exceeding the speed limit held a jury question. I ternational & G. N. R. Co. v. Walters, 161 S. -Cabanne v. St. Louis Car Co., 161 S. W. 597. W. 916. Whether plaintiff's negligence in running the automobile above the statutory speed limit proximately contributed to his injury held a jury question.-Id. § 289 (Tex.Civ.App.) Evidence in an action by a railroad engineer for injuries in a collision of his train with train on the main track at a station held not to show plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law in assuming the track was clear because the switch target was white.-St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Vernon, 161 S. W. 84. § 289 (Tex.Civ.App.) On evidence, in a car repairer's action for personal injuries, held, that it was for the jury to say whether defendant's employés on the engine which struck plaintiff exercised ordinary care to prevent the injury, and, if they did not, whether their exercise of such care could have averted the in jury. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Walters, 161 S. W. 916. 8291 (Ky.) Where the negligence in issue in a conductor's action for injuries was defective step of a caboose and sudden jerk of the train, an instruction, which coupled with the latter negligent act, negligence of the engineer in starting before receiving a signal, was erroneous.-Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Goldston, 161 S. W. 246. § 293 (Ky.) Instructions in an action for injuries from the sudden jerking of the train should have used the terms "violent, unusual, and unnecessary," in characterizing the jerk, instead of "quick, violent, sudden, and unusual." -Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Goldston, 161 S. W. 246. The court having submitted in one instruction the issue of the sudden jerk of the train, it was confusing to submit the same question in a second instruction also submitting the question of a defective step.-Id. When plaintiff seeks a recovery upon the issue of discovered peril as well as upon other theories, charges on contributory negligence should be limited to be considered only upon the other theories, as such defense cannot be urged to defeat liability arising by reason of discovered peril.—Id. IV. LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES TO (B) Work of Independent Contractor. 8315 (Ky.) If one making a railroad cut was an independent contractor, over whom the company had no control, he alone, and not the company, was responsible for a trespass committed by him in dumping earth on plaintiff's land.-Louisville Ry. Co. v. Wigginton, 161 S. W. 209. railroad right of way casting material on plain- V. INTERFERENCE WITH THE RE- § 340 (Ark.) In an action by one insurance company against another, allegations charging interference with plaintiff's employés held not to state a cause of action.-Arkansas Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 136. MATERIALITY. MAYHEM. § 293 (Mo.App.) An instruction, in an action See Alteration of Instruments, §§ 4, 8. for the death of an employé, held to contain inconsistent statements as to the duty of the employer to provide a reasonably safe place to work.-Marquez v. Koch, 161 S. W. 648. An instruction, in an action for the death of an employé, held to erroneously submit the is sue of the employer's reasonable care in view of the evidence of the usual way adopted by others engaged in a similar business.-Id. § 293 (Tex.Civ.App.) In a brakeman's action for injuries from a defective step on the tender, instruction held not objectionable as authorizing a verdict for plaintiff, even though defendant had exercised ordinary care to furnish a proper step and keep it in repair. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Martin, 161 S. W. 405. § 295 (Ky.) Where there was more evidence that the jerk of a train was only an ordinary movement than that it was violent and unnecessary, the court should have instructed upon the question of assumed risk.-Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Goldston, 161 S. W. 246. § 295 (Tex.Civ.App.) When plaintiff seeks a recovery upon the issue of discovered peril as well as upon other theories, charges on assumed risk should be limited to be considered only upon the other theories, as such defense cannot be urged to defeat liability arising by reason of discovered peril.-International & G. N. R. Co. v. Walters, 161 S. W. 916. § 296 (Ky.) An instruction submitting the issue of contributory negligence must charge that it was the duty of the brakeman to perform his duties in a reasonably safe way and exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person under like circumstances.-Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Banks, 161 S. W. 554. § (Tex.Cr.App.) Under the statute providdeprive of an ear, etc., the injury must be ing that to maim is to willfully and maliciously done willfully and maliciously, and, if it arises from a sudden attack without premeditated design, the offense is not maiming.