lenge grand jurors held not ground for reversal | where, on a motion to quash, he made no attempt to establish a claim that they were interested in his prosecution.-Threet v. State, 161 S. W. 139. Setting case for trial in accused's absence held not prejudicial where the trial was had without any request for additional time to prepare for trial. Id. 11662 (Ark.) Remarks of trial judge held not prejudicial in view of other statements by the court.-Coulter v. State, 161 S. W. 186. §1167 (Tex. Cr. App.) Where an indictment charged assault to murder, maiming, and robbery, all committed in the same transaction, defendants were not prejudiced by the fact that the court submitted only the charge of robbery. -Madrid v. State, 161 S. W. 93. $169 (Mo.) The error, if any, in admitting evidence, which is merely cumulative of a necessary but uncontradicted fact established by competent proof, is harmless.-State v. Bruton, 161 S. W. 751. §11702 (Tex.Cr.App.) There was no reversible error, in the asking of questions by the prosecuting attorney for impeachment purposes, as to whether a certain witness was not forget ful and as to whether she had not told stories, where such questions were not answered.Christian v. State, 161 S. W. 101. cial to defendant, where the court instructed the jury to acquit, if defendant did not take the ring, which he was charged to have taken, from off the person of another.-Clemmons v. State, 161 S. W. 973. §1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under an information charging that defendant was the lessee of the premises and kept a disorderly house, where the evidence fully supported such allegation, error, in defining the offense by copying the entire statute as to such offenses was not ground for reversal.-Dean v. State, 161 S. W. 974. § 1178 (Tenn.) The facts that counsel, both for the state and for accused, took the position that he was guilty of first degree murder or entitled to an acquittal on the ground of selfdefense would not operate as a waiver of accused's right to have the question of second degree murder submitted.-Jones v. State, 161 S. W. 1016. (H) Determination and Disposition of Cause. 81186 (Ark.) On reversal of conviction for rape, the state can elect to sentence accused for carnal abuse, instead of having a new trial.Threet v. State, 161 S. W. 139. § 1186 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Acts 25th Leg. c. 21, amending Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art. 723, a judgment of conviction should not ordinarily be reversed for unnecessary instructions in favor of accused. Christian v. State, 161 S. W. 101. XVII. PUNISHMENT AND PREVENTION OF CRIME. § 1171 (Mo.) The closing argument of the prosecuting attorney, to the effect that accused had lived in adultery with his wife before her marriage, and lived with a harlot at the time of the commission of the crime charged, held prejudicial when not justified by the evidence.State v. Wellman, 161 S. W. 795. § 1206 (Tex.Cr.App.) Indeterminate sentence The closing argument of the prosecuting at-law (Acts 33d Leg. c. 132) held invalid for intorney, wherein he denounced a witness for ac- definiteness, within Pen. Code 1911, art. 6.cused as a prostitute, was prejudicial where Ex parte Marshall, 161 S. W. 112. there was no evidence justifying the charge. -Id. 1171 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for bigamy, the district attorney's statement to the jury that if he had been allowed to introduce defendant's letters to his alleged first wife he could have shown his guilt held prejudicial. Harris v. State, 161 S. W. 125. § 1206 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where accused was charged with having committed a murder in 1901, and was not placed on trial until July, 1913, he was entitled to have his punishment assessed by the jury under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 750; the indeterminate sentence law, passed at the regular session of the 33d Legislature (Acts 33d Leg. c. 132) having been declared unconstitutional.-Johnson v. State, 161 S. W. 1098. CROPS. § 1172 (Ark.) Error in instructing, in a prosecution for assault with intent to kill, that every sane man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts was not prejudicial to accused, where he admitted See Chattel Mortgages, §§ 48, 138. that he in fact shot prosecuting witness with intent to kill for the purpose of protecting his own life.-Coulter v. State, 161 S. W. 186. CROSS-EXAMINATION. CROSSINGS. $1172 (Mo.) Error, in an instruction author- See Witnesses, §§ 257-286, 336, 337, 349, 358. izing a conviction if accused assaulted prosecutor with a knife with intent to kill, maim, or disfigure him, while the information only charged an assault with intent to maim, held not prejudicial, where the jury found accused guilty as charged in the information.