limitation was in "conformity with the dual Congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own." Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 692. This Court accordingly refused to read § 8 (b)(4)(A) to ban traditional primary strikes and picketing having an impact on neutral employers even though the activity fell within its sweeping terms. Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665; see Local 761, Electrical Workers Union v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667. Thus, however severe the impact of primary activity on neutral employers. it was not thereby transformed into activity with a secondary objective.

The literal terms of § 8 (b)(4)(A) also were not applied in the so-called "ally doctrine" cases, in which the union's pressure was aimed toward employers performing the work of the primary employer's striking employees. The rationale, again. was the inapplicability of the provision's central theme, the protection of neutrals against secondary pressure, where the secondary employer against whom the union's pressure is directed has entangled himself in the vortex of the primary dispute. "[T]he union was not extending its activity to a front remote from the immediate dispute but to one intimately and indeed inextricably united to it." Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1948) (Rifkind, J.); see Labor Board v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics, 228 F. 2d 553 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1955). We summarized our reading of $8 (b)(4)(A) just a year before enactment of § 8 (e):

"It aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious, widespread, and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice of unions to widen that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers, themselves not concerned with a primary labor dispute. through the inducement of their employees to engage in strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods." Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93, 100. Despite this virtually overwhelming support for the limited reading of § 8 (b)(4)(A), the Woodwork Manufacturers Association relies on Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Electrical Workers, 325 U. S. 797, as requiring that the successor section, 8 (b)(4)(B). be read as proscribing the District Council's conduct in enforcing the "will not handle" sentence of Rule 17 against Frouge. The Association points to the references to Allen Bradley in the legislative debates leading to the enactment of the predecessor $8 (b)(4)(A). We think that this is an erroneous reading of the legislative history. Allen Bradley held violative of the antitrust laws a combination between Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and both electrical contractors and manufac

turers of electrical fixtures in New York City to restrain the bringing in of such equipment from outside the city. The contractors obligated themselves to confine their purchases to local manufacturers, who in turn obligated themselves to confine their New York City sales to contractors employing members of the local, this scheme supported by threat of boycott by the contractors' employees. While recognizing that the union might have had an immunity for its contribution to the trade boycott had it acted alone, citing Hutcheson, supra, the Court held immunity was not intended by the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts in cases in which the union's activity was part of a larger conspiracy to abet contractors and manufacturers to create a monopoly.

The argument that the references to Allen Bradley in the debates over § 8 (b)(4)(A) have broader significance in the determination of the reach of that section is that there was no intent on Local 3's part to influence the internal labor policies of the boycotted out-of-state manufacturers of electrical equipment. There are three answers to this argument: First, the boycott of out-ofstate electrical equipment by the electrical contractors employees was not in pursuance of any objective relating to pressuring their employers in the matter of their wages, hours, and working conditions; there was no work preservation or other primary objective related to the union employees' relations with their contractor employers. On the contrary, the object of the boycott was to secure benefits for the New York City electrical manufacturers and their employees. "This is a secondary object because the cessation of business was being used tactically, with an eye to its effect on conditions elsewhere." " Second, and of even greater significance on the question of the inferences to be drawn from the references to Allen Bradley, Senator Taft regarded the Local 3 boycott as in effect saying. "We will not permit any material made by any other union or by any nonunion workers to come into New York City and be put into any building in New York City." 93 Cong. Ree, 4199. II 1947 Leg. Hist. 1107. This clearly shows that the Senator viewed the pressures applied by Local 3 on the employers of its members as having solely a seeondary objective. The Senate Committee Report echoes the same view:

"[It is] an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in the type of secondary boycott that has been conducted in New York City by local No. 3 of the IBEW, whereby electricians have refused to install electrical products of manufacturers employing 17 Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NIRA §§ 8 (b) (4) and 8 (e), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 1017–1018 (1965).

It is suggested that the boycott in Allen Bradley is indistingiasi able from the activity today held protected in Houston Insulation Contractors Association v. Labor Board, pust. The ernerd distine tion is that in Houston Insulation Contractors Association the h cott was being carried out to affect the labor policies of the employer of the boycotting employees, the primary employer, and not, am in Allen Bradley, for its effect elsewhere.

electricians who are members of some other labor organization other than local No. 3." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 428. (Emphasis supplied.)