-Key v. State, 161 S. W. 121. Where the statute prohibits an injury to a member, such as an ear, etc., which disfigures the person, the whole member need not be detached to constitute the offense, but a severance of only a small part, which does not disfigure the person and could only be discovered by close examination, is not an offense.-Id. An act is "willful" within the statute if it is committed with evil intent, with legal malice, and without reasonable ground for believing the act to be lawful or legal justification, and is "malicious" if committed in a state of mind showing a heart fatally bent on mischief.-Id. If a maiming occurred under the immediate influence of sudden passion aroused by adequate cause, such as an assault, the issue of simple assault by accused would not be in the case, though accused only intended to commit a simple assault; Pen. Code 1911, art. 50, providing that if one intending to commit a misdemeanor shall, through mistake, commit a felony he shall receive the lowest punishment for the felony.-Id. 82 (Mo.) Self-defense may be available to a charge of mayhem.-State v. Bunyard, 161 S. W. 756. §4 (Mo.) An information which alleged that accused feloniously assaulted prosecutor with a knife, and of his malice aforethought cut and § 296 (Tex.Civ.App.) In car repairer's action slit the nose of prosecutor, with intent to maim for personal injuries, instruction as to duty of and disfigure him, sufficiently charges the of defendant's employés after discovering his peril fense of mayhem, under Rev. St. 1909, § 4480. held not without support in the evidence.-In--State v. Bunyard, 161 S. W. 756. 86 (Mo.) Where the evidence raises the is sue of self-defense, the court must as required by Rev. St. 1909, § 5231, submit it to the jury. -State v. Bunyard, 161 S. W. 756. An instruction that, if accused sought or brought on the difficulty or voluntarily entered into it, he could not justify himself under the law of self-defense is erroneous, for not stating the intention with which accused entered into the difficulty.-Id. On a trial for mayhem, an instruction on self-defense held unauthorized under the evidence.-Id. On prosecution for mayhem, in an assault on a school-teacher who was conducting an entertainment in the schoolhouse, the court must presume, in the absence of a contrary showing, that Rev. St. 1909, § 10,784, had been complied with, and that the teacher had the right to eject disturbers.-Id. $47 (Ky.) One who rented a hoisting engine to contractors was not entitled to a lien for such rent, under Ky. St. § 2463, giving one who furnishes "materials" a lien.-Henry Bickel Co. v. National Surety. Co., 161 S. W. 1113. III. PROCEEDINGS TO PERFECT. 8132 (Tenn.) Under a building contract, including the installing of a sprinkler system, to be approved by the State Inspection Bureau, the building is not completed, as regards the time for filing notice of lien, till the work required by the bureau on its inspection is done. -Harrison v. Knaffl, 161 S. W. 1003. held, that his lessee was an assignee of the original lease and not a sublessee.-Pennsylvania Mining Co. v. Bailey, 161 S. W. 200. An assignee of a mining lease was liable to the original lessor for the stipulated royalty.-Id. ing no estate or interest in the land, mines, or § 83 (Mo.App.) Mining licensees, though havminerals, held to have substantial rights which the law would protect, and of which they could not be deprived at will or arbitrarily, in the absence of any substantial violation by them of the license.-Gates v. Steckel, 161 S. W. 1185. § 84 (Mo.App.) Under a license to mine on substantial violations of the terms and condicertain lands, held that there had been no such tions thereof by the licensees as justified the licensors in declaring a forfeiture, and a court of equity would therefore set the forfeiture aside.-Gates v. Steckel, 161 S. W. 1185. Where mining licensors, although aware that licensees were not doing continuous mining, made no complaint until at least a week after the resumption of active mining operations, held that they could not then declare a forfeiture for the past default.-Id. MISTAKE. See Account Stated, § 12; Adverse Possession, MODIFICATION. See Contracts, §§ 238-245. MONEY LENT. action.-Gahren, Dodge & Maltby v. Farmers' §6 (Ky.) A petition held to state a cause of Bank of Estill County, 161 S. W. 1127. MONEY RECEIVED. See Payment, §§ 82-89; Pleading, 367; Within the statute giving materialmen 30 days from completion of the work provided by the contract within which to file notices of liens, they have 30 days from completion of the work as enlarged by amendment of the contract between the owner and contractor, though part of their material was furnished before such money had and received, which defendant claim817 (Mo.App.) The petition in an action for amendment and all of it was for the work pre-ed was paid him for services, should have set viously provided for by the contract.