their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach." Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 66. "It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U. S. 270, 288. " In addition to all else, "the silence of the sponsors of [the] Amendments is pregnant with significance. . . Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, supra, at 66. Before we may say that Congress meant to strike from workers' hands the economic weapons traditionally used against their employers' efforts to abolish their jobs, that meaning should plainly appear. "[I]n this era of automation and onrushing technological change, no problems in the domestic economy are of greater concern than those involving job security and employment stability. Because of the potentially cruel impact upon the lives and fortunes of the working men and women of the Nation, these problems have understandably engaged the solicitous attention of government, of responsible private business, and particularly of organized labor." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. Labor Board, 379 U. S. 203. 225 (concurring opinion of STEWART, J.). We would expect that legislation curtailing the ability of management and labor voluntarily to negotiate for solutions to these significant and difficult problems would be preceded by extensive congressional study and debate, and consideration of voluminous economic, scientific, and statistical data. The silence regarding such matters in the Eighty-sixth Congress is itself evidence that Congress, in enacting §8 (e), had no thought of prohibiting agreements directed to work preservation." In fact, since the eractment of § 8 (e), both the Subcommittee on Einployment and Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. and the Subcommittee on Unemployment and the Impact of Automation and the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor have been extensively studying the threats to workers posed by increased technology and automation," and some legislation directed to the prob In fact, Kep. Alger introduced a bill which would have banned union attempts to limit prefabrication of building materials, which hill was given no attention whatever and failed adoption. 105 Cong. Ree 12137, II 1950 Leg. Hist. 1508. The understanding of Congres with regard to that issue might have been best reflected in a statement on the House floor by Rep. Holland: "When the labor reform bill is out of the way-labor and management could, as they eventu ally must, sit down together and work toward a solution of our Most serious problem-automation-which has already affected the employment picture through more productivity and less employment. If allowed to go unchecked, automation will eventually create many thousands of displaced persons, and unless this problem is properly worked out, it portends a serious threat to our national economy,” 105 Cong. Rec. 13133, 11 1959 Leg. Hist. 1511. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employinent and Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-9 (1963), 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 10 (194) (coneluding with recommendations for a National Com lem has been passed."" We cannot lightly impute to Congress an intent in §8 (e) to preclude labor-management agreements to ease these effects through collective bargaining on this most vital problem created by advanced technology. Moreover, our decision in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., supra, implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of work preservation clauses like that involved here. Indeed, in the circumstances presented in Fibreboard, we held that bargaining on the subject was made mandatory by $8 (a) (5) of the Act, concerning as it does "terms and conditions of employment." Fibreboard involved an alleged refusal to bargain with respect to the contractingout of plant maintenance work previously performed by employees in the bargaining unit. The Court recognized that the "termination of employment which . . . necessarily results from the contracting-out of work performed by members of the established bargaining unit," supra, at 210, is "a problem of vital concern to labor and management... supra, at 211. We further noted, supra, at 211-212: "Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests of labor and management in the subject inatter but is also indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process. Experience illustrates that contracting out in one form or another has been brought, widely and successfully, within the collective bargaining framework. Provisions relating to contracting out exist in numerous collective bargaining agreements, and '[c]ontracting out work is the basis of many grievances; mission on Automation and Technological Progress), and Hearings, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), on "Bills Relating to the Training and Utilization of the Manpower Resources of the Nation..."; Hearings of the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess (1964), on H. R. 10310 and Related Bills "To Establish a National Commission on Automation and Technological Progress"; Hearings before the Subcommittee on Unemployment and the Impact of Automation of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Seas (1961), on H. R. 7373, a "Bill Relating to the Occupational Training, Development, and Use of Manpower Resources of the Nation." See statement in these latter hearings of then Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg, at 3: "Many achievements in attempting to overcome the difficulties created by radical technological change can and should be accomplished through collective bargaining and joint labormanagement efforts. Much has been achieved through such efforts in recent years. Even greater concentration by labor and management on these problems is needed in the period ahead." See the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, § 102 (1), 76 Stat. 23, 24, which directs the Secretary of Labor to "evaluate the impact of, and benefits and problems created by autonuation, technological progress, and other changes in the structure of production and demand on the use of the Nation's human resources; establish techniques and methods for detecting in advance the potential impact of such developments; develop solutions to these problems, and publish findings pertaining thereto." The Secretary has, pursuant to this direction, published numerous bulletins. See, eg, Technological Trends in Major American Industries, Dept. of Labor Bulletin No. 1474. 80-741 - 72 - 25 and that type of claim is grist in the mills of the arbitrators.' United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 584." See Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283. 294. It would therefore be incongruous to interpret $8 (e) to invalidate clauses over which the parties may be mandated to bargain and which have been successfully incorporated through collective bargaining in inany of this Nation's major labor agreements. Finally, important parts of the historic accommodation by Congress of the powers of labor and management are §§ 7 and 13 of the National Labor Relations Act. passed as part of the Wagner Act in 1935 and amended in 1947. The former section assures to labor "the right... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . ." Section 13 preserves the right to strike, of which the boycott is a fort, except as specifically provided in the Act. In the absence of clear indicia of congressional intent to the contrary, these provisions caution against reading statutory prohibitions as embracing employee activities to pressure their own employers into improving the employees' wages, hours, and working conditions. See Labor Board v. Drivers Union, 362 U. S. 274; Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., supra, at 672-673; Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, supra, at 687; Mastro Plastics v. Labor Board, supra, at 284, 287. The Woodwork Manufacturers Association and amici who support its position advance several reasons. grounded in economic and technological factors. why "will not handle" clauses should be invalid in all circuinstances. Those arguments are addressed to the wrong branch of government. It may be "that the time has come for re-evaluation of the basic content of collective bargaining as contemplated by the federal legislation. But that is for Congress. Congress has demonstrated its capacity to adjust the Nation's labor legislation to what, in its legislative judgment, constitutes the statutory pattern appropriate to the developing state of labor relations in the country. Major revisions of the basic statute were enacted in 1947 and 1959. To be sure, then, Congress might be of opinion that greater stress should be put on... eliminating more and more economic weapons from the... [Union's] grasp.... But Congress' policy has not yet moved to this point. Insurance Agents' International Union v. Labor Board, 361 U. S. 477. 500. The determination whether the "will not handle" sentence of Rule 17 and its enforcement violated §8 (e) and 8 (b)(4)(B) cannot be made without an inquiry into whether, under all the surrounding circumstances," As a general proposition, such circumstances might include the remoteness of the threat of displacement by the banned product or the Union's objective was preservation of work for Frouge's employees, or whether the agreements and boy. cott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. Were the latter the case, Frouge, the boycot ting employer, would be a neutral bystander, and the agreement or boycott would, within the intent of Congress, become secondary. There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer, here the door manufacturer, for the activity to fall within this category, 80 long as the tactical object of the agreement and its maintenance is that employer, or benefits to other than the boycotting employees or other employees of the primary employer thus making the agreement or boycott secondary in its aim." The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-à-vis his own employees." This will not always be a simple test to apply." But "Ihlowever difficult the task of drawing lines more nice than obvious, the statute compels the task." Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U. S. 667, 674. That the "will not handle" provision was not an unfair labor practice in this case is clear. The finding of the Trial Examiner, adopted by the Board, was that the objective of the sentence was preservation of work traditionally performed by the job-site carpenters. This finding is supported by substantial evidence, and therefore the Union's making of the "will not handle" agreement was not a violation of $8 (e). Similarly, the Union's maintenance of the provision was not a violation of §8 (b)(4)(B). The Union refused to hang prefabricated doors whether or not they bore a union label, and even refused to install prefabri cated doors manufactured off the jobsite by members of the Union. This and other substantial evidence supported the finding that the conduct of the Union on the Frouge jobsite related solely to preservation of the tra services, the history of labor relations between the union and the employers who would be boycotted, and the economic personality of the industry. See Conument, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 1176, 1188 et arg. (1964). See Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§8 (b) (4) and 8 (e), 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 1018, 1040 (1965). "See Orange Belt District Council of Painters v. Labor Board, 328 F. 2d 534 (C. A. D. C. Cir. 1964); Retail Clerks Union Local 770 v. Labor Board, 296 F. 2d 388 (C. A. D. C. Cir. 1961); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbldg. Workers, 344 F. 2d 107 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1985); Labor Board v. Local 825, Int. Union of Operating Engineers, 328 F. 2d 218 (C. A 3d Cir. 1964); Labor Board v. Joint Council of Teamsters, 338 F. 24 23, 28 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1964); Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union (Munesota Milk Co.), 133 N. L. R. B. 1314, enfd, 814 F. 21 761 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1983); Ohio Valley Carpenters District Couned (Cardinal Industries), 136 N. L. R. B. 977 (1962). "Sov, e. g. Retail Clerks Union Local 770 v. Labor Board, 296 F. 21 368 (C. A. D. C. Cir. 1961); Baltimore Lithographers (AlruGravure), 160 N. L. R B. No. 90, 63 L. R. R. M. 1128 (1900); Joliet Contractors Asan V. Labor Board. 202 F. 2d 606 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 348 U. 8. 824; Labor Board v. Local 11. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 242 F. 2d 932 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1967). See generally, Lesnick, supra, note 39; Comment, 02 Mich. L. Rev. 1176 (1964). Number 71-A75 4-21-67 Labor Cases Cited 55 LC naked principles of primary jurisdiction, see, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 1959, [37 LC 65,367] 359 U. S. 236, 242-3; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 1953, [24 LC 68,020] 346 U. S. 485, 490-1; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 1938, [1 LC 17,024] 303 U. S. 41, do not apply. Nevertheless the principle announced in the primary jurisdiction cases, that important questions of statutory interpretation should be considered first by the Board, which has the major and initial responsibility for enforcing the act, seems applicable here in our discretion. The question whether section 8(b)(4) prohibits picketing designed to elicit a public response to the actions of a government agency with which the union may have both a primary and a secondary dispute is of particular importance. The farther that picketing recedes from "isolated evils" and the closer it comes to the guarantees of the First Amendment, see Tree Fruits, 377 U. S., supra, at 63 [49 LC ¶ 18,898] the more cautious we must be. Finding that the Department picketing raises possibly difficult and substantially different questions from those raised by the conduct that led to the Board's order, we decline to hold the union in contempt so far as this picketing is concerned. This action is intended to be without prejudice to any future Board action, in the 18,703 ordinary course, to determine whether the Department activity violated section 8(b)(4). ̧ Furthermore, it is not in recognition of the union's general claim that we can never find it in contempt until the Board has first exhausted its administrative procedures. In the normal course the court must be able to, and will, proceed directly to enforce its own decree. NLRB v. Bird Machine Co., supra; NLRB v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 2 Cir., 1941, [4 LC ¶ 60,586] 121 F. 2d 673, 674; see also NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 1 Cir. 1952, [21 LC ¶ 66,828] 196 F. 2d 755, 760. Any other result would mean that even flagrant violations of an existing order could go unpunished. With respect to the Craftsman and Lewis Shepard matters the union is to be adjudged in contempt. It may purge itself by making reimbursement to the Board for all proper costs and expenses, including salaries, West Texas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, D. C. Cir., 1953, [23 LC 67,554] 206 F. 2d 442, cert. den. 346 U. S. 855, incurred in the preparation and prosecution of this petition, but not of the amendment, the amount thereof to be referred to this court for determination and supplemental decree only in the event of disagreement between the parties. NLRB v. Republican Publishing Co., 1 Cir., 1950, [17 LC 65,662] 180 F. 2d 437. [11,842] National Woodwork Manufacturers Association et al., Petitioners v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent. No. 110. National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner v. National Woodwork Manufacturers Association et al., Respondents. No. 111. United States Supreme Court. April 17, 1967, On Writs of Certiorari to United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. National Labor Relations Act Hot-Cargo Agreements-Preserving Work for Bargaining Unit Personnel-Prefabricated Building Materials.