I picked it up and pointed it at him; he ran into the pantry, and I waited till he came out, then it went off." It was contended for the defence that the gun went off by accident as the prisoner was about to replace it in the corner. LUSH, J., to the jury. No doubt the prisoner did not intend to discharge the gun at the child. What he did was either an accident or was negligence on his part. The charge is that he so carelessly handled the gun as to occasion the death of the deceased. If a person points a gun without examining whether it is loaded or not, and it happens to be loaded and death results, he is guilty of negligence and manslaughter. Can you come to any other conclusion than that the prisoner did either in joke or otherwise point the gun at the boy? [His LORDSHIP read the evidence.] If he held the gun pointed at the boy, and so held it until the child came out of the pantry, and it went off, what can that be but so improperly and carelessly handling the gun as to be negligence, and therefore manslaughter? Verdict: Guilty with a recommendation to mercy. months' imprisonment. Sentence: Two [N.B. If a man finds a pistol, tries it with the rammer, and thinks it unloaded, carries it home, shews it to his wife, touches the trigger, it goes off and kills her, ruled manslaughter; yet ought to have been only accidental death. Per Holt, C. J., and Foster, J. (Foster's Cr. Law, 263; Com. Dig. Tit. Justices, M. 18).] [See also The State v. Hardie, infra.] [Mens rea is not excluded by Ignorance of Law.j REX v. BAILEY. ADMIRALTY SESSIONS. 1799. RUSSELL AND RYAN 1. The prisoner was tried before Lord Eldon, at the Admiralty Sessions, December 1799, on an indictment for wilfully and maliciously shooting at Henry Truscott. It appeared in evidence, that on the 27th of June, 1799, the prisoner was the captain of a vessel called the Langley, a letter of marque: that about 130 leagues from Falmouth, on that day, he discovered in the morning, and fell in with another vessel called the Admiral Nelson, sailing at that time without colours hoisted, on board of which vessel Henry Truscott, the person charged in the indictment to have been shot at, was a mariner. This vessel was certainly so conducting herself, at that time, as to give the prisoner, the captain of the letter of marque, reasonable ground to think that she was an enemy. Three guns were fired at the Admiral Nelson, one of which, loaded with grape-shot, wounded Henry Truscott severely in the arm.... It was insisted that the prisoner could not be found guilty of the offence with which he was charged, because the Act of the 39 Geo. III. c. 37, upon which (together with the statute relating to maliciously shooting-9 Geo. I. c. 22) the prisoner was indicted at this Admiralty Sessions, and which Act of the 39 Geo. III. is entitled, "An Act for amending certain defects in the law respecting offences committed on the high seas," only received the royal assent on the 10th of May, 1799, and the fact charged in the indictment happened on the 27th of June, in the same year, when the prisoner could not know that any such Act existed (his ship, the Langley, being at that time upon the coast of Africa). LORD ELDON told the jury that he was of opinion that he was, in strict law, guilty within the statutes, taken together, if the facts laid were proved, though he could not then know that the Act of the 39 Geo. III. c. 37 had passed; and that his ignorance of that fact could in no otherwise affect the case, than that it might be the means of recommending him to a merciful consideration elsewhere should he be found guilty. ALL THE JUDGES (except Mr JUSTICE BULLER) met at Lord Kenyon's chambers, and were of opinion that it would be proper to apply for a pardon, on the ground that the fact having been committed so short a time after the Act 39 Geo. III. c. 37 was passed, the prisoner could not have known of it. [Mens rea is not excluded by the prisoner's belief in a religious obligation to commit the crime.] REYNOLDS v. THE UNITED STATES. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1878. 8 OTTO 145. In the District Court of the Territory of Utah, an indictment for bigamy had been found against George Reynolds, a Mormon; who had been convicted and sentenced thereon. At the trial the prisoner requested the Court to direct the jury that their verdict ought to be "Not Guilty" if they found that he had married in pursuance of a belief that polygamy was a religious duty. The Court declined to do so; and, in summing up, directed the jury that if the prisoner deliberately married a second time, having a first wife living, though under the influence of a religious belief that polygamy was right, this want of consciousness of evil intent would not excuse him....On this, and other grounds he sued out a writ of error to the Supreme Court. WAITE, C. J....As to the defence of religious belief. The accused proved that at the time of his alleged second marriage, he was a member of the Mormon Church and a believer in its doctrines. It is its accepted doctrine that it is the duty of its male members, circumstances permitting, to practise polygamy...and that a refusal to do so would be punished...in the life to come....The question is raised whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land....A criminal intent is a necessary element of crime. But here every act necessary to constitute the crime was done knowingly. Ignorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of criminal intent; but not ignorance of the law. And here the only defence of the accused is his belief that the law