INCORPORATION.

See Wills, § 839.

INCUMBRANCES.

INDEBTEDNESS.

INDEMNITY.

S. W. 60.

MAINTENANCE.

§ 283 (Mo.App.) A husband is entitled to select the family domicile; but neither spouse is entitled to demand that the other live in such manner that his or her parents cannot visit them.-Coulter v. Coulter, 161 S. W. 281. Where a wife abandoned her husband, leaving the home that he had provided for her, he condoned her fault by resuming cohabitation with her under a promise to provide as soon as possible a new home more acceptable to her, consenting for her to temporarily remain with her parents.-Id.

A wife is entitled to a decree for separate maintenance under Rev. St. 1909, § 8295, where her husband consented to her living apart from him temporarily, and failed to make any provision for her return to him or to new home in another state.-Id.

§ 283 (Mo.App.) A wife may leave home and sue for separate maintenance under the statute, if her husband's wrongful conduct makes her condition while living with him intolerable. -Kindorf v. Kindorf, 161 S. W. 318.

There is an abandonment, entitling the wife to separate maintenance, where her husband wrongfully drives her from him or turns her out of doors.-Id.

To constitute an abandonment, so as to entitle the wife to a separate maintenance, there must be a failure or refusal to provide for her,

as well as an abandonment.-Id.

A husband cannot, after turning his wife out of his home without cause, relieve himself from providing a separate maintenance by offering to support her if she returns.-Id.

§ 297 (Mo.App.) Evidence in an action for separate maintenance held to sustain a finding that defendant struck his wife and drove her from his home, and afterwards refused to provide for her unless she would return.-Kindorf v. Kindorf, 161 S. W. 318.

Evidence in an action for separate maintenance held not to show that an allowance of $25 a month was excessive.-Id.

IMPEACHMENT.

See Witnesses, §§ 317-410.

IMPLIED CONTRACTS.

See Money Lent; Work and Labor.

IMPROVEMENTS.

See Mechanics' Liens; Municipal Corporations, §§ 266-586, 623; Partition, § 85.

IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE.

See Negligence, § 93.

§ 15 (Tex.Civ.App.) Bank's contract to pay plaintiff's debts held merely a contract of indemnity, and that plaintiff, to maintain his action for the breach thereof, and to recover the difference between the face of the debts and the amount actually paid by defendant for their discharge, must show that he had paid the debts in controversy.-First State Bank of Paradise v. Wallace, 161 S. W. 957.

INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS.

See Master and Servant, §§ 315, 319.

INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

See Abortion, § 6; Assault and Battery, §§ 74, 77; Criminal Law, §§ 619, 1088, 1167; Forgery, 29; Mayhem, § 4; Railroads, § 255; Robbery, §§ 17, 20, 30; Sodomy, § 5.

IV. FILING AND FORMAL REQUISITES OF INFORMATION OR COMPLAINT.

$35 (Ark.) Prosecuting officers have the right to file a criminal "information" which is an accusation in the nature of an indictment, differing only in being presented by a competent public official on his oath of office instead of by a grand jury on their oath.-State v. Williams, 161 S. W. 159.

V. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY OF ACCUSATION.

§ 79 (Mo.App.) An information need not strictly conform to the rules of grammar, if it fully informs defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation.-State v. Schomers, 161 S. W. 1177.

§ 109 (Ark.) An indictment charging a statutory offense must allege all of the essential elements.-State v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 161 S. W. 1066.

$119 (Tex.Cr.App.) The indictment clearly charging an offense both in getting drunk and being found intoxicated in a public place, unnecessary allegations do not invalidate it but are surplusage.-Kuykendall v. State, 161 S. W. 130.

ing both rape and carnal abuse.-Threet v. State, 161 S. W. 139.

§ 130 (Mo.) A count, charging that accused and another jointly stole a horse, could not be joined with another count charging that accused assisted in the escape of such other after he alone had stolen the same horse, not being authorized by Rev. St. 1909, §§ 4528, 5103, 5104. -State v. Christian, 161 S. W. 736.

