[What may be material.] THE QUEEN v. BAKER. CROWN CASE RESERVED. 1895. L.R. [1895] 1 Q.B. 797. Case stated by His Honour Judge Chalmers, sitting as Commissioner of Assize. The defendant Baker was tried on February 9, 1895, at the Glamorganshire Assizes, on a charge of wilful and corrupt perjury. The substance of the indictment was that, on December 18, 1894, at the Petty Sessions held at Cardiff before the stipendiary magistrate, he, Baker, was charged with the offence of selling beer without a licence; and, having been duly sworn, deposed that he had never authorized the plea of guilty to be put in to a previous charge of selling beer without a licence, contrary to section 3 of the Licensing Act, 18721, on November 6, 1894, and that he had not authorized his solicitor to put in the plea of guilty to the charge, even by an indirect authority, and that he had no knowledge that his solicitor was going to plead guilty on his behalf, and that it was against his wish and will that the plea of guilty was put in. Evidence was called on behalf of the Crown to shew that the defendant, after full explanation of the matter, had authorized his solicitor, Belcher, to plead guilty on his behalf; and that when he was informed of what had been done he expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with the result. At the conclusion of the case for the Crown, counsel for the defendant took the objection that, even if the statements made by Baker were knowingly false, they could not amount to perjury, because they were not material to the issues then pending before the stipendiary magistrate. The commissioner held that Baker, having tendered himself as a witness under 35 and 36 Vict. c. 94, s. 51, sub-s. 4, was properly examined at that stage of the proceedings concerning the circumstances of his previous conviction; and that his answers were material, inasmuch as, in the event of a conviction, the facts deposed to would be taken into consideration by the magistrate in the ultimate determination of the case. But he said he would state a case on the objections raised. The jury found the defendant guilty. The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether the above statements of the defendant were material to the issues then depending before the stipendiary magistrate. 135 and 36 Vict. c. 94. LORD RUSSELL of KILLOWEN, C.J. The sole point for our consideration in this case is, whether the statements made by the defendant, which the jury have found to have been made falsely and wilfully, were material to the case which was before the stipendiary magistrate when the defendant was charged for the second time with the offence of selling beer without a licence. I will take the grounds relied on for the defendant in the order in which they are stated in the case. The first ground taken is that, as the defendant had admitted his previous conviction, and had not appealed therefrom, it was immaterial to the then pending inquiry whether the previous plea of guilty had been put in by the defendant's consent or not. The answer to that contention is that the defendant's answers would affect his credit as a witness, and all false statements, wilfully and corruptly made, as to matters which affect his credit, are material. The magistrate may be influenced, in arriving at his decision, by the circumstances of the previous conviction, and, if the defendant's solicitor had pleaded guilty on his behalf without his knowledge or consent, that circumstance might have been taken into consideration as affecting the amount of punishment. The second ground taken is that the previous conviction could only become material when the magistrate decided to convict in the then pending proceeding; and that, as a fact, the proceedings had been adjourned to await the result of the prosecution for perjury. I do not see the relevance of that argument. The magistrate must consider the case on the evidence given before him, and the circumstances may have an influence on the punishment. If on the previous occasion the defendant had, as he alleged, been convicted per incuriam, the magistrate might have given him the benefit of that fact, and might have treated the subsequent charge as if it had been a charge of a first offence. The third ground taken is that a previous conviction only affected the amount of punishment to be awarded by a magistrate, and not any issue to be determined by him, and further that the magistrate could only take cognizance of the fact of the previous conviction, and not of the circumstances under which it took place. But, as I have already pointed out in dealing with the previous objections, it is wrong to suggest that the magistrate could only take cognizance of the fact of the previous conviction. For these reasons I am of opinion that the words stated in the case were material. I will deal shortly with the authorities. In Reg. v. Overton' the date of a receipt which had been given for the price of a greyhound was held to be material. l'atteson, J., so held, after consulting Parke, B.; on the ground that every question on cross-examination of a witness which goes to his credit is material. 1 Car. and Marsh. 655. The case afterwards came before a Court consisting of eleven judges, who supported the view adopted by Parke, B., and Patteson, J. In Reg. v. Lavey', where a plaintiff in a county court had falsely sworn that she had never been tried at the Old Bailey, and had never been in custody at the Thames Police Station, the evidence was held to be material. This, again, was on the ground that it affected her credit. In Reg. v. Gibbon it was held by eleven judges (Martin, B., and Crompton, J., doubting), that perjury might be assigned on evidence going to the credit of a material witness in a cause, although such evidence, being legally inadmissible, ought not to have been received. That is a very strong authority-much stronger than is needed to support the conviction in the present case. I am of opinion that the evidence was material; and the conviction was right, and ought to be affirmed. The other four Judges concurred. Conviction affirmed. [Mens rea is necessary.] [Self-contradiction is not sufficient evidence for conviction.] REX v. MARY JACKSON. YORK ASSIZES. 