-State v. Bunyard, 161 S. W. 756. Though the facts, in prosecution for mayhem, do not justify an. instruction on self-defense, and the instruction given is improperly framed but accused is not injured thereby, he may not complain.-Id. § 1172 (Mo.) Instructions that, while both accused and his wife were competent witnesses for the defense, the jury might consider, as affecting their credibility, their interest in the result of the trial were not reversible error, though it would be better to omit such instructions.State v. Shaffer, 161 S. W. 805. §1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) Accused was not prejudiced by an instruction that the robbery must have been willfully committed, since such requirement only imposed an additional burden on the state.-Madrid v. State, 161 S. W. 93. § 1172 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for robbery, the court's failure to submit the issues of simple and aggravated assault was not prejudi See Railroads, 88 304-351, 415. CUSTOMS AND USAGES. 88 (Tex.Civ.App.) Custom among lumbermen, when lumber delivered was not up to grade, to make out a claim and forward it to the shipper and pending settlement hold the lumber subject to the shipper's order, held not inadmissible in evidence as in contravention of law.-Continental Lumber & Tie Co. v. Miller, 161 S. W. 927. DAMAGES. See Agriculture, § 8; Appeal and Error, 88 1170, 1171, 1175; Death, § 95; Fraud, § 59; Libel and Slander, § 33; Malicious Prosecution, §§ 55, 67, 71; Master and Servant, § 41; Nuisance, & 72; Sales, § 388; Telegraphs and Telephones, $$ 71, 73; Torts, § 10; Trial, §§ 191, 228, 251, 256; Vendor and Purchaser, § 343. For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER III. GROUNDS AND SUBJECTS OF (B) Aggravation, Mitigation, and Reduc- § 62 (Mo.App.) A party who is damaged by the wrongful act of another should take all reasonable precautions to protect his property and minimize his damages.-Weller v. Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 161 S. W. 853. § 62 (Tex.Civ.App.) Amount which contractor could have made in other employment by the use of his wagons and teams held to be deducted in ascertaining his damages from the refusal of the other party to permit him to perform contract for hauling and distributing railroad ties.-Waterman Lumber & Supply Co. v. Holmes, 161 S. W. 70. VI. MEASURE OF DAMAGES. (B) Injuries to Property. 8105 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the fir ing of plaintiff's household goods, plaintiff is competent to testify as to the value of their use, where the goods had no market value_at the place of loss.-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Benjamin, 161 S. W. 379. § 106 (Mo.App.) The damages recoverable for maintaining a temporary obstruction in a nav. igable stream which prevented the rafting of logs to plaintiff's sawmill held the loss caused by the enforced idleness of the mill or the cost of removal in case it amounted to less than the loss from idleness.-Weller v. Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 161 S. W. 853. §111 (Ky.) Measure of damages for injuries to a house was a sum sufficient to restore the property to the condition in which it was prior to the injury, and such further sum as would compensate plaintiff for diminution in the value of the use during the continuance of the injury.-Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 161 S. W. 228. (C) Breach of Contract. § 124 (Tex. Civ. App.) Contractor prevented from performing contract held entitled only to the net profits or difference between the con-. tract price and expenses necessarily incident to performance.-Waterman Lumber & Supply Co. v. Holmes, 161 S. W. 70. VII. INADEQUATE AND EXCESSIVE § 130 (Ky.) Where a boy under 16 had his ankle and foot mashed, was confined to his bed for a month and a half, an award of $2,000 was not excessive, where two years after the accident the foot and ankle were still stiff.-Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Tuggle, 161 S. W. 1112. § 132 (Ky.) In an action for injuries, a verdict allowing plaintiff $3,500 held not excessive.-Board of Council of City of Frankfort v. Kirby, 161 S. W. 1115. § 132 (Ky.) An allowance of $12,500 damages in favor of a carpenter who received such severe injuries that he was unable to do anything and was a physical wreck and would remain so until death is not excessive where, at the time of the injury, he was a strong, vigorous young man of 28 years.