the field; Lieutenant Hector McDonald and Ensign Malcolm Fraser died of their wounds, all very much regretted by every one who knew them. We had twenty-three more Officers wounded, of this number was Colonel Fraser, who commanded the left wing of the army, and it was with great pleasure we observed his behaviour during the action, when he gave his orders with great coolness and deliberation. He was touched at two different times; the first took him in the right breast but having his cartouche box slung, it luckily struck against the star of it and did not penetrate tho', otherways, must infallibly have done his business. The second, he got in the retreat, but striking against the cue of his hair, he received no other damage than a stiffness in his neck for some days. Here I cannot help observing that if any unlucky accident had befallen our Colonel, not only his Regiment must have suffered an irreparable loss, but I think I can, without any partiality say, it would be a loss to his Country. His behaviour this winter in particular to his Regiment has been such, as to make him not only esteemed by them, but by the Garrison in general. Captain Alexander Fraser of our Regiment, was wounded in the right temple, and thought very dangerous, the rest are mostly flesh wounds. I received a musket ball in the right groin, which was thought dangerous for three or four days, as the ball was supposed to be lodged, but whether it has wrought out in walking into Town, or did not penetrate far enough at first to lodge, or is still in, I cannot say, but in twenty days I was entirely cured, and the wound which was at first but small was entirely closed up.

When we marched out, we thought the General did not intend to give the French battle; and as he ordered the Army to carry out intrenching tools, we ought he meant to throw up works on the rising ground, before the Town, if the Enemy should not choose to attack him that day; but, it seems he changed. his mind on seeing their situation, which gave him

all the advantage he could desire with such an inferior Army and where, if the Enemy ventured to attack him he could use his Artillery, on which was his chief dependence, to the best purpose: having a rising ground, whereon he might form his Army and Plant his Cannon, so as to play on the Enemy as they advanced for about four hundred or five hundred yards, with round shot, and when they came within a proper distance the grape shot must have cut them to pieces. However, it seems he observed the enemy, some formed at the edge of the wood, some forming, and the rest marching from St. Foy. The bait was too tempting, and his passion for glory getting the better of his reason he ordered the Army to march and attack the enemy, as he thought, before they could form, in a situation the most desired by them and ought to be avoided by us, as the Canadians and Savages could be used against us to the greatest advantage in their beloved (if I may say element) woods. It would give me great pleasure to relate something more to the advantage, of this gentleman who is, in many respects, possessed of several virtues, and particularly all the military ones, except prudence and entirely free of all mercenary principles; but, as his conduct on this occasion is universally condemned by all those who are not immediately dependent on him, truth obliges me to state matters as I believe, they really stood more especially as it is not said he advised with any of those who had a right to be consulted before such a step should be taken. Nay, it is said: that the preceding night, at a meeting with the different Commandants of the Corps, he declared his intention of fortifying himself on the heights and not to attack the Enemy, unless he should be forced to it, which we were persuaded of by his orders to carry out intrenching tools. We had very little chance of beating an Army* of four times our number; in a situation where we

*The other accounts make the French army any thing but "four times" the number of the English army. It appears certain

could scarce act; and if the Enemy had made a proper use of their advantage, the consequence must have proved tatal to us, as they might have got betwixt us and the Town, cut off our retreat, and by that means ruined us to all intents.

Our situation became now extremely critical: we were beat in the field, by an army greatly superior in numbers, and obliged to rely on what defence we could make within the walls of Quebec, which were hitherto reckoned of very little consequence against a superior army.

The French that very night after the Battle, opened trenches, within six hundred yards of the walls, and went on next, 29th April, with their works pretty briskly. For the first two days after the battle there was very little done by us; and on the 1st. of May, the largest of our block houses (small square redoubts of Logs, musquet proof) was blown up by accident, and Captain Cameron of our Regiment and a subaltern of the 48th with several men, dangerously burnt and bruised. On the 3rd. day after the battle, the General set about to strengthen or (I may say) fortify the Town, and the men worked with the greatest alacrity. In a few days there were about one hundred additional guns mounted, with which our people kept an incessant fire on the enemy, and retarded their works very much.

On the 9th May, the Leostaff Frigate, Captain Dean, On the 9th May, the Leostaff Frigate, Captain Dean, arrived from England, and brought us-news. from thence, and informed us that there was squadron in the River, which might be expected every tide to our assistance. This added greatly to the spirits of the Garrison, and our works were.

a

however that Levi had the advantage of number, and Murray the advantage of position and of a splendid park of artillery, some twenty odd field pieces on a rising ground, whilst Levi had but two guns and his troops were fatigued by their laborious trudge through the Bijou marsh and Suede road, at a time of the year (the 28 April) when the winter snow and rain had made the roads nearly impassable.

carried on briskly. The General seemed resolved from the first to defend the place to the last. This, nobody doubted, and every one seemed to forget their late misfortune, and to place entire confidence in the General's conduct, which all must acknowledge very resolute, when reduced almost to an extremity.

On the 11th May, the French opened two Batteries mounting thirteen guns, and one of two mortars. Their heavy metal consisted of one twenty-four and two eighteen pounders, the rest were all light. They did not seem to confine their fire entirely to any particular part of the Walis, otherwise I believe they might in time have made a breach, and their fire was not very smart. We were masters of a much superior fire, and annoyed the besiegers at their batteries very much. Their fire became every day more and more faint, and it was generally believed they intended to raise the siege.

On the 16th May, in the evening, the Vanguard, commodore Swanton, and Diana Frigate, Captain Schomberg, arrived from England, and next morning 17th May, 1760, they and the Leostaff attacked the two French Frigates that lay at anchor in the Bay, above Cape Diamond; which when they first observed, they made as if they intended to engage, but on our ships approaching nearer, they set sail up the river; but one of them ran ashore immediately, and our Frigates soon got up with theirs, and obliged, them also to run aground and thereafter destroyed them. One ship however escaped out of their reach, and unluckily the Leostaff, after all was over, ran on a rock, sunk and was entirely lost.

That very night several deserters came into Town, and informed that most part of the French army had marched the Trenches being guarded by their Grenadiers only. About twelve o'clock. at night, the General sent out a party who found the Trenches entirely abandoned and next morning,

18th May, 1760, we found ourselves entirely freed of very disagreeable neighbours, having left behind all their artillery, with a great part of their ammunition, Camp equipage and baggage. What made them retreat with such precipitation we could not guess; but, it seems they were seized with a panic. It appears they allowed the savages to scalp all the killed and most part of the wounded, as we found a great many scalps on the bushes.

I have been since informed by Lieutenant McGregor, of our Regiment, who was left on the field wounded, and narrowly escaped being killed, having received two stabs of a bayonet from two French Regulars, that he saw the savages murdering the wounded and scalping them on all sides, and expected every moment to share the same fate, but was saved by a French Officer, who luckily spoke a little English.