THOMPSON, District Judge. This suit was brought by petition under the Tucker Act (24 Stat. 505) to recover $1,143.18, the agreed price of 346 tons of coal alleged to have been delivered to the United States, together with $641.48 for rail transportation and war tax, and the sum of $48.44 for water transportation of the coal, under a contract entered into between the petitioner and the Paymaster General of the Navy on behalf of the United States. The contract consisted of an accepted order for the sale and delivery of a total of 30,000 gross tons of best bituminous coal at the price so far as this claim is concerned of $3.304 per ton f. o. b. mines, "for delivery at Philadelphia, Pa.-Ships." The evidence at the trial showed that 692 tons of coal were shipped under the contract to Greenwich Piers, Philadelphia, where it was inspected by the proper officer of the Navy and accepted as to quality and quantity; that on May 1, 1919, it was loaded upon the two-box hinged barge Clinton belonging to Goucher & Co. and employed by the petitioner, with the approval of the naval officer in charge, and towed by a tug of Goucher & Co. to Pier 27, North Wharves. It was then towed to Pier 24, North Wharves, and, there being no room alongside the steamship Mercury then lying there, to which the coal was destined, the tug brought the barge back to Pier 27. A government tug then took the barge alongside the Mercury, and stevedores employed by the Navy unloaded the forward box by means of a steam digger into the ship. Goucher's tug then took away the forward box, and the government tug put the stern box alongside the steamship. After the forward box had been taken away and the stern box put in alongside of the ship, the work of unloading ended for the night. During the night the stern box capsized, dumping the coal into the river. The controversy in the case is upon the question whether there had been a delivery of the coal in the stern box, under the terms of the contract prior to its capsizing. The jury was directed to find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $1,833.10, subject to the point of law reserved whether, under the evidence, the plaintiff could recover. The determination of the question turns upon the meaning of the language in the contract, "For delivery at Philadelphia, Pa.-Ships." There was no dispute between the petitioner and the respondent that the language is to be considered as though it read "For delivery at ships, Philadelphia, Pa." Paragraph 10 of the contract provides: "The supplier will be allowed reimbursement for expenses actually incurred in connection with transportation, lighterage, hauling, skidding, leveling, switching, carrying, wheeling, trimming, bunkering, storing, etc." There is no dispute that, under the contract, the petitioner was to be responsible for rail transportation and lighterage and to be reimbursed for the expenses incurred in connection therewith. It is contended on behalf of the government, however, that the words "at ships" are to be construed in the same manner as though read "in ships," and attention is directed to certain provisions of paragraph 8 of the conditions in the contract concerning deliveries. [1] The introductory part of condition 8 reads as follows: "Deliveries. 8. When not otherwise specifically stated in the specifications under each class of this order, supplies and materials required delivered 'At the Navy Yard - shall be delivered in accordance with the following." (290 F.) It appears, therefore, that the conditions for deliveries under this head apply only to deliveries required at the Navy Yard and are not applicable to delivery "at ships" as required by the contract. [2] While the word "at" has been construed as equivalent to "in," when used in connection with a place, such as the District of Columbia (Chesapeake Canal v. Key, 3 Cranch, 599, Fed. Cas. No. 2649), it has also been construed as expressing the idea of nearness of place and as being less definite than if "in" or "on" were used (Kibbe v. Benson, 84 U. S. [17 Wall.] 624, 21 L. Ed. 741), and it is commonly used as the equivalent of "near" or "about" (4 Cyc. 366). In connection with vessels, the use of the words "at ships" is unusual. The common shipping or maritime term expressing the petitioner's idea would be "at ship's side," and that expressing the respondent's idea would be "on board." I think the language in the connection in which it is used means "at ship's side," and must be so construed in the light of the conduct of the parties; for, after the barge was taken to the vicinity of the ship, she was taken possession of and placed by the government tug. From that time on the petitioner had no further control of the barge or her cargo. The unloading of the barge and the loading of the coal on board the ship was done by stevedores employed by the government officers and at its expense. The rail transportation and the water transportation, consisting of lighterage, was to be performed by the petitioner; but, when the lighter was turned over to the government tug, its part of the contract was performed, and there was, therefore, a delivery under the contract "at" the ship, and the petitioner's responsibility ended. Clearly, therefore, the loss of the coal by the capsizing of the stern box occurred after delivery, and after the petitioner's performance of its contract was completed. Judgment will be entered on the verdict for $1,833.10, with interest from May 16, 1922, and with costs, to be taxed by the clerk. END OF CASES IN VOL. 290 THIS IS A KEY-NUMBER INDEX It Supplements the Decennial Digests, the Key-Number Series and ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. See Compromise and Settlement. IV. PLEADING, PETITIONS, AND MO- 17 (U.S.D.C.N.Y.) When there had been that it was impractical to proceed against mas- 17 (U.S.D.C.N.Y.) Transaction held an un- ACTION. variance.