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Moore, 161 S. W. 1129. § 166 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff's bruises were slight and he was apparently well, evidence as to a very slight bruise causing cancerous wound, and that a person died from a Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Moore, 161 S. W. 378. pin scratch, was not admissible.-St. Louis § 168 (Ky.) In a personal injury action by a servant, testimony that while unable to work he had to do what little he could to keep from sending his children to the orphans' home is incompetent.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Moore, 161 S. W. 1129. 185 (Mo.) Evidence held to show sufficiently that the condition of plaintiff's kidney was caused by the injuries received in a collision with a street car.-Lyons v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 726. (C) Proceedings for Assessment. § 208 (Tex.Civ.App.) Whether plaintiff was rendered unable to sleep on his left side by reason of the injury so as to be entitled to damages on that ground held a jury question.Trinity & B. V. R. Co. v. Blackshear, 161 S. W. 395. § 208 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence held to authorize the submission to the jury of plaintiff's loss of future earning capacity.-Texas Midland R. R. v. Wiggins, 161 S. W. 445. A failure to prove the life expectancy of plaintiff and to absolutely establish his age tion of his loss of future earning capacity.—Id. held no ground for refusal to submit the ques § 216 (Ky.) An instruction on the measure of damages for personal injuries held erroneous for the use of words "for injuries to his person" and the words "permanent injury to him lessening his power to earn money," in place of money."-Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. the expression "diminution of his power to earn Banks, 161 S. W. 554. action for personal injuries under Employers' $132 (Mo.) Verdict of $17,500 for personal injuries not totally disabling plaintiff held excessive and to require a new trial unless plain- See Waters and Water Courses, §§ 118, 126. tiff would remit all in excess of $10,000.-Lyons v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 726. DATE. § 132 (Tex.Civ.App.) Verdict of $8,500 to See Appeal and Error, § 516. switchman permanently injured in hip, ankle, elbow, and back held not excessive.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Leabo, 161 S. W. 382. § 132 (Tex.Civ.App.) A verdict of $10,500 to a brakeman, earning $100 a month, for loss of his foot, the attendant pain and mental anguish, DEATH. See Abatement and Revival, § 54; Appeal and $246; Pleading, §§ 34, 345, 369; Railroads, §§ 282, 338, 351, 358, 359, 398; Robbery, DECLARATIONS. 30; Street Railroads, § 114; Telegraphs and See Criminal Law, §§ 413, 414; Evidence, § 271. Telephones, § 38; Trial, §§ 252, 258. II. ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH. (A) Right of Action and Defenses. § 9 (Mo.) Rev. St. 1909, § 5425, providing that when a person dies from injury through negligence of person running locomotive, etc., the owner shall pay a penalty not less than $2,000 nor more than $10,000, in discretion of jury, held constitutional.-Lueders v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. 1159. § 10 (Tenn.) Section 9, added by Act April 5, 1910, c. 143, § 2, 36 Stat. 291 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1325), to Act April 22, 1908, known as Employers' Liability Act, which by section 1, declared a railroad liable to a "person suffering injury" while employed in interstate commerce, or, in case of his death, to his personal representative, preserves, by survival, the cause of action given the employé, and has no application in case of instantaneous killing.Carolina, C. & O. Ry. v. Shewalter, 161 S. W. 1136. § 18 (Tenn.) To authorize recovery for the benefit of the father of an adult son instantly killed while employed by a railroad in interstate commerce, under Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), merely declaring the company liable in damages, it must be shown the father had reasonable expectation of pecuniary assistance_or support from deceased.-Carolina, C. & O. Ry. v. Shewalter, 161 S. W. 1136. DEDICATION. I. NATURE AND REQUISITES. § 35 (Tenn.) If the tract dedicated as a street is clearly defined as by a map, and the public use is practically of the whole tract dedicated, it is presumed that an act accepting a part of the tract dedicated is an acceptance of the whole.-Doyle v. City of Chattanooga, 161 S. W. 997. § 37 (Tenn.) The acceptance of a street by a municipality may be implied from a general and long-continued use thereof by the public as of right.