submitted to the trial court without any declarations of law being asked or given, the judgment should be sustained if there is any substantial evidence in support of the finding on the facts. -Winfrey v. Matthews, 161 S. W. 583.

$1011 (Ky.) A finding by the trial court as to the value of the services of an expert witness, based on sharply conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal.-McCormack v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 161 S. W. 518.

$ 1012 (Mo.) Where the facts in evidence are about evenly balanced, the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed.-Ryan v. Strop, 161 S. W. 700.

§ 1012 (Mo.) Where the trial judge decided the case on a transcript taken before another judge and on depositions, and the only witness who testified orally did not testify as to the contract relied on, and none of the witnesses resided in the circuit court over which the trial judge presided, he could not be presumed to be in a position to more advantageously weigh the evidence than the appellate court.-Hersman v. Hersman, 161 S. W. 800.

(H) Harmless Error. 81027 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in an action on vendor's lien notes, the issue was whether the time for payment had been extended under an agreement between an agent of plaintiff and defendant, and the jury specifically found that no agreement was made, rulings involving the

$1032 (Mo.App.) Where appellant complains of the giving of an instruction, he must show, not only that it was erroneous, but that it was prejudicial.-Perry v. Van Matre, 161 S. W.

643.

$1033 (Ky.) A master held not entitled to complain of a ruling that certain persons were fellow servants of plaintiff, and that recovery could only be had in case the master furnished an insufficient number of persons to perform the duties imposed upon such persons.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Moore, 161 S. W. 1129.

§ 1033 (Tex. Civ. App.) After judgment for plaintiff, defendant could not complain on appeal of the action of the trial court in submitting a ground of defense not supported by the evidence.-Missouri. K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Leabo, 161 S. W. 382.

1033 (Tex.Civ.App.) A charge that plaintiff could not recover unless the jury found certain facts, as to some of which there was no dispute, if erroneous, held favorable to defendant.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Martin, 161 S. W. 405.

the defense of failure of consideration, in an ae81033 (Tex.Civ.App.) The burden of proof of tion on a note, being on defendants, failure to so instruct was not prejudicial to them.-Lattimore v. Puckett & Wear, 161 S. W. 951.

§ 1036 (Ky.) Where a grantee pendente lite, in an action for breach of a crossing covenant in a railroad right of way deed, actively conducted the action for the grantor and was his principal witness, he was estopped to claim any part of the recovery, and defendants were not prejudiced by failure to make him a party.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Weddington's Adm'r, 161 S. W. 208.

§ 1039 (Ky.) Where an injured servant attempted to plead in the alternative under the federal Employers' Liability Act and the common law, denial of the master's motion to compel election is harmless, where the court at the close of the evidence ruled that the case did not come within the federal act.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Moore, 161 S. W. 1129.

§ 1042 (Mo.App.) Where a case was tried as though the matters alleged in defendants' special answer had not been stricken, the appellate court may disregard the action of the lower court in striking the principal allegations of defense.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601.

§ 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, though the county court on an appeal from justice court denied a motion to strike out a cause of action not set up in the justice court, when made, the judgment recited that it was sustained, thus indicating that the new cause of action was not considered, the error was cured.-McKneely v. Beatty, 161 S. W. 18.

§ 1043 (Ark.) Since upon affirmance of a judgment for plaintiff he is entitled to judgment against defendant and his sureties on the supersedeas bond, there was no prejudicial er

ror in that, upon the dissolution of an injunction staying proceedings on a decree, the chancellor rendered judgment against defendant and the sureties on the injunction bond, where the same persons also signed the supersedeas bond on the appeal from the judgment enjoined.Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162.

§ 1048 (Mo.App.) In an action for damages for the loss of plaintiff's mare killed in a collision on the highway with defendant's horse and buggy, error in examination of plaintiff's son, who was riding the mare, held not ground for reversal.-Hodges v. Hill, 161 S. W. 633.

