ment of by and with the advice and consent of the AppointSenate, to appoint ambassadors, other public officers. ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution; but Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. this mode. This mode of appointment unites the ad- Advanvantages of an undivided responsibility in tages of the appointing power, with the control of a select and more numerous body, while it avoids many of the evils of each. As the President has the sole nomination to office, the responsibility rests upon him, and he has every motive for the exercise of integrity and wisdom in the selection, for upon him will fall the public approbation or censure. In addition to this, the knowledge, that his nomination must be submitted to a separate and independent body, who have the right to examine into the fitness of the candidate, and the propriety of his choice, will have a silent but salutary operation, in making him more cautious in presenting a friend, or a partizan, for their approbation. As the authority of the Senate is confined to the mere approval, or rejection of the President's nomination, there is no room for the cabal, intrigue, and party or personal motives, which might exist, if they had the right of selection, and which have usually been found to attend the appointments of a body composed of several individuals. Even if the Senate prefer another person, they cannot of this mode. Advantages promote his appointment by rejecting the President's nomination, since the right of selecting another would still rest with him. Their decision will, therefore, be regulated by their opinion of the fitness or unfitness of the individual presented. Removal It was supposed by the author of the Fefrom office. deralist, that this co-operation of the Senate would have another advantage, in giving stability to the administration of government. "The consent of that body," he said, "would be necessary to displace, as well as appoint. A change of the chief magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent, or so general a revolution in the officers of government, as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices." And he adds, "those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which connects the official existence of public men, with the approbation of that body, which, from the greater permanency of its own composition, will, in all probability, be less subject to inconstancy, than any other member of the government." This, however, is not the construction put upon this part of the Constitution. An act of the first Congress, establishing the Department of State, recognised the right of the President to remove from office, without the concurrence of the Senate, and this construction has been adopted in practice ever since. Vacancies. As vacancies may occur, by death, or resignation, in offices, which the public good requires to be immediately filled, the Presi dent has power to fill up all vacancies that Vacancies. may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next session. formation. It is the duty of the President to give to Duty to Congress, from time to time, information of give inthe state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration, such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. This he does by means of messages, sent to Congress, or to either House, as the case may require. During the administration of the first two Presidents, the President, in person, met Congress at the commencement of each session, and delivered to them his addresses on the state of the Union. But that practice has been discontinued, and all the messages of the President, to Congress, or to either House, are now sent by his private Secretary. These messages are the regular sources of information, upon which Congress are to act, in legislating upon either domestic or foreign affairs. The President may, on extraordinary oc- To convene casions, convene both Houses of Congress, Congress. or either of them. The separate attendance of the Senate may be necessary, to ratify a treaty, which may require immediate attention; but the House of Representatives cannot perform any public act, without the concurrence of the Senate. In case of disagreement between the two Houses, with To adjourn respect to the time of adjournment, the Pre- them. sident may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. It is the duty of the President to take care To grant commissions. Impeach ment. that the laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all the officers of the United States. In addition to the restraints imposed by a sense of duty, and the fear of public censure, the Constitution provides, that the President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Impeachment is a mode of trial taken from the British constitution, where it is adopted, in cases in which it is supposed "the ordinary magistrate either dares not, or cannot punish.' The people, by their representatives, the House of Commons, impeach, or accuse, public officers, before the House of Peers, who are thought to stand sufficiently impartial, between the people, and the accused, to be a proper tribunal for this purpose; and to be so independent as to give their decision, uninfluenced by popular excitement, or the power of the accusers. The same reasoning does not apply in this country; but still, impeachments may be useful here. The crimes which may be committed by public officers, prompted by avarice, ambition, or foreign influence, are so numerous, and so complicated, that it is well to provide a mode in which they may be tried without the strictness and precision of form, required in ordinary legal proceedings. Judgment, in cases of impeachment, is limited by a former section of the Consti * 4 Bl. Comm. 260. ment. tution "to removal from office, and disquali- Impeachfication to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit, under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable, and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law." The President's power to pardon, as already noticed, does not extend to cases of impeachment, because the accusation is made in a peculiarly solemn manner, by the representatives of the people, and is generally against officers appointed by, or deriving their authority from him. The Constitution subjects to impeachment who may "all civil officers," which has been held to be impeached. mean all executive and judicial officers; but the Senate has decided that it does not include Senators,* nor (it is presumed) Representatives. But little practical inconvenience can probably arise from this exemption, since either House may expel a member for any crime or misdemeanor which would justify an impeachment; though he may again be intrusted with office, if the people still think him worthy of confidence. CHAPTER X. THE JUDICIARY. THE third article of the Constitution relates Supreme to the Judiciary; and declares, that the ju- Court. dicial power of the United States shall be * Serg. Const. Law, 376. |