Have any facts then been given in evidence against the respondent which make him liable to be proceeded against by this high process of impeachment? What are the offences? What is the constitutional description of those official acts, for which a public officer may be arraigned before this high court? In the fourth section of the second article of the constitution it is declared that" the President, Vice-President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." Treason or bribery is not alledged against us on this occasion. Our offences then must come under the general description of "high crimes and misdemeanors," or we are not impeachable by the constitution of the United States. I offer it as a position I shall rely upon in my argument, that no judge can be impeached and removed from office for any act or offence for which he could not be indicted. It must be by law an indictable offence.' One of the gentlemen indeed who conduct this prosecution, (Mr. Campbell) contends for the reverse of this proposition, and holds that for such official acts as are the subject of impeachment, no indictment will lie or can be maintained. For, says he, it would involve us in this monstrous oppression and absurdity, that a man might be twice punished for the same offence, once by impeachment and then by indictment. And so most surely he may; and the limitation of the punishment on impeachment takes away the injustice and oppression the gentleman dreads. A slight attention to the subject will shew the fallacy of this gentleman's doctrine. If the absurdity and oppression he fears will really ensue on indicting a man for the same offence for which he has already been impeached, they must be charged to the constitution

itself, which in the 3d sec. of the 1st art. after limi ting the extent of the judgment in cases of impeachment, goes on to declare that "the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictm nt, trial. judgment and punishment according to law." The idea of the honourable manager is, that for acts done in the course of official duty, a judge must be proceeded against exclusively by impeachment; and that no indictment will lie in such case.

The incorrectness of this notion ap pears not only from a reference to the constitution, but to the known law of England also. I will remind you of a case, stated, I believe, in the elementary books of the law, in which it is said that if a judge undertakes of his own authority to change the mode of punishment prescribed by law for any crime, he is indictable; for instance, should he sentence a man to be beheaded, when the law directed him to be hanged, the judge is guilty of murder, and may be accordingly indicted. When, sir, I contend, that in order to sustain an impeachment, an offence must be proved upon the respondent which would support an indictment, I do not mean to be understood as admitting that the converse of the proposition is true; that is, that every act or offence is impeachable which is indictable. Far from it. A man may be indictable for many violations of positive law, which evince no mala mens, no corrupt heart or intention-but which would not be the ground of an impeachment. I will instance the case of an assault, which is an indictable offence, but will not surely be pretended to be an impeachable offence, for which a judge may be removed from office. It is true that the 2d sec. of the 1st art. which gives the House of Representatives the sole power of impeachment, does not in terms limit the exercise of that power. But its obvious meaning is, not in that place, to

describe the kind of acts which are to be subjects of impeachment, but merely to declare in what branch of the government it shall commence. The House of Representatives has the power of impeachment; but for what they are to impeach, in what cases they may exercise this delegated power, depends on other parts of the constitution, and not on their opinion, whim or caprice. The whole system of impeachment must be taken together and not in disjointed parts; and if we find one part of the constitution declaring who shall commence an impeachment, we find other parts of it declaring who shall try it, and what acts and what persons are constitutional subjects of this mode of trial. The power of impeachment is with the House of Representatives-but only for impeachable offences. They are to proceed against the offence in this way when it is committed, but not to create the offence, and make any act criminal and impeachable at their will and pleasure. What is an offence is a question to be decided by the constitution and the law, not by the opinion of a single branch of the legislature; and when the offence thus described by the constitution or the law has been committed, then and not until then, has the House of Representatives power to impeach the of fender. So a grand jury possesses the sole power to indict but in the exercise of this power they are bound by positive law, and do not assume under this general power to make any thing indictable which they might disapprove. If it were so, we should indeed have a strange, unsettled and dangerous penal code. No man could walk in safety, but would be at the mercy of the caprice of every grand jury that might be summoned; and that would be crime to morrow which is innocent to day.

What part of the constitution then declares any of the acts charged and proved upon Judge Chase,

even in the worst aspect, to be impeachable? He has not been guilty of bribery or corruption; he is not charged with them. Has he then been guil. ty of other high crimes and misdemeanors ?" In an instrument so sacred as the constitution, I presume every word must have its full and fair meaning. It is not then only for crimes and misdemeanors that a judge is impeachable, but it must be for high crimes and misdemeanors. Although this qualifying adjective "high" immediately precedes and is directly attached to the word "crimes," yet from the evident intention of the constitution and upon a just grammatical construction, it must be also applied to "misdemeanors." The repetition of this adjective would have injured the harmony of the sentence without adding any thing to its perspicuity. How would this be in common parlance? Suppose it should be said that at this trial there are attending many ladies and gentlemen. Would it be doubted that the adjective many applies to gentlemen as well as ladies, altho' not repeated. Or if there is any thing peculiar in this respect in this word "bigb," I will suppose it were said that among the auditors there are men of high rank and station. Would it not be as well understood as if it were said that men of high rank and high station are here? There is surely no difference. So in the constitution it is said, that "a regular statement of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time." Is not the account to be regular as well as the statement? I should have

deemed it unnecessary to have spent a word on so plain a point, had I not understood that a difficulty would probably be made upon it. If my construction of this part of the constitution be not admitted, and the adjective high" be given exclusively to" crimes" and denied to "misdemean

ors," this strange absurdity must ensue. That when an officer of the government is impeached for a crime, he cannot be convicted unless it proves to be a high crime: but he may nevertheleless be convicted of a misdemeanor of the most petty grade. Observe, sir, the crimes with which these "other high crimes" are classed in the constitution, and we may learn something of their character. They stand in connection with "bribery and corruption" tried in the same manner and subject to the same penalties. But if we are to lose the force and meaning of the word "high" in relation to misdemeanors, and this description of offences must be governed by the mere meaning of the term "misdemeanors," without deriving any grade from the adjective, still my position remains unimpaired, that the offence, whatever it is, which is the ground of impeachment, must be such an one as would support an indictment. "Misdemeanor" is a legal and technical term, well understood and defined in law; and in the construction of a legal instrument we must give to words their legal significations-A misdemeanor or a crime, for in their just and proper acceptation they are synonimous terms, is an act committed or omitted, in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it. By this test, let the conduct of the respondent be tried, and, by it, let him stand justified or condemned.

Does not, sir, the court, provided by the constitution for the trial of an impeachment, give us some idea of the grade of offences intended for its jurisdiction? Look around you, sir, upon this awful tribunal of justice-is it not high and dignified, collecting within itself the justice and majesty of the American people? Was such a court created-does such a court sit to scan and punish paltry errors and indiscretions too insignificant to