§ 1048 (Mo.App.) Error in overruling an objection to a question is harmless, where the question is not answered.-Perry v. Van Matre, 161 S. W. 643.

§ 1050 (Ky.) In an action for damages for breach of a railroad's covenant to install crossings, defendant held not prejudiced by the admission of evidence as to the probable cost of the construction of a haul road off the right of way to enable plaintiff to use the crossing constructed on the lower end of the track so as to render the upper end accessible.-Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Weddington's Adm'r, 161 S. W. 208.

1050 (Ky.) Defendant in an action for injuries was not prejudiced by evidence of plaintiff that he thought he was going to die for about two weeks, where plaintiff's physicians testified in substance to the same fact.-Board of Council of City of Frankfort v. Kirby, 161

S. W. 1115.

§ 1050 (Ky.) In a personal injury action by a servant, the admission of evidence that he had to do what little he could to keep from sending his children to the orphans' home, and the failure of the court to admonish the jury that evidence of the servant's sobriety and industry could be considered only on the question of damages, was harmless, though erroneous.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Moore, 161 S. W. 1129.

§ 1050 (Mo.App.) In an action for the killing of plaintiff's mare in a collision with defendant's horse and buggy upon the highway, where the evidence was such as would only sustain a judgment for defendant, held that any error in the admission of evidence that plaintiff's son was accustomed to ride along the highway at a fast rate was not ground for reversal.-Hodges v. Hill, 161 S. W. 633.

§ 1050 (Mo.App.) The admission of evidence as to a matter concerning which another wit: ness had testified fully without objection, if erroneous, was harmless.-Perry v. Van Matre, 161 S. W. 643.

81050 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a personal injury action, the admission without objection of certain evidence held to render any error in the subsequent admission of similar testimony harmless.-Ft. Worth Belt Ry. Co. v. Cabell, 161 S. W. 1083.

§1053 (Tex.Civ.App.) The error in admitting improper evidence is not ground for reversal where the court specifically withdrew it, and directed the jury not to consider it.-Kirby Lumber Co. v. Stewart, 161 S. W. 372.

§ 1056 (Tex.Civ.App.) Refusal to admit evidence of failure to pay taxes on land while it was claimed by adverse possession was reversible error.-Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Jones, 161 S. W. 92.

§ 1060 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a personal injury action by one run down at a railroad crossing, argument of counsel, held harmless.-Texas Midland R. R. v. Wiggins, 161 S. W. 445.

§ 1064 (Ark.) In an action for personal injuries while attempting to board a train, as plaintiff was entitled to do after having been denied opportunity to purchase a ticket, instruction as to right to rely on direction of defendant's agent held not prejudicial.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Green, 161 S. W. 148.

1064 (Ky.) In an action for death by being struck by a train while crossing the track in the course of decedent's work in constructing a coal tipple, and error in admitting evidence of the trainmen's failure to give warning at crossings near the tipple held_not_prejudicial. -Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Winningham's Adm'r, 161 S. W. 506.

§ 1064 (Tex.Civ.App.) Repeated charges allowing recovery in case plaintiff was either physically or mentally incapacitated held prejudicial.-Texas Cent. Ry. Co. v. Rose, 161 S. W. 387.

§ 1066 (Ark.) An inapplicable instruction as to the ordinary duty to hold a train a reasonable time for passengers to board it, held not prejudicial where it must have been understood as relating to the facts in the case.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Green, 161 S. W. 148.

1066 (Mo.App.) Where, plaintiff admitted an express warranty that the jack was sound and a good breeder, an instruction on implied warranty, though not warranted by the evidence, was harmless, and, under R. S. 1909, 88 1850, 2082, requiring that errors not injurious be disregarded, was not ground for reversal. -Perry v. Van Matre, 161 S. W. 643.