Only such offenses may be joined as arise out of the same transaction and are so far related that an acquittal or conviction for one would bar a prosecution for the other.-Id. IX. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE. $171 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where an indictment charged that three persons committed robbery, they were not entitled to acquittal if the evidence did not show that they acted jointly, but one or more might be convicted.-Madrid v. State, 161 S. W. 93.

X. CONVICTION OF OFFENSE INCLUDED IN CHARGE.

§ 191 (Mo.) Rev. St. 1909, § 4458, defining manslaughter in the second degree and the offense of felony of abortion, creates separate offenses, and, under an information charging manslaughter in the second degree, accused may not be convicted of abortion.-State v. Sonner, 161 S. W. 723.

INDORSEMENT.

See Bills and Notes, § 237.

INFANTS.

See Equity, 59; Executors and Administrators, § 221; Guardian and Ward; Master and Servant, § 95; Municipal Corporations, § 766; Negligence, §§ 23, 85; Parent and Child.

INFORMATION.

See Indictment and Information.

INHERITANCE TAX.

See Taxation, §§ 867, 893.

INJUNCTION.

See Appeal and Error, §§ 518, 1043; Execution, § 172; Municipal Corporations, § 623; Partnership; Schools and School Districts, & 107; Trespass to Try Title, § 6.

were also guilty of conspiracy and subject to be enjoined. Clarkson v. Laiblan, 161 S. W. 660. $115 (Tex.Civ.App.) Court held not authorized to grant a permanent injunction in a suit originally filed by a single plaintiff, where a substituted petition made the original plaintiff and another parties plaintiff, and there was no citation or notice to defendants after it was filed and no answer filed or other appearance made.-J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Owens, 161 S. W. 911.

§118 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a suit for an injunetion, the rule that the allegations of the petition must be taken most strongly against complainant is reenforced by the requirement that the material elements entitling complainant to relief shall be sufficiently certain to negative every reasonable inference possible on other supposable facts to the contrary.-Ross v. Veltmann, 161 S. W. 1073.

$122 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a supplemental petition in an injunction suit alleged a new ground for injunctive relief, it should have been verified.-Ross v. Veltmann, 161 S. W. 1073.

$128 (Ark.) In an action to compel defendant, the former engineer of a drainage district, to turn over the records of his office to his successor, evidence held to show that defendant was never elected engineer of the district but was merely engaged as a construction engineer. -Keene v. Trice, 161 S. W. 499.

Evidence held insufficient to show that defendant was employed until the completion of the work but to establish that he was employed for a stipulated length of time.-Id.

§ 128 (Mo.) In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal ordinance prohibiting further burials in a cemetery located within a municipality, evidence held to show that the ordinance was not passed for the benefit of the public health or to abate nuisances.-Union Cemetery Ass'n v. Kansas City, 161 S. W. 261. IV. PRELIMINARY AND INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS.

(B) Continuing, Modifying, Vacating, or Dissolving.

sworn

$163 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, after a answer is filed showing changed conditions that no longer entitle complainant to the temporary restraining order, it may be dissolved.-Ross v. Veltmann. 161 S. W. 1073.

$188 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, after a sworn answer is filed showing changed conditions that no longer entitle complainant to the temporary restraining order, it is dissolved, costs so

RELIEF.

(C) Contracts.

$59 (Tex.Civ.App.) The insolvent proprietor of a moving picture show, who licensed plaintiffs to visit his show at any time without payment, will be enjoined from preventing plaintiffs from visiting his performance.-Prickett v. Steiner, 161 S. W. 35.

(G) Personal Rights and Duties.

$99 (Mo..App.) A man's occupation partakes of the character of property entitled to the protection of an injunction.-Clarkson v. Laiblan, 161 S. W. 660.

to which she is entitled may be taxed against defendant.-Ross v. Veltmann, 161 S. W. 1073.

