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a neutral employer, including the immediate employer when in fact the activity directed against him was carried on for its effect elsewhere.

Indeed, Congress in rewriting § 8(b)(4) (A) as §8(b)(4)(B) took pains to confirm the limited application of the section to such "secondary" conduct. The word "concerted" in former §8(b)(4) was deleted to reach secondary conduct directed to only one individual. This was in response to the Court's holding in Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., [19 LC 66,346]

341 U. S. 665, that "concerted" required proof of inducement of two or more employees. But to make clear that the deletion was not to be read as supporting a construction of the statute as prohibiting the incidental effects of traditional primary activity, Congress added the proviso that nothing in the amended section "shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing"" Many statements and examples proffered in the 1959 debates confirm this congressional acceptance of the distinction between primary and secondary activity."

[Effect of Landrum-Griffin Act Amendments]

II. The Landrum-Griffin Act amendments in 1959 were adopted only to close various loopholes in the application of §8(b)(4)(A) which had been exposed in Board and court decisions. We discussed some of these loopholes, and the particular amendments adopted to close them, in Labor Board v. Servette, Inc., [49 LC ¶ 18,899] 377 U. S. 46, 51-54. We need not repeat

The proviso was added In the Conference Committee, the report of which stated its purpose to be, to make it clear that the changes in section 8(b)(4) do not overrule or qualify the present rules of law permitting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 38 (1959), in I Legislative History of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 942 (hereafter 1959 Leg. Hist.). See Local 761, Electrical Workers Union v. Labor Board, [42 LC 16.066] 366 U. S. 667, 691.

"See 105 Cong. Rec. 1729-1730. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 994 (remarks of the Secretary of Labor. inserted into the record by Senator Dirksen): 105 Cong. Rec. 3951-3952, 6290, 6667, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1007, 1052, 1193-1194 (Senator McClellan): 105 Cong. Rec. 6285. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1046 (Senator Ervin): 105 Cong. Rec. 6300-6301, II Leg. Hist. 1059 (Senator Mundt); 105 Cong. Rec. 6390, 6423, 17674, II Leg. Hist. 1061. 1079. 1386 (Senator Goldwater); 105 Leg. Hist. 6670. 6535-6536. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1197, 1140-1441 (Senator Curtis): 105 Cong. Rec. 1426, 15674. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1462, 1616 (Rep. Bosch): 105 Cong. Rec. 3926-3927, 3928, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1469-1470.

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that discussion here, except to emphasize, as we there said, that "these changes did not expand the type of conduct which § 8(b)(4)(A) condemned, that is, union pressures calculated to induce the employees of a secondary employer to withhold their services in order to force their employer to cease dealing with the primary employer." Id., at 52-53.

Section 8(e) simply closed still another loophole." In Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Labor Board (Sand Door), [35 LC ¶71,599] 357 U. S. 93, the Court held that it was no defense to an unfair labor practice charge under §8(b)(4)(A) that the struck employer had agreed, in a contract with the union, not to handle nonunion material. However, the Court emphasized that the mere execution of such a contract provision (known as a "hot cargo" clause because of its prevalence in Teamsters Union contracts), or its voluntary observance by the employer, was not unlawful under § 8(b)(4)(A). Section 8(e) was designed to plug this gap in the legislation by making the "hot cargo" clause itself unlawful. The Sand Door decision was believed by Congress not only to create the possibility of damage actions against employers for breaches of "hot cargo" clauses, but also to create a situation in which such clauses might be employed to exert subtle pressures upon employers to engage in "voluntary" boycotts." Hearings in late 1958 before the Senate Select Committee explored seven cases of "hot cargo" clauses in Teamster Union contracts, the use of which the Committee found conscripted neutral employers in Teamsters organizational campaigns."

1471 (Rep. Lafore): 105 Cong. Rec. 14343-14344. II Leg. Hist. 1518-1519 (Rep. Landrum); 105 Cong. Rec. 14347-14348. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 15221523 (Analysis of Landrum-Griffin bill inserted Into the record by Rep. Griffin): 105 Cong. Rec. 15532, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1568 (Rep. Griffin): 105 Cong. Rec. 15195, 15544-15545. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1543. 1580-1581 (Rep. Rhodes): 105 Cong. Rec. 15529. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1565 (Rep. Shelly): 105 Cong. Rec. 15551-15552. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 15871588 (Rep. Elliott): 105 Cong. Rec. 15688, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1630 (Rep. Riehlman): 105 Cong. Rec. 15691. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1633 (Rep. Arends).