§ 1068 (Mo.) An instruction on acquisition of title by prescription, if erroneous, held harmless, where the undisputed evidence showed that the defendant and its predecessors had been in actual, open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession for more than ten years. -Quinn v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. 820.

the jury might find for plaintiffs, with 10 per § 1068 (Tex.Civ.App.) Error in charging that cent. interest, is harmless, where the judgment provided only for 6 per cent.-Willett v. Herrin, 161 S. W. 26.

a

§ 1068 (Tex.Civ.App.) On evidence, in switchman's action for injuries, such that only a verdict for plaintiff could have been rendered, error, if any, in an instruction as to the negligence of defendant's foreman and yardmaster held not ground for reversal.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Leabo, 161 S. W. 382.

$1070 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the petition alleged that a described tract contained 160 acres, and sought recovery of an undivided one-half, that the verdict and judgment awarded an undivided one-half of the land set forth in plaintiff's petition, without more definite description, was not a fundamental error.-Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Jones, 161 S. W. 92.

(J) Decisions of Intermediate Courts.

1092 (Mo.App.) The court's discretion as to affirmance of a judgment of a justice of the peace for nonpayment of the fee for filing the transcript will not be disturbed except for abuse.-Muth Realty Co. v. Timmerberg, 161 S. W. 589.

§ 1092 (Tenn.) The reduction of the verdict, in an action for death, being upheld by the Court of Civil Appeals, will not be interfered with by the Supreme Court.-Carolina, C. & O. Ry. v. Shewalter, 161 S. W. 1136.

(K) Subsequent Appeals. $1097 (Mo.) Matters determined on a previous appeal in the same action become the law of the case and will not again be reviewed.-Armor v. Frey, 161 S. W. 829.

XVII. DETERMINATION AND DISPOSITION OF CAUSE.

(B) Affirmance.

§ 1127 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where defendant in er ror's motion to affirm was denied at the term at which the transcript should have been filed, because made within the 90 days allowed, a similar motion at the next term will be denied

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

because filed too late.-Bartley v. Robinson, 161 S. W. 386.

§ 1133 (Tex.Civ.App.) In the absence of a statement of fact, bills of exception, and motion for new trial, a judgment will be affirmed, unless fundamental error appears on the face of the record proper.-National Aëroplane Co. v. McCormick, 161 S. W. 375.

§ 1140 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where verdict for defendant on plea of reconvention showed that jury allowed part of a claim which should not have been submitted, held, that the judgment would be reversed unless the entire amount of such claim was remitted.-Gillispie v. Ambrose, 161 S. W. 937.

(D) Reversal.

§ 1170 (Mo.App.) A new trial should not be granted to defendant in an action for libel in charging perjury because the verdict for plaintiff only found exemplary damages for him, without mentioning actual damages, in view of Rev. St. 1909, § 1850, requiring the court to disregard defects not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.-Roney v. Organ, 161 S. W. 868.

$1170 (Tex.Civ.App.) A charge correct in law, which directed a verdict for the defendant on the finding of certain facts, held not ground for reversal, though the defense could be sustained by a finding of fewer facts than were embraced in the hypothesis.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Martin, 161 S. W. 405.

$1171 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the jury did not follow erroneous instructions as to the measure of damages, and it did not appear what evidence they considered in arriving at an excessive verdict, such verdict will be reversed.Louisiana Rio Grande Canal Co. v. Quinn, 161 S. W. 375.

APPLIANCES.

See Master and Servant, §§ 101-129, 265.
APPROPRIATION.

See States, § 137; Statutes, § 5.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD. See Partition, § 22; Reference; Specific Per formance, § 80.

I. SUBMISSION.

$16 (Mo.) A statutory submission to arbitration of the rights of distributees to lands acquired from their ancestor was revoked by the bringing of suit by one of the parties for partition, before actual submission to the arbitrators. Ferrell v. Ferrell, 161 S. W. 719.

ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL.

See Appeal and Error, § 766; Criminal Law, §§ 711-730; Trial, § 106.

ARREST.

See Municipal Corporations, § 745.

ARSON.