VIII. LIABILITIES ON BONDS OR

UNDERTAKINGS.

tion of an injunction staying proceedings on a $ 241 (Ark.) Immediately upon the dissoludecree, the chancellor could render judgment against the principals and sureties on the injunction bond according to its terms, under Kirby's Dig. § 3998.-Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162.

INNOCENCE.

See Criminal Law, § 308.

INNUENDO.

III. ACTIONS FOR INJUNCTIONS. $114 (Mo.App.) Where the business agent of a local union, by threats of a strike made to plaintiff's employer, according to the regulations of the union, caused plaintiff's loss of a job and of a subcontract, the other officers of the union

INSANE PERSONS. See Habeas Corpus, § 20.

II. INQUISITIONS. $13 (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 476, providing for inquisitions without notice to or the presence of the alleged insane person, is un

constitutional.-Citizens' State Bank of Trenton v. Shanklin, 161 S. W. 341.

Where defendant was not notified, his mere presence in court at a subsequent proceeding wherein he was declared sane is not a judicial admission of the validity of the first inquisition; it appearing that the second was not instituted by him.-Id.

$26 (Mo.App.) A proceeding without notice is subject to collateral attack.-Citizens' State Bank of Trenton v. Shanklin, 161 S. W. 341. IV. CUSTODY AND SUPPORT. § 54 (Mo.App.) An unauthorized person, acting as guardian for a lunatic, is not entitled credits for any expenditures except for necessaries for the insane person or his family. -Citizens' State Bank of Trenton v. Shanklin, 161 S. W. 341.

to

and not so as to defeat it.-Mitchell v. German Commercial Accident Co., 161 S. W. 362. Where the language employed in a policy is in the least doubtful, it is to be more strictly construed against the insurer, and in such a way as to protect the insured.—Id.

§ 146 (Mo.App.) In case of ambiguity, a contract of insurance should be construed most strongly against the insurer.-Century Realty Co. v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 624, 631; Same v. Travelers' Ins. Co., Id. 630.

§ 146 (Tex.Civ.App.) Insured is ordinarily bound by the terms of the policy, whether he reads it or not.-Indiana & O. Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Keiningham, 161 S. W. 384.

Every doubt must be resolved against the company in case of inconsistent provisions in an insurance policy.-Id.

$ 151 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a live stock policy made the application a part of it, the application would control if the policy provided that the horse should be insured only while it remain

Nor is. he entitled to credits for sums furnished defendant's adult daughter to defray necessary expenses during her last illness.-Id.

V. PROPERTY AND CONVEYANCES. $65 (Mo.App.) Where the guardian of defendant, appointed in an inquisition wherein he was held insane, expended money to keep up life policies previously taken out by defendant, the guardian is entitled to a credit for such expenditures even though his appointment was void.-Citizens' State Bank of Trenton v. Shanklin, 161 S. W. 341.

§ 66 (Tex.Civ.App.) Plaintiff was not entitled to a return of the consideration as a condition to the canceling of certain deeds executed by an insane person in the absence of proof that he had the money at the time of his death or that it had been used to purchase necessaries or been invested by or for him for the benefit of his estate and was still on hand.-Brown v. Brenner, 161 S. W. 14.

INSOLVENCY.

not so limit the liability.-Indiana & O. Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Keiningham, 161 S. W. 384.

$1792 (Mo.App.) An express promise being made by the insured to repay a loan and redeem ed a personal obligation on the insured, and, the policy pledged therefor, the contract creatthough the pledge was void, the personal obligation remained.-Gillen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 667.

VIII. CANCELLATION, SURRENDER, ABANDONMENT, OR RESCIS

SION OF POLICY.

$ 239 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1899, § 7900, providing for the surrender of life policies for an adequate consideration, the insured could, after default in premiums, surrender the policy on cancellation of a personal indebtedness.-Gillen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 667.

