failed to show title in plaintiffs by descent, purchase, or operation of law, or show by what right they claimed.-McAlister v. Harness, 161 S. W. 185.

$65 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 1794, 2387, 2388, a petition in ejectment held sufficient as against an objection that it failed to state that plaintiff was entitled to possession on the very day suit was filed.-Fitzpatrick v. Garver, 161 S. W. 714.

§ 66 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 1794, 2387, 2388, a petition in ejectment held sufficient as against an objection that it failed to show that defendants were then unlawfully withholding possession.-Fitzpatrick v. Garver, 161 S. W. 714.

$ 69 (Mo.) Under the express provisions of Rev. St. 1909, § 1806, held that defendant in ejectment had the right to unite in his answer a general and specific denial with a statement of any new matter constituting a defense and counterclaim.-Hynds v. Hynds, 161 S. W. 812. § 86 (Mo.) Defendant who undertook to show that widow and administrator of the ancestor under whom all claimed had settled with all the heirs except himself, that she had promised him the land, bought with estate funds, as his share, and that the land in question did not exceed the value of his own share, held to have the burden of establishing such claim.-Hynds v. Hynds, 161 S. W. 812.

§ 95 (Mo.) In ejectment where the rights of the parties rested upon a resulting trust created by the acts of the administrator of their ancestor, evidence held to sustain defendant's claim that a settlement had been made with all the other beneficiaries except himself.Hynds v. Hynds, 161 S. W. 812.

V. DAMAGES, MESNE PROFITS, IMPROVEMENTS, AND TAXES.

§ 135 (Mo.) While ordinarily rents are recoverable in ejectment, no rent can be recovered in ejectment by tenants in common where their interest was subject to defendant's claim for an allowance for improvements, and the evidence failed to disclose for what the land would rent without the improvements.-Armor v. Frey, 161 S. W. 829.

ELECTION.

See Criminal Law, § 678.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES. See Appeal and Error, § 1039; Pleading, 369; Sales, § 425.

ELECTIONS.

See Counties, § 34; Intoxicating Liquors, § 36; Schools and School Districts, §§ 97-107; Weapons.

IV. QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS. $60 (Ky.) Const. § 155, held to authorize Act March 12, 1912 (Laws 1912, c. 47), providing that women may vote on all school measures and questions submitted to a vote of the people.-Stuessy v. City of Louisville, 161 S. W.

564.

$65 (Ky.) An election in the city of Louisville on a tax measure held a school district election, within Const. § 155, conferring on the General Assembly the sole right to regulate such elections.-Stuessy v. City of Louisville, 161 S. W. 564.

A proposition to issue bonds of a school district for the improvement of the schools of the district was a school measure or question, within Act March 12, 1912 (Laws 1912, c. 47), providing that women may vote for school trustees and on all school measures and questions.-Id.

ELECTRICITY.

See Appeal and Error, § 781.

81 (Mo.) Repeal of Rev. St. 1909, §§ 9568, 9569, 9570, authorizing the city of St. Louis to fix service rates of public utilities, by Acts 1913, p. 651, § 139, vesting such power in the Public Service Commission, nullified St. Louis city ordinance No. 24196, approved February 24, 1909, prescribing a maximum electric rate, and regulating the furnishing of electricity for light and power.-Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. City of St. Louis, 161 S. W. 1166.

§ 16 (Mo.) An electric light and power company held not liable for injury to a spectator caused by the falling of a pole by reason of a crowd pressing against the cable.-Meehan v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 161 S. W. 825.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

See Municipal. Corporations, §§ 266-586.
I. NATURE, EXTENT, AND DELEGA-
TION OF POWER.

§ 2 (Ky.) That a corner lot has been assessed $1 per front foot on one street for the construction of a sewer thereon will not render invalid, as a taking of private property without just compensation in violation of Const. § 242, an assessment for a sewer constructed upon the other street.-Gesser v. McLane, 161 S. W. 1118.

II. COMPENSATION.

(A) Necessity and Sufficiency in General. §§ 79, 80 (Mo.) Plaintiffs held estopped to recover compensation.-Quinn v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. 820. (B) Taking

Injuring Property

as

Ground for Compensation. street by limitations, and a railroad company, 8119 (Mo.) Where a city acquires title to a with the city's consent, appropriates such street for its tracks, the former owner of the street cannot recover compensation from the railroad Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. 820. company for such appropriation.-Quinn v. St.