ought not to have been enacted. In Reg. v. Wagstaffe (10 Cox 531) the parents of a sick child who omitted to call in medical attendance because of their religious belief that what they did for its cure would be effective, were held not to be guilty of manslaughter; but it was said the contrary would have been the result if the child had been starved to death by them, under a notion that it was their religious duty to abstain from giving it food. In that case WILLES, J., said, "There is a great difference between neglecting a child in respect to food (with regard to which, there can be but one opinion), and neglect of medical treatment, as to which there may be many opinions." When the offence consists of a definite positive act, which is done knowingly, it would be dangerous to hold that the offender might escape punishment because he religiously believed the law which he had broken ought never to have been made. No case can be found, we believe, that has gone so far.... Judgment affirmed. [EDITOR'S NOTE. The Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act (57 and 58 Vict. c. 41, s. 1) makes it a statutory offence for a parent wilfully so to neglect a child as to cause unnecessary injury to its health. Accordingly, in such a case as that of Reg. v. Wagstaffe, the parent might now be convicted of manslaughter; see a more recent prosecution of one of the "Peculiar People," Reg. v. Senior (L. R. [1899] 1 Q. B. 283). In this case, some of the judges appear to have been prepared to hold, moreover, that the neglect would amount to manslaughter even at common law; and thus to overrule Reg. v. Wagstaffe.] [In some exceptional crimes, less than the usual mens rea suffices.] SHERRAS v. DE RUTZEN. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 1895. L.R. 1 Q.B.D. 918. Case stated by the chairman of quarter sessions for the county of London. The appellant was the licensee of a public-house, and was convicted before a metropolitan police magistrate under s. 16, sub-s. 2, of the Licensing Act, 1872', for having unlawfully supplied liquor to a police constable on duty without the authority of a superior officer of such constable for so doing. It appeared that the appellant's public-house was situated nearly opposite a police station, and was much frequented by the police 1 By the Licensing Act, 1872 (35 and 36 Vict. c. 94), s. 16, "If any licensed person "(1) Knowingly harbours or knowingly suffers to remain on his premises any constable during any part of the time appointed for such constable being on duty ...or "(2) Supplies any liquor or refreshment whether by way of gift or sale to any constable on duty unless by authority of some superior officer of such constable, or "(3) Bribes or attempts to bribe any constable,... he shall be liable to a penalty..." when off duty, and that on July 16, 1894, at about 4.40, the police constable in question, being then on duty, entered the appellant's house and was served with liquor by the appellant's daughter in his presence. Prior to entering the house the police constable had removed his armlet, and it was admitted that if a police constable is not wearing his armlet that is an indication that he is off duty. The armlet is removed at the police-station when a constable is dismissed, and a publican seeing the armlet off would naturally think the police constable off duty. The police constable was in the habit of using the appellant's house, and was well known as a customer to the appellant and his daughter. Neither the appellant nor his daughter made any inquiry of the police constable as to whether he was or was not on duty, but they took it for granted that he was off duty in consequence of his armlet being off, and served him with liquor under that belief. The appellant and his daughter were in the habit of serving a number of police constables in uniform with their armlets off each day, and the question whether they were or were not on duty was never asked when the armlet was seen to be off. The appellant appealed to quarter sessions against the conviction, contending that in order to constitute an offence under s. 16, sub.-s. 2, of the Licensing Act, 1872, there must be shewn to be either knowledge that the police constable was on duty, or an intentional abstention from ascertaining whether he was on duty or not. The Court of quarter sessions, however, upheld the conviction, considering that knowledge that the police constable, when served with liquor, was on duty, was not an essential ingredient of the offence: but stated this case for the opinion of the Court. DAY, J. I am clearly of opinion that this conviction ought to be quashed. This police constable comes into the appellant's house without his armlet, and with every appearance of being off duty. The house was in the immediate neighbourhood of the police-station, and the appellant believed, and he had very natural grounds for believing, that the constable was off duty. In that belief he accordingly served him with liquor. As a matter of fact, the constable was on duty; but does that fact make the innocent act of the appellant an offence? I do not think it does. He had no intention to do a wrongful act; he acted in the bonâ fide belief that the constable was off duty. It seems to me that the contention that he committed an offence is utterly erroneous. An argument has been based on the appearance of the word "knowingly" in sub.-s. 1 of s. 16, and its omission in sub-s. 2. In my opinion the only effect of this is to shift the burden of proof. In cases under sub-s. 1 it is for the prosecution to prove the know |