$240 (Mo.App.) A pledge of a life policy by the insured to the company to secure a loan held not a surrender of the policy, under Rev. St. 1899, § 7900.-Gillen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 667.

§ 241 (Mo.App.) The insured could consent to

INSPECTION.

See Appeal and Error, § 659; Carriers, § 290; Municipal Corporations, §§ 591, 611.

INSTRUCTIONS.

To jury, see Criminal Law, §§ 7551⁄2-830; Trial, §§ 136, 191–296.

INSURANCE.

See Abatement and Revival, § 39: Executors and Administrators, §§ 57, 423, 434: Fraudulent Conveyances, § 39: Insane Persons, 65; Judgment, § 569; Libel and Slander, 80; Licenses, § 7; Master and Servant, § 340.

V. THE CONTRACT IN GENERAL. (A) Nature, Requisites, and Validity. $145 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where live stock insurance policies did not provide that the policy was in force only while the horse was in a certain town, and insured requested a similar renewal policy, insured could assume that the policy issued did not contain a provision so limiting the company's liability.--Indiana & O. Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Keiningham, 161 S. W. 384.

its proceeds to the payment of his loan, either directly or by way of estoppel.-Gillen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 667.

X. FORFEITURE OF POLICY FOR BREACH OF PROMISSORY WARRANTY, COVENANT, OR CONDITION SUBSEQUENT.

(E) Nonpayment of Premiums or Assessments.

$ 367 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1899, § 7897, providing for purchase of extended insurance, a loan contract by which the insured agreed that the net reserve should be applied to the payment of the loan held void.-Gillen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 667.

Where the insured was not sufficiently informed of his rights, his failure to reply to a notice from the company and protest against the application of the proceeds of the net reserve of his policy to the satisfaction of a personal indebtedness created by a loan was not an acquiescence by estoppel to such action by the company.-Id.

§ 666 (Mo.App.) Though an indemnity policy fixed $5,000 as the limit for any one injured, the insurer, being entitled to conduct the defense and bound to pay the costs and expenses thereof, held bound to defray the interest accrued on a judgment pending appeal in accordance with Rev. St. 1909, § 7181, though the judgment was for $5,000.-Century Realty Co. v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 624, 631; Same v. Traveler's Ins. Co., Id.

630.

§ 668 (Ky.) Where the defense was cancellation by notice accepted by the insured's agent, and there was no evidence that the agent had any authority other than to procure the policy, a peremptory instruction was properly given for plaintiffs.-Dixie Fire Ins. Co. v. A. Layne & Bro., 161 S. W. 530.

XX. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE. (B) The Contract in General. § 723 (Tex.Civ.App.) False statements that one had never had dysentery or any disease of the genital organs or undergone a surgical operation are material to the risk, within Acts 31st Leg. (1st Extra Sess.) c. 36.-Supreme Ruling of Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Hansen, 161 S. W. 54.

(D) Forfeiture or Suspension.

it learned of insured's death on the day after paying dues in arrears, but instead, requesting the appointment of an administrator for insured, knowing that she had no other property, could be considered in determining whether it had knowledge of her illness while retaining her premiums prior to her death, as well as on the question of waiver of the forfeiture after her death.-Id. '

A forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums is waived where a benefit association, with knowledge of the cause of forfeiture, causes plaintiff to incur additional expense in furnishing proof.-Id.

with knowledge of insured's ill health when By accepting and retaining back premiums they were paid, a mutual benefit association waived a forfeiture for nonpayment.-Id. Though a mutual benefit association did not know that its agent had accepted back premiums after the time within which they could be paid, or while insured was in bad health, it ratified the agent's act by retaining them after learning that she was in bad health when the agent received them, so as to waive the forfeiture as of the time the agent accepted the premiums.-Id.

