[At common law, even an agreement in restraint of trade
might amount to a Conspiracy.]

THE KING v. THE JOURNEYMEN TAILORS

KING'S BENCH. 1721.

OF CAMBRIDGE.

8 MODERN 11.

One Wise and several other journeymen tailors, of or in the town of Cambridge, were indicted for a conspiracy amongst themselves to raise their wages; and were found guilty. Motion was made in arrest of judgment, upon several errors in the record.

Thirdly, because no crime appears upon the face of this indictment; for it only charges them with a conspiracy in a refusal to work at so much per diem; whereas, they are not obliged at all to work by the day, but by the year, by 5 Eliz. c. 4.

It was answered that the crime was not the refusal to work, but the conspiracy to raise the wages.

THE COURT....It is not for the refusing to work, but for conspiring, that they are indicted. And a conspiracy of any kind is illegal, although the matter about which they conspired might have been lawful for them, or any of them, to do if they had not conspired to do it.

Fourthly, that this fact is laid in the town of Cambridge, but it doth not appear by the record in what county Cambridge is; which it ought to do, because there are other towns of that name in England, e.g. in Gloucestershire. And so it is a mis-trial, for there is no more ...[to summon the jury from] Cambridgeshire than any other

reason...

county....

THE COURT....Cambridge being mentioned in several Acts of Parliament, the Court must take notice of such Acts, and will intend that Cambridge is in the county of Cambridge.

Fifthly. This indictment ought to conclude contra formam statuti, for by the late statute, 7 Geo. I. c. 13, journeymen tailors [in London] are prohibited to enter into any contract or agreement for advancing their wages....

It was answered that the omission...is not material, because this indictment is for a conspiracy; which is an offence at common law. It is true that the indictment sets forth that the defendants refused to work under rates which were more than is enjoined [in London] by the statute, for that is only two shillings a day. But...it is not for this

denial to work...but for a conspiracy to raise their wages, that these defendants are indicted. It is true it does not appear by the record that the wages demanded were excessive; but that is not material, because it may be given in evidence.

THE COURT. This indictment need not conclude contra formam statuti; because it is for a conspiracy, which is an offence at common law.

So the judgment was confirmed by the whole Court.

[EDITOR'S NOTE. See also the case of Rex v. Hammond, infra, p. 411. But the rules, (based partly on the common law doctrine of Conspiracy and partly upon statutes), by which it was made criminal for associations of workmen to attempt to affect the rate of wages and the course of the labour-market, have been brought to an end by s. 3 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (38 and 39 Vict. c. 86). This provides that an agreement to do, or procure to be done, any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen shall not be indictable as a conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be a crime punishable with imprisonment.]

[What injurious agreements may not be indictable as Conspiracies.]

THE KING v. SEWARD AND OTHERS.

KING'S BENCH. 1834.

1 ADOLPHUS AND ELLIS 706.

This was an indictment for conspiracy, found at the General Sessions of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery in and for the Isle of Ely, holden at Ely. [The conspiracy alleged was a combination by certain parishioners of Chatteris to give a poor man, who was legally settled in the parish of St Ives, a sum of three pounds to marry a female pauper then legally settled in, and actually chargeable to, the parish of Chatteris; and thereby throw her maintenance upon the parish of St Ives. The marriage had taken place, and the wife had been removed to St Ives, and had there received poor-law relief. The defendants having been convicted, a motion was made for a rule to shew cause why the judgment should not be arrested, because the indictment did not shew that the marriage had been procured by any violence, threat, contrivance, or other sinister means.]

Kelly. The objection here taken is founded on an erroneous view of the offence. The charge is, in substance, not a conspiracy to procure a marriage, but a conspiracy unlawfully to exonerate one parish from the maintenance of a pauper and throw it upon another. A conspiracy merely to procure a marriage would not be indictable; but it becomes an offence if the thing is to be done for an unlawful end or by unlawful means. Here an unlawful end is stated, viz. to transfer a burden wrongfully from one parish to another; hence if no means were stated, or no overt acts alleged, the indictment would still be good.

LORD DENMAN, C.J. I am of opinion that this rule must be absolute. An indictment for conspiracy ought to shew that it was either for an unlawful purpose, or to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means that is not done here. To say that meeting together and combining to exonerate one parish from the burden of a poor person and throw it on another, amounts to an indictable conspiracy is extravagant. If such a proposition could be maintained, it would apply to parishioners hiring out a poor boy from their own parish into another. Then when it is said that such a proceeding is a conspiracy, because it is to be carried into effect by unlawful means, we must see in the means stated something which amounts to an offence.