-A clause in a union contract providing that no member of the union will handle any doors which have been fitted prior to being furnished on the job must be interpreted as a lawful effort to preserve for craftsmen work which they have traditionally performed on job sites. The NLRB properly found that the clause was inserted in the contract for the sole benefit of employees in the bargaining unit, and not for the unlawful purpose of dictating the labor policies of a manufacturer of prefabricated building materials. NLRA, Section 8(e). Back reference.-¶ 5222.382. Secondary Boycott-Prefabricated Materials-Refusal to Handle-Preservation of Work-Refusal by union craftsmen on a construction site to handle prefabricated doors was lawful primary activity. The strike was provoked by the employer's action in purchasing prefabricated doors, in violation of a lawful provision of his labor contract designed to protect the traditional job-site work of craftsmen against the encroachment of factoryfitted building materials, although the specifications under which he was performing did not require the use of prefabricated units. NLRA, Section 8(b)(4)(B). Back reference.-¶5220.0853. Labor Law Reports 1 11,84 18,704 Labor Relations Cases National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB Number 71-A76 4-21-67 Affirming in part and reversing in part (CA-7 1965) 52 LC 16,745, 354 F. 2d 594, which affirmed in part and set aside in part (1964) 149 NLRB 646, 1964 CCH NLRB ¶ 13,555. Charles B. Mahin (Richard S. Ratcliff, John A. McDonald and Spray, Price, Hough & Cushman, of counsel), Chicago, Illinois, for Petitioner in No. 110 and Respondent in No. 111. Dominick L. Manoli, Associate General Counsel (Arnold Ordman, General Counsel, Norton J. Come, Assistant General Counsel, Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General, and George B. Driesen, Attorney, of counsel), National Labor Relations Board, for Respondent in No. 110 and Petitioner in No. 111. Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice HARLAN Con curred in a separate opinion. Mr. Justice STEWART, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, and Mr. Justice CLARK joined, dissented in a separate opinion. [Question Presented] BRENNAN, J.: Under the Landrum-Griffin Act amendments enacted in 1959, § 8(b) (4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act became § 8(b)(4) (B) and § 8(e) was added. The questions here are whether, in the circumstances of this case, the Metropolitan District Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (hereafter the Union), committed the unfair labor practices prohibited by §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B).' [Background Facts] Frouge Corporation, a Bridgeport, Connecticut, concern, was the general contractor on a housing project in Philadelphia. Frouge had a collective bargaining agreement with the Carpenters' International Union under which Frouge agreed to be bound by the rules and regulations agreed upon by local unions with contractors in areas in which Frouge had jobs. Frouge was therefore subject to the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and an organization of Philadelphia contractors, the General Building Contractors Association, Inc. A sentence in a provision of that agreement entitled Rule 17 provides that No member of this District Council will handle. . . any doors . . . which have been fitted prior to being furnished on the job ." Frouge's Philadelphia project called for 3,600 doors. Customarily, before the doors could be hung on such The text of these sections appears in the Appendix. The full text of Rule 17 is as follows: "No employee shall work on any job on which cabinet work, fixtures, millwork, sash, doors, trim or other detalled millwork is used unless the same is Union-made and bears the Union Label of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. No member of this District Council will handle material coming from a mill where cutting out and fitting has 11,842 projects, "blank" or "blind" doors would be mortised for the knob, routed for the hinges, and beveled to make them fit between jambs. These are tasks traditionally performed in the Philadelphia area by the carpenters employed on the jobsite. However, precut and prefitted doors ready to hang may be purchased from door manufacturers. Although Frouge's contract and job specifications did not call for premachined doors, and "blank" or "blind" doors could have been ordered, Frouge contracted for the purchase of premachined doors from a Pennsylvania door manufacturer which is a member of the National Woodwork Manufacturers Association, petitioner in No. 110 and respondent in No. 111. The Union ordered its carpenter members not to hang the doors when they arrived at the jobsite. Frouge thereupon withdrew the prefabri cated doors and substituted "blank" doors which were fitted and cut by its carpenters on the jobsite. [Decision of NLRB] The National Woodwork Manufacturers Association and another filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board against the Union alleging that by including the "will not handle" sentence of Rule 17 in the collective bargaining agreement the Union committed the unfair labor practice under 88(e) of entering into an "agreement... whereby the employer agrees to any cease or refrain from handling 1967, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. Number 70-AS 4-18-67 Labor Cases Cited 55 LC National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB forcing the sentence against Frouge, the Union committed the unfair labor practice under §8(b)(4)(B) of "forcing or requiring any person to cease using ... the products of any other . . . manufacturer The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the charges, [1964 CCH NLRB 13,555] 149 NLRB 646.' The Board adopted the findings of the Trial Examiner that the "will not handle" sentence in Rule 17 was language used by the parties to protect and preserve cutting out and fitting as unit work to be performed by the jobsite carpenters. The Board also adopted the holding of the Trial Examiner that both the sentence of Rule 17 itself and its maintenance against Frouge were therefore "primary" activity outside the prohibitions of §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). The following statement of the Trial Examiner was adopted by the Board: "I am convinced and find that the tasks of cutting out and fitting millwork, including doors, has, at least customarily, been performed by the carpenters employed on the jobsite. Certainly, this provision of Rule 17 is not concerned with the nature of the employer with whom the contractor does business nor with the employment conditions of other employers or employees, nor does it attempt to control such other employers or employees. The provision guards against encroachments on the cutting out and fitting work of the contract unit employees who have performed that work in the past. purpose is plainly to regulate the relations between the general contractor and his own employees and to protect a legitimate economic interest of the employees by preserving their unit work. Merely because it incidentally also affects other parties is no basis for invalidating this provision. . Its "I find that (the provision) is a lawful work-protection or work-preservation provision and that Respondents have There were also charges of violation of 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B) arising from the enforcement of the Rule 17 provision against three other contractors whose contracts with the owners of the construction projects involved specified that the contractors should furnish and install precut and prefinished doors. The Union refused to permit its members to hang these doors. The Board held that this refusal violated 8(b)(4)(B). The Board reasoned that, since these contractors (In contrast to Frouge) did not have "control over the work that the Union sought to preserve for its members, the Union's objective was secondary-to compel the project owners to stop specifying precut doors in their contracts with the employer-contractors. (1964 CCH NLRB 13.555] 149 NLRB, at 658. The Union petitioned the Court of Appeals to set aside the remedial order issued by the Board Labor Law Reports 18,705 not violated Section 8(e) of the Act by entering into agreements containing this provision and by thereafter maintaining and enforcing this provision." [1964 CCH NLRB 13,555] 149 NLRB, at 657. [Decision of Court of Appeals] The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the Board in this respect. [52 LC 16,745] 354 F. 2d 594, 599. The court held that the "will not handle" agreement violated § 8(e) without regard to any "primary" or "secondary" objective, and remanded to the Board with instructions to enter an order accordingly. In the court's view, the sentence was designed to effect a product boycott like the one condemned in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, [9 LC T 51,213] 325 U. S. 797, and Congress meant, in enacting § 8(e) and § 8(b) (4)(B), to prohibit such agreements and conduct forcing employers to enter into them. The Court of Appeals sustained, however, the dismissal of the § 8(b)(4) (B) charge. The court agreed with the Board that the Union's conduct as to Frouge involved only a primary dispute with it and held that the conduct was therefore not prohibited by that section but expressly protected by the proviso "[t]hat nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing . . ." Id., at 597. We granted certiorari on the petition of the Woodwork Manufacturers Association in No. 110 and on the petition of the Board in No. 111. 384 U. S. 968. We affirm in No. 110 and reverse in No. 111. [Congressional Intent] I. Even on the doubtful premise that the words of § 8(e) unambiguously embrace the sentence of Rule 17, this does not end in on this finding, but the court sustained the Board. 354 F. 2d, 594, at 597 [52 LC f 16.745]. The Union did not seek review of the question here. Not before us, therefore, is the issue argued by the AFL-CIO in its brief amicus curiae, namely, whether the Board's "right-to-control doctrine-that employees can never strike against their own employer about a matter over which he lacks the legal power to grant their demand" is an incorrect rule of law inconsistent with the Court's decision in Labor Board v. Insurance Agents' International Union, [39 LC 66.239] 361 U. S. 477, 497-498. The statutory language of § 8(e) is far from unambiguous. It prohibits agreements to 'cease from handling any of the products of any other employer [Emphasis supplied.] Since both the product and its source are mentioned, the provision might be read not 111,842 |