the judicial department. If the proceedings are void, it would be the statute alone which would in such case constitute an adjudication upon the rights of the parties. So where by reason of non-compliance with the law regulating constructive service, jurisdiction has not attached, a retroactive statute cannot cure the defect.1

Even in those commonwealths where retrospective laws. are specifically prohibited by the constitutions, there are certain classes of statutes of that character which are considered valid and constitutional as being salutary and wholesome regulations, and not within the just construction of the inhibition. Such laws are often necessary for the enforcement of justice, as when a mere irregularity would otherwise make a good transaction void. It is generally recognized that a statute expressly retroactive, the object of which is to correct an innocent mistake, to remedy a mischief, to execute the intentions of parties and to promote justice, as a matter of right and public policy should be sustained. Such a statute does not deprive a party of a vested right, because a party cannot have a vested right to do a wrong.3

Although retrospective curative acts may in some cases be unobjectionable, retrospective expository acts declaring how former statutes are to be interpreted or construed in their application to transactions already past, are in every case objectionable and unconstitutional. If such interpretation or construction by the legislature is to be considered as giving the former acts a new meaning, it then becomes a new rule, and is to have the same effect as any other newly created statute. But if it is to be considered as an exposition of the former acts for the information and government of the courts in the decision of causes before them, the legislature would

1 Israel vs. Arthur, 7 Col. 5; Pryer vs. Downey, 50 Cal. 388; Daniell vs. Correll, 19 Ill. 226.

2 See Dimson vs. Bank, 36 N. H. 466; Raixden vs. Holden, 15 Ohio St. 207. 3 Cooley's Const. Limitations, pp. 460–477.

then be taking cognizance of a judicial question. Should the legislature by statute declare what was the intention of a former act, or prescribe that a former act should or should not be construed in a certain manner, and provide that such declaratory law should have retroactive as well as prospective force, the courts must declare it void as an assumption of judicial power by the legislature. Should a declaratory statute have the intended retroactive effect, it would amount to a legislative mandate to the court, establishing a particular interpretation upon a particular statute, thus exercising a judicial power in settling a question of interpretation, and subordinating the judiciary as a co-ordinate department. Accordingly, it has been held that a mandate of the legislature to the judiciary directing what construction shall be placed on an existing statute is unconstitutional. Had the legislature power to give to declaratory acts their intended effect, it would in every case in which it felt so disposed, sit as a court of review to which parties might appeal when dissatisfied with the rulings of the court. The acts of the legislature are committed to writing, and it is by the written language that their sense is to be ascertained, and not by a subsequent legislative body which differs in organization from the body which enacted the law. Such arbitrary interpretation of a law would not be a legal interpretation, but a substitution of the language and meaning of one legislative body for the other. Therefore where the courts held that insurance companies were taxable to a certain extent under an existing statute, a subsequent act of the legislature declaring that it was intended that they should be taxable at a certain other rate, and that such was the true intention and construction of the original statute, was held void as far as it was in

2

1 Dash vs. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477.

People vs. Board of Supervisors, 16 N. Y. 424; Greenough vs. Greenough, II Pa. St. 489.

3 Governor vs. Porter, 5 Humph. 165.

Greenough vs. Greenough, supra.

tended to have retroactive force. So where the courts construed a law, declaring that every incorporated company must annually within twenty days of the first of January publish a report, to mean whenever January came after the organization of the corporation, a subsequent act declaring the word annually as used in the prior act to have meant once a year after such corporation had been doing business at least twelve months, was held void so far as it was retroactive.2

It is evident that the legislature has no authority to interpret or define words of the constitution for the courts,3 or to declare a matter of constitutional construction, nor can it set aside a construction of a constitutional provision which has become fixed and settled by judicial determination. So where the constitution of Georgia entitled the head of a family to enter a homestead, and the courts decided that a single person having no others dependent upon him could not be regarded as the head of a family though keeping house with servants, an act declaring any single person living habitually as housekeeper to himself should be regarded as the head of a family, was held void. And where the courts had construed the meaning of "former jeopardy" as used in the constitution, an act of the legislature making it mean no more than legal conviction, was held unconstitutional,5

Similarly, the legislative branch of the government cannot, by a statutory enactment, declare an act of its own to be either constitutional or void, though it may repeal, or refuse to enact, any law because it deems it unconstitutional, irrespective of whether or not the courts declare it constitutional. The con

1 People vs. Board of Supervisors, 16 N. Y. 424.

2 Union Iron Co. vs. Pierce, 4 Bissel, 327.

3 Westinghausen vs. People, 44 Mich. 263; comp. People vs. Supervisors of La Salle, Ico Ill. 495.

♦ Calhoun vs. McLendon, 42 Ga. 405.

5 Powell vs. The State, 17 Texas Appeal, 345.

See In re Lafayette Co., 2 Chaud. (Wis.) 212; In re Ruan Street, 132 Pa. St. 257, 279.

struction of a statute being a judicial power, the attempt of the legislature to exercise such power by adding a proviso to a law that "nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing a lottery in this State, or as allowing the sale of lottery tickets, contrary to the provisions of the constitution," is an unconstitutional assumption of the functions of the judiciary.1

Until the judiciary has fixed the meaning of a doubtful law upon which rights have become vested, it may be explained by legislative enactment; and, when explanatory statutes are designed to explain doubtful statutes, they deserve the attention of the judiciary. But when the words and intent of the act are so explicit and plain that no court has ever been appealed to, to declare their meaning, the legislature cannot by a retroactive law put a construction upon them contrary to their obvious letter and spirit.3

Since courts will give effect to laws if they possibly can, and since the legislature can make laws looking to the future, declaratory statutes will be held to govern cases arising after the statute was passed. If a statute should combine retrospective and prospective criminal legislation, in so far as the two are separable the latter part will be held good.5

But some courts refuse to apply this rule of construction, and intimate that if the legislature would prescribe a different rule for the future from that which the courts enforce, it must be done by a new law, and cannot be done by a mandate to the courts which leaves the law unchanged, but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it not according to judicial

1 Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Mo. 101.

2 O'Conner vs. Warren, 4 W. & S. 223; Gough vs. Pratt, 9 Md. 526; Lamberton vs. Hogan, 2 Pa. St. 22.

Reiser vs. Wm. Tell Association, 39 Pa. St. 137.

Greenough vs. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489.

5 Jackson vs. People, 128 U. S. 189.

but according to legislative judgment. The legislature cannot compel courts for the future to adopt a particular construction of a law which the legislature permits to remain in force.

Finally, under the constitution of Pennsylvania, which provides that no law shall be revived, amended, or extended by a reference to its title only, but that so much thereof as is revived, amended, or extended, shall be reënacted and published at length, the courts deem themselves prohibited from giving effect, even as to future cases, to expository or declaratory acts.3

1 Governor vs. Porter, 5 Humph. 165.

Art. 3, Sec. 6. "Titusville Iron Works vs. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. St. 627.