III. PROCEEDINGS TO TAKE PROP. ERTY AND ASSESS COMPENSATION.

$172 (Tex.Civ.App.) A county court has jurisdiction in matters of eminent domain, such jurisdiction not being taken away by Acts 32d Leg. c. 24.-Balch v. San Antonio, F. & N. R. Co., 161 S. W. 1091.

IV. REMEDIES OF OWNERS OF
PROPERTY.

§ 296 (Mo.) Where, in an action against a railroad company by the former owner of the land of a street which the company had appropriated with the city's consent, the defendant relied upon title in the city by prescription, evidence of invalid condemnation proceedings under which the street was originally taken by the city, was admissible as evidence of color of title and to fix the boundary line.-Quinn v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. $20.

Where defendant relied upon prescriptive title in the city and estoppel, a petition signed by plaintiff and others, requesting that the city permit the railroad company to use the street, and the ordinance enacted pursuant thereto, were admissible in evidence.-Id.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTS.

opportunity to comply with the conditions as to delivery.-Brown v. Allbright, 161 S. W.

EMPLOYÉS.

See Master and Servant.

EQUITY.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 894, 1178; Cancel lation of Instruments; Conversion; Corporations, 279; Injunction; Marshaling Assets and Securities; Partition; Quieting Title; Reformation of Instruments; Set-Off and Counterclaim; Specific Performance; Subrogation; Trial, § 11; Trusts.

Equitable estoppel, see Estoppel, §§ 52-119.
I. JURISDICTION, PRINCIPLES, AND

MAXIMS.

(C) Principles and Maxims of Equity. § 59 (Mo.) Where children after their majority acquiesced for a long time in some domestic arrangement, whereby each received from their father's estate an amount nearly equal to the share that each was apparently entitled to, the maxim "Equality is equity" applied.-Hynds v. Hynds, 161 S. W. 812.

§ 65 (Mo.) Where plaintiff in a suit to rescind an exchange of property was defrauded, he was not barred from relief in equity on the theory that his hands were unclean because he overvalued his property in the exchange.— Schroeder v. Turpin, 161 S. W. 716.

IV. PLEADING.

(E) Demurrer, Exceptions, and Motions. § 241 (Tenn.) Every reasonable presumption should be exercised in favor of a bill when assailed by demurrer.-Adams v. Chattanooga Co., 161 S. W. 1131.

X. DECREE AND ENFORCEMENT
THEREOF.

§ 418 (Ark.) Where defendant filed his answer on September 9th, and on October 12th was given ten days from that date in which to file an amended answer by an order which provided that certain evidence be taken on November 27th, but defendant did not file an amended answer, nor appear in court on November 27th, he cannot claim that the decree then rendered was prematurely entered.-Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162.

§ 430 (Ark.) After the expiration of the term at which a decree is rendered, the court can only set it aside upon application under the statute for a specified cause, or by bill of review under the chancery practice.-Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162.

ERROR, WRIT OF.

ESTATES.

See Deeds, §§ 120, 124; Descent and Distribution; Estoppel, § 98; Executors and Adminis trators; Landlord and Tenant; Life Estates; Partnership, § 246; Remainders; Tenancy in Common; Trusts, § 147; Wills.

(B) Estates and Rights Subsequently Acquired.

$35 (Ark.) Where land was voluntarily conveyed to a county for county seat purposes, title to the property subsequently acquired by the grantors inured to the benefit of the county.-Schuman v. George, 161 S. W. 1039.

§ 37 (Tex.Civ.App.) A chattel mortgage upon property not in existence may become operative if the property covered subsequently comes into the possession of the mortgagor, on the equitable principle of estoppel rather than on the principle that the execution of the mortgage then creates a valid lien upon the thing mortgaged.-Ivy v. Pugh, 161 S. W. 939.

III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. (A) Nature and Essentials in General. § 52 (Tenn.) One claiming the benefit of an estoppel must have proceeded with the utmost good faith.-Fourth Nat. Bank v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1144.

§ 54 (Tenn.) One relying on an estoppel must have exercised such reasonable diligence as the circumstances of the case require.-Fourth Nat. Bank v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1144.

Where both parties have the same means of ascertaining the truth, no estoppel can exist.— Id.

One who conducts himself with a careless indifference to means of information reasonably at hand or ignores highly suspicious circumstances which should warn him of danger or loss cannot invoke the doctrine of estoppel.-Id.

