of the European monarchy against the independence of the Spanish. American States, furthered, as they would be, in accordance with the political system which recognized only the doctrine of the legitimacy and the divine right of kings, would necessarily menace the very existence of our own institutions, since these had been founded on the most contemptuous disregard of the very principles deemed most 'holy' by an alliance which arrogated to itself the undoubted right to take a hostile attitude in regard to these States in which the overthrow of the government may operate as an example. In what country did the overthrow of the legitimacy, then, exert so potent an influence as in the United States? And if the Spanish-American Republics are now to be assailed for their imitation of our example, could we hope, as the embodied representatives of the very principles most obnoxious to the Holy Alliance, to escape their flaming zeal in the cause of 'order and legitimacy' after they had finished with the South American Republics? A blow aimed at them because they were republics was a blow equally aimed at the independence of our own country, and hence it was that Mr. Monroe declared that any such intervention of the allied powers of Europe could not be regarded in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States-a declaration characterized no less by the calmness of its delivery than by the patriotic foresight in which it was advanced. Originated for the purpose of meeting a particular conjuncture of events, it finds in them alone. its real purport and its justification."

A further interpretation of the Monroe doctrine is given by Wheaton on International Law, page 124. He says:

The policy of the American Government, in regard to Europe, adopted at an early stage of the war, which had so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remained the same. This policy was, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of the European powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for them; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve these relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But with regard to the American continents, circumstances were widely different. It was impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of these continents without endangering the peace and happiness of the United States; it was therefore impossisible that the latter should behold such interference in any form with indifference.

President Woolsey, of Yale College, in his work on International Law, page 67, et seq., takes this view of the Monroe doctrine:

The proceedings at Verona indirectly gave rise to what has been called the Monroe doctrine, which met the reigning principle of interference in Europe by a similar principle in the opposite direction. The history of this doctrine is, in brief, the following: At Verona the subject was agitated of attempting, in conformity with the known wishes of the absolutists in Spain, to bring back the Spanish colonies into subjection to the mother country. This fact having been communicated to our government by that of Great Britain in 1823, and the importance of some public protest on our part being insisted upon, President Monroe, in his annual message, used the following language: "That we should consider any attempt on the part (of the allied powers), to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," and again, "that we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing (governments on this side of the Atlantic whose independence we had acknowledged), or controling in any manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States." Soon afterwards a resolution was moved in Congress embodying the same principle, but was never called up. But the mere declaration of the President, meeting with the full sympathy of England, put an end to the designs to which the message refers.

In another place of the same message, while alluding to the question of boundary on the Pacific between the United States and Russia, the President speaks thus: "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle, in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not

to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." Was it intended by this to preclude the South American republics, without their will, from receiving such colonies within their borders-of surrounding their territory for that purpose? Such a thing, probably, was not thought of. Mr. Adams, when President, in 1825, thus refers to Mr. Monroe's principle, while speaking in a special message of a congress at Panama: “An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders may be found desirable. This was more than two years since announced by my predecessor to the world as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents." Mr. Adams, when Secretary of State under Mr. Monroe, originated the "principle," and must have known what he meant. But the principle, even in this tame form, was repudiated by the House of Representatives, in a resolution declaring that the United States "ought not to become parties" with any of the South American republics" to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European powers with their independence or form of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continent of America."

On the whole, then, (1) the doctrine is not a national one. The House of Representatives, indeed, had no right to settle questions of policy or of international law. But the cabinet has as little. The opinion of one part of the government neutralized that of another. (2.) The principle first mentioned of resisting attempts to overthrow the liberties of the Spanish republics was one of most righteous self-defense and of vital importance. And such it will probably always be regarded if a similar juncture should arise.

The Monroe doctrine came up again in another shape in 1848. President Polk, having announced that the Government of Yucatan had offered the dominion over that country to Great Britain, Spain, and the United States, urges on Congress such measnres as may prevent it from becoming a colony and a part of the dominions of any European power, which would be, he says, in contravention of the declaration of Mr. Monroe, and which must, by no means, be allowed.

Mr. Calhoun, in his speech on this subject, shows that the case is very different from that contemplated by Mr. Monroe; that the declarations of the latter could not be regarded as expressing the settled policy of this country, and that they were mere declarations without threat of resistance. The "colonization" contemplated by the Monroe doctrine could not apply to Yucatan, and the possibility of England (which was especially intended) acquiring power there was remote. The principle, he adds, "which lies at the bottom of the (President's) recommendation is, that when any power on this continent becomes involved in internal warfare, and the weaker side chooses to make application to us for support, we are bound to give them support, for fear the offer of the sovereignty of the country may be made to some other power and accepted. It goes infinitely and dangerously beyond Mr. Monroe's declaration. It puts it in the power of other countries on the continent to make us a party to all their wars."

