V. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON IN- | tiff's agent.-Avery Co. v. Powell, 161 S. W. DORSEMENT OR TRANSFER. 741. An accommodation indorser of a note war 99 335. § 537 (Mo.App.) Where, in an action by an rants that, if the note is dishonored, he will, indorsee of a note, defendant introduced proof that the execution of the note was induced by upon notice thereof, pay the same.-Id. fraud, and plaintiff offered uncontradicted evidence that he was a holder in due course, the issue whether he was such holder was for the jury.-Hill v. Dillon, 161 S. W. 881. (D) Bona Fide Purchasers. § 352 (Mo.App.) Under Negotiable Instruments Law, a wife who received a note from her husband as a gift was not a bona fide purchaser.-Greer v. Orchard, 161 S. W. 875. VI. PRESENTMENT, DEMAND, NO- $397 (Mo.) Where a note, payable to a bank and at the bank, was owned by the bank at maturity, presentment and demand were not necessary. Havlin v. Continental Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 161 S. W. 741. VII. PAYMENT AND DISCHARGE. $429 (Tex.Civ.App.) A note for $200, executed by plaintiff to defendant, was satisfied and discharged if plaintiff afterwards presented to defendant a bill for $200 for services in satisfaction of the note, and requested that the note be returned, and defendant impliedly acquiesced in such means of payment.-Autrey v. Collins, 161 S. W. 413. § 434 (Mo.) Payment of a note by an accommodation indorser, after dishonor by the maker, was not a voluntary payment.-Havlin v. Continental Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 161 S. W. 741. VIII. ACTIONS. BLASTING. See Adjoining Landowners, § 8. BOARD OF EDUCATION. See Schools and School Districts, § 97. See Physicians and Surgeons, § 11. BONA FIDE PURCHASERS. BONDS. See Appeal and Error, $$ 395, 1043, 1241; Bail; Elections, $ 65; Evidence, § 83; Habeas Corpus, §§ 3, 113; Justices of the Peace, 8159; Levees, § 34; Mandamus, & 57; Principal and Surety; Schools and School Districts, § 97. BOOMS. § 462 (Tex.Civ.App.) A petition in an action See Navigable Waters, §§ 21, 26. § 485 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 1985, the execution of a note alleged to have been procured by fraud is admitted, and the fraud cannot be relied upon unless the answer setting it up be verified.-Avery Co. v. Powell, 161 S. W. 335. BOUNDARIES. See Partition, § 9; Pleading, § 129; Trial, §§ 243, 253. II. EVIDENCE, ASCERTAINMENT, AND ESTABLISHMENT. § 37 (Mo.) Evidence held not to show that defendant's fence was 12 feet too far north, or that the boundary was as claimed by plaintiff.— Clark v. McAtee, 161 S. W. 698. § 489 (Ky.) Where, after reference to commissioner, and report and motion by plaintiff for judgment, defendant, who admitted the execution of the note sued on, and who offered no $ 37 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for cutting evidence, filed an amended answer, held that plaintiff would have been entitled to judgment and removing timber from land, evidence on the even if such answer had not been stricken for issue of boundaries held to show that the timwant of verification.-Taulbee v. Lewis & Chamber was cut and removed from a tract of plaintiff.-Kirby Lumber Co. v. Stewart, 161 S. W. bers, 161 S. W. 1100. 372. $497 (Mo.App.) Under Negotiable Instrument Law (Rev. St. 1909, §§ 10022, 10025, and 10029), in a suit on a note by an indorsee on proof that the title of the payee was defective because the instrument was obtained by fraud, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that he acquired title as a holder in due course. Hill v. Dillon, 161 S. W. 881. Mere want or failure of consideration for a note sued on by an indorsee, not coupled with negotiation in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as to amount to a fraud, does not constitute defective title so as to change the burden of proof of bona fide holder under Rev. St. 1909, & 10029.-Id. § 499 (Mo.App.) A defendant pleading payment of a note has the burden of proof.-Winfrey v. Matthews, 161 S. W. 583. $40 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a latent ambiguity in a call for a boundary arises because the proof shows that a line run in accordance with the call will not reach the corner called for, the manner of ascertaining the true corner is for the jury.-Kirby Lumber Co. v. Stewart, 161 S. W. 372. § 41 (Ark.) An instruction on the issue of agreed boundary line held proper.