$ 756 (Mo.App.) Under the by-laws held that a suspension did not become effective, even though the member was notified of his default. until the council declared him to be suspended. -Bange v. Supreme Council Legion of Honor of Missouri, 161 S. W. 652.

To sustain a forfeiture for nonpayment of contributions, it must appear that the notice of suspension was received by the member in time for him to have acted upon it, where it was not delivered to his regular address.-Id.

For the notice of suspension to conclude a forfeiture, it must be an official one.-Id.

8751 (Mo.App.) Where the by-laws required notice of contributions called to be mailed to the member at his regular address, the mailing of such notice was a condition precedent to the right of the association to declare a forfeiture of death benefits.-Bange v. Supreme Council Legion of Honor of Missouri, 161 S. W. 652.

Parties to an insurance contract may agree that the mailing of notices for contributions shall constitute notice to the member.-Id.

$755 (Mo.App.) Waiver of forfeiture of a benefit certificate for nonpayment of dues by the acceptance of a premium is not based on contract or actual intention, but on estoppel to insist on conditions inconsistent with the acceptance or rejection of the premium.-Keys v. National Council, Knights & Ladies of Security, 161 S. W. 345.

A forfeiture of a benefit certificate once waived cannot afterwards be revived.-Id.

As between the association and a beneficiary, the rule that actual knowledge of the cause of forfeiture must be shown to work a waiver will not be applied, if it should have known of the facts by proper attention to its business. -Id.

A waiver of a forfeiture of a mutual benefit certificate may be inferred when the association, after knowledge of the cause of forfeiture, requires insured under the policy to do some act or incur some expense.-Id.

Knowledge of the local financial officer of a mutual benefit association that insured was more than 60 days in arrears when she was zeinstated charged the association with such knowledge.-Id.

The conduct of a mutual benefit association in not unequivocally declaring a forfeiture when

the place where the member would be likely to get his mail.-Id.

For acquiescence in an illegal suspension to bind the beneficiary, it need not appear that the member had official notice of his suspension. -Id.

8757 (Mo.App.) Where a member acquiesced in a suspension, his beneficiary is bound by such acquiescence, even though the suspension was not legal.-Bange v. Supreme Council Legion of Honor of Missouri, 161 S. W. 652.

§ 761 (Tex.Civ.App.) An application for reinstatement in a fraternal mutual benefit association held a warranty that the member had had none of the diseases mentioned in the original application after the certificate was issued.-Supreme Ruling of Fraternal Mystic Circle v. Hansen, 161 Š. W. 54.

In the absence of a statute limiting the effect of a breach of warranty, on which one is reinstated to membership in a fraternal mutual benefit association which has issued a benefit certificate on his life, that he has not had certain diseases, the breach works a forfeiture of the contract.-Id.

(F) Actions for Benefits. $818 (Mo.App.) In an action on a certificate defended on the ground of forfeiture for nonpayment of premiums, evidence of the retention of back premiums paid after actual notice of insured's ill health when paying them was admissible upon the association's intention in originally receiving the premiums.Keys v. National Council, Knights & Ladies of Security, 161 S. W. 345.

In an action on a certificate defended on the ground of forfeiture by nonpayment of back premiums until insured was ill, evidence that insured's neighbors knew that she was sick was not admissible to show that the company had actual knowledge of her sickness.-Id.

$819 (Mo.App.) Slight evidence showing an intention to waive a forfeiture of a mutual benefit certificate for nonpayment of premiums will prevent a forfeiture.-Keys v. National Council, Knights & Ladies of Security, 161 S. W. 345.

In an action on a certificate defended on the ground of forfeiture by nonpayment of premiums until after sickness, evidence that the association retained back premiums after notice of insured's ill health when she paid them was admissible, as showing a waiver of forfeiture by ratifying the act of the association's agent in theretofore accepting back premiums without a health certificate, so as to show that insured could rely on such a course.-Id.

