HumeW. Blackwood, 1886 - 239 sider |
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ab extra action Adam Ferguson Adam Smith affirm afterwards agnosticism amongst Annandale antecedent believe Bishop Butler Cartesian causality cause CHAPTER character Clephane connection consciousness critical curious David Hume derived Descartes developed doctrine doubt Edinburgh elements ence England English Essays ethics existence experience Francis Hutcheson Gilbert Elliot Henry Home historian History Hobbes honour human nature Hume's Hutcheson ideas identity impressions infer Infinite Inquiry intellectual interest Inveresk justice knowledge Leibniz letter literary Locke Lockian London Lord Malebranche matter Matthew Sharp mental merit metaphysical mind moral never Ninewells notion object opinion origin Paris pass perceptions phenomena philo philosophy Political principle priori reach reason recognise regard relation Religion result Rousseau says scepticism Scotland Scottish sensation sense Sir Gilbert Elliot speculative sphere Spinoza subsequent substance succession tells tendency theism theistic theory things thought tion Treatise uncon unity universe virtue volume whole writing wrote
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Side 155 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.
Side 132 - I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when, after three or four hours...
Side 155 - But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar ; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist.
Side 94 - Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.
Side 154 - All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.
Side 113 - The original of them all is that which we call SENSE. (For there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.) The rest arc derived from that original.
Side 131 - The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.
Side 135 - That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.
Side 155 - The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be connected.
Side 175 - I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.