here, for I cannot suspect our honourable oppo'. nents of so much illiberality, that at that period the administration of our affairs was in the hands of the political friends of the judge, and therefore he was permitted to escape however atrocious his crimes. Whatever, sir, may have been the character of that administration, even if a weak and wicked one, as it has been represented, it could have no ob ject in protecting any individual at so great a risque to themselves and their reputation. If judge Chase had really violated the law and constitution to come at the blood of Fries, and had done this in the face of the public, the administration would have put too much at hazard by endeavouring to shelter him. I hope, however, no such reason will be given for the neglect of these charges-And as we most cheerfully and truly confide in the justice of the present administration, we trust no such distrust will be avowed of the integrity of the former-we feel as safe under trial now as we should have done then, and look without distrust for the same impartial justice from this honorable court, as we should have expected and received at any time.

We feel however, sir, a serious inconvenience from the delay of this prosecution. In five years facts fall into oblivion, and witnesses engaged in their ordinary occupations of life cannot tax their memories with the circumstances of such distant events. It is difficult to discover indeed who were present at the transaction-To guard against injustice of this kind, even in civil cases, and protect us from fraudulent and slumbering demands, a limitation is put by law upon the claims of every

The criminal code of the United States has justly adopted the same principle-By a statute, no person shall be prosecuted or punished for treason or other capital offence, with some exceptions, unless the indictment be found within three years af

ter the offence is committed; and for smaller offences the prosecution must be instituted within two years. We cannot it is true claim the benefit of the letter of this law, but we may claim something from its principle; in expecting from this honourable court every indulgence and allowance for any deficiency in our proof, which should be attributed not to the real weakness of our case, but to the unreasonable staleness of the charges. Judge Chase was a stranger in Philadelphia, and necessarily found extreme difficulty in discovering what persons were in court at the time to which the charges relate, and in selecting those who had the best recollection of the transaction.

This first article, sir, charges, "That unmind. ful of the solemn duties of his office, and contrary to the sacred obligations by which he stood bound to discharge them faithfully and impartially and without regard to persons, the said Samuel Chase on the trial of John Fries, charged with treason, before the circuit court of the United States, held for the district of Pennsylvania, in the city of Philadelphia, during the months of April and May 1800, whereat the said Samuel Chase presided, did in his judicial capacity, conduct himself in a manner highly arbitrary, oppressive and unjust." This general accusation is followed by three distinct specifications of offence, to wit:

"1. In delivering an opinion, in writing, on the question of law, on the construction of which the defence of the accused materially depended, tending to prejudice the minds of the jury against the case of the said John Fries, the prisoner, before counsel had been heard in his defence:

"2. In restricting the counsel for the said Fries from recurring to such English authorities as they believed apposite, or from citing certain statutes of the United States, which they deemed illustrative

of the positions, upon which they intended to rest the defence of their client :

"3. In debarring the prisoner from his constitutional privilege of addressing the jury (through, his counsel) on the law, as well as on the fact, which was to determine his guilt, or innocence, and at the same time endeavoring to wrest from; the jury their indisputable right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of law, as well the question of fact, involved in the verdict which they were required to give."

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In the whole of these specifications I am able to discover but one truth; the rest is wholly contradicted and disproved by the evidence-It is true, that judge Chase did ferm and reduce to writing, and, in a limited manner, deliver an opinion on a question of law, on the construction of which thedefence of the accused materially depended-but when the article goes on to charge that this opinion tended to prejudice the minds of the jury against the case of John Fries the prisoner, before counsel had been heard in his defence, it is utterly unfound. ed and untrue-To whom was this opinion delivered? To the counsel for Fries and to the attorney for the United States; and to no other person. The third copy, and but three were made, never was delivered to the jury or to any other person, and never could produce any prejudice or injury to John Fries-Nor indeed was it ever intended to come to the knowledge of the jury, until they had completely heard the discussion of the case by counsel, when they were to have taken out with them this opinion of the judge upon the law of the case submitted to them. At that period of the trial when it was not only the right but the duty of the court to state to the jury their opinion of the law arising on the facts, then and not until then was it the intention of the judge to communicate to them this deliber

ate opinion. Could this be done with any intention to injure or oppress the prisoner; if such was the intention of the act, then and not otherwise, it was criminal. In inquiring into the nature of this act, I confine my self now to the forming and delivery of this opinion, and to decide its innocence or criminality, we should consider it in relation to its motives, its time and manner and its consequences. If nothing partial, oppressive or corrupt is to be found in any of these, I know not in what or whence the criminality is to be established. In deciding, sir, upon the motive which prompted the judge to this act, we must look for materials in the testimony: by this we must be governed, and not by the imputations, surmises and constructions of our opponents, however eloquent and ingenious. The judge and his motives are not only strongly denounced in the article, but have also had the same fate from the mouths of the managers. I take the evidence for my guide, and I know it will be the guide of this honourable court.

What then, sir, did judge Chase declare himself to be the reasons which induced him to form this opinion, to reduce it to writing, and to hand it to the counsel? And permit me here, sir, to state, that in all criminal prosecutions for an act equivocal in itself, and whose character of guilt or innocence depends upon the intention with which it was done, the declarations of the party, made at the time, are always received in evidence to ascertain and fix the true character of the act; and the fair and legal explanation of the act is taken and derived from such declarations of the party, if not disproved by other evidence. What then did judge Chase himself say of his intention and motives in relation to this opinion? Mr. Lewis states that on this occasion judge Chase said, that he had

understood that at the former trial there had been a great waste of time on topics which had nothing to do with the business or case, and in reading common law decisions on the doctrine of treason, as well as under the statute of Edw. 3d before the revolution; and also relating to certain acts of Congress for crimes less than treason. That to prevent this in future, he or they had considered the law, made up their minds and reduced it to writing. And in order that the counsel might govern themselves accordingly, had ordered three copies to be made out, &c. &c. Here then the judge, at the time of the act now charged to proceed from a corrupt and partial intention, declares in unequivocal language what were his true motives. His object was to prevent an unnecessary waste of time in a court, where a vast deal of criminal and civil business was then depending and waiting for trial, This was the motive, and the only motive declared and avowed by the judge, at the time he delivered this offensive paper, and unless it be disproved by the evidence or the circumstances of the case, it must be taken to be the true one. It is not a subject of enquiry now whether the reason he assigned for this proceeding be a good or a bad one: it is enough to our purpose that it most certainly is neither partial nor corrupt. As the motive was not partial, so neither was or could be the act oppressive to the prisoner, unless the judge, in executing his design of preventing the waste of time, pursued it to an unreasonable extent. If he obstructed only the introduction of irrelevant matter, and did not exclude any thing that could and ought to have benefited the prisoner, he was guilty of no injustice or impropriety. If the proper and legal rights of the counsel of the prisoner were curtailed to his injury, there was certainly injustice done; but if nothing more than