-Turquett v. McMurrain, 161 S. W. 175. BREACH.. See Sales, §§ 161-181, 279, 284, 428-446. BREACH OF THE PEACE. See Municipal Corporations, § 663. BRIDGES. § 520 (Mo.App.) In a suit against the guarantor of a note, where he set up fraud in the procurement of his guaranty, evidence held insufficient to show any fraud on the part of plain- See Railroads, $$ 99, 411. For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER BRIEFS. § 42 (Tex.Cr.App.) Two saloons having been raided at the same time, evidence that defendant See Appeal and Error, 88 742, 758-773, 879; had some whisky shortly after, and that he said Criminal Law, § 1130. BROKERS. See Appeal and Error, § 671; Evidence, §§ 168, 471; Fraud, § 49; Principal and Agent, § 123. IV. COMPENSATION AND LIEN. 849 (Ark.) That a broker did not notify the owner of the name of his prospective purchaser held no defense to an action for a commission.-Reich v. Workman, 161 S. W. 180. § 54 (Mo.App.) It is sufficient if the purchaser is ready to complete the purchase within a reasonable time.-Bunyard v. Farman, 161 S. W. 640. 854 (Tex.Civ.App.) A broker was not required to prove that his purchasers were ready, willing, and able to buy, where defendants on receiving notice of the sales wrote plaintiff and the proposed purchasers confirming the same.E. R. & D. C. Kolp v. Brazer, 161 S. W. 899. § 56 (Ark.) A broker held entitled to commission where he interested the purchaser and was the procuring cause of the sale, although it was consummated by defendant.-Reich v. Workman, 161 S. W. 180. § 60 (Mo.App.) Owner held entitled, after production of purchaser by broker, to reasonable time in which to make deed, prepare abstract, and correct any curable defects therein and not liable for commissions if the purchaser refuses to allow such reasonable time.-Bunyard v. Farman, 161 S. W. 640. it came from the raid, is insufficient to convict him of burglary of one of the places, though whisky of that kind was in such saloon.-Jobe v. State, 161 S. W. 966. See Trial, § 11. CALENDARS. CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See Appeal and Error, §§ 742, 1172; Bills and Notes, 102; Chattel Mortgages, § 241; Costs, 32; Justices of the Peace, § 44; Quieting Title; Reformation of Instruments; Sales, § 23. I. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES. § 6 (Mo.App.) Makers of a note, who later became only sureties by third persons assuming payment, on being discharged by extension of time of payment, were not entitled to a cancellation of the instrument.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601. CARNAL KNOWLEDGE. See Rape. CARRIERS. See Appeal and Error, §§ 1064, 1066; Commerce, §§ 16, 47; Judgment, § 715; Master and Servant, § 86; Release, § 57; Trial, § 228. II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS. What is a reasonable time for an owner of land to make a deed, prepare an abstract, and (B) Bills of Lading, Shipping Receipts, correct any curable defects therein after the production of a purchaser by a broker depends on the facts of each case.-Id. and Special Contracts. § 55 (Tenn.) A "bill of lading" is not a negotiable instrument but is merely a contract by a carrier to deliver the goods described at a V. ACTIONS FOR COMPENSATION. particular place according to the usual course § 85 (Mo.App.) Where the owner claimed of transportation.-Fourth Nat. Bank v. Nashthat the purchaser refused to complete the pur-ville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1144. chase because of curable defects in the title, a decree correcting a misdescription in the own er's deed held admissible to show the owner's ability to cure such defect, though not recorded, shown by the abstract, or known to the broker. -Bunyard v. Farman, 161 S. W. 640. I. OFFENSES AND RESPONSIBILITY THEREFOR. 83 (Tex.Cr.App.) If the wrecking of saloons was for the purpose of stealing goods from them, all present and engaging in it would be guilty of burglary, but if the breaking was actuated only by a mob and riot spirit, with no intent to appropriate the property, there was no burglary.-Jobe v. State, 161 S. W. 966. II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. $41 (Mo.) Evidence held to sustain a finding that defendant broke into a corncrib.-State v. Duff, 161 S. W. 683. § 57 (Mo.App.) A purchaser of goods shipped subject to the consignor's order, with draft attached, before honoring the draft, has no right to maintain replevin against the carrier to obtain possession of the goods.-Burgess v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. 858. § 59 (Tenn.) Where the draft originally attached to a bill of lading held by complainant bank by transfer, as well as three other drafts against the same bill, were dishonored and taken up by the maker before the fifth draft was made, at which time the bill which covered a domestic shipment was more than three months old, held, that the bank was not an innocent transferee of the bill of lading.