$ 56 (Tenn.) If a ground of estoppel is based on negligence, the negligence must have been the proximate cause of the conduct of the complaining party.-Fourth Nat. Bank v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1144.

(C) Persons Affected.

§ 98 (Mo.) Where plaintiffs had an estate in remainder under the will of their grandfather, they were not estopped from claiming the remainder because their parents, who were the

1186.

ESCAPE.

810 (Mo.) Evidence, in a prosecution for assisting one to escape with knowledge that he had stolen a horse, held not to sustain a conviction.-State v. Christian, 161 S. W. 736.

The burden was on the state to show that the

person who had stolen the horse was in fact trying to escape.-Id.

ESCROWS.

§8 (Ark.) Grantor depositing deed with a bank to be delivered to trustees of a church on their payment of a mortgage debt, and receiving payments thereon, held not entitled to withdraw the deed without giving the trustees an

proceeds, for they did not take under the life tenants, but directly from the original owner.Armor v. Frey, 161 S. W. 829.

(E) Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Re

view.

$ 107 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for the price of lumber, plaintiff could not insist that defendant by asking damages for the breach of the contract was estopped to disaffirm the contract, where plaintiff based the claim of estoppel only on defendant's examination and acceptance of the lumber.-Continental Lumber & Tie Co. v. Miller, 161 S. W. 927.

§ 107 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where only pleading was verified account, instruction authorizing recovery, if defendant had led plaintiff to be

See Abortion, § 6; Account Stated, § 19; Adverse Possession, §§ 14, 85, 95, 104, 112, 114, 115; Appeal and Error, §§ 172, 197, 231, 260, 499, 688, 695, 697, 742, 837, 842, 843, 854, 894, 901-934, 989-1012, 1032, 1033, 1050-1056; Arson; Assault and Battery, 35; Attachment, § 308; Banks and Banking, 246; Bigamy; Bills and Notes, §§ 497, 499, 520; Boundaries, § 37; Brokers, $$ 85, 86; Burglary, §§ 41, 42; Carriers, §§ 69, 132, 134, 246, 316-318, 320, 366; Compromise and Settlement, § 23; Conspiracy, § 19; Constitutional Law, § 48; Contracts, $$ 99, 175, 346; Corporations, 88 121, 361, 432, 519; Criminal Law, §§ 308-564, 656, 676, 678, 741, 763, 764, 778, 780, 781, 784, 811, 938-958, 1036, 1054, 1059, 1090, 1097, 1144, 1163, 1169; Customs and Usages; Damages, §§ 166-185; Death, 58; Dedication, 88 35, 37; Deeds, 88 59, 194, 211; Depositions; Ejectment, 88 86, 95; Eminent Domain, § 296; Escape, 8 10; Estoppel, § 117; Exchange of Property, § 8; Executors and Administrators, § 221; Fraud, 50; Frauds, Statute of, § 158; Fraudulent Conveyances, §§ 295-301; Guaranty, 890; Habeas Corpus, §§ 85, 113'; Highways, 184; Homestead, § 181; Homicide, §§ 156-254; Husband and Wife, §§ 25, 273, 297; Injunction, § 128; Insurance, §§ 646, 818, 819; Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 224-236; Jury, 107; Justices of the Peace, § 101; Landlord and Tenant, § 169; Larceny, §§ 55-65; Libel and Slander, §§ 112, 156; Limitation of Actions, § 142; Malicious Prosecution. §§ 58, 64; Marriage, §§ 40. 47; Master and Servant, §§ 265, 274-281; Money Received, 18; Mortgages, §§ 32, 292, 463; Municipal Corporations, §§ 816, 819; Navigable Waters, § 26; Negligence, §§ 121-134; New Trial, §§ 72, 78; Partition, 8 63; Partnership, § 218; Perjury, §§ 11, 32; Physicians and Surgeons, 11; Pleading, §§ 356, 428; Principal and Agent, 88 123, 160; Prostitution, §§ 1, 4; Railroads, 88348, 396, 398, 441, 443, 481; Rape, 66; Reformation of Instruments, § 45; Release, § 57; Remainders, § 16; Robbery, $ 20, 24; Sales, §§ 181, 359, 441; Schools and School Districts, § 107; Seduction, 88 44, 46; Specific Performance, § 121; Stipulations, & 14; Street Railroads, $8 112, 114; Telegraphs and Telephones, §§ 66, 71; Tenancy in Common, § 15; Trespass to Try Title, $$ 6, 35-41; Trial, §§ 75-105, 136-141, 178, 194, 229, 250-253; Usury, § 115; Vendor and Purchaser, $$ 79, 80, 242, 243, 315; Venue, § 72; Waters and Water Courses, § 126; Wills, §§ 52, 53, 163, 166, 488; Witnesses; Work and Labor, § 7.