§ 25 (Mo.) In a prosecution for burning insured property, in violation of Rev. St. 1909, § 4509, it is not necessary to prove that the insurer of the property is a corporation.-State v. Ruckman, 161 S. W. 705.

§ 37 (Mo.) In a prosecution for arson in the third degree, evidence held insufficient to sustain a conviction.-State v. Ruckman, 161 S. W. 705.

Evidence of motive uncorroborated by incriminatory facts and circumstances is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of guilty. -Id.

ARTICLES.

$1172 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under rule 62a for Courts of Civil Appeals (149 S. E. x), the appellate court may, in an action by a woman to set aside her former husband's deeds to their See Corporations, § 18. community property, reverse only that part of the judgment which erroneously granted 'partition without evidence of value.-Gutheridge v. Gutheridge, 161 S. W. 892.

See

ASSAULT AND BATTERY.

Homicide, § 292; Mayhem; Municipal Corporations, § 745; Rape, § 66.

I. CIVIL LIABILITY.

§ 1175 (Ark.) In an action against a telegraph company, where it was only liable for nominal damages, the case will be reversed and judgment for nominal damages entered.-Ful-| (A) Acts Constituting Assault or Battery kerson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 161 S. W. 168.

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and Liability Therefor.

§ 2 (Ky.) An assault is an attempt with force or violence to do a corporal hurt to another; while a battery is an unlawful touching of the person of another by the aggressor himself.Hixson v. Slocum, 161 S. W. 522.

§ 12 (Ky.) Plaintiff who attempted to compel defendant to leave the sidewalk where he had a right to be, attempting to use force therefor, is the aggressor in the assault, though defendant applied profane epithets towards him.Hixson v. Slocum, 161 S. W. 522.

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ASSESSMENT.

See Municipal Corporations, §§ 408-586; Taxation, §§ 301, 463.

ASSETS.

See Marshaling Assets and Securities.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 281, 302, 361, 499, 690, 719-748; Criminal Law, § 1130.

ASSIGNMENTS.

See Chattel Mortgages, §§ 204, 225; Limitation
of Actions, § 49; Mines and Minerals, § 64;
Witnesses, § 143.

ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF
CREDITORS.

See Bankruptcy.

ASSUMPSIT, ACTION OF.

See Money Lent; Work and Labor.

ASSUMPTION.

See Mortgages, §§ 280-292.

that the third person's indicia of ownership should have been continuous.-Id.

An instruction held not so framed as to enable the jury to apply the law to the proof of a voluntary conveyance of defendant's goods, by the aid of the third person, to his wife.-Id. ATTENDANCE.

See Jury, 75.

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

See Contempt, § 10; Continuance, § 12; District and Prosecuting Attorneys; New Trial, § 32; Partition, § 114; Trial, § 106.

IV. COMPENSATION AND LIEN OF

ATTORNEY.

(A) Fees and Other Remuneration. § 135 (Mo.App.) Where an attorney renders valuable services which are accepted by his client, there is an implied agreement to pay therefor.-Connor Realty Co. v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 161 S. W. 865.

(B) Lien.

§ 189 (Ky.) A judgment for a client, which has been reversed on appeal, has no effect to limit his right to settle the controversy with his opponent, irrespective of his contract with his attorney for a fee based on the amount of

Of risk, see Carriers, § 298; Master and Serv- the recovery.-McCormack v. Louisville & N. R. ant, 88 203-226.

ATTACHMENT.

See Justices of the Peace, § 173; Malicious
Prosecution, §§ 55, 71; Sequestration.
III. PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE.
(B) Affidavits.

8119 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the affidavit and bond for attachment were sufficient, the fact that the petition was subject to general demurrer will not render the attachment void.-Baker v. Hahn, 161 S. W. 443.

§ 122 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the affidavit and bond for attachment were sufficient, the petition, though subject to general demurrer, may be amended without suing out a new writ of attachment.-Baker v. Hahn, 161 S. W. 443. VI. PROCEEDINGS TO SUPPORT OR ENFORCE.

