Voting for signate, in their ballots, which of the candiPresident dates they intended for President, and which President. for Vice President. The object contemplat

and Vice

ed by the original plan, was to secure the two most distinguished citizens, for the two highest offices of the government; but the amendment appears to be judicious, inasmuch as it removes all doubt, as to the intention of the electors, and prevents difficulties which might otherwise occur.

CONCLUSION.

IN regarding the Constitution, a brief exposition of which has been attempted in the preceding pages, the first observation which occurs, is, that it is the deliberate expression of the will of the whole people of the United States, as to the mode of their government; and, therefore, that all powers granted by it, and exercised under it, have the authority and support of the will of the people. This extends to every act that is constitutionally done by the government, or any department of it; which is to be considered as the act of the people, since it is done, under the authority given by them.

In ascertaining the limits of this authority, and the particulars to which it is to extend, the terms of the Constitution are to be liberally and fairly interpreted, and such a construction put upon them, as would be given by any candid and unprejudiced mind; not confined to their strict literal meaning, nor yet enlarged beyond their true import. It is a necessary consequence of the imperfection of language, that scarcely any instrument, of any length, can be framed, which will not admit of some variety of construction; and this is particularly the case with the Constitution, which necessarily deals in general expressions, and grants general powers, that include, and absolutely require, the exercise of others, not specified. In short, we must always recollect, when constru

ing it, that we are examining a Constitution.*

*

The convention of 1787 presented this plan to the people of the United States, as "the result of a spirit of amity and mutual concession;" and, as such, it was accepted and ratified by them. It is acknowledged to be an experiment, but it is an experiment made under the most favourable circumstances. Prepared by men, distinguished for their talents, integrity, and patriotism, collected from every part of the country, and well acquainted with the wants and wishes of the people; digested in a calm discussion of several months, in secret session, and, therefore, without the influence of popular excitement; afterwards submitted to the deliberate examination of the whole community, and scrutinized with all the jealousy of party feeling, and individual opposition; and finally adopted by the people, acting in thirteen separate and distinct conventions; it is probably as perfect, and as little liable to objection, as any human production can be. If it fail, there is little prospect of success for any other. It contains within itself a provision for amendment, by which to remedy any defects in its original structure, or such as may occur in process of time. But this power should be used with great caution; and always with the conviction, that stability is an important requisite of good government; and that frequent changes are destructive of its utility. Lord Bacon says, "it is good not to try experiments in States, except the necessity be urgent, or the utility

* 4 Wheat. 407.

evident; and well to beware that it be the reformation that draweth the change, and not the desire of change that pretendeth the reformation."

Another important observation is, that the Constitution is not a compact of the States, but a frame of government, made by the people of the United States. The States, as such, are no parties to it; they were expressly, and intentionally excluded. Their continued existence is, indeed, contemplated; and their action is, in some cases, essential to the proper and complete operation of the general government. But in such cases, the people have made it their duty to act, and have not given them any control over the federal government. Nor are the States in any danger from this construction. The general government is not calculated for, nor can it desire, the destruction of the State governments; and if it did, the mutual jealousy of the people of the different States, and their attachment to their local institutions, would be amply sufficient to preserve them from consolidation. Those who speak of the general government, as a foreign power, aiming at the destruction of the several States, and actuated principally by motives of ambition, seem to forget that it was formed by the people, for their own benefit; and is administered by men of their own choice, taken from among themselves, possessing the same local attachments, and equally interested to promote the general welfare.

The great defect of the former confederation, was its want of energy, arising from the fact, that it legislated for sovereign States,

who might obey its laws if they thought proper; but there was no means of enforcing obedience, except by a resort to arms. And such must ever be the case, unless the laws operate directly upon individuals, who may be coerced by the ordinary civil magistrate... To effect this, it was necessary for the States to be so closely united as to form, in some respects, but one nation. Accordingly, "to form a more perfect union," is the first declared object of the present Constitution; and for this purpose, a portion of their sovereignty was taken from the States by the people, and given to the general government. So far, they are consolidated; but in all other respects they retain their original powers. Any attempt of the States to exercise powers taken from them, and vested in the Union, is a violation of the principles of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution for the dissolution of the Union, or the withdrawal of any one of the States from the confederacy. Such an event was, evidently, not contemplated, and cannot take place constitutionally. If it be asked whether the States are bound to continue united, without any right to resist the authority of the Union, or secede from it, in case of oppression? the reply must be, that they are; unless the oppression be of such a character as will justify open and forcible opposition; or, in other words, a revolution. The right of the people, to overturn an oppressive government, or refuse submission to it, lies at the foundation of our political existence; and can never be taken away by any form of government. But any thing short of this,