-Massari v. Forest Lumber Co., 470. 70 (U.S.D.C.N.Y.) No person has authori- VIII. DECREE AND ENFORCEMENT THEREOF. 99 (U.S.C.C.A.N.J.) Resale proper, where IX. APPEAL. 118 (U.S.C.C.A.Cal.) Finding on competent X. COSTS. 122 (U.S.C.C.A.N.J.) Bidder, unsuccess- 20 (U.S.C.C.A.Fla.) Liability for maritime AGENCY, 20 (U.S.D.C.Cal.) Has jurisdiction of suit III. PARTIES, PROCESS, CLAIMS, AND 50 (U.S.D.C.Cal.) Petition to bring in third Word "wholly," in admiralty rule 56, equiva- 290 F.-65 ALIENS. II. EXCLUSION OR EXPULSION. Hearing granted by court on issue of citizen- (1025) 32(1) (U.S.C.C.A.N.Y.) Chinese entitled to judicial hearing on right to enter.-U. S. v. Tod, 689. Certificate of naturalization granted in county other than that in which applicant resided was subject to cancellation.-Id. ANTI-TRUST LAWS. 32 (6) (U.S.C.C.A.N.Y.) Administrative proceeding can be introduced in judicial hearing on issue of citizenship.-U. S. v. Tod, 78. 32(6) (U.S.C.C.A.N.Y.) Board can consid- See Monopolies, 29. er appearance of applicant in determining age. -U. S. v. Tod, 689. 32 (6) (U.S.D.C.Mass.) Immigration tribunals not bound by strict rules of evidence.-Moy Yoke Shue v. Johnson, 621. Admission of incompetent evidence by immigration tribunal held not to establish unfairness of hearing.-Id.. APPEAL AND ERROR. See Criminal Law, 1031-1167. For review of rulings in particular actions or proceedings, see also the various specific topics. 1. NATURE AND FORM OF REMEDY. 32(7) (U.S.C.C.A.N.Y.) Unsupported testi-14(1⁄2) (U.S.C.C.A.Conn.) Method of remony of applicant held not to show order of view immaterial, where no question of fact is exclusion was erroneous.-U. S. v. Tod, 689. involved.-McCall Co. v. Bladworth, 365. 32(8) (U.S.C.C.A.N.Y.) Evidence held not conclusive applicant was adopted son of resident.-U. S. v. Tod, 689. 32 (13) (U.S.C.C.A.N.Y.) Courts cannot interfere with order of exclusion, unless fair hearing is denied.-U. S. v. Tod, 689. Findings of fact within jurisdiction of board of inquiry are conclusive.-Id. III. IMMIGRATION. 39 (U.S.C.C.A.Hawaii) Congress can impose any condition on right to import aliens. The Nanking, 769. 40 (U.S.C.C.A.Hawaii) Act, even if putting imperative duty on vessel to prevent unlawful landing of immigrants, not unconstitutional.The Nanking, 769. 512 [New. vol. 16A Key-No. Series] (U.S.C.C.A.N.Y.) Alien, returning from temporary visit abroad, can bring with him his wife, notwithstanding admission of quota.-U. S. v. Tod, 198. 57 (U.S.C.C.A.Hawaii) Amended Immigration Act was intended to make duty of preventing landing of immigrants imperative. The Nanking, 769. III. DECISIONS REVIEWABLE. (D) Finality of Determination. 71 (4), (U.S.C.C.A.Wis.) Orders granting and refusing to dissolve preliminary injunction held appealable.-Harvey v. Harvey, 653. V. PRESENTATION AND RESERVATION IN LOWER COURT OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW. (A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court. 171 (3) (U.S.C.C.A.III.) Theory of case below controls on appeal.-Meyer v. W. R. Grace & Co., 785. (B) Objections and Motions, and Rulings Thereon. 187(3) (U.S.C.C.A.Ohio) Decree will not be reversed for absence of party, not indispensable, whose joinder was not asked.-Scott v. Saunders, 30. X. RECORD AND PROCEEDINGS NOT IN RECORD. (K) Questions Presented for Review. Court cannot impose less than $1,000 penalty 705 (U.S.C.C.A.Ark.) Allowance of comagainst vessel for permitting unlawful landing. pensation to trustee and counsel not increased, Penalty is imposed for each immigrant un-ings & Trust Co. v. Road Improvement Dist. lawfully permitted to land.-Id. No. 2 of Benton County, Ark., 152. -Id. 58 (U.S.C.C.A.Hawaii) Answer to libel for penalty for permitting unlawful landing held insufficient.-The Nanking, 769. IV. NATURALIZATION. 62 (U.S.D.C.Ohio) "Conscientious objector" held ineligible to citizenship.-In re D, 863. 65 (U.S.D.C.Mass.) Persons of Japanese race not eligible to citizenship.-U. S. v. Hidemitsu Toyota, 971. 67 (U.S.D.C.N.Y.) United States court has jurisdiction to cancel naturalization certificate granted by state court.-U. S. v. Koopmans, 545. Naturalization proceeding in state court must be initiated in county of applicant's residence. -Id. in absence of evidence of value.-Guardian Sav XVI. REVIEW. (C) Parties Entitled to Allege Error. 878(1) (U.S.C.C.A.Mich.) Appellee, who has not appealed, cannot allege error.-American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 896. (F) Discretion of Lower Court. 954(1) (U.S.C.C.A.Mich.) Order granting or refusing preliminary injunction reviewable only for plain error in the exercise of discretion.-Blackmore v. Collins, 204. (G) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and Findings. 711⁄2 (U.S.D.C.N.Y.) Rule as to determin-997 (3) (D.C.) Court's findings on motion ing whether certificate of naturalization should of both parties for directed verdict have force be canceled, as "illegally" granted, stated.-U. of verdict.-Campbell v. Willis, 271. S. v. Koopmans, 545. 997 (3) (D.C.) Motion of both parties for Proceeding for cancellation of illegal certifi-directed verdict submits issues of fact to court. cate not by appeal.-Id. -Splain v. B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co., 275. |