8211 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an action against a nonresident is commenced by attachment, a default judgment on a petition, not stating a cause of action, will not warrant a foreclosure of the attachment.-Baker v. Hahn, 161 S. W. 443.

VIII. CLAIMS BY THIRD PERSONS. § 302 (Mo.App.) An interplea filed by a claimant of the property levied on in attachment is a separate suit, wherein the interpleader is plaintiff, while plaintiff in the main action is defendant.-Keet-Rountree Dry Goods Co. v. Hodges, 161 S. W. 862.

§ 308 (Mo.App.) One claiming the ownership of property levied on in attachment issued against defendant in possession has the burden to show title.-Keet-Rountree Dry Goods Co. v. Hodges, 161 S. W. 862.

A defendant in possession of personalty levied on in attachment may not, where a third person interpleads, introduce evidence to support the third person's claim.-Id.

8311 (Mo.App.) An instruction, on a trial of an interplea filed by a third person claiming goods levied on in attachment issued against defendant, held misleading.-Keet-Rountree Dry Goods Co. v. Hodges, 161 S. W. 862.

An instruction should have added the element

Co., 161 S. W. 518.

$ 190 (Ky.) Where defendant in a personal injury action compromised directly with plaintiff, its liability to an attorney who had a contract with plaintiff for a contingent fee on the percentage basis must be measured by treating the sum paid to plaintiff as the entire recovery, and not merely the percentage to which plaintiff was entitled.-McCormack v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 161 S. W. 518.

AUTHORITY.

See Justices of the Peace, §§ 36-45; Levees, §§ 7, 34; Principal and Agent, §§ 103, 123.

AUTOMOBILES.

See Estoppel, § 119; Licenses. §§ 6, 7: Master and Servant, §§ 107, 247, 258, 285, 289; Negligence, § 134; Railroads, §§ 333, 348; Statutes, § 79.

BAIL.

II. IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. $68 (Tex.Cr.App.) A recognizance on appeal, failing to provide that the appellant would abide the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals "in this case," is fatally defective.Matula v. State, 161 S. W. 965.

$68 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 919, a recognizance, omitting the concluding words "in this case," is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Criminal Appeals of an appeal in a misdemeanor case.-Darnell v. State, 161 S. W. 971.

BAILMENT.

See Pledges; Warehousemen.

§ 12 (Mo.App.) Bailee of a deed without reward held bound to exercise ordinary care thereof, and, in action to recover expenses of litigation necessitated by his destruction thereof and procurement of a deed to a third person, instructions to find for him unless he acted fraudulently and in bad faith were sufficiently liberal.-Sails v. Funk, 161 S. W. 1175.

§ 29 (Mo.App.) In an action to recover the expenses of a suit to quiet title from one whose destruction of a deed made it necessary, plain

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

tiff's wife who, though she had an interest in the property, paid no part of such expenses, held neither a necessary nor a proper party.Sails v. Funk, 161 S. W. 1175.

BANKRUPTCY.

III. ASSIGNMENT, ADMINISTRATION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF BANKRUPT'S ESTATE.

(C) Preferences and Transfers by Bankrupt, and Attachments and Other Liens.

er time, whatever may be his motive.-Murray v. Walker, 161 S. W. 512.

In a proceeding by an alleged stockholder of a national bank to compel an examination of the bank's stock books, evidence that plaintiff was not a stockholder in good faith or at all held admissible.-Id.

§ 253 (Ky.) The directors of a national bank are regarded as trustees for the stockholders, and the strictest performance of their duties as such is required.-First Nat. Bank v. Doherty, 161 S. W. 211.

BAR.

BEQUESTS.

§ 192 (Tenn.) Relative to the question of certain creditors of a bankrupt contractor being See Limitation of Actions. entitled to priority as having filed notices of lien within 30 days of completion of a building, the bankrupt's trustee is bound by the agreement of the contractor and building owner in extending time for the completion.-Harrison v. Knaff, 161 S. W. 1003.