To lay down the principle that the acquisition of territory on this continent, by any European power, cannot be allowed by the United States, would go far beyond any measures dictated by the system of the balance of power, for the rule of self-preservation is not applicable in our case; we fear no neighbors. To lay down the principle that no political systems unlike our own, no change from republican forms to those of monarchy, can be endured in the Americas, would be a step in advance of the congresses at Laybach and Verona, for they apprehended destruction to their political fabrics, and we do not. But to resist attempts of European powers to alter the constitutions of states on this side of the water, is a wise and just opposition to interference. Anything beyond this justifies the system which absolute governments have initiated for the suppression of revolutions by main force.

That the policy of Mr. Monroe was one of non-intervention by Euro pean powers, and the opposition of the Government of the United States to intervention on the part of European powers to intermeddle with quarrels not their own, to aid and build up the South American republics, whose independence had been achieved by their own valor, is clear from the fact that the same Administration recognized another system in the Brazilian Empire, by entering into diplomatic intercourse with that empire. This policy is further illustrated in the position taken by Mr. Seward, when he warned Maximilian to quit Mexico. In his dis. patch to the American minister at Versailles, bearing date of September 6th, 1865, he said:

We do not insist, or claim, that Mexico and the other States of the American con

tinent shall adopt the political institutions to which we are so earnestly attached, but we do hold, that the people of these countries are entitled to exercise the freedom of choosing and establishing institutions like our own if they are preferred.

Ever since that time there has been some sort of republican form of government in these South American states, especially in the United States of Colombia. The Government of the United States has recognized their existence as independent republics, has entered into treaties with them from time to time upon various subjects, has been represented at their seat of government by ministers resident, and they in turn have been represented at Washington, in the same way. The very subjectmatter of this resolution was the subject of a treaty signed at Bogota, on the 12th of December, 1846, ratified in 1848. "That treaty was," to use the language of Secretary Evarts, "by its own stipulation to remain in full force and effect for twenty years; and then, if neither party gave notice of its intended termination, it was to continue in force, terminable by either party by a twelve-month's notice. No such notice, on either side, has ever been given, and no other treaty with New Granada, on this subject, has ever been executed. This treaty is consequently in force, and the canal communication, should it be accomplished in accordance therewith, and with the concurrence of the United States that it is in such accordance, which under this treaty must be deemed essential, would be to-day under the protection and guarantee of the United States, and both its projectors and the Government of New Granada, would be authorized in certain contingencies to call upon the Government of the United States for the fulfillment of this obligation."

That treaty contains this provision in Article 35:

The Government of New Granada guarantees to the Government of the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the government and citizens of the United States, and for the transportation of any articles of produce, manufactures, or merchandise of lawful commerce, belonging to the citizens of the United States; that no other charges shall be levied or collected upon the citizens of the United States, or their said merchandise thus passing over any road or canal that may be made by the Government of New Granada, or by authority of the same, than is, under like circumstances, levied upon and collected from the Granadian citizens; that any lawful produce, manufactures, or merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States thus passing from one sea to the other, in either direction, for the purpose of exportation to any other foreign country, shall not be liable to any import duties whatever, or having paid such duties, they shall be entitled to drawback upon their exportation, nor shall citizens of the United States be liable to any duties, tolls, or charges of any kind, to which native citizens are not subjected, for thus passing the said isthmus. And in order to secure to themselves the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as a special compensation for the said advantages, and for the favors they have acquired by the 4th, 5th, and 6th articles of this treaty, the United States guarantee positively and efficaciously to New Granada by the present stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the beforementioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while such treaty may exist; and in consequence the United States also guarantee in the same manner the rights of Sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said terri

ory.

The debates in Congress from time to time on this question, beginning in 1823, and extending down to 1856, are very voluminous, and embrace every phase of the subject. We have omitted presenting extracts from all the speeches of our eminent men, because it would make the report too lengthy to be read. Already a voluminous document, to wit, Executive Document No. 112, containing the message of President Hayes to Congress on the 11th of February, 1880, and a learned communication from Secretary Evarts, containing certain articles of the

treaty of 1848 with New Granada, the treaty with the Nicaraguan States, diplomatic correspondence from time to time and proposed modifica. tions of the treaty of '48, have been published and read by members of the 46th Congress; and while it may be admitted that the message of President Monroe had no reference whatever to the construction of the ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama, or anywhere between North and South America connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, yet the extension of the American domain to the Pacific coast, the rapid settlement, development, and growth, and the commercial importance of our Pacific possessions, our extended and defenceless sea coast on both the Atlantic and Pacific, all of which is the result of recent development, naturally and justly make the construction of any interoceanic communication at these points a matter of vast and paramount impor tance to the people of the United States; and we think that it does not manifest undue selfishness on the part of the Government of the United States to guard with great vigilance any proposed attempt on the part of any European power, by its own agency or the agency of others under European control, to engage in the construction of such intercommunication.

