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but New York, New Jersey, and Delaware in the nega tive, and Maryland was divided.

At the same time, on the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch, or Senate, there were but the five States of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, in favor of it; the other six States voted in the negative; and on the question of the ratio in the Senate, it was decided by six StatesMassachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia-to five, that the ratio of representation should be the same in the second as in the first branch of the Legislature.

1

It deserves to be remarked, that South Carolina and Georgia, though then among the less populous States, yet, regarding the future numbers which their territory was likely to give them, voted with the larger States; while New York, already somewhat exceeding the average in population, and destined, in less than thirty years, to be the most populous State in the Union, voted with the smaller States.

This equitable ratio was then decided to be according to the number of free citizens and three-fifths of the slaves — nine of the States being in favor of it, with only New Jersey and Delaware in the negative.

Such had been the decision in the Committee of the Whole; but the subject was resumed in the House on the twenty-seventh of June, when Mr. Luther Martin, of Maryland, in an elaborate speech, insisted on the neces sity of an equality of votes, which he maintained the States could not give up without giving up their liberty: that, if too little power was given to the new government, it might be added to, but if too much, it could never be resumed that the failure of the States to comply with 1 Madison's Debates, page 643.

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the requisitions of Congress had proceeded from inability, caused by the indebtedness of the people, and the waste of property during the war, which were but temporary evils: that the remedy for the inequality of the States might be found in a division of the largest: that, in the event of a dissolution of the Union, the smaller States could protect themselves: and that he had rather see partial confederacies resorted to than the plan on the table adopted.

The fallacy of the reasoning by the friends of an equality of votes was ably pointed out by Mr. Madison. He showed that while the power they claimed was most unreasonable and unjust, their fears of injustice from the larger States were visionary, since, being as diverse in interests and pursuits as in situation, they could have no motive to combine. He was supported by Wilson, of Pennsylvania, Dr. Franklin, and Hamilton, who pointed out the dangerous consequences of a dissolution of the Union, and among others, alliances between the individual States and the rival and hostile nations of Europe, who would make us parties in their quarrels.

On taking the question, that the suffrage should not be the same in the first branch of the Legislature as that established by the articles of Confederation, six States voted aye-Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, no-and Maryland divided; when the subject was postponed.

It was then proposed by Mr. Ellsworth, of Connecticut, that each State should have an equal vote in the Senate. He trusted that this middle ground would be adopted by way of compromise, and that Massachusetts was the only New England State which would consent to an exclusion of the States from an equal vote in both branches. He said that the large States, notwithstanding the equality

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of suffrage, have an influence which would maintain their superiority; and that this qualified equality was essential to the self-defence of the small States, who could, with more difficulty, combine, from their greater number. Mr. Gorham endeavored to show that the fears of the small States were unfounded, as had been proved by the union of the three districts into which Massachusetts had been divided; by the case of Connecticut and New Haven; and by that of East and West Jersey: that the weak States more needed the protection of law and government than the strong States.

Mr. Madison entreated the members from the small States to renounce a principle confessedly unjust, which could never be admitted, and which, if admitted, must infuse mortality into a constitution intended to be permanent. His fear was, in case of a separation, that the large States, now supposed to be wanting in energy, would have too much of it; so as not only to be formidable to the small States, but to the liberty of all. Military force would soon be introduced by State jealousy, and the example would be followed, till the practice became universal. What had been first intended merely as the means of national defence, had always proved the instru ments of tyranny.

Mr. Hamilton maintained that the present contest was not one of liberty—it was one of power. it was one of power. There was no ground of combination among the largest States. Their interests were distinguished into those of carrying and non-carrying States, and this divides the largest States.

Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, said the votes against a just representation were as twenty-two to ninety of the American people; and the question presented was, whether less than one-fourth should withdraw from the Union, or more than three-fourths renounce their inherent, indis

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putable right in favor of an artificial political system. And he asked, for whom they were forming a government; was it for men, or the imaginary beings called States? Unless the rule of suffrage was the same in both branches of the Legislature, the government would be neither solid nor lasting. He showed that the apprehended danger of monarchy and aristocracy were illusory, since they gave power to the few over the many, while the large States wished to give it to a majority: that there were two species of bad government—those which had too much power, and those which had too little; and that it was the latter defect of weakness under which the people of the United States were then suffering. If equality in the Senate was permitted, we should still be fettered, as heretofore, and twenty-four votes would control sixty-six.

Mr. Ellsworth maintained that the power proposed to be given to the small States, in only one branch, was merely conservative of those States, and could not oppress the larger. He insisted that no salutary measure had ever been defeated for want of a majority of the States to favor it. The proportional vote in the first branch affords security to the large States. An equality of votes in the second branch can alone afford security to the small States. He urged that in all confederacies the votes of the members were equal.

Mr. Madison denied that this equality was universal; and he instanced the German system, and the Lycian Confederacy. He showed how, with the power claimed by the small States, they might injure the majority, by obstructing their wishes, and forcing on them measures repugnant to their interests. He urged that the division of interests did not lie between the large and the small States, but between the Northern and Southern.

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Mr. Davis, of North Carolina, regarded a proportional representation as increasing the numbers in the Senate too much; and to make the States equal, would be bringing us back to the Congress as now constituted. He could vote for no plan yet proposed.

Mr. Wilson proposed, by way of obviating the objection of making the Senate too numerous, to give each State a member for every one hundred thousand of its population, but allowing the States not having that number one member.

Dr. Franklin suggested that, in all cases which affected the sovereignty of the States, their votes should be equal; as also in the appointment of civil officers of the general government; but that, in fixing the salaries of such officers; in all appropriations and dispositions of money; and in laws for supplying the revenue, the States should have votes in proportion to their contributions.

Mr. King, of Massachusetts, was in favor of proportional suffrage in the Senate. He saw, with astonishment, that, when all were convinced that every man was secured in his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of State sovereignty. He would support such an expedient as Mr. Wilson had suggested, but would never consent to an equality of votes.

A

Mr. Drayton, from New Jersey, and Mr. Martin, said there could be no Confederacy which did not secure to the small States equality in the Senate.

Mr. Bedford, of Delaware, maintained that there was no middle course between a perfect consolidation of the States and a mere Confederacy. He said that all the States which were now large, or expected to be so, were seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small States; and whether a combination, or, as some supposed,