-Id. MEETINGS. See Schools and School Districts, § 56. MEMORANDA. See Witnesses, § 257. MENTAL CAPACITY. See Wills, §§ 47-53, 329. MENTAL SUFFERING. See Telegraphs and Telephones, §§ 68, 71, 74. MINES AND MINERALS. II. TITLE, CONVEYANCES, AND (C) Leases, Licenses, and Contracts. 864 (Ark.) Where mining lessee leased the property for a term extending beyond his term, forth the relation of the parties and the contract or wrong out of which the cause of action arose; it not being one on an account.-St. Louis Sanitary Co. v. Reed, 161 S. W. 315. § 18 (Mo.App.) In an action for money had and received, which defendant claimed was paid him by plaintiff for his services, it was error to hold that the burden at the outset and by the pleadings was on defendant.-St. Louis Sanitary Co. v. Reed, 161 S. W. 315. MONOPOLIES. I. VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF $2 (Tenn.) Under Const. art. 1, § 22, for- §12 (Tex.Civ.App.) A contract by which plaintiff, in consideration of the execution of For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER A combination in violation of the anti-trust statute is void, irrespective of the common-law distinction between reasonable and unreasonable restrictions on trade.-Id. MOOT QUESTIONS. X. FORECLOSURE BY ACTION. (F) Pleading and Evidence. §463 (Ark.) Evidence, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, held to show that, at the time the mortgagee's deed to the mortgagor releasing a condition in a prior deed was executed and deposited in a bank for delivery when the mortgage was paid, there was no time fixed within which payment should be made.Brown v. Allbright, 161 S. W. 1036. MOTION PICTURES. See Appeal and Error, § 781; Certiorari, § 64. See Injunction, § 59. (A) General Rules of Construction. $105 (Tex.Civ.App.) A deed and a bill of sale with a mortgage and notes simultaneously executed by the grantee as security for the purchase price referring to the same subject-matter held but one act and to be construed as one and the same agreement.-Vinson v. W. T. Carter & Bro., 161 S. W. 49. IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTIES. $199 (Ark.) Where a senior mortgagee was in possession as tenant of the administrator and heir of the deceased mortgagor, and not as mortgagee, he could not be required to account for rents and profits for the benefit of a junior mortgagee.-Armistead v. Bishop, 161 S. W. 182. VI. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY MORTGAGED OR OF EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. $280 (Mo.App.) Though a deed did not state directly that the grantee assumed a mortgage yet, as the deed mentioned it and provided that the grantor should be released from liability for it, it amounted to an assumption by the grantee.-Greer v. Orchard, 161 S. W. 875. § 281 (Ark.) Where a deed recited that the consideration was a certain sum in cash, and the assumption of a $400 mortgage by the grantee, the grantee by accepting the deed impliedly promised to discharge the mortgage.Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162. § 283 (Ark.) A grantee assuming a mortgage on the premises as a part of the consideration was a surety for the debt.-Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162. § 283 (Mo.App.) Where a grantee assumes a mortgage, not only does he become the principal debtor between the parties, but the mortgagee, after notice of the assumption, must treat the grantee as the principal and the grantor as surety.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601. § 283 (Mo.App.) Where mortgaged property is conveyed to one who assumes the mortgage debt, the grantee becomes the principal and the mortgagor and grantor his surety.-Greer v. Orchard, 161 S. W. 875. § 292 (Ark.) Evidence held to sustain a finding that a defendant assumed in a deed to himself to discharge a mortgage which covered part of the land.-Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162. MOTIONS. See Continuance, § 33; Criminal Law, § 1088; New Trial, §§ 108, 124, 167; Pleading, $$ 345-369; Trial, § 178; Venue, §§ 36-72. MULTIFARIOUSNESS. See Appeal and Error, § 736. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. See Appeal and Error, §§ 172, 781; Cemeteries, § 3; Constitutional Law, § 115; Contempt, 36; Counties; Courts, § 231; Dedication; Elections, 8 65; Electricity, § 1; Eminent Domain, $§ 2, 119, 296; Evidence, $$ 83, 242; Injunction, § 128; Licenses, § 6; Monopolies, § 2; Railroads, §§ 76, 99, 236, 398; Schools and School Districts; Street Railroads; Waters and Water Courses, § 183. I. CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE, AND DISSOLUTION. (A) Incorporation and Incidents of Ex istence. § 14 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 386a, a city with less than 2,000 inhabitants could not be lawfully incorporated so as to include more than two square miles of territory, and, an attempt having been made to do it, the defect could not be cured by eliminating the excess.