Other statements on the floor of Congress repeat the same refrain." Third, even on the premise that Congress meant to prohibit boycotts such as that in Allen Bradley without regard to whether they were carried on to affect labor conditions elsewhere, the fact is that the boycott in Allen Bradley was carried on not as a shield to preserve the jobs of Local 3 members, traditionally a primary labor activity, but as a sword, to reach out and monopolize all the manufacturing job tasks for Local 3 members. It is arguable that Congress may have viewed the use of the boycott as a sword as different from labor's traditional concerns with wages, hours, and working conditions. But the boycott in the present case was not used as a sword; it was a shield carried solely to preserve the members' jobs. We therefore have no occasion today to decide the questions which might arise where the workers carry on a boycott to reach out to monopolize jobs or acquire new job tasks when their own jobs are not threatened by the boycotted product.""

It is true that the House bill proposed to amend the Clayton Act to narrow labor's immunity from the antitrust laws. H. R. 3020, § 301 (b), I 1947 Leg. Hist. 220. This was omitted from the Conference agreement. It is suggested that this history evidences that Congress meant § 8 (b)(4)(A) to reach all product boycotts with work preservation motives. The argument is premised on a statement by the House Managers in the House Conference Report that "since the matters dealt with in this section have to a large measure been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since the conference agreement contains effective provisions directly dealing with boycotts themselves, this provision is omitted from the conference agreement." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 65, I 1947 Leg. Hist. 569. The statement is hardly probative that § 8 (b)(4)(A) enacted a broad prohibition in face of the overwhelming evidence that its Senate sponsors intended the narrower reach. Actually the statement at best reflects that the House may have receded from a broader position and accepted

1 See 93 Cong. Rec. 4132 (Senator Ellender), II 1947 Leg. Hist. 1056: "A secondary boycott, as all of us know, is a concerted attempt on the part of a strong union to compel employers to deal with them, even though the employees of that employer desire to be represented by other unions, or not to be represented at all.. [An] example is the New York Electrical Workers Union, the IBEW." See also Statement of Senator Ball, 93 Cong. Rec. 5011, II 1947 Leg. Hist. 1491, who described "the situation which has arisen, such as that in New York where a local of the IBEW is using a secondary boycott to maintain a tight little monopoly for its own employees, its own members, and a few employers in that area."

We likewise do not have before us in this case, and express no view upon, the antitrust limitations, if any, upon union-employer work preservation or work extension agreements. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 662-665,

that of the Senate. For § 8 (b)(4)(A) constituted the "effective provisions" referred to and the House Managers' understanding of and agreement with the reach of the section as intended by its Senate sponsors is expressed at page 43 of the same Reports:

"Under clause (A) strikes or boycotts, or attempts to induce or encourage such action, were made unfair labor practices if the purpose was to foree an employer or other person to cease using, selling. handling. transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of another, or to cease doing business with any other person. Thus it was made an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in a strike against employer A for the purpose of foreing that employer to cease doing business with employer B. Similarly it would not be lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or otherwise deals in the goods of, or does business with, employer B." In effect Congress, in enacting §8 (b)(4)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, returned to the regime of Duplex Printing Press Co. and Bedford Stone Cutters, supra, and harred as a secondary boycott union activity directed against a neutral employer, including the immediate employer when in fact the activity directed against him was carried on for its effect elsewhere.

Indeed. Congress in rewriting $8 (b)(4)(A) as $8(b)(4)(B) took pains to confirm the limited appli cation of the section to such "secondary" conduct. The word "concerted" in former §8 (b)(4)(A) was deleted to reach secondary conduct directed to only one individual. This was in response to the Court's holding in Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, that "concerted" required proof of inducement of two or more employees. But to make clear that the deletion was not to be read as supporting a construction of the statute as prohibiting the incidental effects of traditional primary activity, Congress added the proviso that nothing in the amended section "shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.": Many statements and examples proferred in the 1959 debates confirm this congressional acceptance of the distinction between primary and secondary activity.