I. JUDICIAL NOTICE.

of the fact that telegraph poles are more than

85 (Mo.) This court will take judicial notice

150 feet apart.-Lueders v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. 1159.

§7 (Mo.) The court knows that ordinarily cement sets and hardens in less than eight days, and an electric light and power company, erecting poles supported by bolts secured by cement about eight days before using the poles, exercises proper care.-Meehan v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 161 S. W. 825.

cial notice that before statehood the decisions $34 (Tex.Civ.App.) The courts will take judiof the Supreme Court of the United States were the law of the land in the territory of New Mexico.-Stamp v. Eastern Ry. Co. of New Mexico, 161 S. W. 450.

§ 35 (Tex.Civ.App.) A foreign law is required to be proven just as any other substantive fact. Stamp v. Eastern Ry. Co. of New Mexico, 161 S. W. 450.

II. PRESUMPTIONS.

§ 65 (Mo.) Every person is presumed to know the law.-Garrett v. Wiltse, 161 S. W. 694.

§ 80 (Mo.) In an action for personal injuries sustained in Kansas, where neither party proved the law of Kansas, the law of Missouri applied.-Lyons v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 726.

In the absence of a showing to the contrary, the laws of a sister state will be presumed to be the same as that of the former.-Id.

$80 (Mo.) Georgia being one of the states originally under the common law, it will be presumed that the common law remains in force therein.-Armor v. Frey, 161 S. W. 829.

§ 82 (Mo.App.) It is presumed that the courts will pursue the proper course if their power is properly invoked.-Roney v. Organ, 161 S. W. 868.

§ 83 (Ky.) On an issue as to whether a city had exceeded its debt limit, high school bonds the absence of evidence to the contrary.-Southpreviously issued would be presumed valid in ern Bitulithic Co. v. Detreville, 161 S. W. 560. IV. RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY, AND COMPETENCY IN GENERAL.

(A) Facts in Issue and Relevant to Issues. § 106 (Mo.App.) It is error to permit an interpleader claiming goods levied on in attachment to show that his general reputation for truth and veracity is good.-Keet-Rountree Dry Goods Co. v. Hodges, 161 S. W. 862.

§ 116 (Mo.App.) Where, in an action for damages for assault with intent to rape, defendant, in an attempt to show that a business competitor instigated the action, shows that a conversation took place between such competitor and the plaintiff's father, plaintiff's evidence that such conversation was about lodge matters, and not about the trouble out of which the litigation arose, is admissible.-Marts v. Powell, 161 S. W. 871.

$117 (Tex.Civ.App.) Testimony that when witness reached the place of the accident he found a pint whisky bottle one-third full in the débris of plaintiff's wagon is not competent, standing alone, to show intoxication.-Texas Midland R. R. v. Wiggins, 161 S. W. 445.

§ 117 (Tex. Civ.App.) Evidence as to finding a bottle of whisky in the débris of the wagon after the accident held properly excluded for lack of sufficient evidence that the driver was intoxicated or addicted to drink within a reascnable time before the accident.-Texas Midland R. R. v. Nelson, 161 S. W. 1088.

(B) Res Gestæ.

horse and buggy on the highway, statement of plaintiff's son, who was riding the mare, that he should have to ride home fast, held admissible as a part of the res gestæ.-Hodges v. Hill, 161 S. W. 633.

§ 126 (Ky.) Statements made by decedent that he was jerked from a train on which he was employed, within two minutes after his injuries were received, were admissible as res gestæ.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Strange's Adm'x, 161 S. W. 239.

V. BEST AND SECONDARY EVIDENCE. $168 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for broker's commissions for sales for defendants, their exagent with whom the transactions were had held properly permitted to testify that he sent letters confirming sales to the purchasers on receipt of plaintiff's telegrams that sales had been made to them.-E. R. & D. C. Kolp v. Brazer, 161 S. W. 899.

§ 185 (Tex.Civ.App.) Plaintiff having given defendants notice to produce correspondence and papers, and they having failed to do so, plaintiff was entitled to introduce carbon copies of letters written by him to defendants as secondary evidence.-E. R. & D. C. Kolp v. Brazer, 161 S. W. 899.

