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the vendor and the vendee, though the latter has not yet obtained possession. It would be a very narrow construction to hold that the property must have been in the possession of the bailor.

Drake. There was no intention on the part of the coal owners to constitute a bailment. The duty of the prisoner would have been sufficiently fulfilled if he had delivered any other load of coals to the prosecutor, and therefore there was no bailment within the Act, for Reg. v. Hassall shews that only those bailments are within the Act where the specific thing bailed is to be re-delivered.

COCKBURN, C.J. We are all of opinion that the conviction is good. The case turns on the construction of the 24 and 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 3, which enacts that "whosoever, being a bailee of any chattel, money, or valuable security, shall fraudulently take or convert the same to his own use, or the use of any person other than the owner thereof, although he shall not break bulk or otherwise determine the bailment, shall be guilty of larceny." In this case the prisoner was entrusted with money to buy coals, which he was to bring home to the prosecutor for remuneration in the prisoner's own cart. The prisoner, having bought the coals, abstracted a portion of them with the intention of appropriating such portion to his own use.

Some members of the Court are of opinion that, even if there was no evidence of any specific appropriation of the coals by the prisoner to the prosecutor, yet, as they were bought with the prosecutor's money given by him to the prisoner for that purpose, that would ipso facto vest the property of the coals in the prosecutor, and so there would be a bailment within the terms of the statute.

Others are of opinion that a specific appropriation of the coals by the prisoner to the prosecutor was necessary, and that there was evidence of such specific appropriation. The prisoner went with the prosecutor's money to buy coals, put them into the cart, and took a portion for himself, pretending to the prosecutor that he had brought the whole of the coal to him. We are all of opinion that this was evidence of a specific appropriation sufficient to justify the jury in coming to the conclusion at which they arrived.

Conviction affirmed.

1 Supra, p. 227; S. C. 30 L. J. R., M. C. 175.

[Only an act of conversion quite inconsistent with the bailment can amount to an Appropriation.]

REGINA v. JACKSON.

SOMERSET ASSIZES.

1864.

9 Cox 505.

The prisoner was indicted for larceny of a coat of which he was the bailee. From the evidence it appeared that the prisoner lodged with the prosecutor, and on the 3rd of January borrowed a coat from the prosecutor for the day, and returned it. On the 10th of January he took the coat without the prosecutor's permission. He was seen wearing it by the prosecutor, who again gave him permission to wear it for the day. Some few days afterwards, he left the town; and he was found, wearing the coat on his back, on board a ship bound for Australia.

MARTIN, B., stopped the case; stating that in his opinion there was no evidence of a conversion sufficient to satisfy the statute. There are many instances of conversion sufficient to maintain an action of trover, which would not be sufficient to support a conviction under this statute; the determination of the bailment must be something analogous to larceny, and some act must be done inconsistent with the purposes of the bailment. As, for instance, in the case of bailment of an article of silver for use, melting it would be evidence of a conversion. So, when money or a negotiable security is bailed to a person for safe keeping, if he spend the money or convert the security, he is guilty of a conversion within this statute. The prosecution ought to find some definite time at which the offence was committed; e.g., a taking the coat on board ship which was subsequent to the prisoner's going on board himself.

Edlin, for the prosecution, contended that there was evidence of a conversion sufficient to satisfy the statute; for the fact that the prisoner was taking the coat with him on a voyage to Australia was inconsistent with the bailment, it being a bailment to wear the coat for a limited period.

case did not disclose such a crime as was He refused the application of the prose

MARTIN, B., said that the contemplated by the statute. cution that he would state a case.

[But mere pawning may be such an act.]

REGINA v. MEDLAND.

CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT. 1851.

5 Cox 292.

The prisoner was indicted for larceny. It appeared that she had taken ready-furnished lodgings, and had pawned some of the property therein belonging to the landlord. It was proved that she had often pawned, and afterwards redeemed, portions of the same property.

Robinson, for the prisoner, submitted that if the jury were satisfied that the prisoner took the property for the purpose of pawning, but with the intention of redeeming it, she would be entitled to an acquittal, because the intent would not be permanently to deprive the owner of it.