The proviso was added in the Conference Committee, the report of which stated its purpose to be, "to make it clear that the clung in section 8 (b) (4) do not overrule or qualify the present rules of las permitting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute." II. R Conf. Rep. No 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sesse, 38 (1959), in 1 Legis lative History of the Labor Management Reporting and Dickente Act of 1959 942 (hereafter 1959 Leg. Hist.). See Local 761, fltrical Workers Union v. Labor Board, 366 V. S. 667, 681.

See 105 Cong. Rec. 1729-1730, II 1959 Leg. Dist. 994 (marke of the Secretary of Labor, inserted into the record by Senator Dark sen); 105 Cong. Rec. 3951-3952, 6290, 6667, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1007, 1052, 1193-1194 (Senator McClellan); 105 Cong. Ree, 6255, II 1989 Leg. Hist. 1046 (Senator Ervin); 105 Cong. Ree, 600 601, II Leg Hist. 1059 (Senator Mundt); 105 Cong Ree 600, 628, 17874, II Leg. Hist. 1061, 1079, 138 (Senator Goldwater): 105 Leg Hist

IL

The Landrum-Griffin Act amendments in 1959 were adopted only to close various loopholes in the application of $8 (b)(4)(A) which had been exposed in Board and court decisions. We discussed some of these loopholes, and the particular amendments adopted to close them, in Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., 377 U. S. 46, 5154. We need not repeat that discussion here, except to emphasize, as we there said, that "these changes did not expand the type of conduct which §8 (b)(4)(A) condemned, that is, union pressures calculated to induce the employees of a secondary employer to withhold their services in order to force their employer to crase dealing with the primary employer." Id., at 52-53.

Section 8 (e) simply closed still another loophole." In Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), 357 U. S. 93, the Court held that it was no defense to an unfair labor practice charge under § 8 (b)(4)(A) that the struck employer had agreed. in a contract with the union, not to handle nonunion material. However, the Court emphasized that the mere execution of such a contract provision (known as a "hot cargo" clause because of its prevalence in Teams.ers Union contracts), or its voluntary observance by the employer, was not unlawful under § 8 (b)(4)(A). Section 8 (e) was designed to plug this gap in the legislation by making the "hot cargo" clause itself unlawful. Sand Door decision was believed by Congress not only to create the possibility of damage actions against employers for breaches of "hot cargo" clauses, but also to create a situation in which such clauses might be employed to exert subtle pressures upon employers to engage in "voluntary" boycotts." Hearings in late 1958 before the Senate Select Committee explored seven cases of "hot cargo" clauses in Teamster union contracts, the use of which the Committee found conscripted neutral employers in Teamster organizational campaigns."

The

6670, 6535-6536, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1197, 1140-1441 (Senator Curtis); 105 Cong. Rec. 1426, 15674, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1462, 1616 (Rep. Bosch): 105 Cong. Rec. 3926-3927, 3928, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 14691470, 1471 (Rep. Lafore): 105 Cong. Ree. 14343-14344, II Leg. Hist. 1518-1519 (Itep. Landrum); 105 Cong. Ree. 14347-14348, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1522-1523 (Analysis of Landrum-Griffin bill inserted into the record by Rep. Griffin); 105 Cong. Ree. 15532, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1568 (Rep. Griffin); 105 Cong. Rec. 15195, 15544-15545, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1543, 1580-1581 (Rep. Rhodes): 105 Cong. Ree. 15529, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1565 (Rep. Shelly); 105 Cong. Rec. 15551-15552, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1587-1588 (Rep. Elliot); 105 Cong. Rec. 15688, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1630 (Rep. Richlman); 105 Cong. Ree, 15601, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1633 (Rep. Arends),

Throughout the committee reports and debates on §8 (e), it Was referred to as a measure designed to close a loophole in $8 (b)(4) (A) of the 1947 Act. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 78-79, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 474-475 (1959) (Minority Views); H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21, I 1950 Leg. Hist. 778-779.

See Cox, supra, note 16, at 272.

