§ 89 (Ark.) In an action to recover a fee paid | under Rev. St. 1909, § 8317, for producing an to a de facto prosecuting attorney not entitled abortion.-Id. thereto, submission of the case on the sole issue whether plaintiff knew when he made the payment that the fee demanded was illegal was more favorable than defendant was entitled to. -Williford v. Eason, 161 S. W. 498. PENALTIES. See Agriculture, § 8; Jury,, § 107; Robbery, 8 30; Statutes, 241; Telegraphs and Telephones, § 34. PENDENCY OF ACTION. See Limitation of Actions, § 105. PERJURY. Under Rev. St. 1909, § 8317, a physician's right to practice cannot be suspended because of a willingness or offer to produce an abortion. -Id. Rev. St. 1909, § 8317, relative to revocation of licenses to practice medicine and surgery, held not to authorize the State Board of Health to determine what shall constitute dishonorable conduct on the part of a physician and surgeon, in view of Const. art. 4, § 1, and article 3.-Id. Assuming that the State Board of Health, under Rev. St. 1909, § 8317, may determine what shall constitute unprofessional conduct, it could not suspend a physician for offering to commit an abortion, where it had not prohibited such offers, in view of Const. art. 2, See Libel and Slander, §§ 7, 156; Witnesses, §§ 15, prohibiting retrospective legislation.-Id. 286. I. OFFENSES AND RESPONSIBILITY § 11 (Mo.) Evidence of false testimony before the grand jury as to whether a hotel proprietor was running a bawdyhouse held material, within Rev. St. 1909, § 4344.-State v. Burnett, 161 S. W. 680. II. PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT. $32 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for perjury in falsely testifying that accused had never been injured while working for another railroad, parts of the transcript in such action, which showed that accused's counsel therein withdrew from the case upon it appearing that accused had testified falsely, were not admissible. -Key v. State, 161 S. W. 130. $32 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution for testifying falsely before the grand jury as to his brother's age, evidence that an action was pending against the brother in the justice court, in which he had entered a plea of minority and swore that he was only 19 years of age, was admissible, but the result of that trial was inadmissible.-Poulter v. State, 161 S. W. 475. Testimony of grand jury men was admissible to show that defendant acted deliberately and willfully and did not testify through misapprehension or agitation.-Id. PERSONAL INJURIES. See Abatement and Revival, § 54; Carriers, §§ 246, 280-347; Damages, §§ 130, 132, 166221; Death; Electricity, § 16; Evidence. §8 471, 548; Master and Servant, §§ 86-296; Municipal Corporations, §§ 766-821; Negligence; Pleading, §§ 34, 369; Railroads, $$ 275-400; Release; Street Railroads, §§ 81118; Trial. $$ 84, 191, 194, 217, 229, 242, 243, 250, 252, 260, 296. See Pleading. PETITION. PETIT LARCENY. See Larceny, § 65. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS. See Evidence, §§ 317, 528, 548; Malicious ecution, § 71; Witnesses, § 410. § 24 (Mo.App.) In an action against a surgeon for damages for negligence in an operation, evidence held insufficient to go to the jury.Boner v. Nicholson, 161 S. W. 309. PLEADING. See Abatement and Revival, § 54; Appeal and I. 55; Partnership, § 213; Process, § 66; Quieting Title, §§ 34-50; Railroads, §§ 114, 439, 441; Rape, § 66; Reformation of Instruments, § 36; Sales, § 446; Specific Performance, § 114: Street Railroads, § 117; Telegraphs and Telephones, § 65; Trespass to Try Title, § 32; Trial, §§ 139, 194, 250253, 397. FORM AND ALLEGATIONS IN GEN- §8 (Ark.) Mere abstract conclusions of law may not be pleaded.-Wood v. Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Conway County, 161 S. W. 1057. The allegation that the delay in completing work under a contract was negligent held a mere conclusion of law.-Id. § 8 (Mo.) An allegation that a certain deed was ineffective is a conclusion of law and not an allegation of fact.-Boothe v. Cheek, 161 S. W. 791. § 8 (Mo.App.) Averments in a petition, that by obstruction of a stream plaintiff's sawmill was rendered wholly worthless, and he was caused to move it, held conclusions of the pleadPros-er-Weller v. Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 161 S. W. 853. § 11 (Mo.) The right of a licensed physician to practice is a valuable privilege which is protected by such safeguards as the Legislature has thrown around it.-State ex rel. Spriggs v. Robinson, 161 S. W. 1169. Rev. St. 1909, § 8317, so far as it authorizes the revocation of licenses to practice medicine and surgery, is highly penal and must be so construed.-Id. Evidence held insufficient to sustain suspension of physician by State Board of Health § 8 (Mo.App.) The statement of a conclusion that, if defendant was negligent, the plaintiff was also guilty of negligence contributing thereto, held bad.-Johnson v. Springfield Traction Co.. 161 S. W. 1193. 88 (Tex.Civ.App.) An allegation that defendant became bound to pay plaintiff held a conclusion.-Baker v. Hahn, 161 S. W. 443. § 34 (Mo.App.) The word "disease" as used in an allegation of the answer, in an action for the price of a jack, that the jack was not a good breeder and sure foal-getter because of the disease, meant any derangement of the functions or alteration of the structure of the animal organs.-Perry v. Van Matre, 161 S. W. 643. § 34 (Tex.) In action for death of an employé, where petition alleged that the floor was greasy and slippery, but failed to show that any other person was responsible for such condition, held, that it would be presumed that the employé caused such condition.-Snipes v. Bomar Cotton Oil Co., 161 S. W. 1. $35 (Mo.App.) The words "a corporation," appearing in the caption of a complaint after the name of the plaintiff, may be disregarded as surplusage.-Iroquois Mfg. Co. v. AnnanBurg Milling Co., 161 S. W. 320. $214 (Mo.App.) A demurrer admits all facts well pleaded and the inferences of fact which may be reasonably drawn therefrom, but not conclusions of law nor the conclusions of the pleader.-Weller v. Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 161 S. W. 853. 8214 (Tex.Civ.App.) On demurrer the averments of the petition must be taken as true.Dye v. Livingston Lumber Co., 161 S. W. 53. § 228 (Tex.Civ.App.) An exception to five counts in a petition of reconvention was properly overruled where one of the counts stated a proper counterclaim.-Gillispie v. Ambrose, 161 S. W. 937. Exception to five counts in plea of reconvention for misjoinder by which it was proposed to strike them out and permit other counts to II. DECLARATION, COMPLAINT, PE- remain, held properly overruled, as the entire TITION, OR STATEMENT. § 48 (Ark.) Every essential element of the cause of action must be stated in the complaint. -Wood v. Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Conway County, 161 S. W. 1057. § 67 (Ky.) Plaintiff is only required to state in his petition facts making out a prima facie case in his favor, and is not bound to anticipate the answers or objections which defendant may intend to rely upon.-Flynn v. Barnes, 161 S. W. 523. pleading is to be stricken, leaving it to the VI. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL § 237 (Mo.) In an action against a railroad company by the former owner of the land of a street, which the company had appropriated with the city's consent, held not error to permit defendant to amend its answer to conform to the evidence, after the instructions were given.Quinn v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 161 S. W. III. PLEA OR ANSWER, CROSS-COM-820. § 243 (Ark.) Where no cause of action was stated in a complaint as distinguished from a cause of action defectively stated, it could not be amended.-Arkansas Life Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 136. (C) Traverses or Denials and Admissions. 126 (Ky.) An answer, denying that plaintiff "on October 22, 1912, loaned defendants 257 (Ky.) In action on notes, every fact $5,000, which amount both jointly and severally provable under an amended answer stricken by promise to pay," held to admit a loan on some the court, alleging that, under contract by other day, for a different amount, and a promise which defendant, as plaintiff's agent, was to reeither joint or several.-Gahren, Dodge & Malt-ceive $2.50 on each wagon shipped by plaintiff, by v. Farmers' Bank of Estill County, 161 S. W. 1127. § 127 (Ky.) An answer denying that on October 22d plaintiff loaned defendant $5,000, being an admission of a loan on some other day, or for a less sum, the consideration for the loan was admitted, so that the further answer that the debt was without consideration presented no defense.-Gahren, Dodge & Maltby v. Farmers' Bank of Estill County, 161 S. W. 1127. § 129 (Ky.) Where defendant's allegations of ownership of land and that a part of his boundary was within a boundary claimed by plaintiff were not denied, no issue was raised as to whether the lap was within defendant's deed.-Bassett v. Lush, 161 S. W. 227. V. DEMURRER OR EXCEPTION. 192 (Ark.) Where mere abstract conclusions of law are pleaded, the defect may be reached by demurrer.-Wood v. Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Conway County, 161 S. W. 1057. § 193 (Ark.) Failure to state every essential element of the cause of action may be reached by demurrer.-Wood v. Drainage Dist. No. 2 of Conway County, 161 S. W. 1057. $193 (Mo.) In case a petition shows on its face a misjoinder of action, the defect may be reached by demurrer, but if it does not show such defect on its face, the fault may be attacked by answer.-Norton v. Reed, 161 S. W. 842. § 193 (Mo.App.) It is no ground for demurrer in actions at law that the prayer for relief is not warranted by the averments of the petition. -Weller v. Missouri Lumber & Mining Co., 161 6. W. 853. § 214 (Mo.) A demurrer to the petition admits the truth of the allegations therein.-Meehan v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 161 S. W. 825. 650 wagons were so shipped, held provable under the original answer, alleging that a large number, the exact number of which defendant could not tell, were shipped.-Taulbee v. Lewis, & Chambers, 161 S. W. 1100. VII. SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION. IX. BILL OF PARTICULARS AND § 330 (Tex.Civ.App.) That plaintiff was in possession of the account books and would not permit defendant, his former partner, to inspect them was a sufficient excuse for not par ticularly itemizing the amount alleged by counterclaim to be due to defendant.-Reeves v. White, 161 S. W. 43. XI. MOTIONS. § 345 (Ky.) Judgment was properly directed for defendant on the pleadings, where the petition did not aver that the death was accidental, and the answer did not cure the error; the evidence not disclosing the manner of death other than that it was by drowning.-Farnsley's Adm'r v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 161 S. W. 1111. § 355 (Ky.) In an action on notes, held, that the court properly struck an unverified answer setting up counterclaim for defendant's failure to comply with an order requiring him to verify it. Taulbee v. Lewis & Chambers, 161 S. W. 1100. § 356 (Mo.) The question whether an amendment of the answer, intended to make it agree with the proof, was in fact warranted by the For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER 161 S.W.-81 evidence, cannot be decided on motion to strike | close a mortgage and recover the debt, was the amendment.-Hynds v. Hynds, 161 S. W. 812. § 367 (Mo.App.) The failure of the petition in an action for money had and received to set forth the relation of the parties, the contract, or the wrong out of which the cause of action arose, could have been reached by motion to make it more definite and certain, if not by demurrer. St. Louis Sanitary Co. v. Reed, 161 S. W. 315. $ 369 (Ky.) Where a petition, in an action for death of a railroad employé charged that he was engaged either in interstate or intrastate commerce at the time of the accident, it was not sustainable under Civ. Code Prac. § 113, subd. 4, authorizing alternative allegations, and defendant was entitled to compel plaintiff to elect on which she would proceed.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Strange's Adm'x, 161 S. W. 239. In negligence cases, a cause of action for physical pain and mental anguish during the period between the accident and death of the person injured cannot be joined with a cause of action for death, but the plaintiff must elect be tween them.-Id. A motion to compel plaintiff to elect whether she would proceed under the state law or under the federal Employers' Liability Act to recover for the death of her intestate, made before proceeding to trial, was in time.-Id. waived by defendant by not objecting on that ground, the mortgage having been made an exhibit and read in evidence and considered with the complaint.-Felker v. Rice, 161 S. W. 162. § 424 (Mo.App.) A defendant may waive his right to insist upon the filing of an account, in accordance with Rev. St. 1909, § 1832, in an action begun in the circuit court.-Barton Lumber Co. v. Gibson, 161 S. W. 357. § 428 (Mo.App.) An objection to the petition, first made by an objection to evidence, can prevail only when the petition wholly fails to state any cause of action, construed most favorably to plaintiff.-Price v. City of Maryville, 161 S. W. 295. § 433 (Mo.App.) The omission of an essential averment from a petition is not wholly waived by answer to the merits; but a failure to demur brings into play the rule of liberal construction, and, if the omitted fact can be found to be alleged by inference, the petition will not be held bad after verdict.-Coulter v. Coulter, 161 S. W. 281. A petition, in an action by a wife for separate maintenance, under Rev. St. 1909, § 8295, held good, though not in terms alleging that the husband's abandonment was without just cause, when not challenged until after verdict. Id. PLEDGES. See Insurance, § 240. to which produce stored with it was pledged for § 29 (Mo.App.) A cold storage company, advances, refusing arbitrarily to sell to cuscient to pay it, and afterwards selling it for an tomers produced by the pledgor at prices suffiinsufficient amount, is liable for loss.-Union Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Pitts, 161 S. W. 1182. PLURAL. § 369 (Ky.) Where an injured servant attempted to rely on both the common law and the federal Employers' Liability Act, the defend- See Statutes, § 188. ant's motion to require an election must be sustained.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Moore, 161 S. W. 1129. § 369 (Mo.) Where the same cause of action was set out in separate counts to meet possible variations in the proof, plaintiff was not required to elect on which he would proceed.-Schroeder v. Turpin, 161 S. W. 716. XIII. DEFECTS AND OBJECTIONS, § 403 (Mo.) Failure of plaintiffs' petition to allege defendant's incorporation was cured by an answer expressly admitting that defendant was a corporation.-Davidson v. Laclede Land & Improvement Co., 161 S. W. 686. POLICE. See False Personation, § 2; Municipal Corporations, § 180. POLICE POWER. See Constitutional Law, § 60; Municipal Corporations, §§ 591-623; Railroads, § 99. POSSESSION. See Adverse Possession; Ejectment, § 16; For- § 403 (Tex.Civ.App.) The defects in the plead- The failure of defendant's answer to show that plaintiff, the wife of the possessor of land against whom a judgment had been recovered, was a party to that action so as to be bound by the judgment, is cured where plaintiff's petition showed that the property was the community estate of herself and her husband.-Id. § 406 (Mo.) Where a defect in parties or a misjoinder of causes of action are not taken advantage of either by demurrer or answer, it is waived.-Norton v. Reed, 161 S. W. 842. See Wills, § 693. POWERS. II. CONSTRUCTION AND EXECUTION. § 34 (Mo.) Whenever there is a conveyance by the donee of a power and the conveyance cannot be given full effect without its being construed as an execution of the power, it will be held to be such execution, even though there is no reference to the power.-Armor v. Frey. 161 S. W. 829. $418 (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, §§ 1800, $41 (Mo.) Where an owner of land devised it 1804, a defendant who pleads over by taking is- to his children for life with the power of apsue on the facts after the overruling of a de- pointment by will in favor of their children, the murrer to the petition on the grounds of multi-execution by a child of the power in favor of fariousness and misjoinder of parties thereby waives the objection.-Wolz v. Venard, 161 S. W. 760. $423 (Ark.) The failure to make a note an exhibit to the complaint, in an action to fore his son is not a devise of property, rendering the son liable on the father's covenant of warranty made in the conveyance of land; the son taking from the original owner.-Armor v. Frey, 161 S. W. 829. PRESCRIPTION. PREMIUMS. Where third persons agreed with defendants to pay their note due a bank, and the bank not only accepted the promise of the third persons, but induced them to assume payment of the debt, granting an extension of time without notifying defendants, the bank must be held to have elected to accept the third persons as principals, and can look to defendants merely as sureties. -Id. Where defendants, primarily liable on a note, became sureties owing to a subsequent agreement by third persons to pay it, their liability was unaffected by the Negotiable Instruments Law.-Id. $ 46 (Mo.App.) The extension of time of payment of a note by a bank, where defendants, the makers, had already agreed with others that See Adverse Possession; Limitation of Actions. they should discharge it, held not to work an PRESENTMENT. See Bills and Notes, § 397. PRESUMPTIONS. See Appeal and Error, §§ 901-934; Criminal Law, 88 308, 1144, 1163; Evidence, §§ 65-83. PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY. See Criminal Law, §§ 81, 792. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See Appeal and Error, § 1027: Attorney and Client: Banks and Banking, §§ 54, 105-116, 253; Brokers; Carriers, § 194; Corporations, 308-361, 413, 432; Drains, § 17: Evidence, $$ 242, 243, 441; Husband and Wife, §§ 25, 138; Injunction, § 114; Intoxicating Liquors, § 169; Municipal Corporations, § 292; Witnesses, 144. III. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS TO THIRD PERSONS. (A) Powers of Agent. 8103 (Ark.) A traveling salesman, in the absence of proof of special authority, had no power to accept an order for goods taken by him on behalf of his principal, so as to effectuate a binding contract between the buyer and seller.-Outcault Advertising Co. v. Young Hardware Co., 161 S. W. 142. § 123 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for broker's commissions, evidence held to warrant a finding that defendants' agent, with whom plaintiff conducted the transactions in question, had authority to act.-E. R. & D. C. Kolp v. Brazer, 161 S. W. 899. $136 (Tex.Civ.App.) An agent is not personally responsible upon a contract made for a known principal.-Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Floyd, 161 S. W. 954. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. See Appeal and Error, § 467; Bills and Notes, I. CREATION AND EXISTENCE OF (A) Between Individuals. estoppel on the bank to hold the makers; there having been no change of position by them.Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601. III. DISCHARGE OF SURETY. § 104 (Mo.App.) The extension of the time of payment of a note due a bank held to relieve the makers of liability; their liability having become that of sureties by reason of a subsequent agreement with third parties for the payment of the note.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601. § 108 (Mo.App.) For an extension of time of payment to discharge a surety on a note, such extension must be supported by a valid consideration and be binding upon the creditor, this also being the rule of Negotiable Instruments Law.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601. IV. REMEDIES OF CREDITORS. § 160 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action on a bond to indemnify against the default of a contractor and to indemnify plaintiff, who made a deposit to assist the contractor, evidence that plaintiff was not an owner of the house, but merely advanced the money, was admissible to establish plaintiff's interest.-Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bankers' Trust Co., 161 S. W. 45. § 162 (Mo.App.) Where defendants, who had executed a note, but who were liable only as sureties, owing to a subsequent agreement by third persons to pay it, claimed that they had been discharged by the principal's extension of time, the question was for the jury, where the evidence was conflicting.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601. § 163 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where in an action on a bond, judgment was rendered against both the against the contractor and judgment for the surety and contractor with execution first surety over against him, it was immaterial whether the contractor was solvent as to the surety's liability to reimburse plaintiff.-Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bankers' Trust Co., 161 S. W. 45. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. See Witnesses, § 193. PROBATE. See Wills, §§ 229-329. PROBATE COURTS. § 14 (Mo.App.) Where third persons agreed with defendants, for a valuable consideration, to assume a debt defendants owed a bank, the relation of principal and surety was created be- See Courts, § 2002. tween the parties, even though the bank was not a party to the agreement.-Citizens' Bank of Senath v. Douglass, 161 S. W. 601. Where a creditor accepts a promise of third parties made to the debtor to discharge the latter's obligation, the creditor is bound to respect the contract of suretyship between them.-Id. I PROCESS. See Appeal and Error, § 880; Attachment; Corporations, § 668; Limitation of Actions, § 119; Mandamus; Searches and Seizures; Sequestration. For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER I. NATURE, ISSUANCE, REQUISITES, | yond a reasonable doubt.-Currington v. State, AND VALIDITY. 161 S. W. 478. §31 (Ky.) Under Ky. St. § 2524, and Civ. Code Prac. § 39, declaring an action to be begun by summons, filing a petition, etc., the summons to be valid must name the defendants to be summoned.-Casey v. Newport Rolling Mill Co., 161 S. W. 528. II. SERVICE. In a prosecution under Acts 32d Leg. c. 23, the burden of proof was on the state.-Id. PROVINCE OF COURT AND JURY. See Criminal Law, §§ 736-764; Trial, §§ 191, 194. PROVOCATION. See Homicide, § 295. PROXIMATE CAUSE. (A) Personal Service in General. § 66 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 1869, referring to service upon nonresidents, held, that the service of an amended petition is not authorized where the notice does not men- See Negligence, §§ 58, 59. tion the amendment.-Baker v. Hahn, 161 S. W. 443. (E) Return and Proof of Service. PUBLICATION. PUBLIC DEBT. § 142 (Ky.) In a collateral attack on a judg- See Municipal Corporations, § 110. ment, the sheriff's return is, under Ky. St. § 3760, conclusive, unless attacked on the ground of fraud or mistake.-S. B. Reese Lumber Co. v. Licking Coal & Lumber Co., 161 S. W. 1124. PROFITS. See Mortgages, § 199. PROMISSORY NOTES. See Bills and Notes. PROPERTY. See Logs and Logging; Mines and Minerals; PROPERTY TAX. See Taxation, § 117. PROPOSITIONS. See Appeal and Error, § 742. PROSTITUTION. See Criminal Law, § 371. See Municipal Corporations, §§ 863, 867; PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS.. See Municipal Corporations, §§ 266-586. See Adverse Possession, § 73. III. DISPOSAL OF LANDS OF THE § 176 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the state of Texas placed grants made by a former sovereign on the same footing as those made by the state, any grant by the state of a part of lands embraced in a grant of a former sovereign was void.-Campbell v. Gibbs, 161 S. W. 430. PUBLIC NUISANCE. See Nuisance, § 72. PUBLIC POLICY. § (Ark.) The statute prohibiting pandering punishes one procuring any female, whether vir- See Cemeteries, § 3. tuous or not, to enter a place for prostitution. -Boyle v. State, 161 S. W. 1049. PUBLIC PURPOSE. To warrant a conviction of pandering, the See Taxation, § 38. proof must show that men and women resorted to the house to which prosecutrix was brought for immoral purposes, and was a place in which prostitution was allowed, and that she was taken there for that purpose.-Id. § (Tex.Cr.App.) Acts 32d Leg. c. 23, held intended to cover all acts, conduct, devices, etc., to induce any female to submit her body to other men for the purpose of prostitution, whether they succeeded in inducing her to do so or not, and that whether she was virtuous or not prior thereto was immaterial.-Currington v. State, 161 S. W. 478. § 4 (Ark.) Evidence held to justify a conviction of pandering, punishable by the act of 1913. -Boyle v. State, 161 S. W. 1049. On a trial for pandering, the testimony of witnesses living at the house that up to the time prosecutrix was taken to it it was not used as a disorderly house held relevant to contradict testimony that the house had been and was then used as a disorderly house.-Id. Where the state proved that accused was engaged only in the business of maintaining a disorderly house, to which prosecutrix was brought, evidence that accused, at the time of the alleged offense, was engaged in the business of securing patents was admissible.-Id. Evidence of defendant's manner toward females on the street corners was admissible on the issue whether he was in the practice of procuring females to enter a disorderly house. -Id. PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See Schools and School Districts. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS. PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY. See Waters and Water Courses, § 183. PUPILS. See Schools and School Districts, § 169. See Work and Labor. QUASHING. See Execution, § 161. QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT. See Criminal Law, §§ 736-742; Trial, §§ 136141, 370. QUIETING TITLE. § 4 (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution under Acts 32d Leg. c. 23, offense must be shown be- See Judgment, §§ 251, 490; Remainders, § 17. |