1823. 1 LEWIN 270. Prisoner was indicted for perjury. It appeared that she had made two statements on oath, one of which was directly at variance with the other. HOLROYD, J., to the jury :-Although you may believe that, on one or other occasion, she swore that which was not true, it is not a necessary consequence that she committed perjury3. For there are cases in which a person might very honestly and conscientiously swear to a particular fact from the best of his recollection and belief, and, from other circumstances at a subsequent time, be convinced that he was wrong, and swear to the reverse; without meaning to swear falsely either time. Again, if a person swears one thing at one time, and another at another, you cannot convict if it is not possible to tell which was the true and which was the false. 1 3 C. and K. 26; and see 21 L. J. R. (M.C.) 10. 2 L. and C. 109. may have committed where a man swears fact be true or false, 3 [EDITOR'S NOTE. And, on the other hand, a person perjury, although the fact which he swore to was true. For to a particular fact without knowing at the time whether the it is as much Perjury as if he knew the fact to be false; and is equally indictable;" per Lawrence, J., in Rex v. Mawbey (6 T. R. 637).] [What evidence is sufficient for conviction.] REGINA v. HOOK. CROWN CASE RESERVED. 1858. DEARSLY AND BELL 606. [The prisoner had been convicted, at Chester Assizes, of a perjury. On the hearing of an information, at Petty Sessions, against a publican for keeping his house open during prohibited hours, Hook had sworn "I did not see any person leave the public-house that night after 11 p.m." To prove the falsehood of this statement, evidence was given (1) by three witnesses, that, to each of them separately, Hook had stated that he had seen one Williamson and three other men leave after eleven on the night in question, and by other witnesses (2) that the four men did so leave the house, and (3) that Hook asked the publican to give him a bribe to perjure himself. The question was reserved, whether this evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for perjury.] M'Intyre, for the prisoner. It is clearly established that to support a conviction for perjury the falsity of the oath must be proved directly by two witnesses at least; or there must be one witness and strong corroborative evidence to confirm him. One witness is not sufficient, because there would be only one oath against another. Although it was proved that persons did leave the house after eleven, there is no evidence beyond the prisoner's own statement, when he was not upon his oath, that he saw any person leave, or that the statement he made when upon oath was false. Not only is there no oath that he did see, but none that he was there and could have seen. Here, there is the prisoner's statement not upon oath against his statement on oath; and the facts proved against him are consistent with his evidence on oath being true, and his statements not on oath being false. * BYLES, J. The rule of law requiring two witnesses to prove an assignment of perjury reposes on two reasons; first, that it would often be dangerous and always unsatisfactory to convict the defendant when there is but the oath of one man against the oath of another: secondly, that in all judicial proceedings all witnesses, even the most honest, would be constantly exposed to the peril, annoyance and oppression of indictments for perjury, if the single oath of another man, without any confirmatory evidence, might, in point of law, suffice to convict. But the letter and spirit of the rule, and both of the reasons for it, appear to me to be satisfied where, of two distinct admissions of the defendant inconsistent with his innocence, one is proved by one witness, and one by another. It has been already held that the testimony of one witness deposing to the defendant's admission on oath, if there is corroboration, is enough; Regina v. Wheatland'. But if a single witness deposing to an admission of the defendant be one witness within the rule, then another witness, deposing to another admission, must surely be a second witness within the same rule.... SECTION XIX. BIGAMY. Conviction affirmed. [May be committed although the second marriage was invalid on other grounds as well as that of the bigamy.] THE QUEEN v. ALLEN. CROWN CASE RESERVED. * 1872. L.R. 1 C.C.C.R. 367. COCKBURN, C.J., delivered the judgment of the Court:-This case came before us on a point reserved by Martin, B., at the last Assizes for the county of Hants. The prisoner was indicted for having married one Harriet Crouch, his first wife being still alive. The indictment was framed upon the statute 24 and 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57, which enacts that "whosoever being married shall marry any other person, during the life of the former husband or wife, shall be guilty of felony." The facts of the case were clear. The prisoner had first married one Sarah Cunningham, and on her death he had married his present wife, Ann Pearson Gutteridge. The second wife being still living, he, on the 2nd of December, 1871, married one Harriet Crouch. So far the case would appear to be clearly one of bigamy within the statute; but, it appearing that Harriet Crouch was a niece of the prisoner's first wife, it was objected, on his behalf, that since the passing of 5 and 6 Wm. IV. c. 54, s. 2, such a marriage was in itself void, and that to constitute an offence, within 24 and 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57, the second marriage must be one which, independently of its bigamous character, |