Let it suffice to say that the following conclusions are ascertainable from the

research materials at hand:

a. Restrictive practices do exist

b. Many construction labor agreements contain obvious restrictive provisions

c.

Case law analysis and the other studies indicate that the problem is wide-
spread

d. Certain area practices involve restrictive working procedures not necessar

e.

ily a part of the contract.

Exact measurement of the excessive costs produc ed by restrictive practices is, for all practical purposes, an impossibility.

The specific examples of construction industry restrictive practices that are included in this section of the report were, in the most part, derived from survey results conducted by the Associated General Contractors of America in cooperation with, and at the request of, David Pellish, Executive Secretary of the Douglas Commission on Urban Problems.

In the fall of 1967, Mr. Pellish attended the annual AGC Board Meeting in St. Louis and requested the executive committee of the Association to authorize and direct the Labor Division of the AGC to conduct a restrictive practices survey by soliciting returns from its 131 member chapters for the answers to this difficult and disturbing problem.

Mr. Pellish stressed the urgency and importance of the information to be compiled and he stated "that the entire problem of restrictive practices in construction would be the subject of a special report," one of twenty, to be released by the Commission,

in addition to the major study of the Commission summarizing the findings of the

construction situation in urban America.

The actual compilation and analysis of the restrictive problems survey was contracted out to Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., a Washington, D. C., consulting

5

4

firm. The firm retained Paul A. Weinstein, Associate Professor of Economics,

University of Maryland, as Senior Associate, to write the report.

To the best of our knowledge, the "special report" was never issued for general publication, and the final Douglas Commission study devoted only a few of some 300,000 words to the problem.

The concept that few words are better than none at all can be misleading. Certainly this was the case for John Herling, a columnist for the Washington Daily News. "... take the problem of 'restrictive practices.'

What in effect do they mean?

Over the years,

Who is responsible for them? the finger of blame was so often aimed at the building trades unions that the fact of union 'guilt' became ar economic and social cliche. Mr. Douglas refused to assign blame that easily.

He was fortunate to have as one of his commissioners John H. Lyons, president of the AFL-CIO Iron Workers and one of the younger AFL-CIO vice presidents. Having determined that the commission was not loaded against labor, Mr. Lyons could persuade many suspicious building tradesmen that unless they were prepared to explain construction labor's attitude, they would continue to be the automatic target of hostility in certain sectors of the public. Misunderstanding was rooted in ignorance, on both sides of the argument. The report excavates the ignorance.

The report places the fact of 'restrictive practices' in the context of 'special insecurity facing the construction worker. For, it points out, 'not only the workers, but the entrepreneurs and manufacturers in the competitive homebuilding industry enjoy less security than is common in other industries. Restrictive practices, typically considered simply as union or labor matters, often result from pressures by contractors and producers.'

The Douglas Commission has made news by persuading the building tradesmen that restrictive practices belong in the orbit of their concern as well as the community's. It thus has been able to win active allies in the fight for the massive program of homebuilding: 500, 000 new units of low-cost housing to start with, and the rapid removal, replacement or rehabilitation of 7 million substandard .6 dwelling units, dilapidated or lacking the most rudimentary plumbing.'

Yet a cursory analysis of building trades agreements negotiated since the issuance of the Douglas Commission report reveals no apparent trend toward elimination of restrictive practices. Continued refusal by the Building and Construction Trades Department AFL-CIO to sensibly revise and update the Green Book is indicative of an established union attitude towards stabilization of the status quo.

In 1966, the National Constructors Association issued a report highlighting labor 8 problems in the building trades. This carefully documented report painted a dark

picture. It was a story of diminishing productivity, excessive absenteeism, jurisdictional disputes which resulted in work stoppages, one-man picket lines caused by a walkout over a trivial issue, and general failure to observe the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements. Writing in the August 1970 United Association Journal, President Peter T. Schoemann acknowledged the validity of the 1966 NCA study and reports: "However, I must state flatly that since the 1966 report was issued, the situation has gotten worse, year by year. 119

The Associated General Contractors of America, beginning in 1969, held a series of national conferences dealing with the more effective and efficient use of manpower and the development of additional trained employees for the construction industry. A list of those national conferences follows:

of America and Georgetown University, October 22-23, 1964

AGC Manpower Conference, July 27-28, 1967

AGC National Labor Conference, May 20-21, 1968

AGC Seasonality in Construction Conference, November 7-8, 1968

AGC Jurisdictional Disputes Seminar, October 10, 1969

Published reports of the presentations and recommendations of these meetings

were distributed to participants and others for information and guidance in improving the efficient employment of craftsmen and laborers.

The cement masons were cited by eight respondents for demanding hand trowelling:

There shall be no restriction on the use of machinery but all cement floating machinery shall be operated by cement finishers and all hand work shall be also done by cement finishers. Under no circumstances shall work be left under machine finish.

In one instance the finishing had to be done by hand before and after the machine finishing. The question arises, why have the machine?

MACHINE USE AND ADOPTION

The engineers have several rules which affect the use of machines. The operating engineer is generally qualified to run a variety of machines. Frequently, a contractor has cause to stop the use of machine A and require the operator to run B. The union contracts only permit the operator to move from A to B and back to machine

A. This prohibits the use of a third machine at another time in the day.

This is a means of increasing the number of men and limiting flexibility of an employer, and leads to increased costs.

The operating engineer is tied to a specific piece of equipment. If the machine is laid up (broken or without a job) the operator is not necessarily laid off. In some areas the operator continues on the payroll even though there is no work.

The complaint against the engineer is not only one of high costs but lack of flexibility in scheduling and use.

FOREMEN

The most frequently cited issue involved foremen and their proliferation and use. Some contracts required a foreman where there was only one worker on the job,

others permitted four journeymen before a foreman was required. Every foreman and area foreman (a foreman's foreman) adds to costs.