-Fourth Nat. Bank v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1144. § 69 (Tenn.) Though a railroad company wrongfully delivered grain without the surrender of the bill of lading, the consignor had no right of action against it where they were not injured because they had received payment for their goods.-Fourth Nat. Bank v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1144. In an action by the holder of a bill of lading for surrendering freight without presentation of the bill of lading, evidence held to show that defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the bank's loss.-Id. (F) Loss of or Injury to Goods. § 132 (Tex.Civ.App.) There is no presumption that property, when delivered to a carrier for carriage, was in the same condition as when delivered to the consignee, where there was evilivered to the company and was damaged when dence that it was in good condition when dedelivered to the consignee.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Western Automatic Music Co., 161 S. W. 380. § 134 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence, in an action for damage to a piano while being shipped on defendant's railroad, held to sustain a finding of ownership of the piano in plaintiff.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Western Automatic Music Co., 161 S. W. 380. (J) Charges and Liens. § 194 (Tex.Civ.App.) As a rule a consignor with whom a contract of shipment is made is impliedly liable for the freight charges, irrespective of whether he is owner.-Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Floyd, 161 S. W. 954. While a consignor is ordinarily liable for the freight charges, if the owner is the real consignor, and the person making the shipment, to the carrier's knowledge, only acts as the consignor's agent, the owner, and not his agent, is liable for the freight charges.-Id. IV. CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS. (A) Relation Between Carrier and Pas senger. $ 239 (Ark.) Under the statutes, a person who goes to a railroad station for the purpose of becoming a passenger on a train, but is given no opportunity to purchase a ticket, has the right to board the train as a passenger without a ticket. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Green, 161 S. W. 148. $241 (Mo.App.) A railway postal clerk is a passenger. Farmer v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 327. § 246 (Ark.) In an action for personal injuries, evidence held to show that plaintiff before attempting to board a train was given no opportunity to purchase a ticket. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Green, 161 S. W. 148. (D) Personal Injuries. § 280 (Mo.App.) A mail clerk assumes the risk of injuries incident to his transportation in a mail car, though the carrier is required to exercise toward him the same high degree of care generally imposed in favor of passengers. -Farmer v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 327. § 286 (Ark.) Railroad companies must keep in a safe condition all parts of their platforms and approaches thereto to which the public would naturally resort, and all parts of their station grounds reasonably near to the platform where passengers boarding or leaving trains would ordinarily be likely to go.-St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Grider, 161 S. W. 1032. $286 (Tex.Civ.App.) A railroad company which maintains an unlighted and unguarded station platform elevated four or five feet above the ground is guilty of negligence towards its passengers. Stamp v. Eastern Ry. Co. of New Mexico, 161 S. W. 450. $ 287 (Ark.) A railroad company denying an intending passenger opportunity to purchase a ticket, and, on his attempting to board the train without one, told him to go back and procure one, held bound to give him a reasonable time to do so.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Green, 161 S. W. 148. § 290 (Tex.Civ.App.) A carrier of passengers must furnish a reasonably safe car and exercise the highest degree of care to ascertain and repair defects in the car, as by furnishing an experienced inspector, etc.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Moore, 161 S. W. 378. & 298 (Mo.App.) A passenger on a freight train necessarily assumes the risk of perils arising from jolts, jars, or lurches ordinarily incident to the operation of such trains.-Farmer v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 327. New Mexico gave plaintiff a pass for an intrastate trip, a condition in the pass exempting the company from all liability, whether caused by its own negligence or not, was valid.Stamp v. Eastern Ry. Co. of New Mexico, 161 S. W. 450. A pass given as a gratuity is none the less a free pass because the carrier requires the person using to sign an agreement exempting it from liability for injuries.