See Final Report for the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, S. Rep. No. 1139, Sith Cong., 2d Sess, 3 (1960). The Final Report, ordered to be printed after enactment of the LMRA, defined a "hot cargo" clause

This loophole closing measure likewise did not expand the type of conduct which §8 (b)(4)(A) condemned. Although the language of § 8 (e) is sweeping, it closely tracks that of § 8 (b)(4)(A), and just as the latter and its successor §8 (b)(4)(B) did not reach employees' activity to pressure their employer to preserve for theinselves work traditionally done by them, § 8 (e) does not prohibit agreements made and maintained for that purpose.

The legislative history of §8 (e) confirins this conclusion. The Kennedy-Ervin bill as originally reported proposed no remedy for abuses of the "hot cargo" clauses revealed at the hearings of the Select Committee. Senators Goldwater and Dirksen filed a minority report urging that a prohibition against "hot cargo" clauses should be enacted to close that loophole. Their statement expressly acknowledged their acceptance of the reading of §8 (b)(4)(A) as applicable only "to protect genuinely neutral employers and their employees, not themselves involved in a labor dispute, against economic coercion designed to give a labor union victory in a dispute with some other employer." ** They argued that a prohibition against "hot cargo" clauses was necessary to further that objective. They were joined by Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Select Committee, in their proposal to add such a provision. Their statements in support consistently defined the evil to be prevented in terms of agreements which obligated neutral employers not to do business with other employers involved in labor disputes with the union. Senator Gore initially proposed, and the Senate first passed, a "hot cargo" amendment to the Kennedy-Ervin bill which outlawed such agreements only for "common carriers subject to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act." This reflected the testimony at the Select Committee hearings which attributed abuses as "an agreement between a union and a unionized employer that his employees shall not be required to work on or handle hot goods' or 'hot cargo' being manufactured or transferred by another employer with whom the union has a labor dispute or whom the union considers and labels as being unfair to organized labor." Final Report,

supra, at 3.

S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 78, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 474 The Senators explained, at 79, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 475:

"Hot-cargo clauses-It has become common to find clauses m union contracts whereby the employer agrees not to handle what the union chooses to call hot goods, unfair materials, and blackhisted products. Such clauses have become standard in contracts entered into by the Teamsters Union. Here, employer A, who has a dispute with a union or whose employees are being solicited for union membership, is in real trouble. He may have customers waitmg for his product or he may have suppliers eager to send him raw material, but both his delivery of products and supply of raw material cannot move from or to his place of business because the carriers in either instance have 'hot cargo' clauses in their contracts with the Teamsters Union. His alternative is to go out of business or yield to the union's demand, which often is a demand for a compulsory membership contract with a union which his employees do not want."

26 See statements of these Senators, cited note 21, supra, Both Senators Dirksen and McClellan introduced unsuccessful "hot eargo” legislation in substantially the same terms as §8 (e) as enarted, 105 Cong. Ree. 3948, 6411-6412, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1007 (Senator McClellan), 1071 (Senator Dirksen).

of such clauses primarily to the Teamsters Union. Significantly, such alleged abuses by the Teamsters invariably involved uses of the clause to pressure neutral trucking employers not to handle goods of other employers involved in disputes with the Teamsters Union."

The House Labor Committee first reported out a bill containing a provision substantially identical to the Gore amendment. The House Report expressly noted that since that proposal tracked the language of § 8 (b)(4)(A) "it preserved the established distinction between primary activities and secondary boycotts." The substitute

Landrum-Griffin bill, however, expanded the proposal to cover all industry and not common carriers alone. H. R. 8400, § 705 (b)(i) in I 1959 Leg. Hist. 683. Representative Landrum stated, "I submit if such contracts are bad in one segment of our economy, they are undesirable in all segments." 105 Cong. Rec. 14343, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1518. In describing the substitute bill, Representative Landrum pointedly spoke of the situation "where the union, in a dispute with one employer, puts pressure upon another employer or his employees, in order to force the second employer or his employees, to stop doing business with the first employer, and bend his knee to the union's will." Ibid. An analysis of the substitute bill submitted by Representative Griffin referred to the need to plug the various loopholes in the "secondary boycott" provisions, one of which is the "hot cargo" agreement." In Conference Committee, the Landrum-Griffin application to all industry, and not just to common carriers, was adopted.