-Doyle v. City of Chattanooga, 161 S. W. 997. § 37 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where streets were dedicated to the public, the use of them by the public, and the removal of gravel therefrom by the city under the claim that they were a public street, is sufficient to show acceptance of the dedication, even though the streets were not always kept in condition fit for travel.-City of La Grange v. Brown, 161 S. W. 8. § 38 (Tenn.) The use of a street by the general public may operate as an acceptance thereof, as to make the dedication irrevocable.-Doyle v. City of Chattanooga, 161 S. W. 997. II. OPERATION AND EFFECT. § 63 (Tex.Civ.App.) Mere nonuser or delay in the improvement of a street, so that parts of it became practically impassable and were not used by travelers, is insufficient to establish an abandonment by the city of that portion of the street, where it was a part of the general street system which was dedicated in laying out a subdivision. § 32 (Mo.App.) A widow suing for the negligent death of her husband, leaving surviving children, must sue for herself and as trustee for the children, so that all the damages may be recovered in one action.-Marquez v. Koch, 161-City of La Grange v. Brown, 161 S. W. 8. S. W. 648. (D) Pleading and Evidence. § 47 (Tex.Civ.App.) A petition, in an action by a surviving widow for personal injuries to her husband, is insufficient as stating a cause of action for wrongful death, under Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 4694, when it did not allege whether the injuries were or were not the cause of the husband's death.-Black v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1077. § 58 (Mo.App.) The rule that it is presumed that a decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence, where no one saw the accident, would not apply where there was evidence by eyewitnesses tending to show contributory negligence. Battles v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 161 S. W. 614. DEEDS. See Acknowledgment, § 4; Adverse Possession, §§ 80, 103, 104, 114; Appeal and Error, § 742; Bailment; Brokers, &60; Escrows; Estoppel, 35; Evidence, §§ 420, 441; Executors and Administrators, 8$ 145, 397; Guardian and Ward; Insane Persons, § 66; Mortgages; Partition, § 9; Partnership, § 141; Pleading, § 8; Railroads, § 72; Reformation of Instruments, §§ 19, 23, 25, 36, 45; Taxation, $776; Trespass to Try Title, § 6; Trial, 105; Trusts, § 31; Vendor and Purchaser, §§ 229, 231, 258. I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyances in General. (E) Damages, Forfeiture, or Fine. $95 (Ky.) The measure of damages is such §8 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where defendants recoveras will compensate the estate of decedent for ed land possessed by plaintiff's husband and the destruction of his earning power, in view plaintiff sought to defeat the effect of the judgof all the evidence bearing on the question.-ment by claiming the land as her own, a deed Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stewart's Adm'x, executed by the husband after the adverse judg ment is wholly ineffective, even though he claimed it was confirmatory of a prior verbal gift; such gift being of no effect.-Childress v. Robinson, 161 S. W. 78. 161 S. W. 557. $101 (Ky.) In an action under the federal Employer's Liability Act for negligent death, the jury should apportion the recovery, if any, between the beneficiaries.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stewart's Adm'x, 161 S. W. 557. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Bankruptcy; Marshaling Assets and Securities; Subrogation; Witnesses, § 143. DECEDENTS. See Witnesses, §§ 143, 144. See Pleading. DECLARATION. §8 (Tex.Civ.App.) The location of land acquired by adverse possession within Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 5676, is fixed to a certain extent, and a purchaser from the possessor must take notice of that fact and of the fact that he acquires no title unless he purchases the land whose location is so fixed.-Mixon v. Wallis, 161 S. W. 907. § 17 (Ark.) An agreement upon the part of a grantee to support the grantor during his lifetime is a sufficient consideration for a deed conveying land.-Fine v. Lasater, 161 S. W. 1147. $17 (Mo.) Where a son, on receiving a deed of his parents' farm and homestead, orally For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER agreed that when they could not care for themselves he would assist them, and after the death of his father cared for his mother according to his agreement, there was a sufficient consideration for the deed.-Wing v. Havelik, 161 S. W. 732. (B) Form and Contents of Instruments. 831 (Tex.Civ.App.) A deed is not binding upon one who signs it but who is not named in the body of the deed as one of the grantors.