-Id. A pass given by a railroad company to the mother of one of its employés is none the less a free pass because the giving of such pass was customary, where the employé could not have recovered in case of the carrier's refusal.-Id. § 316 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action by a passenger who fell while alighting from a train from her dress catching upon something, where there was no showing that it caught on any projection upon the platform, the doctrine of negligence.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Davis, res ipsa loquitur does not raise an inference of 161 S. W. 932. While a railroad company must exercise a high degree of care to furnish suitable cars and platforms, it is not an insurer in this respect, and one injured upon a car platform has the burden of proving the company's negligence.Id. § 317 (Ark.) In an action for personal injuries while attempting to board a moving train, advice of defendant's agent to board the train and his offer of help held admissible on the question of negligence.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Green, 161 S. W. 148. § 317 (Ark.) In an action for injuries to a passenger by the derailment of a car, evidence that track was in bad condition about five months after the accident held admissible to show the condition of the track at the time of the accident.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Thurman, 161 S. W. 1054. § 318 (Ark.) Evidence held to warrant finding that the station platform was one which passengers would be likely to use, and that defendant's duty was not discharged by having a safe waiting room and a safe approach therefrom to the train.-St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Grider, 161 S. W. 1032. § 318 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for injuries received by a passenger who fell while alighting from a car, a judgment in her favor cannot be upheld, where the testimony showed that the accident was as reasonably attributable to a nonactionable cause as to the company's negligence.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 161 S. W. 932. § 320 (Ark.) Whether defendant should be charged with knowledge that the platform through which plaintiff fell and which was intended for freight would be used by passengers was for the jury.-St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Grider, 161 S. W. 1032. § 320 (Ark.) In an action for injuries to a passenger by the derailment of a car, the question of the carrier's negligence held for the jury. -St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Thurman, 161 S. W. 1054. § 320 (Mo.App.) In an action by a railroad mail clerk injured by a jar when the engine was coupled, held, that the presumption of negligence arising under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was sufficient to carry the case to the jury. Farmer v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 327. § 321 (Ark.) In an action for personal injury by falling through a platform at defendant's station, which was in fact intended for freight, but was not so designated, and was seldom so used, held, that defendant's requested instructions as to its duty to maintain in proper con § 307 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where, before statehood, a railroad company in the territory of For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (8) NUMBER 161 S.W.-77 Where the location of a cemetery to a large extent blocked the growth of one part of a city, an ordinance, enacted, not to protect the public health, but to benefit speculators and landowners in the vicinity, which prohibited subsequent burials in the cemetery and would tend to work the destruction of the cemetery, is unreasonable, tyrannical, and invalid.-Id. § 22 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 1336, the sanctity of a burial ground does not depend upon whether the particular portion is filled with graves.Cave Hill Cemetery Co. v. Gosnell, 161 S. W. 980. § 323 (Tex.Civ.App.) That a railroad company owes the highest degree of care to a passenger upon its premises will not excuse the contributory negligence of the passenger.Stamp v. Eastern Ry. Co. of New Mexico, 161 See Mandamus, § 79. S. W. 450. § 327 (Ark.) A passenger, injured by falling through a platform while waiting at defendant's station for a train, could not recover therefor if he failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, which failure contributed in any degree to his injury.-St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Grider, 161 Š. W. 1032. $ 327 (Tex.Civ.App.) A passenger, unfamiliar with a railroad station, in walking around in the dark is guilty of contributory negligence barring recovery for a fall from the unlighted and unguarded platform.