BANKS AND BANKING.

See Wills.

BEST AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law, §§ 400, 403; Evidence, 168, 185.

See Appeal and Error, § 907; Forgery, & 29;
Frauds, Statute of, §§ 23, 26, 158; Garnish-
ment, 108: Guaranty, $$ 36, 70, 77-90; See Jury, §§ 99, 107.
Judgment, 251; Novation, § 5; Principal
and Surety, §§ 14, 46.

II. BANKING CORPORATIONS AND

ASSOCIATIONS.

(C) Stockholders.

§ 47 (Ark.) Stockholder of bank held entitled

to have the liability of other stockholders on their subscriptions enforced, and the directors had no right to cancel the notes for the stock subscriptions.-Bank of Des Arc v. Moody, 161 S. W. 134.

(D) Officers and Agents.

54 (Ark.) Directors of bank negligently permitting the cashier to make bad loans resulting in the insolvency of the bank held liable to the stockholders for their negligence.-Bank of Des Arc v. Moody, 161 S. W. 134.

Director of bank who was never notified of his election and never acted as such held not liable to stockholders for his failure to prevent the cashier from making bad loans.-Id.

III, FUNCTIONS AND DEALINGS. (B) Representation of Bank by Officers and Agents.

$105 (Mo.App.) In view of Rev. St. 1909, § 1112, one who had not been removed as cashier though he is principally occupied with other business in another city, is authorized to bind the bank.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601.

$ 109 (Mo.App.) The cashier of a bank has prima facie authority to extend the time for payment of negotiable paper, this being particularly true where he has virtual control of the bank's entire business.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601.

§116 (Mo.App.) Where the cashier of a bank in his private capacity learned that payment of a note given by defendants had been assumed by third persons, and he later extended the time of payment of the note, the bank__was chargeable with his knowledge.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601.

(C) Deposits.

§ 154 (Ark.) A depositor has a right of action to recover the amount of a deposit in a bank, if payment thereof is refused.-Bank of Des Arc v. Moody, 161 S. W. 134.

IV. NATIONAL BANKS.

§ 246 (Ky.) A stockholder in a national bank held to have the absolute right under Rev. St. U. S. § 5210 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3498), to examine the list of stockholders at any prop

See Counties, § 116.

BIAS.

BIDS.

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See Alteration of Instruments, § 8; Carriers, $$ 55, 59, 69.

BILLS AND NOTES.

See Account, Action on, § 4; Appeal and Error, 842; Banks and Banking, $$ 109, 116; Cancellation of Instruments; Carriers, §§ 55, 57, 59; Corporations, § 327; Costs, § 32; Husband and Wife, § 156; Judgment, § 713; Justices of the Peace, § 44; Limitation of Actions, §§ 49, 105, 123; Malicious Prosecution, $$ 58, 67; Novation, § 5; Pleading, §§ 257, 355; Principal and Surety, §§ 14, 46, 104. 108, 162; Sales, §§ 347, 359; Set-Off and Counterclaim, §§ 28, 33; Subrogation, § 4; Trial, § 252; Usury, §§ 2, 48, 80.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (B) Form and Contents of Promissory Notes and Duebills.

§ 49 (Mo.App.) Persons signing for accommodation, but as joint makers, are persons primarily liable to pay the note within Negotiable Instruments Law.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601.

(E) Consideration.

894 (Tex.Civ.App.) A previous debt, though barred by limitation, was a sufficient consideration for the execution of a new note to the extent that it was given for such indebtedness.— Helmke v. Uecker, 161 S. W. 17.

(F) Validity.

$ 102 (Mo.App.) Where defendant signed a note without taking any precautions to ascertain its terms, he is not entitled to cancellation on the ground of mistake because the terms were not as he thought they should be.-Avery Co. v. Powell, 161 S. W. 335.

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