-Wilson v. Carter, 161 S. W. 411. St. $15 (Tex.Civ.App.) Sayles' Ann. Civ. 1897, art. 386b, enacted in 1895, providing for the relinquishment of excess territory by cities, held only to apply to those incorporated prior to 1895.-Wilson v. Carter, 161 S. W. 411. Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 386c, enacted in 1897, and validating incorporation of cities which had included more than two square miles of territory and whose city councils had restricted the limits to prescribed bounds, held not applicable to a city so incorporated in 1911. -Id. Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 776, validating incorporation of cities which had included more than two square miles of territory, held not to apply to city incorporation proceedings which were subject to such defect but which had been dissolved by an election prior to the taking effect of the act.-Id. § 17 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where a municipal corporation was illegally incorporated so as to contain more than two square miles of territory but with less than 2,000 inhabitants in violation of Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 386a, but officers were elected and debts incurred, it was a corporation de facto.-Wilson v. Carter, 161 S. W. 411. II. GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONS IN GENERAL. § 63 (Mo.) The courts may inquire into the reasonableness of municipal ordinances.-Union Cemetery Ass'n v. Kansas City, 161 S. W. 261. III. LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL ACTS, RIGHTS, AND LIABILITIES. $ 64 (Ky.) The extent of legislative control over municipalities extends as far as is essential to accomplish a result in which the state has an interest in its governmental capacity but not so as to deprive the municipality of discretion in the means of accomplishing the result. -Kenton Water Co. v. City of Covington, 161 S. W. 988. $70 (Ky.) The establishment of a water system in a city is not a governmental function in which the state can have such an interest as would give it power to compel its maintenance therein. Kenton Water Co. v. City of Covington, 161 S. W. 988. $73 (Ky.) Laws 1910, c. 83, requiring any city, before establishing its own waterworks in any neighboring town annexed, to purchase the property of the water company then supplying such town, violates Const. § 181.-Kenton Water Co. v. City of Covington, 161 S. W. 988. does not repeal Ky. St. § 3456, providing that the cost of improvements at street intersections shall be paid by the city.-City of Henderson v. Connell, 161 S. W. 1121. § 417 (Ky.) That a drain had been constructed along a portion of the route of the sewer in question held not to preclude the sewer from being an original improvement the cost of which was assessable against the abutting property, under Ky. St. § 3490.-Gesser v. McLane, 161 S. W. 1118. § 434 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 1336, making the disturbance of cemetery property a misdemeanor, such property cannot be sold under execution to pay an assessment for the public improvement made by the municipality in which the property is located.-Cave Hill Cemetery Co. v. Gosnell, 161 S. W. 980. § 459 (Ky.) Ky. St. § 3490, subd. 9, relative IV. PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OR to apportionment of the cost of the construcOTHER GOVERNING BODY. (B) Preliminary Proceedings and Ordinances or Resolutions. § 292 (Mo.App.) As the statute requires no particular form of signature to a petition, the signature of a corporate officer is binding if he had authority to bind it in ordinary corporate contracts.-Pasche v. South St. Joseph Town Co., 161 S. W. 322. tion of sewers in cities of the fourth class, not being mandatory, the council has power to assess the cost of a sewer, to the extent of $1 per front foot, on the abutting property and provide for the payment of the cost in excess thereof out of the general fund.-Gesser v. McLane, 161 S. W. 1118. § 469 (Ky.) Where a sewer was constructed by a city of the fourth class on its side of a street forming the line between two cities, the fact that the assessment therefor was not levied on the property abutting the street on the opposite side over which it had no control did not invalidate the assessment.-Gesser v. McLane, 161 S. W. 1118. § 470 (Ky.) A corner lot which has been assessed $1 per front foot for the construction of a sewer on one street may be assessed for a sewer constructed on the other street.