However, provisos were added to $8 (e) to preserve the status quo in the construction industry, and exempt the garment industry from the prohibitions of §§ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B). This action of the Congress is strong confirmation that Congress meant that both $$ 8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B) reach only secondary pressures. If the body of $8 (e) applies only to secondary activity, the garment industry proviso is a justifiable exception which allows what the legislative history shows it was designed to allow, secondary pressures to counteract the effects of sweatshop conditions in an industry with a highly integrated process of production between jobbers, manu

See, eg, remarks of Secretary of Labor Mitchell inserted into the record by Senator Dirksen, 105 Cong. Rer. 1730, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 993: "The testimony before the select commute agon and again illustrated the method by which certain umous, particularly the Teamsters, utilized the inadequacies of the present secondary boycott provisions to force employers to do business with only those people approved by union officials."

H. R. 8342, § 705 (x) (2) (Elhort bill), in 1 1959 Leg. Hist. 755-757.

1. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess, 21, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 779.

30 105 Cong. Rec. 14346, 11 1959 Leg. Hist. 1522-1523. Rep. Griffin noted that the present law did not "prohibit resort to... [secondary] activity to force [secondary] employees to sign contracts or agreements not to handle or transport goods coming from a Source characterized by the union as 'unfair.'"

facturers, contractors and subcontractors. First, this motivation for the proviso sheds light on the central theme of the body of $8 (e), from which the proviso is an exception. Second, if the body of that provision and § 8 (b)(4)(B) were construed to prohibit primary agreements and their maintenance, such as those concerning work preservation, the proviso would have the highly unlikely effect, unjustified in any of the statute's history, of permitting garment workers, but garment workers only, to preserve their jobs against subcontracting or prefabrication by such agreements and by strikes and boycotts to enforce them. Similarly, the construction industry proviso, which permits "hot cargu" agreements only for job-site work, would have the curious and unsupported result of allowing the construction worker to make agreements preserving his traditional tasks against job-site prefabrication and subcontracting. but not against nonjob-site prefabrication and subcontracting. On the other hand, if the heart of $8 (e) is construed to be directed only to secondary activities, the construction proviso becomes, as it was intended to be, a measure designed to allow agreements pertaining to certain secondary activities on the construction site because of the close community of interests there, but to ban secondary-objective agreements concerning nonjob site work, in which respect the construction industry is no different from any other. The provisos are therefore substantial probative support that primary work preser vation agreements were not to be within the ban of $8 (e).”

The only mention of a broader reach for §8(e) appears in isolated statements by opponents of that provision, expressing fears that work preservation agreements would be banned. These statements have scant probative value against the backdrop of the strong evidence to the contrary. Too, "we have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reli

31 See, e. g., 105 Cong. Ree. 6668, 17327, II 1959 Leg. Hot. 1195, 1377 (Senator Kennedy).

See Esser County and Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters Labor Board, 332 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1964): Note, The lapset of the Taft-Hartley Aet on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 Yale L. J. 673, 684-689 (1951).

See Mastro Plastics Corp. Labor Board, 350 U. 8. 270, 25286, and cases there cited.

105 Cong. Rec. 17844, 11 1959 Leg. Hist. 1128 (Senator Morse); 105 Cong. Ree. 16590, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1708 (Analysis of "Seeondary Boycotts and Hot Cargo Contracts" by Senator Kennedy and Rep. Thompson). It is somewhat unclear whether statements by Senator McNamara and Reps. Thompson and Kearns respecting plumbing prefabrication clauses for construction projects esteemed agreements with a primary or a secondary objective: 105 Cong Ree. 19785, 19809, 2004-2005, 11 1959 Leg. Hist. IN13, 1816, il. As described by Senator McNamara, the clause in question permitted fabrication, so long as it was accomplished by members of a koral union of the pipefitters. 105 Cong. Rec. 19785, 11 1959 Leg. His 1815. Moreover, the statements purported only to indicate their interpretation of the construction industry proviso. In any event, these statements could represent only the personal views of the legislators, since the statements were inserted in the Congres Record after passage of the Act.