-Stamp v. Eastern Ry. Co. of New Mexico, 161 S. W. 450. CERTIFICATE. CERTIORARI. See Appeal and Error, §§ 659, 664. II. PROCEEDINGS AND DETER MINATION. § 64 (Tenn.) In a suit to dissolve a corporation and distribute its assets, where the preferred stockholders were not before the court, it would be improper for the court to construe the charter in relation to the rights of the preferred and common stockholders; that being a moot question not presented by the record.Adams v. Chattanooga Co., 161 S. W. 1131. CHALLENGE. $330 (Mo.App.) Where a passenger, ordered by the porter to remain in the smoking car, remained without protest, and no one knew that the smoke was making him sick, he could See Jury, §§ 99, 107. not recover.-Russell v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. 638. § 347 (Ark.) A passenger's attempt to board a moving train was not necessarily negligence, that being a question for the jury on all the circumstances of the case.-St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Green, 161 S. W. 148. § 347 (Ark.) Ordinary care did not require a passenger as a matter of law to remain in a waiting room until the arrival of his train.St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Grider, 161 S. W. 1032. (F) Ejection of Passengers and Intruders. $353 (Tex.Civ.App.) Though plaintiff purchased a ticket, yet if he refused to deliver it to the conductor, and informed him that he had no money to pay his fare, the carrier's servants may eject him, whether he was intoxicated or not.-Texas Cent. Ry. Co. v. Rose, 161 S. W. 387. § 366 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the employés do not know of the intoxicated condition of a passenger, they may act upon the presumption that he will exercise care to avoid injury.-Texas Cent. Ry. Co. v. Rose, 161 S. W. 387. Where a carrier ejected an intoxicated passenger, its liability depends upon whether the place of ejection was such a one as a prudent person would have considered safe under the circumstances.-Id. CARRYING WEAPONS. See Weapons. CASHIERS. See Banks and Banking, §§ 105-116. CEMETERIES. See Appeal and Error, § 172; Constitutional Law, $$ 129, 316; Injunction, § 128; Municipal Corporations, §§ 434, 586, 592, 609. 83 (Ky.) It is sound public policy to protect the sepulcher of the dead.-Cave Hill Cemetery Co. v. Gosnell, 161 S. W. 980. § 3 (Mo.) Neither the state nor the municipality can preclude itself from enacting laws prohibiting burials in places where they constitute a public nuisance.-Union Cemetery Ass'n v. Kansas City, 161 S. W. 261. CHANGE OF VENUE. See Criminal Law, §§ 121-137; Venue, §§ 3672. CHARACTER. See Criminal Law, §§ 376, 776; Witnesses, §§ 2662, 336-361. CHARGE. To jury, see Criminal Law, §§ 755-830; Trial, §§ 191-296. CHARTER. See Colleges and Universities, § 9; Municipal CHATTEL MORTGAGES. See Estoppel, § 37; Homestead, § 108; Usury. $ 80. I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (B) Form and Contents of Instruments. property as the entire crop to be raised on § 48 (Ark.) A chattel mortgage describing the plaintiff's farm in Faulkner county, or elsewhere in that county, is sufficiently definite to give all persons notice of the lien on any crop raised by the mortgagor on defendant's land in the county.-Storthz v. Smith, 161 S. W. 183. III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA TION. (D) Lien and Priority. $138 (Tex.Civ.App.) In view of Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 5475, giving a landlord a preference lien upon crops, etc., for rent, held, that a landlord's lien, operative before the tenant's crop was planted, was superior to the lien of a previously executed chattel mortgage.-Ivy v. Pugh, 161 S. W. 939. IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF § 170 (Tex.Civ.App.) Whoever, with actual or constructive notice of the chattel mortgage, is directly or indirectly the instrumentality through which a conversion of mortgaged property is brought about is liable for the conversion.-| chattel mortgage, upon an agreement that the Nunn v. Padgitt Bros., 161 S. W. 921. holder and mortgagee would surrender the note and cancel the mortgage, held to operate as a VI. ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE OR present cancellation of the mortgage.-Helmke DEBT. $204 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 5661, providing that all persons shall be charged by the registration of a chattel mortgage with notice thereof and of the rights of mortgagee's assignee, and article 5659 requiring a mortgage to be satisfied by acknowledging satisfaction upon the registry, the failure of the purchaser of chattel mortgage notes to have their assignment to him recorded would not prevent one purchasing the property from being charged with notice of his rights under the mortgage.