The RECORDER, after consulting the judges in the adjoining court:I have taken the opinion of Mr Justice Coleridge, and of Mr Baron Platt upon this case, and they both think with me that there is nothing in the evidence that will justify the jury in acquitting the prisoner on the ground that she took this property with the intention of redeeming it. It would be very dangerous to hold that the suggestion of such an intent would be sufficient to constitute a valid defence. A person may pawn property without the slightest prospect of ever being able to redeem it, and yet there may be some vague intention of doing so if afterwards the opportunity should occur, however improbable it may be that it will do so. But it can never be said that there is an intention to redeem, under circumstances that render it very improbable or at least uncertain that such ability will ever exist. A man may take my property, may exercise absolute dominion over it, may trade upon it and make a profit upon it for three months, and yet may say, when charged with stealing it, that he meant to return it to me at some time or another. I shall direct the jury that for such a defence to be at all available there must be not only the intent to redeem, evidenced by previous similar conduct, but there must be proof also of the power to do so, of which the evidence here seems rather of a negative character.

Verdict, Guilty.

[Yet even selling, by a person who has ceased to be bailee or custodian, is not sufficient.]

REGINA v. CHARLES JONES.

MONMOUTH ASSIZES. 1842.

CARRINGTON AND MARSHMAN 611.

Indictment for stealing a pig. It appeared that on Dec. 18th the prosecutor had employed the prisoner to drive six pigs from Cardiff to Usk fair (which was on the 20th), for which he paid the prisoner six shillings. The prisoner had no authority to sell any of the pigs. On Dec. 19th, the prisoner left one of the pigs at Mr Matthews's, of Coedkernew, to be kept till the next night, saying that it was too tired to walk. On Monday, the 20th, the prisoner told the prosecutor at Usk that he had left the pig at Mr Matthews's because it was tired ; and the prosecutor then desired the prisoner to call at Mr Matthews's and ask him to keep the pig for him till the following Saturday, and he would pay him for the keep. On Tuesday, the 21st, the prisoner called at Mr Matthews's, and sold the pig to Mr Matthews for a guinea; and on the 23rd, he told the prosecutor that he had seen Mr Matthews, and that Mr Matthews would keep the pig till Saturday.

Greaves, for the prosecution. The difficulty is, that the prisoner sold the pig when it was no longer in his possession....He had merely the custody of the pigs, and if he had sold one of the pigs on the road it would have been larceny.

CRESSWELL, J. If a man is allowed to have the possession of a chattel and he converts it to his own use, it is not larceny, unless he had an intention of stealing it when he obtained the possession of it. But if he has merely the custody of a chattel, he is guilty of a larceny if he disposes of it, although he did not intend to do so at the time when he received it into his custody. Here, it appears, that the prisoner left the pig on Sunday, the 19th; and if nothing more had appeared, I should have held that Matthews kept it merely for the prisoner. But on Monday, the 20th, he told the prosecutor that he had left it there; and the prosecutor told him to ask Matthews to allow the pig to remain there till the Saturday. The prosecutor thus consented to Matthews being the keeper of the pig for him (the prosecutor); and then the prisoner goes and sells the pig to Matthews. I think that the prisoner must be acquitted.

[EDITOR'S NOTE. It was not until after the prosecutor had put an end to the prisoner's control over the pig, that the prisoner committed any act of dishonesty. Hence that act did not amount to a larcenous taking or appropriation.]

CHAPTER 4. PERSONAL CHATTELS.

[There can be no larceny of Real Property.]
THE FORESTER'S CASE.

ASSIZES. 1338.

Y. B. 11 and 12 Edw. III. (Rolls Ser.) 641.
LIB. Ass. ann. 12, f. 37, pl. 32.

A forester was indicted for having feloniously cut down trees and carried them away. The Justices would not arraign him; for the felling of trees which are so annexed to the soil cannot be called felony even if a stranger did it. Besides here perhaps he himself had the keeping of them. But because it was possible that the trees were first cut down by the lord, and then carried off by the forester, [the Justices] recalled the Inquest; who answered that he was forester when he felled them and carried them away.

SHARESHULL, [J.] to the Inquest. Did the forester hide the trees from the lord?

The Inquest. We do not know.

ALDEBURGH, [J.]. Assuredly we will not charge him, whether he concealed them or no. But we adjudge it no felony, for he was the keeper; and a tree is part of the freehold.

[See also THE CASE OF PEACOCKS, infra p. 249.]

[Even though the thing had originally been Personal Property.]

CARVER v. PIERCE.

KING'S BENCH. 1648.

STYLE 66.

Carver brings an action upon the case against Pierce for speaking these words of him,-"Thou art a thief, for thou hast stolen my dung"; and hath a verdict.

The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, that the words were not actionable. For it is not certain whether the dung be a chattel or

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