-Le Blanc v. Jackson, 161 S. W. 60. § 38 (Mo.) A deed failing to describe any land which could be located from the description was void.-Schroeder v. Turpin, 161 S. W. 716. § 38 (Mo.App.) A deed which did not contain a sufficient description of the land conveyed was invalid on its face, and did not convey any title. -Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Field, 161 S. W. 364. 841 (Ky.) Deed referring to land as that conveyed to the grantor held to convey the same land, though it contained different calls than in the grantor's deed.-Bassett v. Lush, 161 S. W. 227. (D) Delivery. § 59 (Ark.) The acknowledgment and filing for record of a deed was prima facie evidence of its delivery to the grantee.-Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162. 861 (Ark.) Deed, executed by father to daughter in consideration of support, and delivered to a bank with instructions to deliver it to the daughter's husband after father's death, held to be in escrow and, having been delivered to daughter's husband after grantor's death, would not be canceled.-Fine v. Lasater, 161 S. W. 1147. Whether the delivery of a deed to a third party, to be delivered by him to the grantee after the grantor's death, is to be deemed a present delivery is a question of fact, depending on the conduct and intent of the parties to the transaction.-Id. For the delivery of a deed to a third party, to be delivered to the grantee after the grantor's death, to constitute a present delivery, the grantor must deliver it for the grantee's use, and in some way express such intent, and must part both with the possession and with all control of the deed.-Id. § 67 (Mo.App.) A deed, which was presumptively not delivered so as to become operative until after the date of its acknowledgment, did not, when delivered, relate back to its date or to the date of a prior executed void deed between the parties, at least not for the purpose of conveying title as of those dates so as to uphold an action on a special tax bill against the grantee, who did not otherwise have title at that time.Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Field, 161 S. W. 364. (E) Validity. $78 (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit to set aside deed, evidence held to authorize submission to the jury of the question whether the grantor was mentally incompetent to make the conveyance at the time he executed it.-Brown v. Brenner, 161 S. W. 14. III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA TION. (A) General Rules of Construction. deed must be effectuated if not in contravention § 93 (Mo.) The intention of the parties to a Wiltse, 161 S. W. 694. positive rule of law.-Garrett v. of some be gathered from its four corners.-Id. The intention of the parties to a deed must § 97 (Mo.) The habendum clause of a deed may be referred to for the removal of ambiguities and even to control and modify the granting clause when that is necessary to effectuate the grantor's plain intent.-Garrett v. Wiltse, 161 S. W. 694. (B) Property Conveyed. § 111 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where by the rejection of a false and impossible part of a description which is repugnant to the general intention of a deed a perfect description will remain, the false part should be rejected and effect given to the deed.-Griswold v. Comer, 161 S. W. 423. (C) Estates and Interests Created. § 120 (Mo.) A grantee, though the grantor's heir, cannot take more than the grantor has to convey.-Boothe v. Cheek, 161 S. W. 791. § 124 (Mo.) A deed held to give the grantee an estate in fee simple.-Garrett v. Wiltse, 161 S. W. 694. At common law the word "heirs" was necessary to pass an estate of inheritance.-Id. The words "heirs" in a conveyance at common law was a word of limitation and not of purchase.-Id. To construe the word "heirs," when used in a deed, as a word of purchase and not of limitation, the intent not to use the word in its usual legal meaning must be unequivocally shown.-Id. IV. PLEADING AND EVIDENCE. § 194 (Mo.App.) It is presumed that a deed was not delivered so as to become operative until after the date of its acknowledgment.-Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Field, 161 S. W. 364. § 211 (Mo.) Evidence held sufficient to show that at the time of execution of a deed the grantor was of sound mind.-Wing v. Havelik, 161 S. W. 732. Evidence held not to show any undue influence on the part of the grantee or his wife.