If, then, the Monroe doctrine could properly apply to the establish. ment of monarchical systems on the Western Hemisphere in 1823, your committee are of opinion that it would also apply to any attempt on the part of European governments to cause so great a change in the navigation of the two great oceans, as the construction of this proposed canal must necessarily do. The United States Government, in 1823, by this bold declaration on the part of her President, gave notice to the world that she would regard as unfriendly any effort on the part of European governments to establish monarchical systems on the Western Hemisphere, as a danger and a menace to her peace and safety; and that she would aid the South American republics, by force, if necessary, in main. taining their independence from foreign conquest and dominion. If the message of Mr. Monroe meant anything at all, it must have meant this, otherwise, it was a mere empty declaration of words without meaning and without result. The United States, by the treaty of 1848 with New Granada, referred to, have also promised their aid in preserving the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama and the dominion of the Republic of New Granada over that Isthmus, and when the United States gave notice to the world that she would regard as unfriendly any intervention of European powers, it would seem, from the language of Mr. Calhoun, above cited, that she also promised her own non-intervention unless menaced by threatened dangers on the part of said European powers. She has justly the right, therefore, to be consulted in all matters pertaining to the construction of any mode of transit across the Isthmus of Panama.

No American statesman, so far as we are advised, has ever taken the bold ground that aid and proffers of friendship tendered by the United States to any of her sister republics on this side of the Atlantic meant that those republics should be denied the right to improve their own territory. Every government should have the power to exercise the right of eminent domain over her own territory; and to exercise that right over a domain not her own, is a reiteration of the declaration of right claimed by the Holy Alliance, or rather, a revamping of the principles of the unjust Holy Alliance. The United States are too strong to fear, and too great to be jealous. Should the construction of an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus of Panama by the Republic of New Granada be made under proper guarantees and stipulations and in exact accordance

with existing treaties there could certainly be no fear on our part from the Republic of New Granada. Our great superiority of strength and all those elements of power which constitute a great nation of people utterly forbid the idea of danger from any such source as that; and in the event of the construction of a ship-canal across the Isthmus of Panama, or elsewhere, by an association or associations of citizens of different nationalities, under the laws, guidance, and control of the Republic of New Granada, with means furnished from all parts of the globe as means for all great improvements involving vast expenditures are always furnished-should, in the event of war, become a subject of dispute between the government of the United States and any other government, it would be quite as easy to seize the canal by force of arms, and subject it to American control, as it would, by force of arms, to prevent its construction. The difference would be the worth and uses of the transit after the war was ever, against the barren and fruitless obstruction to its construction.

That such a transit would greatly benefit the commerce of all the States, on both oceans, and be of great advantage, in time of war, to the United States, cannot be doubted. Should it be constructed entirely by the United States-under the absolute control of the United States— and war should ensue, it would probably abide the hazard of the conflict, and fall into the hands of the strongest party. By whomsoever constructed, it could never be a fort, nor would the dangers of its navigation deter a strong power from attempting its seizure and control.

The logical sequence of the Monroe doctrine is, that the flag of all our cis-Atlantic republics shall, with their approval and our aid, forever float over their own dominion, and that no other flag shall.

While we are so justly proud of our own giant strides towards future wealth, power, and national greatness, would it not add to that pride, so justly cherished, if our people could look with welcome composure on all efforts of our weaker sisters to emulate our example? An increase of their population, wealth, and commerce is a corresponding increase of our wealth and commerce-the differences in soil, climate, and production making an interchange and extension of all our commercial relations desirable and profitable.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs cannot urge upon the House the adoption of a resolution in violation of existing treaties. That respect which we have always demanded and always commanded from nations with which we are on friendly terms, should be extended by us to such nations. If we have entered into solemn treaty stipulations with other governments, weaker than our own, which the lapse of years and the onward march of unforeseen events make seemingly disadvantageous to us, every principle of good faith, of equity, and that magnanimity which should impel the stronger power to respect the weaker, would require at least a reasonable effort on our part, by diplomatic intercourse, or by treaty amendments, or treaty abrogations, to secure such other guarantees and securities as would protect our national interests and comport with our national dignity.

The legislative branch of the Government of the United States is supposed to be its most important department, because it is presumed to speak the voice of the people of the United States; yet the Constitution only confers-and wisely confers-upon one branch of Congress the right to participate in the treaty-making power, and that branch, too, which is not elected by the people. And so sacred was this power regarded by the framers of the Constitution that they provided that all the proceedings of that branch of Congress, in the ratification of treaties, should