8208 (Mo.) Where defendants in partition claimed by adverse possession, a petition by them in a former partition suit, alleging that they jointly owned one-half of the same lands and believed that the present plaintiffs owned the rest as heirs, was admissible as an admission that defendants were not then holding adversely, though no estoppel was pleaded in the present action.-Boothe v. Cheek, 161 S. W. 791. 8213 (Tex.Civ.App.) In trespass to try title, evidence that plaintiff offered to purchase a deed from defendants to the property held in'admissible, for that fact will not affect plaintiff's title, being a mere attempt to remove a possible cloud.-Zimmermann v. Baugh, 161. S. W. 943.

(C) By Grantors, Former Owners, or Privies.

a

§ 230 (Tex.Civ.App.) The testimony of grantor that before the execution of the deed he, with the grantee's agent, went on the ground, and pointed out the boundary, is inadmissible against a subsequent purchaser relying on the deed duly recorded.-Kirby Lumber Co. v. Stewart, 161 S. W. 372.

(D) By Agents or Other Representatives. $242 (Mo.) An assessment of the benefits and damages to certain property from the widening of a street will not be disturbed, when more favorable to the owner than his authorized agent testified would be satisfactory, though disproportionate to assessments against other property. In re Nineteenth St. in Kansas City, 161 S. W. 1150.

Where a property owner authorized an agent to represent him in condemnation proceedings, he was bound by the agent's testimony that his principal would be satisfied with the assessment so long as the benefits did not exceed the damages, though such agent exceeded his instructions.-Id.

8243 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff selling feedstuff for defendants would wire orders to defendants' agent, who would write letters of confirmation to the purchasers-sending carbon copies to plaintiff and to defendants-such letters were acts and declarations of defendants through their agent, and admissible to bind them in an action for plaintiff's commissions.E. R. & D. C. Kolp v. Brazer, 161 S. W. 899.

VIII. DECLARATIONS.

(A) Nature, Form, and Incidents in General.

in land, declarations of plaintiff's father bear§ 271 (Ky.) In an action to establish a trust ing upon his intention to create a trust in the his wife, made when the wife was not present, proceeds of purchaser's money note, payable to held not competent against those claiming under her.-Adams v. Button, 161 S. W. 1100.

IX. HEARSAY.

8317 (Mo.) In a proceeding to suspend a physician for producing abortions, the testimony of a witness, that physicians had told him that defendant had the reputation of being a criminal abortionist, was hearsay evidence.-State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 161 S. W. 1169.

$317 (Tex.Civ.App.) A witness cannot testify to declarations by the alleged husband that he quarreled with his first wife, and left the country with the woman the validity of whose marriage to him was in issue.-Adams v. Wm. Cameron & Co., 161 S. W. 417.

§ 317 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for wrongful garnishment arising out of plaintiff's signing notes for the price of corporate stock sold to A., evidence that F. told plaintiff that L., who was negotiating the transaction, was to receive $1,000 of the stock as a commission for making the sale, was objectionable as hearsay. -Bennett v. Foster, 161 S. W. 1078.

XI. PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AFFECTING WRITINGS. (A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding to Terms of Written Instrument.

§ 419 (Ark.) Parol evidence is admissible to show that a grantee agreed, as a part of the consideration, to assume and discharge a mortgage.-Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162.

§ 420 (Ark.) A condition that a county seat would be located in a certain town could not be attached to the donors' conveyance of a site therefor by a parol agreement.-Schuman v. George, 161 S. W. 1039.

(C) Separate or Subsequent Oral Agreement.

ployment as agent for the sale of oil, which re§ 441 (Mo.App.) A written contract of emquired plaintiff to get the market prices, could not be varied by parol evidence that when the mit plaintiff to give a rebate to his customers contract was executed defendant agreed to per

from his commission.-Goller v. Henseler Mercantile Oil & Supply Co., 161 S. W. 584.

8441 (Mo.App.) Where deed under Rev. St. 1909, § 2793, was to be construed as containing a covenant against incumbrances, parol evidence held not admissible to show an agreement to assume taxes in addition to the recited consideration; section 1974, relative to proving want or failure of consideration, having no application.-Laclede Laundry Co. v. Freudenstein, 161 S. W. 593.

(D) Construction or Application of Language of Written Instrument.

§ 448 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where there is no ambiguity in a written contract, parol evidence to explain its meaning is inadmissible.-Conn v. Rosamond, 161 S. W. 73.