Throughout the committee reports and debates on § 8(e), it was referred to as a measure designed to close a loophole in § 8(b)(4)(A) of the 1947 Act. See. e.g., S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 78-79, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 474-475 (1959) (Minority Views): H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 778-779.

See Cox, supra, note 16, at 272.

See Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, S. Rep. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1960). The Final Report,

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This loophole closing measure likewise did not expand the type of conduct which § 8(b)(4)(A) condemned. Although the language of § 8(e) is sweeping, it closely tracks that of § 8(b)(4)(A), and just as the latter and its successor § 8(b)(4)(B) did not reach employees' activity to pressure their employer to preserve for themselves work traditionally done by them, § 8(e) does not prohibit agreements made and maintained for that purpose.

The legislative history of § 8(e) confirms this conclusion. The Kennedy-Ervin bill as originally reported proposed no remedy for abuses of the "hot cargo" clauses revealed at the hearings of the Select Committee. Senators Goldwater and Dirksen filed a minority report urging that a prohibition against "hot cargo" clauses should be enacted to close that loophole. Their statement expressly acknowledged their acceptance of the reading of §8(b)(4)(A) as applicable only "to protect genuinely neutral employers and their employees, not themselves involved in a labor dispute, against economic coercion designed to give a labor union victory in a dispute with some other employer.' "25 They argued that a prohibition against "hot cargo" clauses was necessary to further that objective. They were joined by Senator McClellan, Chairman of the Select Committee, in their proposal to add such a provision. Their statements in support consistently defined the evil to be prevented in terms of agreements which obligated neutral employers not to do business with other employers involved in labor disputes with the union. Senator Gore ordered to be printed after enactment of the Landrum-Griffin Act. defined a hot cargo" clause as an agreement between a union and a unionized employer that his employees shall not be required to work on or handle hot goods' or 'hot cargo' being manufactured or transferred by another employer with whom the union has a labor dispute or whom the union considers and labels as being unfair to Ibid. organized labor."

23 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 78, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 474. The Senators explained, at 79, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 475:

"Hot-cargo clauses.-It has become common to find clauses in union contracts whereby the employer agrees not to handle what the union chooses to call hot goods,' 'unfair materials,' and blacklisted products. Such clauses have become standard in contracts entered into by the Teamsters Union. Here, employer A, who has a dispute with a union or whose employees are being solicited for union membership. is in real trouble. He may have customers waiting for his product or he may have suppliers eager to send him raw material, but both his delivery of products and supply of raw material cannot move from or to his place of business because the carriers in either instance have hot cargo' ¶ 11,842

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initially proposed, and the Senate first passed, a "hot cargo" amendment to the Kennedy-Ervin bill which outlawed such agreements only for "common carriers subject to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act." This reflected the testimony at the Select Committee hearings which attributed abuses of such clauses primarily to the Teamsters Union. Significantly, such alleged abuses by the Teamsters invariably involved uses of the clause to pressure neutral truck. ing employers not to handle goods of other employers involved in disputes with the Teamsters Union."

The House Labor Committee first reported out a bill containing a provision substantially identical to the Gore amendment." The House Report expressly noted that since that proposal tracked the language of $8(b)(4)(A) "it preserved the established distinction between primary activities and secondary boycotts." "The substitute Landrum-Griffin bill, however, expanded the proposal to cover all industry and not common carriers alone. H. R. 8400, § 705(b)(1) in I 1959 Leg. Hist. 683. Representative Landrum stated, "I submit if such contracts are bad in one segment of our economy, they are undesirable in all segments." 105 Cong. Rec. 14343, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1518. In describing the substitute bill, Representative Landrum pointedly spoke of the situation "where the union, in a dispute with one employer, puts pressure upon another employer or his employees, in order to force the second employer, or his employees, to stop doing business with the first employer, and 'bend his knee to the

clauses in their contracts with the Teamsters Union. His alternative is... [to] go out of business or yield to the union's demand, which often is a demand for a compulsory membership contract with a union which his employees do

not want."

See statements of these Senators, cited note 21. supra. Both Senators Dirksen and McClellan Introduced unsuccessful "hot cargo" legislation in substantially the same terms as $8(e) as enacted. 105 Cong. Rec. 3948. 6411-6412. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1007 (Senator McClellan), 1071 (Senator Dirksen).

See. e.g., remarks of Secretary of Labor Mitchell inserted into the record by Senator Dirksen. 105 Cong. Rec. 1730. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 993: "The testimony before the select committee again and again illustrated the method by which certain unions. particularly the Team sters, utilized the inadequacies of the present secondary boycott provisions to force employers to do business with only those people approved by union officials."

H. R. 8312. $705(a) (2) (Elliott bill). in I 1959 Leg. Hist. 755-757.

H. R. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.. 21, I 1959 Leg. Hist. 779.

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union's will." Ibid. An analysis of the substitute bill submitted by Representative Griffin referred to the need to plug the various loopholes in the "secondary boycott" provisions, one of which is the "hot cargo" agreement." In Conference Committee, the Landrum-Griffin application to all industry, and not just to common carriers, was adopted.

However, provisos were added to § 8(e) to preserve the status quo in the construction industry, and exempt the garment industry from the prohibitions of §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B). This action of the Congress is strong confirmation that Congress meant that both §§ 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B) reach only secondary pressures. If the body of §8(e) applies only to secondary activity, the garment industry proviso is a justifiable exception which allows what the legislative history shows it was designed to allow, secondary pressures to counteract the effects of sweatshop conditions in an industry with a highly integrated process of production between jobbers, manufacturers, contractors and subcontractors." First, this motivation for the proviso sheds light on the central theme of the body of §8(e), from which the proviso is an exception. Second, if the body of that provision and §8(b)(4)(B) were construed to prohibit primary agreements and their maintenance, such as those concerning work preservation, the proviso would have the highly unlikely effect, unjustified in any of the statute's history, of permitting garment workers, but garment workers only, to preserve their jobs against subcontracting or prefabrication by such agreements and by strikes and boycotts to enforce them. Similarly, the construction /industry proviso, which permits "hot cargo" agreements only for jobsite work, would have the curious and unsupported result of allowing the construction worker to make

105 Cong. Rec. 14347. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1522-1523. Rep. Griffin noted that the present law did not "prohibit resort to . . . [secondary] activity to force [secondary] employers to sign contracts or agreements not to handle or transport goods coming from a source characterized by a union as 'unfair.' ''

"See, e.g., 105 Cong. Rec. 6668, 17327, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1195, 1377 (Senator Kennedy). "See Essex County and Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Labor Board, [49 LC ¶ 18,964] 332 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1964); Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 Yale L. J. 673, 684-689 (1951).

"See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, [29 LC 69.779] 350 U. S. 270, 285-286, and cases there cited.

4105 Cong. Rec. 17884, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1428 (Senator Morse); 105 Cong. Rec. 16590, II 1959 Labor Law Reports

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agreements preserving his traditional tasks against jobsite prefabrication and subcontracting, but not against nonjobsite prefabrication and subcontracting. On the other hand, if the heart of § 8(e) is construed to be directed only to secondary activities, the construction proviso becomes, as it was intended to be, a measure designed to allow agreements pertaining to certain secondary activities on the construction site because of the close community of interests there," but to ban secondary-objective agreements concerning nonjob-site work, in which respect the construction industry is no different from any other. The provisos are therefore substantial probative support that primary work preservation agreements were not to be within the ban of § 8(e)."

The only mention of a broader reach for § 8(e) appears in isolated statements by opponents of that provision, expressing fears that work preservation agreements would be banned." These statements have scant probative value against the backdrop of the strong evidence to the contrary. Too, "we have often cautioned against the danger, when interpreting a statute, of reliance upon the views of its legislative opponents. In their zeal to defeat a bill, they understandably tend to overstate its reach." Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, [49 LC

18,898] 377 U. S. 58, 66. "It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, [29 LC ¶ 69,779] 350 U. S. 270, 288.

In addition to all else, "the silence of the sponsors of (the) Amendments is pregnant with significance. . . ." Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, supra, at 66. Before we may say that Congress meant to strike Leg. Hist. 1708 (Analysis of "Secondary Boycotts and Hot Cargo Contracts" by Senator Kennedy and Rep. Thompson). It is somewhat unclear whether statements by Senator McNamara and Reps. Thompson and Kearns respecting plumbing prefabrication clauses for construction projects concerned agreements with a primary or a secondary objective. 105 Cong. Pec. 19785, 19809, 20004-20005. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1S15, 1S16, 1861. As described by Senator McNamara, the clause in question permitted fabrication, so long as it was accomplished by members of a local union of the pipefitters. 105 Cong. Rec. 19785, II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1815. Moreover, the statements purported only to indicate their interpretation of the construction industry proviso. In any event, these statements could represent only the personal views of these legislators, since the statements were inserted in the Congressional Record after passage of the Act.

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from workers' hands the economic weapons traditionally used against their employers' efforts to abolish their jobs, that meaning should plainly appear. "(I)n this era of automation and onrushing technological change, no problems in the domestic economy are of greater concern than those involving job security and employment stability. Because of the potentially cruel impact upon the lives and fortunes of the working men and women of the Nation, these problems have understandably engaged the solicitous attention of government, of responsible private business, and particularly of organized labor." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. Labor Board, [50 LC 19,384] 379 U. S. 203, 225 (concurring opinion of STEWART, J.). We would expect that legislation curtailing the ability of management and labor voluntarily to negotiate for solutions to these significant and difficult problems would be preceded by extensive congressional study and debate, and consideration of voluminous economic, scientific, and statistical data. The silence regarding such matters in the Eighty-sixth Congress is itself evidence that Congress, in enacting §8(e), had no thought of prohibiting agreements directed to work preservation. In fact, since the enactment of § 8(e), both the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and the Subcommittee on Unemployment and the Impact of Automation and the Select Subcommittee on

In fact, Rep. Alger introduced a bill which would have banned union attempts to limit prefabrication of building materials, which bill was given no attention whatever and failed of adoption. 105 Cong. Rec. 12137. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1508. The understanding of Congress with regard to that issue might have been best reflected In a statement on the House floor by Rep. Holland: "When the labor reform bill is out of the way-labor and management could, as they eventually must, sit down together and work toward a solution of our most serious problemautomation-which has already affected the employment picture through more productivity and less employment. If allowed to go unchecked, automation will eventually create many thousands of displaced persons, and unless this problem is properly worked out, it portends a serious threat to our national economy." 105 Cong. Rec. 13133. II 1959 Leg. Hist. 1511.

See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-9 (1963), 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 10 (1964) on the Nation's Manpower Revolutlon (concluding with recommendations for a National Commission on Automation and Technological Progress). and Hearings, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963), on Manpower Retraining: Hearings before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor. 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), on H. R. 10310 and Related Bills "To Establish a National Com11,842

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Labor of the House Committee on Educa tion and Labor have been extensively study. ing the threats to workers posed by increased technology and automation," and some legislation directed to the problem has been passed." We cannot lightly impute to Congress an intent in § 8(e) to preclude labor-management agreements to ease these effects through collective bargaining on this most vital problem created by advancel technology.

Moreover, our decision in Fibrebord Paper Prods. Corp., supra, implicitly rec nizes the legitimacy of work preservat: .clauses like that involved here. Indeed, in the circumstances presented in Fibreht we held that bargaining on the subject was made mandatory by § 8(a) (5) of the Act. concerning as it does "terms and conditions of employment," § 8(d). Fibreboard involve ! an alleged refusal to bargain with respect the contracting-out of plant maintenance work previously performed by employers in the bargaining unit. The Court rec nized that the "termination of employment which... necessarily results from the cons tracting out of work performed by members of the established bargaining unit," supra, at 210, is "a problem of vital concern to labor and management . . . ‚” supra, at 211 We further noted, supra, at 211-212:

"

"Industrial experience is not only retlertive of the interests of labor and manage ment in the subject matter but is mission of Automation and Technological i'r gress: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Unemployment and the Impact of Automat a of the House Committee on Education ! Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), on II i 7373. a Bill Relating to the Occupational Train ing. Development, and Use of Manpower sources of the Nation." See statement in latter hearings of then Secretary of Labor, Ar thur Goldberg, at 3: "Many achievements 21 attempting to overcome the difficulties creat by radical technological change can and shot be accomplished through collective barga and joint labor-management efforts. Much been achieved through such efforts in not years. Even greater concentration by labor 1 management on these problems is needed in the period ahead."