§ 819 (Mo.App.) Evidence held to make out a prima facie case, casting on the defendant the burden of establishing its defense.-Bange v. Supreme Council of Legion of Honor of Missouri, 161 S. W. 652.

§ 825 (Mo.App.) The question whether a fraternal benefit association has followed a course of conduct as might waive a forfeiture of a certificate for nonpayment of dues is usually for the jury.-Keys V. National Council, Knights & Ladies of Security, 161 S. W. 345. in an action on a mutual benefit certificate, defended on the ground of forfeiture by nonpayment of premiums for three months, and offering to pay such arrears while ill, whether the association, by accepting such dues and requesting the appointment of an administrator, waived the forfeiture held a jury question.-Id. Evidence held to make it a jury question whether the forfeiture was waived by failing to unequivocally declare a forfeiture on learning that the premiums were paid while insured was sick.-Id.

§ 825 (Mo.App.) The question of the insured's regular address held for the jury.-Bange v. Supreme Council Legion of Honor of Missouri, 161 S. W. 652.

INTENT.

$169 (Tex.Cr.App.) Person who in procuring whisky acted merely as agent of purchaser held not guilty of selling it.-Cowley v. State, 161 S. W. 471.

VIII. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.

$ 224 (Mo.App.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 7227, 7228, every keeping for another of intoxicating liquors in a local option county is prima facie unlawful and when admitted places the burden of explanation upon the accused.-State v. Galliton, 161 S. W. 848.

for pursuing the occupation of selling intoxicat§ 230 (Tex.Cr.App.) The prosecution being ing liquors, testimony that defendant at various other times, after selling to witness, solicited him to make purchases is admissible.-Miller v. State, 161 S. W. 128.

Evidence of whisky and alcohol being frequently shipped and delivered to defendant is admissible, on a prosecution for pursuing the business of selling intoxicating liquors.—Id.

icating liquors, evidence as to receipt by accused § 233 (Tex.Cr.App.) On trial for selling intoxof liquor about and prior to the alleged sale held Competent.-Cowley v. State, 161 S. W. 471. Where accused testified that he procured whisky from D. at request of prosecuting witness, exclusion of testimony that accused inquired for D., was directed to him, started in that direction, and immediately thereafter delivered to the prosecuting witness a half pint of whisky held erroneous.-Id.

keeping for another intoxicating liquors, in vio§ 236 (Mo.App.) Evidence in a prosecution for lation of local option law (Rev. St. 1909, § 7227), held to sustain a conviction.-State v. Galliton, 161 S. W. 848.

§ 239 (Tex.Cr.App.) The charge on prosecution for pursuing the occupation of selling intoxicating liquors held not to authorize a conviction merely for making two sales.-Miller v. State, 161 S. W. 128.

INTOXICATION.

INTEREST.

INVITED ERROR.

II. RATE.

$31 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where an obligation providing for the return of money did not stipulate any rate of interest, the obligee can recover only the legal rate of 6 per cent.-Willett v. Herrin, 161 S. W. 26.

INTERMEDIATE COURTS.

See Appeal and Error, § 1092.

INTERPLEADER.

See Attachment, § 302; Garnishment, § 217.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

III. LOCAL OPTION.

§ 36 (Tex.Cr.App.) Under Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 5728, objection to notice of local option election must be made by contest and cannot be made on prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors in prohibition territory.-Miller v. State, 161 S. W. 128.

VI. OFFENSES.

§ 146 (Tex.Cr.App.) Person who, on behalf of himself and others, contributing part of the purchase price, bought whisky which they then drank, held not guilty of selling whisky.-McLain v. State, 161 S. W. 117.

JOHNSON GRASS.

See Agriculture, § 8.

JOINDER.

See Indictment and Information, §§ 124, 130; Parties, § 14.

JOINT TENANCY.

See Tenancy in Common.

JUDGES.

See Criminal Law, §§ 634, 656; Exceptions, Bill of, § 51; Justices of the Peace; Venue, § 72.

JUDGMENT.