-Id. Evidence, in an action to set aside a deed from parents to a son, held insufficient to show that the will of the father was overcome by that of the mother, who was of unsound mind. -Id. DEFAMATION. § 69 (Ark.) Under Kirby's Dig. § 1122, providing that, before the county court, which has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the result of an election upon the question of the removal of See Libel and Slander. a county seat, should make any order carrying such result into effect a donor of a new location should execute a sufficient conveyance DEFAULT. thereof to the county in fee, held, that deed of See Judgment, § 138. a donor pending an appeal, in which the order of the county court was reversed, was not in DELAY. valid as having been executed by mistake. See Telegraphs and Telephones, §§ 38, 66, 74. Schuman v. George, 161 S. W. 1039. § 72 (Mo.) A deed will be set aside when ob tained by the undue influence of a person other DELEGATION OF POWER. than the grantee; "undue influence" meaning See Licenses, § 6; Taxation, § 29. any influence, however exercised, which destroys free agency, and substitutes the will of another for that of the person in whose name the act DELIVERY. brought in judgment is done.-Wing v. Havelik, See Deeds, §§ 59-67; Sales, § 181; Telegraphs 161 S. W. 732. and Telephones, §§ 37, 38. See Appeal and Error, § 659; Habeas Corpus, See Appeal and Error, §§ 334, 361, 395, 509, § 113. § 83 (Ark.) The refusal of a witness to answer questions not shown to be material was not ground for suppressing the deposition.-Fancher v. Kenner, 161 S. W. 166. § 107 (Tex.Civ.App.) Objections that answers to questions in a deposition are not responsive must be taken before announcement of ready for trial.-E. R. & D. C. Kolp v. Brazer, 161 S. W. 899. DEPOSITS. See Banks and Banking, § 154. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. 635, 773, 781; Criminal Law, § 1106; Divorce, 146; Justices of the Peace, §§ 159, 164, 166; Limitation of Actions, § 130; New Trial, § 167; Quieting Title, § 34. II. INVOLUNTARY. § 60 (Mo.App.) Where plaintiff, after the striking of his amended petition for departure from the original petition, failed to prosecute the suit, and such failure was not induced by the striking of such petition, the court properly dismissed the cause.-Poncot v. St. Louis, Î. M. & S. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1190. DISORDERLY HOUSE. See Adverse Possession, §§ 31, 79; Equity, 8 See Perjury, § 11; Prostitution, §§ 1, 4. III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF § 128 (Mo.) While a husband at common law was liable on his warranty in a deed made by him and his wife conveying her land, an heir of the husband is not liable on the covenant of warranty by reason of advancements.-Armor v. Frey, 161 S. W. 829. $130 (Mo.) Under the express provisions of the statute of descents and distributions (Rev. St. 1909, § 332), the heir takes subject to the payment of the ancestor's debts, and the creditor's claim is somewhat in the nature of a lien. -Armor v. Lewis, 161 S. W. 251. DISSOLUTION. See Corporations, § 691; Injunction, §§ 163, 188. DISTRICT AND PROSECUTING See Contempt, § 10; Criminal Law, 706-730; DISTRICTS. See Drains; Highways, § 161; Levees, §§ 2-34. See Contracts, § 111. IV. JURISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, (C) Pleading. § 104 (Mo.App.) In an action for divorce, an amendment of the petition, after submission of the case at the suggestion of the court, so as to withdraw a charge of adultery which had not See Banks and Banking, §§ 54, 253; Corpora- been sustained and make a charge of indignities tions, § 310, 313. DISABILITIES. See Negligence, § 85. DISCHARGE. more specific, held properly allowed as merely conforming the petition to the proof.-Rea v. Rea, 161 S. W. 278. § 105 (Mo.App.) Where a petition for divorce was properly sworn to originally, it was not essential that it be reverified after an amendment to conform to the proof.-Rea v. Rea, 161 S. W. See Master and Servant, §§ 20-41; Principal 278. and Surety, §§ 104, 108; Release. DISCOVERED PERIL. (E) Dismissal, Trial or Hearing, and New Trial. § 146 (Mo.App.) In an action for divorce, an See Master and Servant, § 295; Negligence, & amendment of the petition, after submission to 119; Railroads, § 338. DISCRETION OF COURT. See Appeal and Error, §§ 653, 957-979, 1092; Continuance, § 33; Criminal Law, §§ 676, 1150-1153; Jury, § 75; Justices of the Peace, § 158; New Trial, § 72; Trial, § 106; Venue, $$ 42, 72. conform the petition to the proof as to a charge of indignities contained in the petition and to eliminate a charge of adultery, held not to entitle defendant to introduce further evidence.Rea v. Rea, 161 S. W. 278. (F) Judgment or Decree. § 167 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 2381, does not prohibit a suit to set aside a judgment of di For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER |