favor equally on the commerce of all nations. I have here a French paper, dated 15th November, 1880, in which de Lesseps quotes a letter that he had written on the 14th of August, 1879, stating what were the arguments against the construction of the Panama Canal, and enumerating them as only two-the first being the greatly exaggerated cost of the canal, and the second being the hostility of the United States to the construction of the canal. He says in regard to the first that the estimate was greatly exaggerated, and in regard to the second that he would himself go to the United States and remove it, and then he says that he had been here and had removed it, and that he had shown that a canal would not cost more than five hundred millions of francs. He says: "I have also removed every possible hostility in the United States. The Americans have recognized the enterprise of piercing the Isthmus of Panama as in the interest of all. Abso ute neutrality is guaranteed by the very concession itself, and the fact that certain great and powerful American bankers have joined the syndicate is proof of the result of my voyage to the United States. By the terms of a memorandum signed on the 7th of July, 1880, a special American committee, to reside in New York, will represent the interests of this company in the United States in all that concerns the observance of the neutrality of the canal as defined in article 5 or the concession. No obstacle whatever now opposes itself to the speedy and successful construction of this grand canal, and the moment has now come to constitute the universal company under the patronage of the bankers of Europe and America united in a syndicate. The total expense is calculated not to exceed six hundred million francs." In all these papers de Lesseps credits the United States with furnishing about onehalf of the business of the canal, and that American business is in a great degree not foreign trade, but domestic trade. It is either domestic trade or is the carrying of the products of our Pacific coast. That is the important point; that is the point which shows how very much greater our interests in this canal are than those of all the rest of the world combined.

VIEWS OF ADMIRAL AMMEN.

Mr. CRAPO suggested that Admiral Ammen might furnish the committee with some information.

The CHAIRMAN. Our special business is as to the Monroe doctrine.

Admiral AMMEN. If you wish me to answer any questions of the committee I will be very happy to do so. I came up here at the invitation of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We should be very glad to hear you in regard to the joint resolution introduced by Mr. Crapo.

Admiral AMMEN. I think very well of it. And in regard to the whole matter, it strikes me that the best thing to be done is to let the people of Europe know that we do not desire interference on this side of the ocean. In regard to Great Britain and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the minister from Nicaragua is present and will be able to inform the committee about it. Although I have never spoken with him about it, he will tell you that the Mosquito question, which was the basis of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, has not yet been settled. I think very favorably of the Crapo resolution. I was sent by our government, somewhat against my will, to the Paris scientific congress, and if you have taken the trouble to read the report of Mr. Menocal and myself you will certainly feel convinced that that was hardly a reputable body, and should not by any means be called a scientific body. De Lesseps was deserted there by every engineer of the society of civil engineers in Paris-a very distinguished body. The whole proceeding of de Lesseps was questionable in the extreme. You have only to look over the reports which I made to the State Department to be aware of that fact. I happened to be one of a commission appointed by President Grant to examine into the merits of the canal question. We were to examine every thing in relation to the canal, its practicability, &c., and we made our report which you, gentlemen, have no doubt before you. I would be happy to answer any questions that may be put to me

by the committee. Mr. RICE. Do you know anything as to the law under which the Panama Canal Company is organized?

Admiral AMMEN. I have the idea that it is organized under a general French law; and under that law Mr. de Lesseps was, in regard to the Suez Canal matter, liable to prosecution. The assertion was made by him that a sufficiency of the stock of the Suez Canal Company had been taken, which was not a fact, and Mr. de Lesseps would have been a criminal under the French law had not the stock been taken afterward by the Khedive.

Mr. RICE. Was the Suez Canal Company organized under the same French law? Admiral AMMEN. I have no positive information about it, but I have no doubt of the fact.

VIEWS OF MR. JAMES B. EADS.

The Chairman stated that the committee would be glad to hear from Mr. Eads in reference to the Monroe doctrine.

Mr. EADS. I only arrived yesterday from the Isthmus, and I came here this morning

expecting to hear my friends Captain Phelps and Admiral Ammen address the committee. I did not come prepared to say anything myself. The question before you is one for statesmen to handle, and I am only an engineer. Engineers are simply servants of statesmen and capitalists to carry out their decisions. There are some political aspects in which the question should be viewed. It is notorious, I believe, that French power has followed French capital wherever it has gone. The same methods were used, I believe, by Mr. de Lesseps in carrying through his Suez Canal project, in spite of the opposition of England, as he has been using in carrying through this enterprise in spite of the public opinion in the United States. The commerce which will support an interoceanic transit there will certainly support but one. It has been estimated by Mr. de Lesseps and his friends that that commerce exceeds 6,000,000 tons annually, but it has also been estimated by the Chief of the Bureau of Statistics as low as 1,600,000 tons. Probably two or two and a half million tons will cover the amount of tonnage that would actually cross the Isthmus if the transit were opened to-day. I presume it is safe to say that three-fourths of that is United States tounage. Now the question arises whether it is wise, on the part of the United States, to sit by quietly and see this transit line established at a point so distant from the United States, and that will compel American tonnage to go so much farther to reach our Pacific possessions from New York, or from the Valley of the Mississippi, which will furnish probably one-half of the whole of it. The area of the Valley of the Mississippi is equal to six-tenths of the total area of the thirty-eight States that compose this Union, and its exceptionally productive character and variableness of climate are too well known to need any reference here.

It

By the Panama route our commerce from the month of the Mississippi River to the Pacific States would have to traverse a distance of 2,300 miles greater than it would have to traverse by the Tehuantepec route, and about 1,250 miles greater than by the Nicaragua route. If I am in error in making this statement, both of these gentlemen, Admiral Ammen and Captain Phelps, are well qualified to correct me. I have seen these figures laid down on some of the maps published before the question arose. is also a much greater distance from the Atlantic States to the Pacific States by way of Panama than by way of Nicaragua or Tehuantepec. Now it is not probable that this generation will see more than one transit line established; and, if it be established in the interest of Europe or France, it will be to the disadvantage of our commerce until we can get some other relief. The ease with which the French Government can find a pretext to put the naval and military forces of France on the isthmus in case of any little disagreement between the Panama Canal Company and the United States of Colombia, must be patent to every one, and the question is whether it is wise for the United States to permit such a condition of affairs to arise as would make it necessary for the French Government to protect French capital with French arms on the American isthmus, and at the same time tax American commerce with the additional distance that it would be compelled to travel to such points from one line of our coast to another, or from the ports of the Mississippi Valley to the Pacific.

Mr. WILSON. What right of eminent domain does the French Government acquire by this concession?

Mr. EADS. The French Government does not seek to acquire any right of eminent domain on the isthmus. The French Government says that it has nothing to do with the De Lesseps canal. But the point is whether, if a French company gets a footing there, it will not be the duty of the French Government to protect it.

Mr. RICE. Would the relations of the French Government to the Panama Canal be different from those which it had to the Suez Canal?

Mr. EADS. You are leading me into a discussion which, as I stated in the commencement of my remarks, I feel totally unfit to enter on.

Mr. RICE. Excuse me for putting the question. I am entirely unacquainted with the conditions under which the Suez Canal was constructed, and I am endeavoring to ascertain whether the projected Panama scheme would go forward under the same conditions as the Suez Canal scheme did. I supposed that England was more interested than any other nation in the commerce passing through the Suez Canal?

Mr. EADS. Yes. The French company got a concession from the Khedive of Egypt, and it was necessary, in order to make that concession valid, that it should have the approval of the Sultan. The English Government, through its influence, prevented the Sultan from giving that approval, but French arms and French influence sustained Mr. de Lesseps in going on and constructing the canal without the Sultan's approval. Mr. RICE. And the English Government did not interfere forcibly?

Mr. EADS. It did not.

Mr. RICE. And it afterwards bought up a controlling share of the stock? Mr. EADS. Yes. The gentleman who conducted the negotiations by which England paid twenty millions of dollars for a controlling influence in the Suez Canal within the last few years, I am well acquainted with. He is Col. John Stokes, of the Royal Engineers, a man distinguished for his diplomatic services quite as much as for his ability as an engineer. He was kind enough to come to London to see me on my last visit

nere, and he gave me letters which took me through the Suez Canal. He is one of the British directors of that canal. I made the remark to him, "Your government has been investing a large amount of money in this canal since I saw you." With a peculiar twinkle of the eye, which told me the whole story, he said, "It is a big enough interest to fight for." That was the object of England-to get a fighting interest in that canal.

Mr. RICE. So that the French Government exercised no power to maintain French supremacy in that canal company after it had been constructed in the way in which Mr. de Lesseps proposes to construct the Panama Canal?

Mr. EADS. The French Government was not in a condition to do that. The Suez Canal was completed about the time that the Franco-Prussian war broke out, and the condition of France since that time has not been such as to justify her in exercising any claim of sovereignty over the Suez Canal, or keeping up her domination there.

REMARKS OF SEÑOR MAXIMO JEREZ.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that, as Señor Jerez, the minister from Nicaragua to the United States, was present, the committee would like to hear anything he might have to say pertinent to the subject.

Señor JEREZ, speaking through an interpreter, said that he did not think it pertinent to his duty to express any official opinion on the question, but that he had no objection to give his personal opinion. He had always believed that the policy pursued by the United States Government in regard to the interoceanic canal was just and right, especially as that policy was set out in the two last messages of President Hayes. The reasons put forward by the President, and the American feeling in general, on the canal question, he believed to be very obvious. In the first place it was a geographical question, as Mr. Phelps had shown by reference to the map, because the line of any interoceanic canal would be virtually the coast line of the United States, as it had to connect its Pacific coast with its Atlantic coast. He believed the joint resolution introduced by Mr. Crapo to be proper and just. In his opinion the Clayton-Bulwer treaty did not affect the question at all, because that treaty referred to absolute and exclusive control, while the Crapo resolution merely referred to a certain control-so far as sufficient to protect American interests. He believed it would be only natural that the control of the transit should be rather in the American Government than in the French Government.

FURTHER STATEMENT BY MR. A. T. RICE.

Mr. A. T. RICE said he desired to make an additional statement in reference to the conduct of the British Government with regard to the Suez Canal. He said: I merely wish to add to Captain Ead's statement that the construction of the Suez Canal by a French company was very violently opposed by Lord Palmerston's government. Lord Palmerston declared himself in most decided terms, which (as he was then premier) carried all the weight of the government, against the French project, and thereby he paved the way for any future action which England might deem it necessary to take in the matter.

Mr. CRAPO. Was there any protest made by the English Government against the Suez Canal project?

Mr. A. T. RICE. There was a protest by the English premier in the House of Commons. I do not know whether any action was taken by the House, but there was a very decided action taken by the British Government so far as a protest went.

The CHAIRMAN stated that the committee would be glad to hear from Mr. Webb, of New York, who was present in the room, and who is largely interested in commercial matters.

If he

Mr. WEBB said that he had simply attended as a listener; that he had formerly felt some interest in the Nicaraguan Canal project, but that he would rather be excused from making any remarks now because he had not come prepared to do so. could make it convenient to attend the adjourned meeting of the committee on next Tuesday, perhaps he would do so, and would give his views to the committee. He did not think the Monroe doctrine had been much dwelt upon in the discussion to-day, and it seemed to him that that was the great question.

The CHAIRMAN said that the committee would be very happy to hear from Mr. Webb next Tuesday.

Mr. WEBB said he would make an effort to be present, but he could not promise absolutely.

The further hearing on the subject was then postponed till Tuesday, 18th inst.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 18, 1881. Present, the chairman, and Messrs. Bicknell, King, Herndon, Hill, Rice, Morton, and Killinger.

VIEWS OF MR. WILLIAM H. WEBB, OF NEW YORK.

Mr. WILLIAM H. WEBB said: Mr. Chairman, I am present this morning chiefly on your invitation. I attended here at the last session of the committee as a listener, because I felt an interest in the subject of a canal across the isthmus. The resolution as just read (the resolution introduced by Mr. Crapo) I am heartily in sympathy with, and most decidedly in favor of. I understand this resolution to be necessary in consequence of an attempt on the part of the French to build a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. The building of that canal, as I understand it, is in conflict with the Monroe doctrine. When that doctrine was announced, we were much less prepared than we are now to support it. We were comparatively poor and with a small population. Now we have grown to be strong, and have shown in the late rebellion that we are strong within ourselves and strong as against other people. Taerefore, I think that we should not hesitate to reassert the Monroe doctrine, especially at present, when there is an effort being made by those who may be considered, in one sense, our enemies in trade, if not otherwise, to take the control of the isthmus and the building of the canal. Since the first announcement of the Monroe doctrine we have become possessed of very large additional territories, particularly on the Pacific Coast; and the. building of a canal under the control of any foreign government would jeopardize the safety of the coast and harbors of the Pacific States. For that reason I think that whenever a canal is built, and wherever it is built, across the isthmus, this government should have absolute control of it. In order to understand fully what may be the considerations of the French in regard to this canal, we may look back a little to see what has been done heretofore. A half century or more ago Louis Napoleon endeavored to enlist the French people in constructing a canal across Nicaragua. For various reasons he did not succeed in that; but he never lost sight of the advantages which such a canal would present to the French people, and perhaps to all the European nations. That was a favorite project with him as long as he lived. He did not succeed in getting possession of Nicaragua; and afterwards, when a favorable opportunity presented itself, he attempted to get possession of Mexico at an enormous expense of life and treasure. We are all aware of the disastrous results of that attempt. We know that, at that time, the Monroe doctrine was asserted most forcibly by Mr. Seward, who sent a message to the Emperor of the French, through General Webb, our representative at Brazil, that the French must get out of Mexico. I have understood from General Webb himself that Napoleon's answer was, to give him time and that he would get out. He did get out, as we all know. I think that if we were able to assert the Monroe doctrine under those circumstances, when we had been in trouble which had cost us an enormous loss of life and treasure, we are certainly in a position to do it now; and we ought to do it now more forcibly than ever.

Previously to Napoleon's attempt to get possession of Mexico, one of our own citizens, the late Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, attempted to build a canal across Nicaragua, and obtained a liberal and very valuable concession from the Nicaraguan Government. He could not find money in this country to build it, and he went personally to Europe, particularly to England, to see if he could not enlist English capitalists in the scheme. After all the efforts that he could make, he was refused any assistance, on the part of the English people more particularly; and, as I have always understood, their chief ground of refusal was, not because they believed that the canal would not be an advantage to them, but because they believed it would be a greater advantage to the United States, and that it would enable us to colonize and people our Pacific possessions more rapidly than we otherwise could. No one had then dreamed of a transcontinental road across the Rocky Mountains. That was their chief reason for refusing to lend assistance to the building of that canal. The English have always acknowledged (to my certain knowledge, because I have made similar efforts myself) that a canal across the isthmus would be of advantage to their shipping interests, especially in the settlement of their Australian colonies. At a later date, some ten years or more after Mr. Vanderbilt made the attempt, myself and associates of New York made a contract with the Nicaraguan Government somewhat similar to that made by Mr. Vanderbilt, and supposed to be on as favorable terms. We would have built a canal at that time but for what we deemed to be bad faith on the part of the Government of Nicaragua by the non-fulfillment of the contract, and more particularly through the interference of the Emperor of the French. We were prevented from going on with our enterprise, and we withdrew from the isthmus. Immediately after that Napoleon made another effort to build a canal at Nicaragua, and a contract was made with the Nicaraguan Government by one of his favorites, Mr. Michel Chevalier. That failed, chiefly, as I have always understood, because, soon after that, the difficulties between France and Prussia arose; but, so long as Mr. Chevalier lived (and he died only a year or two ago), he entertained the idea of building that canal. I speak knowingly on the subject, because I have had inter

views with him on two separate occasions (making visits to Europe chiefly for that purpose). I tried to see if I could not gain his interest in constructing that canal; but he invariably refused to have any association or connection with any American interest, being determined that if the canal was to be built, it should be built under French auspices and with European money. That gives you a little idea of how determined the French have been to obtain and keep control of any canal that may be constructed across the isthmus, independent of the control and wishes of the American people.

Now another effort is being made, somewhat in the same interest, by the followers and adherents of Louis Napoleon, to build a canal elsewhere. They have found that the Government of Nicaragua is in sympathy with the American people, and has given evidence that it prefers to have a canal across Nicaragua built by Americans. Therefore they have been forced to go elsewhere, and have located their canal at Panama. I believe verily that the whole project is got up by a set of adventurers known as promoters, who will probably be the only parties that will make any money out of the enterprise if it is attempted.

The building of the Panama Railroad, after the acquisition of our Pacific possessions and the attempt of Mr. Vanderbilt to build a railroad across Nicaragua, induced the British Government, as I understand it, to desire a treaty, which was afterwards consummated with the United States, and was known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. I think that the chief object of England in obtaining that treaty was that our people might be kept from getting possession of the trade and the advantages of any connection across the isthmus. By a treaty of that kind Great Britain was enabled to get the trade and business of those colonies quite as much as if they had been her own settlements, and without the cost of maintaining them. I think that that was the chief reason for England's seeking the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which treaty, as I understand, is contrary to the spirit and tenor of the Monroe doctrine. That has been seen and understood by our statesmen, I think, ever since the treaty was made. It is also, I believe, well known that England encouraged France to go to Mexico and to get possession of that country. If I have been correctly informed, England agreed at one time to join France in the attempt to get possession of Mexico, but finally withdrew, believing that the building of cruisers for the rebels would probably accomplish eventually all that England wanted, which was chiefly the destruction of our commerce and our mercantile marine. I think that that was the thing that England had ultimately in view even so long ago as that day.

Since the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was made, some 30 years ago, there have been very great changes in this country-great changes in the business of the world everywhereand I think the time has arrived when that treaty should be abrogated. I think that we should seize on this occasion (the attempt to build a canal across Panama under the auspices of a foreign government) to give notice, as required by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, for its abrogation in the shortest possible time. With the abrogation of that treaty, and with the building of a canal across the isthmus under the control of this government, the manufacturers of this country, whose business has increased immensely since the making of the treaty, would be vastly benefited. We would be able to obtain large markets. These markets would be more open to us if a canal were built and we had the control of it. A canal under foreign domination would throw open our Pacific coasts and expose them to more ready and easy attack than would be the case if the canal were under our own control. If a canal were built under the control of a foreign power, we should be obliged to maintain fleets at both ends of the canal at a very vast expense.

Mr. HILL. What would we want fleets there for? We would not want them there surely to protect British and German ships which are now doing all our carrying trade?

Mr. WEBB. No, sir; but we would want to protect our own trade. If we were at war with a power with which the French Government was at peace, the canal company might say, "We cannot give you any facilities in this canal or allow your vessels to pass through." If a canal were built there under the control of a foreign people, they would have the advantage over us in many ways. They would control our commerce with the South American States, both on the Atlantic and the Pacific. We would have to pass by the mouths of the canal on either side, and it would be a very easy matter for a few ships to intercept our trade. That trade seems to be our natural trade. It is the trade that we should have; and, in my judgment, if there had been proper statesmanship shown in this country, we would have nearly the whole of that trade to-day.

Foreign governments, more particularly France and Prussia, perhaps might say, "We have as much right to control this canal as the Government of the United States has." The answer to that is, they are farther from the canal than we are, and that the canal does not control their coasts as it does ours. I think that our government looked forward to this when Mr. Seward was Secretary of State, and when we made the purchase of Alaska. The English Government might say, "We have possessions