-Nunn v. Padgitt Bros., 161 S. W. 921. v. Uecker, 161 S. W. 17. Such agreement held, if not a present cancellation of the mortgage, to be a covenant to cancel it, enforceable in a suit on the mortgage note.-Id. On facts stated, held, that the holder of a larger note executed by the maker of a smaller note secured by a chattel mortgage was entitled to judgment on the larger note, with foreclosure of the mortgage to the extent of the smaller note.-Id. CHURCHES. See Religious Societies. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law, § 784; Jury, § 107. VII. REMOVAL OR TRANSFER OF PROPERTY BY MORTGAGOR. (A) Rights and Liabilities of Parties. §§ 220-222 (Tex.Civ.App.) While a chattel mortgagor in possession may sell the property in recognition of the mortgagee's right, a sale See Process. in denial of such right would be a conversion by the mortgagor.-Nunn v. Padgitt Bros., 161 S. W. 921. CITATION. See Municipal Corporations. CLAIM AND DELIVERY. Where a mortgagee of chattels assigned the mortgage notes to plaintiff and subsequently purchased the mortgaged property, he became, in effect a mortgagor in possession as to plain- See Replevin. tiff; and hence his subsequent sale of the property in denial of plaintiff's rights was a conversion.-Id. $225 (Tex.Civ.App.) A sale by a chattel mortgagor in denial of the right of the mortgagee would amount to a conversion by the purchaser if persisted in by him.-Nunn v. Padgitt Bros., 161 S. W. 921. That a chattel mortgagor denied, when he sold property covered by a recorded chattel mortgage, that the property was incumbered would not be a defense to the right of the mortgagee to sue the purchaser of the property for its conversion by the denial of such mortgagee's rights.-Id. The fact that the county clerk advised purchasers of property covered by a recorded chattel mortgage that the property was not mortgaged would not prevent the purchasers of the property from being liable to the mortgagee for its conversion.-Id. That defendant agreed to advance money with which to purchase property covered by a recorded chattel mortgage only on condition that mortgagors should first convey to her that she might convey to her son and in that method give her what she considered greater security for the money advanced would not prevent defendant's purchase in denial of the mortgagee's rights from being a conversion of the property as to mortgagee.-Id. CLAIMS. See Executors and Administrators, §§ 221-227; See Quieting Title. COLLATERAL ATTACK. COLLATERAL SECURITY. See Pledges. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES. See Torts, § 10. 89 (Ky.) College authorities may make any regulations for their government which a parent could make for the same purpose without interference from the courts, unless the regulations are unlawful or against public policy.Gott v. Berea College, 161 S. W. 204. An assignee of notes secured by a recorded admission of students and rules of conduct govA college may prescribe requirements for the chattel mortgage was not negligent in permit-erning them, unless it is supported by public ting the property to remain in the possession of one who he knew had purchased it from mortgagor so as to prevent him from recovering for its conversion by sale, in view of Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 5665, making chattel mortgages void against subsequent purchasers, etc., unless registered, where the property remains in mortgagor's possession. Id. § 229 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the value of converted property covered by a recorded chattel mortgage exceeds the debt, the judgment, in an action by a mortgagee for such conversion, should be for the debt, and, if the debt exceeds the value of the property, should be for such value. Nunn v. Padgitt Bros., 161 S. W. 921. appropriations, and then a student entering college impliedly agrees to conform to such rules. -Id. College could adopt a rule prohibiting its stuUnder its charter provisions, held, that Berea dents from entering eating houses and places of amusement in the town, not controlled by the college, on pain of dismissal.-Id. Even if such rule was unreasonable, one who ran a restaurant near the campus, which was largely patronized by students, but who had no children in the school, could not object to such rule.-Id. COLOR OF TITLE. VIII. PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE Sée Adverse Possession, § 100. SATISFACTION. 8 241 (Tex.Civ.App.) Execution of larger note COMBINATIONS. by the maker of a smaller note secured by a See Monopolies, § 12. For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER |