To Major General Alexander Campbell.

'MY DEAR CAMPBELL,

'Cartaxo, 25th November, 1810.

I have sad reports of the Lusitanian Legion pulling to pieces the houses in Alemquer. I request you to call before you Baron Eben, and the Commanding Officers of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, and inform them that I have had reason to complain of that corps more frequently, since they joined the army, than I have of all the other corps of the army taken together; and that I cannot but attribute the variety and the frequency of these acts of misconduct and indiscipline entirely to the want of attention on the part of their Commanding and other Officers; that if I do not see an early change in the habits of that corps, I shall turn them out of the army, and send them to a distance from the other troops, with which they are unfit to serve; and I shall report to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent the names of the Officers whose inattention to their duty must be the cause of the gross misconduct of the troops. I shall also consider it my duty to report to His Majesty the names of the Officers of his service who are serving in the Lusitanian Legion.

6

Believe me, &c.

'Major General

A. Campbell.

'WELLINGTON.

To the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley.

MY DEAR HENRY, 'Cartaxo, 25th November, 1810. I enclose a copy of my dispatch of yesterday to the Secretary of State. Since writing that letter I have received further accounts of the position of the French army, which appears to be principally collected about Torres Novas and Golegão; and I am afraid that I shall not be able to do any thing of importance with them, without putting matters in a state of risk.

I have received your letter of the 25th. I think it much more probable that I shall have to retire, and resume our

position, than that I shall be able to advance. The enemy is in considerable strength at and on their right of the position of Santarem, and they have their whole army at Torres Novas, Golegão, &c., with a post at Leyria, and one on the other side of the Zezere, at Punhete.

I could not attack them without incurring the risk of placing the fate of the Peninsula on the result of a general action, in which the advantage of ground would be much in favor of the enemy. Indeed, the continued bad state of the roads, and the swelling of the rivers, would prevent my moving for the present, even if it were desirable for other reasons; and in the meantime, I received accounts last night of the advance through Lower Beira of a detachment of 6000 men of those troops which I had been informed were upon the frontier.

The larger body, I believe, still remains upon the frontier, at least they were still in Silveira's front on the 17th. These accounts must prevent, for the present, at least, the execution of a plan which I had in contemplation to strike a blow on that detachment of the enemy which was across the Zezere.

Under these circumstances, that to which I must look for from General Hill's corps, is to get the English infantry belonging to it back to Alhandra as expeditiously as possible, when I shall find the enemy likely to advance again. I had settled the following plan for the passage of the whole corps.

First, that the artillery, cavalry, Portuguese infantry, and baggage, should march along the left bank to Aldea Galega, where I would have requested you to embark them in boats, and to have them carried over.

Secondly, that the English infantry, about 5500 men, should embark in the flotilla at , and proceed in the boats at once to Alhandra, by the great western channel, if this part of the army should still be in possession of the right bank of the river, as far as Valada; if not, by the eastern channel, covered by Lyceria.

'A conversation, however, which I had yesterday with Sir Thomas Williams, has induced me to alter this plan. It appears that it is desirable to get the boats down the river again, and the seamen into their ships; and I have settled with Sir Thomas Williams, that when it may be desirable to

to

pass over General Hill's corps, the flotilla shall come up where the British infantry will embark, unless it should be found practicable to march across the island of Lyceria; in which case a bridge will be thrown from Çamora to the island, and the troops will embark on the island opposite to Alhandra.

I am convinced that the roads in Lyceria are of that description that troops cannot march upon them in the wet season; and, therefore, the embarkation of the British infantry at Çamora, where the flotilla can be in one tide, and of the cavalry, artillery, baggage, and Portuguese infantry at Aldea Galega, appears to be the plan best suited to all the circumstances of the case; and I will give you notice when I shall wish to carry it into execution.

Vice Admiral

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

the Hon. G. Berkeley.

P. S. Since writing the above I have received a letter of the 20th from Silveira, from which I learn that the troops coming in from Lower Beira are 12,000 or 14,000 men, and Drouet's corp appears still to remain in Castille.

MY DEAR HILL,

To Lieut. General Hill.

'Cartaxo, 26th November, 1810, 3 P.M.

I have received your letter of yesterday, for which I am much obliged to you. The reinforcement on its march through Lower Beira consists certainly of convalescents and detachments from the troops now in Portugal. It is said by some to consist of 5000 to 6000; by others of 10,000 or 12,000 men. The 9th corps does not form part of this reinforcement. This corps is still on the frontiers of Castille.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will order the 6 pounders and howitzers mentioned in the enclosed letter, (which you sent to me.) and two 12 pounders, which came across the Tagus with General Fane, and all the ordnance and stores on the left bank of the river, with the exception of those belonging to your own corps, to be sent back to the arsenal at Lisbon without loss of time, by Aldea Galega.

The rocket carriages may as well go back likewise by the

same route.

'Lieut. General Hill.

Believe me, &c.

'WELLINGTON.

'P.S. I shall be very glad to have the route and distances from opposite to Abrantes to Aldea Galega, with a draft of the route, if you can send it to me.

To Charles Stuart, Esq.

6 W.'

MY DEAR SIR, Cartaxo, 26th November, 1810. I have received your letter of the 25th, with its enclosures. I have repeatedly written to Government respecting the pecuniary wants of Portugal, but hitherto without effect. I . have no doubt but that some more assistance must be given to this country.

I do not like the Conde de Redondo's paper, because he attempts to prove that we are in debt to the Government where no debt exists; and he attempts to prove this debt from a statement in a ministerial newspaper, instead of from the actual engagements of the Government and the state of transactions under those engagements.

That which they ought to do is to make out a statement of their claims under the actual engagements of the British Government, and the payments; they ought then to show what their actual receipts of revenue, contribution, &c. have been under the different heads, and their expenses; also their future expected income and expense; and from all this show how inadequate the subsidy from Great Britain is to defray the expense which it is intended to cover.

'I have had in contemplation different modes of increasing the army; but I do not advise drafting any part of the militia. One thing to do is to make the Lusitanian Legion two regiments of Caçadores, and to add four other regiments of Caçadores, and two regiments of the line. All this put together will make an increase to the establishments of 6000 men of infantry, which we want most. But it is impossible to do anything of this kind with the existing Government.

You will have received the accounts from the north and Lower Beira. I doubt the 9th corps coming in. I believe

the troops now marching through Lower Beira are the convalescents and detachments belonging to the regiments

already in Portugal.

C. Stuart, Esq.

Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

To Lieut. General Hill.

'MY DEAR HILL,

'Cartaxo, 27th November, 1810, 9 A. M.

I have just received your letter, enclosing a number from Colonel Lobo, who appears, as usual, to think that the whole force of the enemy is coming upon him. I should think that one fact which he mentions in another letter, viz., "that the enemy have strongly fortified the church of Punhete, and have made intrenchments upon the road from thence to Abrantes," might convince him that the enemy's measures on that side of the Zezere are merely defensive, and that the force stationed there is intended to cover the march of the reinforcements and convoys coming through Lower Beira.

There is one part of Colonel Lobo's last letter which requires an iminediate answer, and that is the postscript regarding the bridge.

If the enemy should attack Abrantes, it was my intention to assist the place from the left of the Tagus; and, in that view, the preservation of the bridge was an object: and I desired Fane to have it laid over the river, excepting four or five boats on the right bank, which might be added when we should want to use the bridge.

I am afraid, however, that the enemy might get at the boats of the bridge, notwithstanding the fire of the works of Abrantes; and this being the case, I think, upon the whole, it would be best to take up the bridge, and have all the boats brought over to the left bank, there to be kept in charge of Don Carlos's people. We should thus keep up the communication, and support the garrison by boats, in case it should be necessary,

I beg you will read this letter to Colonel Lobo.

I wish that the gentlemen in Abrantes, and particularly -, would begin to have some little confidence in themselves, and in that which they have been repeatedly told; viz., that the enemy can make no serious attack upon