-Gesser v. McLane, 161 S. W. 1118. § 487 (Ky.) A purchaser who knew of a street improvement on which the assessment had been paid held presumed to have knowledge of Ky. St. § 2834, part of the city charter permitting a lien for improvements and permitting corrections, so that he was not a purchaser without notice, but was liable for a correcting additional assessment.-Richards V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 161 S. W. 1105. The fact that the original assessment for a street improvement paid by defendant's vendor was erroneous, and that such error misled defendant and required him to pay an additional assessment held not sufficient ground for estoppel, in view of his presumed knowledge of Ky. St. § 2834, expressly authorizing a city to correct an erroneous assessment.-Id. cial Taxes. Where the board of directors placed the active (F) Enforcement of Assessments and Spemanagement of a corporation in the hands of its secretary and president, the signing by the secretary of a petition for street paving held binding.-Id. A general resolution of the board of directors at the end of the year, ratifying all of his acts, validates his signature as of the time of sign ing.-Id. Though the statute requires a petition for a street improvement to be in writing, the authority of an officer of the corporation to sign such petition need not be written.-Id. $325 (Mo.App.) A finding by the board of public works that a petition for paving had been signed by the owners of a majority of the abutting property establishes prima facie the validity of such signatures.-Pasche v. South St. Joseph Town Co., 161 S. W. 322. lien of a special tax bill issued under Kansas § 558 (Mo. App.) An action to enforce the City charter, permitting such suits against owners of the land charged, but providing that only the title and interest of the defendants shall be affected by the proceedings, is not one in rem until jurisdiction of the subject-matter is acquired.-Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Field, 161 S. W. 364. § 565 (Mo. App.) An action to enforce a special tax bill, brought under Kansas City charter, providing that the owners of any interest in the land charged may be made defendants, but only their right or interest in the land shall be affected, can only be maintained against one owning some interest in the land when action is brought.-Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. (E) Assessments for Benefits, and Special Field, 161 S. W. 364. Taxes. § 408 (Ky.) The provision of Acts 1912, c. 113, that a city may assess the cost of street improvements against the property owners, etc., 8586 (Ky.) As cemetery property is free from the lien of public improvements, the court cannot, by indirection, cast such burden on a cemetery corporation by making it personally lia For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER ble for the assessment.-Cave Hill Cemetery | XI. USE AND REGULATION OF PUBCo. v. Gosnell, 161 S. W. 980. A landowner is not personally liable for an assessment for public improvements placed in front of or nearby his land.-Id. X. POLICE POWER AND REGULA TIONS. LIC PLACES, PROPERTY, AND WORKS. (A) Streets and Other Public Ways, § 648 (Mo.) Where a city uses a strip of land for public use for more than ten years under claim of title, and improves the same, the strip becomes a public street by adverse possession. (A) Delegation, Extent, and Exercise of Quinn v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. Power. 820. § 663 (Ky.) The sidewalk belongs to the pub§ 591 (Mo.) The city cannot surrender or bar-lic, and an abutting owner cannot compel a gain away its police power.-Union Cemetery member of the public to leave the sidewalk, Ass'n v. Kansas City, 161 S. W. 261. even though he is guilty of a violation of a breach of the peace.-Hixson v. Slocum, 161 S. W. 522. $591 (Tenn.) The provision of section 16 of the ordinance of Morristown providing for the inspection of slaughterhouses, which confers police powers upon the inspector, is objectionable.-Noe v. Town of Morristown, 161 S. W. 485. The provision of section 13 of the ordinance of Morristown providing for the inspection of slaughterhouses, which gives the inspector absolute power to dispose of the condemned meat, is objectionable as delegating to him a decision which should be controlled by law.-Id. The provisions of the ordinance of Morristown regulating the inspection of slaughterhouses and the sale of meat, that certain acts should be "sufficient" evidence that the goods were on sale, are objectionable.