"See the Manpower Development and Tre ing Act of 1962, 102(1), 76 Stat. 23, 24, wh directs the Secretary of Labor to evaluate the impact of, and benefits and problems created by automation, technological progress, and changes in the structure of production and de mand on the use of the Nation's human r Sources: establish techniques and methods for detecting in advance the potential impact of such developments: develop solutions to th problems, and publish findings pertaining the to." The Secretary has, pursuant to this dire tion, published numerous bulletins. See, c' Technological Trends in Major American Indus tries, Dept. of Labor Bulletin No. 1474.

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indicative of the amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process. Experience illustrates that contracting out in one form or another has been brought, widely and successfully, within the collective bargaining framework. Provisions relating to contracting out exist in numerous collective bargaining agreements, and (c)ontracting out work is the basis of many grievances; and that type of claim is grist in the mills of the arbitrators.' United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., [40 LC ¶ 66,629] 363 U. S. 574, 584."

See Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, [36 LC 65,161] 358 U. S. 283, 294. It would therefore be incongruous to interpret §8(e) to invalidate clauses over which the parties may be mandated to bargain and which have been successfully incorporated through collective bargaining in many of this Nation's major labor agreements.

Finally, important parts of the historic accommodation by Congress of the powers of labor and management are §§ 7 and 13 of the National Labor Relations Act, passed as part of the Wagner Act in 1935 and amended in 1947. The former section assures to labor "the right... to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection...." Section 13 preserves the right to strike, of which the boycott is a form, except as specifically provided in the Act. In the absence of clear indicia of congressional intent to the contrary, these provisions caution against reading statutory prohibitions as embracing employee activities to pressure their own employers into improving the employees' wages, hours, and working conditions. See Labor Board v. Drivers Union, 362 U. S. 274; Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 672-673 [19 LC 66,346]; Labor Board v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 687 [19 LC ¶ 66,347]; Mastro Plastics Corp., v. Labor Board, supra, at 284, 287 [29 LC 69,779].

The Woodwork Manufacturers Association and amici who support its position advance several reasons, grounded in economic

"As a general proposition, such circumstances might include the remoteness of the threat of displacement by the banned product or services, the history of labor relations between the union and the employers who would be boycotted, and the economic personality of the industry. See Comment, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 1176, 1185 et seq. (1964).

"See Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b) (4) and 8(e), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 1018, 1040 (1965).

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and technological factors, why "will not handle" clauses should be invalid in all circumstances. Those arguments are addressed to the wrong branch of government. It may be "that the time has come for a reevaluation of the basic content of collective bargaining as contemplated by the federal legislation. But that is for Congress. Congress has demonstrated its capacity to adjust the Nation's labor legislation to what, in its legislative judgment, constitutes the statutory pattern appropriate to the developing state of labor relations in the country. Major revisions of the basic statute were enacted in 1947 and 1959. To be sure, then, Congress might be of opinion that greater stress should be put on... eliminating more and more economic weapons from the . . . (Union's) grasp.... But Congress' policy has not yet moved to this point Labor Board v. Insurance Agents International Union, [39 LC ¶ 66,239] 361 U. S. 477, 500.

[Preservation of Work as Objective] III. The determination whether the "will not handle" sentence of Rule 17 and its enforcement violated § 8(e) and § 8(b)(4) (B) cannot be made without an inquiry into whether, under all the surrounding circumstances," the Union's objective was preservation of work for Frouge's employees, or whether the agreements and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. Were the latter the case, Frouge, the boycotting employer, would be a neutral bystander, and the agreement or boycott would, within the intent of Congress, become secondary. There need not be an actual dispute with the boycotted employer, here the door manufacturer, for the activity to fall within this category, so long as the tactical object of the agreement and its maintenance is that employer, or benefits to other than the boycotting employees or other employees of the primary employer thus making the agreement or boycott secondary in its aim." The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-à-vis his own employees. This will not always be a sim

* See Orange Belt District Council of Painters v. Labor Board, [48 LC 1 18.721] 328 F. 2d 534 (C. A. D. C. Cir. 1964): Retail Clerks Union Local 770 v. Labor Board, [43 LC 1 17.049] 296 F. 2d 368 (C. A. D. C. Cir. 1961): Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbldg. Workers, [51 LC 19,626] 344 F. 2d 107 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965); Labor Board v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, [50 LC

19.257] 326 F. 2d 218 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1964): Labor Board v. Joint Council of Teamsters, [50

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