Stapleton v. King. ment, as all such considerations are to be considered as merged in the writing. Sustaining this view see, also, Phillips on Evidence, Cowen, Hills and Edwards' notes, p. 391, No. 131. In Miles v. Culver, 8 Barb. 207, an instrument in the following form: "Received in store, on account of Ira D. Richmond, from Justice NILES, two hundred and fortyfive barrels of apples, to forward to New York, at fortyfour cents per barrel, and advanced ten dollars and cartage," was held to constitute a contract, and to contain all the stipulations of the parties, and that parol evidence was not admissible to add thereto. In Goodyear v. Ogden & Pearl, 4 Hill, 104, an instrument in form as follows: "Genoa, Sept. 22, 1841. Received of Ives Goodyear, 4018 bushels wheat in store," was held to constitute a contract of bailment, and that parol evidence was not admissible to prove a sale. Sustaining the same view, see Wakefield v. Steadman, 12 Pick. 562; Bursley v. Hamil ton, 15 id. 40. These cases show how cautious courts have been in extending the exception to the rule inhibiting parol evidence for the explanation or contradiction of a written instrument. The writings construed in many of those cases partake less of the nature of a contract than does the instrument in question in this case. The writing involved in this case acknowledges the receipt of a less quantity of wool than that due, and stipulates that an abatement of the remainder has been made. Certainly this stipulation as to abatement constitutes a contract, binding upon the party making it. But the instrument goes further, and specifies the consideration of this abatement; it "is to settle all difficulty of alleged disease in said sheep." It is not claimed that the wool was not received, or that the quantity received differed from the amount stated; evidence to establish these facts would be admissible. It is conceded that the quantity of wool Stapleton v. King. specified in the receipt was delivered, and that it was received in lieu of a greater amount then due. Defendants admit the stipulation upon the part of plaintiffs, and seek to prove by parol that they did not enter into the agreement which constitutes the consideration of the stipulation of plaintiffs. To allow this to be done would be a direct violation of the principles of the authorities cited, and an infraction of a well-established and salutary rule of law. We conclude, therefore, that the court did not err in instructing the jury that they could not consider any verbal statements or stipulations made before or at the time of the delivery of the paper in question. 2. PARTNER SHIP: joint contract. II. As to the authority of Pearson A. King, to bind his co-defendant, Porter, by his acceptance of the writing in question. Of this we entertain no doubt. The contract for the keeping of the sheep was made with them jointly. Afterward they divided the sheep, each one taking one-half under his immediate charge. But they could not then, by their own acts, without the concurrence of plaintiffs, make that two distinct agreements, which they contracted with plaintiffs should be but one. If the defendants then had brought an action against the plaintiffs for a breach of their contract, it would have been necessary for them to join in the action. And where several plaintiffs must join in bringing a personal action, a release by one joint plaintiff is a bar to the action. Austin v. Hall, 13 Johns. 286; Decker v. Livingston, 15 id. 478; Myrick v. Dame, 9 Cush. 248. Besides, Porter is accepting the benefits of this agreement, so far as it exonerates him in part from his agreement to deliver two pounds of wool per head of sheep. Upon what principle can he accept its benefits, and be discharged from its burdens. The case mainly relied upon by appellant, in opposition to the right of King to bind Porter is, Banchor v. Cilley, Ex'r, 38 Me. 553. Cilley and Carey were keeping a hotel. Gower v. Doheney. Cilley, in the presence of Carey, made a purchase of liquors on their joint account on credit. Cilley having deceased, an action was brought against his executor for the price of the liquors. The defendant contended that Cilley and Carey were partners and that the action should have been brought against the survivor. It was held that they were not necessarily partners as between themselves, and that as plaintiff did not seek to charge them as partners, it was not necessary to decide whether they might be regarded as partners as to third persons. To this it may be replied, first: That a partnership is not necessary, in order to enable one party to release a right of action, which shall be binding upon another. That a mere