-Id. § 592 (Mo.) Where a cemetery association was incorporated by a special act, the right of the municipality in which it was located to prohibit the continued use of the burying ground cannot be denied on the ground that the charter of the municipality giving it authority to pass such ordinances prohibited the passage of ordinances inconsistent with the state laws.Union Cemetery Ass'n v. Kansas City, 161 S. W. 261. § 609 (Mo.) Under Kansas City Charter 1909, art. 1, § 1, par. 13, art. 3, § 1, par. 16, or under paragraph 41 alone, the city may prohibit the further use of a public burying ground when it is detrimental to public health and its continued use constitutes a nuisance.-Union Cemetery Ass'n v. Kansas City, 161 S. W. 261. 8611 (Tenn.) The ordinances of a town, providing for the selection of places for the inspection of animals to be slaughtered for food and confirming a contract which made the premises of a company the only place where they should be inspected and slaughtered, were void as not being within the powers conferred by the town charter (Acts 1903, c. 103).-Noe v. Town of Morristown, 161 S. W. 485. An act authorizing the establishment of a municipal slaughterhouse, to be constitutional, must provide that all persons should have a right to resort to that place to do their own slaughtering or to have it done by their own agents.-Id. The original ordinance of Morristown, providing for the selection of one or more places for the inspection and slaughter of animals intended for food, is in the main valid.—Id. 8617 (Tenn.) The power to grant an exclu sive franchise, even of the limited class which may be granted within a town, must be expressly conferred by the Legislature.-Noe v. Town of Morristown, 161 S. W. 485. $623 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. Civ. St. 1911, arts. 844, 856, and 965, a city council by resolution held authorized to require the removal of a dilapidated wooden building located within the fire limits, where it was likely to fall and endanger human life or to burn.Howell v. City of Sweetwater, 161 S. W. 948. A city having properly condemned a wooden building within the fire limits, and the owner having refused to remove the same, the city could enjoin the construction of improvements, and compel the removal of the building as a nuisance.-Id. § 663 (Tex.Civ.App.) Even though the abutting owner owns the fee of the street, the city is entitled to remove soil or gravel therefrom when necessary to properly grade it, and to use the gravel or soil in improving the streets in another locality.-City of La Grange v. Brown, 161 S. W. 8. As Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 769, expressly authorized cities owning waterworks to improve a highway to their plants even though they be without the corporate limits, a city may use gravel and soil removed from a street within its corporate limits for the purpose of improving the highway to its water plant.-Id. XII. TORTS. (B) Acts or Omissions of Officers or Agents. 8745 (Tex.Civ.App.) A municipal corporation is not liable for the wrongful assault and imprisonment of the plaintiff by its officers without a showing of some wrongful act by the corporation itself.-Swanson v. Nacogdoches, 161 S. W. 83. (C) Defects or Obstructions in Streets and Other Public Ways. $766 (Mo. App.) Where an injury results from a danger inherent in the plan adopted by a city for the improvement of a street, it is not liable, but if the danger has arisen from negligent construction or maintenance liability accrues.-Trippensee v. City of Jefferson, 161 S. W. 303. § 766 (Tenn.) A city was responsible for the death of children 11 and 9 years of age by drowning in a pond, which occupied the whole width of a public street, about 120 feet from a public park.-Doyle v. City of Chattanooga, 161 S. W. 997. pedestrian by the tilting of a stone in steps § 768 (Ky.) In an action for injuries to a leading from one street to another, it was imed of a defect in the construction or a failure material whether the city's negligence consistto keep the steps in proper repair. Board of Council of City of Frankfort v. Kirby, 161 S. W. 1115. § 768 (Mo.App.) Where walks are not negligently constructed nor allowed to become or remain unsafe, an injury caused by mere slant is not actionable.-Price v. City of Maryville, 161 S. W. 295. A city is not liable for a step-off rendered necessary in the construction of a sidewalk, where it is not negligently maintained and the plan is not manifestly unsafe.-Id. A city held liable for injuries to a pedestrian at night by stepping on a "low place" in the sidewalk, which resulted from a defect in the walk, and was not a mere step-off arising from the topographical conditions, of which defect the city had had notice.-Id. § 772 (Mo.App.) Where a city allowed water from one of its hydrants to run over the sidewalk so that it formed slush with newly fallen snow, it cannot escape liability for injuries to one who fell upon the unevenly frozen slush, on the ground that the snow was a gen |