*

TAUNTON, J. I am of the same opinion. Merely persuading an unmarried man and woman in poor circumstances to contract matrimony, is not an offence. If, indeed, it were done by unfair and undue means, it might be unlawful; but that is not stated. There is no averment that the parties were unwilling, or that the marriage was brought about by any fraud, stratagem, or concealment, or by duress or threat. No unlawful means are stated, and the thing in itself is not an offence: to call this a conspiracy, is giving a colour to the case which the facts do not admit of. As stated, it is nothing more than the case where the officers of a parish agree, after consultation, to apprentice out children from their own parish into another. No doubt, when that is done, the one parish may be exonerated and the other subjected to a charge; but no offence is committed.

[A Conspiracy requires more than one conspirator.]

THE KING AND QUEEN v. THORP AND OTHERS.

KING'S BENCH. 1696.

5 MODERN 221; COMBERBACH 458.

Information against Thorp and others, setting forth that they and each of them, being persons of ill fame, did, on the tenth of October in the fifth year of William and Mary, and at divers other times as well before as after, wickedly, unlawfully, and deceitfully, conspire, at Winchester, to take one Edward Mitchell, being under the age of eighteen years, the only son and heir of Robert Mitchell, Esq., and to carry him out of the custody, counsel, and government of his said father, without his notice and against his will, and to marry him to Cornelia Holton, a person of ill name and of no fortune; that the defendants did unlawfully assemble themselves together to accomplish the said conspiracy and wicked intentions; that they, and every one of them, by divers false, malicious, and deceitful insinuations, did falsely, unjustly, maliciously, and deceitfully persuade the said Edward Mitchell to hate his father, and to leave Winchester School where he was placed by his father for his learning, and to frequent the house of the defendant Thorp at Winton, and did persuade the said Edward Mitchell, and by divers false allurements did compel him, to be drunk with strong waters and other liquors; and that they introduced Cornelia Holton into his company, and did unlawfully and deceitfully, by false speeches, persuade and solicit him to be married to her; that in further prosecution of their intentions the defendants, and every of them, on the sixteenth of October in the fifth of William and Mary, did, by divers false assurances and promises, solicit, invite, and procure the said Edward Mitchell to leave the said school, against the will and without the notice or consent of his father, and did receive, maintain, and keep him, with an intent to persuade him to marry the said Cornelia Holton; that the said Cornelia Holton did contract matrimony with the said Edward Mitchell, on the twentieth day of October, in the fifth year aforesaid, at Watlington, in the county of Oxford, by the abetting and false means of the said defendants, to the damage of the said father, &c.

Upon not guilty pleaded, this information was tried at the Assizes at Winchester, and all the defendants were found not guilty, except Thorp; and he was acquitted of compelling the said Mitchell to be drunk, and found guilty of all the rest in the information.

It was moved in arrest of judgment :-Firstly, that this information does not contain any matter of misdemeanor. As it is no crime in

him to marry, it is no crime to persuade him to marry. Secondly, it is laid by way of a conspiracy; and the defendant Thorp being alone found guilty, there can be no judgment against him. Because one cannot

HOLT, C.J. It is a great crime and worthy to be punished; and so it shall be, if we can any way come at it.

[But no judgment was ever given.]

[EDITOR'S NOTE. As to when conspiracies to bring about a marriage are criminal, see the cases of Wade v. Broughton, 3 Ves. & B. 173, and Rex v. Edward Gibbon Wakefield, 2 Lewin 1.]

[How a Conspiracy is proved.]

THE KING v. PARSONS AND ANOTHER.

KING'S BENCH. 1762.

1 WM BLACKSTONE 391.

The defendants were convicted on an information for a conspiracy to take away the character of one Kempe, and accuse him of murder, by pretended conversations and communications with a ghost, that conversed by knocking and scratching in a place called Cock-lane'. When they were brought up for judgment, Lord MANSFIELD, who tried the information, declared, that he had directed the jury that there was no occasion to prove the actual fact of conspiring, but that it might be collected from collateral circumstances2; and he should be glad to know the opinion of his brethren, whether he was right in such direction. Quod nemo negavit.

[See also REX v. HUNT supra, p. 388.]

1 [In Smithfield. Parsons' daughter, a child of eleven, effected the deceptions. For details, see Boswell's Life of Dr Johnson, under June 1763.]

2 So where the defendants severally had bribed the prosecutor's apprentices to put grease into his cards (he being a card-maker), their being all of one family, and concerned in card-making, was held evidence of a conspiracy; Rex v. Cope, 1 Stra. 144; infra, p. 410.