joint contract is sufficient for that purpose. Second. That the case does not decide that the parties were not partners as to third persons. The instruction that the contract is joint, and that King had authority to make the subsequent contract, and accept what is called the receipt, and by that act bind Porter, is, in our opinion, proper. Affirmed. GOWER V. DOHENEY et al. Where Conveyance: JUDICIAL SALE: PURCHASER WITHOUT NOTICE. the judgment creditor becomes the purchaser of real estate, sold at execution sale, he will be protected from an unrecorded deed or outstanding equities of which he had no notice at the time of his purchase. He stands on the same footing, in this respect, as any other bona fide purchaser. Appeal from Warren District Court. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16. ACTION of right for the possession of the N. W. 1 of the N. E., and N. E. of N. W. of section 31, tp. 77, Gower v. Doheney. range 25 west. Upon the answer of the defendant, the cause was transferred to the chancery docket, and tried by the first method of trying equitable causes. The plaintiff's petition was dismissed, and he appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion. Bryan & Seevers for the appellant. Todhunter & Williamson for the appellees. DAY, Ch. J.-The plaintiff's chain of title to the lands in controversy is as follows, to wit: George S. Hampton entered the same on the 18th day of February, 1854. At the March term, 1858, of the district court of Johnson county, James H. Gower, Bros. & Co. obtained judgment against said Hampton, for $411.20. February 4, 1860, execution issued on said judgment, directed to the sheriff of Warren county, and on the 18th day of February, 1860, a transcript of the judgment was filed in the office of the clerk of said county. On the 10th day of March, 1860, said execution was levied on the lands in question, and on the 1st of May following, they were sold in pursuance of said levy, to James H. Gower, Bros. & Co., for $125.00. On the 18th day of June, 1860, Gower Bros. & Co. assigned the certificate of purchase to James Otis Gower, who obtained a sheriff's deed for the same on the 22d day of July, 1864, and caused the same to be duly filed for record on the day following. James Otis Gower, on the 31st day of December, 1864, made his last will, devising said lands to plaintiff, and on the 12th day of September, 1865, died in Johnson county. The will was duly probated, and on the 24th day of April, 1869, was filed for record in the office of the recorder of Warren county. It was proved that James Otis Gower, in May, June and July, 1861, was engaged in recruiting a company for the 1st Iowa Cavalry; that he went into the United States service Gower v. Doheney in July, and remained till August, 1863, when he was discharged for disability, and that he was not able afterward to attend to business, which was the cause of the delay in obtaining the deed, and that neither plaintiff nor James H. Gower, Bros. & Co. had any knowledge of the claim of defendant, White, to said land, till long after the sheriff's sale, and but a short time before the commencement of this suit. The defendant, Martin Doheney, also claims title to the lands in controversy, through George S. Hampton, as follows, to wit: The said Hampton, as the agent of Miles White, and with money by him furnished, entered said lands in his own name in order that upon sale thereof he might convey the same without the delay of sending to White for a deed. On the 28th day of November, 1858, Hampton, having failed to make sale of the lands, executed and delivered to Miles White a deed for the same, which was filed for record on the 10th day of January, 1861. On the 31st day of August, 1868, White conveyed said lands to Doheney, by deed, which was duly filed for record September 8, 1868. We have thus a case wherein the judgment debtor, holding the legal title of the lands in controversy under an implied trust, after judgment was obtained against him, but before a transcript of the judgment was filed in the county in which the lands were situated, conveyed the same to the cestui que trust, who failed to file the deed for record until eight months after the sheriff's sale. We are thus brought to consider in what manner the judgment creditor, purchasing at a sheriff's sale, and those holding under him, are affected by equities of third persons or their claims under unrecorded deeds. It is well settled that a third person, who purchases at a sheriff's sale, without notice of outstanding equities, is entitled to the same protection as any other purchaser without notice and for value. The rule, however, as to the judgment creditor |