cloud upon the title of the Pacific Company to the lands; and prayed for a decree adjudging that the mortgage did not embrace the land grant in question. Parker subsequently filed a demurrer to this cross-bill. On December 24, 1886, Hamlin intervened by petition, and was admitted as a co-plaintiff in the cause. Subsequently the case was heard and separate decrees rendered in favor of Parker and Hamlin for the amounts of their several claims, adjudging the mortgage to be a valid lien upon the lands, which were ordered to be sold and dismissing the cross-bill. Appellants took an appeal from these decrees to this court. Parker thereupon moved for a dismissal of the appeal as to him upon the ground that less than $5,000 was involved. The consideration of this motion was postponed to the merits. Messrs. William Wirt Howe, John F. Dillon and Wager Swayne for appellants. Messrs. A. H. Garland and A. H. Leonard for appellee. Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court: (1) The motion of the plaintiff Parker, to dismiss the appeal as to him upon the ground that less than five thousand dollars is involved, demands our first consideration. His position is that the suit embraces two separate and distinct controversies; one between Parker and appellants, and one between Hamlin and appellants; that there were separate decrees in these several causes; that these decrees cannot be aggregated for the purpose of sustaining the jurisdiction of this court, nor can the appeal be sustained as to him by reason of the fact that as to Hamlin more than the requisite jurisdictional amount is at issue. It is true that the amount of Parker's decree was but twenty-four hundred dollars and interest, but his bill was filed not only for himself, but for all the other bondholders under the mortgage, and the cross bill avers that he actually represented upwards of two hundred of the bonds issued under this mortgage (an averment ad[511 mitted by his demurrer,) and prayed for a decree declaring the invalidity of the entire mortgage as to these lands. Had the bill been filed by the trustee under this mortgage for the foreclosure of the whole amount of the debt, and a similar cross bill had been filed for its cancellation, there could be no doubt of the appealable character of any decree rendered upon these pleadings. This mortgage, however, contained a provision permitting a foreclosure by any holder of an overdue bond or coupon. Parker's bill was filed practically for the benefit of the entire number of bondholders, and the cross bill could not be sustained except upon the theory that the entire mortgage was invalid as a lien upon these lands. While a decree in favor of the cross-plaintiff might not have been binding upon any defendant to the cross bill who did not appear, it certainly would have been binding upon Hamlin as well as Parker, since Hamlin, on being made a plaintiff, expressly stipulated that the cause should be considered as if he had been one of the original plaintiffs; that Parker's pleadings should be considered as his; and that the pleadings of the defendants should apply equally to him. If Parker's argument in this connection be sound, it would necessarily follow that if every bondholder of this mortgage had intervened, and a cross bill had been filed against them all, praying a cancellation of the entire mortgage, our jurisdiction to review a dismis sal of this bill could not be sustained as to any of such bondholders whose decrees were not more than five thousand dollars, notwithstanding it would be sustained as to others whose decrees were larger. The result would be that the land might be sold for the benefit of the larger bondholders, and freed from the lien of the smaller. Where several plaintiffs claim under the same title, and the determination of the cause necessarily involves the validity of that title, this court has jurisdiction as to all such plaintiffs, though the individual claims of none of them exceed five thousand dollars. Thus in Shields v. Thomas, 58 U. S. 17 How. 3 [15: 93] where a bill was filed by several distributees of an estate, to compel the payment of money alleged to be due them, and a decree was rendered in their favor, it was held that this court had jurisdiction over an appeal, although the amount payable to each individual was less [52] than two thousand dollars. It was held that the matter in controversy was the amount due the representatives of the deceased collectively; and not the particular sum to which each was entitled, when the amount was distributed among them. Said the court: "They all claimed under one and the same title. They had a common and undivided interest in the claim; and it was perfectly immaterial to the appellant how it was to be shared among them." The case of Rodd v. Heartt, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 354 [21: 627], is still more nearly analogous. In this case, which was in admiralty, a fund exceeding the jurisdictional amount paid into the registry of the court was claimed on the one hand by several creditors secured by one mortgage, and on the other by a number of mariners and material-men. A decree having been made adverse to the mortgagees, an appeal was taken by them to this court, and it was held that although no one of the claims under the mortgage equalled the jurisdictional amount, yet as the claim of the appellants, which was disallowed, exceeded that sum, an appeal would lie. In The Con nemara, 103 U. 8. 754 [26: 322], it was held that where salvors united in a claim for a single salvage service, jointly rendered by them, the owner of the property was entitled to an appeal where the sum decreed exceeded $5,000, though in the division among the several parties sharing in the recovery several were awarded less than $5,000. In line with these cases are those of Davies v. Corbin, 112 U. S. 36 [28: 627], and Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366 [34: 706]. The true distinction is between cases in which there are several plaintiffs interested collectively under a common title, and those wherein the matters in dispute are separate and distinct, and are joined in one suit for convenience or economy. Of the latter class are those relied upon by the plaintiff Parker in this case, and his motion to dismiss must, therefore, be denied. Indeed the cross bill to set aside the whole mortgage as to these lands is sufficient of itself to remove all difficulty with regard to our jurisdiction. (2) The case upon the merits depends upon the question whether the mortgage of 1870 should be construed to cover a land grant made by Congress the following year to the Baton Rouge Company, in aid of the construction of its road. To answer this question satisfactorily it is necessary to consider the power of this company under its charter, and [53] the manner in which it attempted to exercise this power. The Act of 1869 of the Legislature of Louisiana, incorporating the Baton Rouge Company, authorized it (§ 13) to obtain from any parish or other municipality any rights, privileges, or franchises that such municipality might choose to grant in reference to the construction of the road; and by section 14, it was authorized to borrow money or to purchase property for the purpose of constructing the road, to issue its corporate bonds, and, to secure the payment of such bonds, to mortgage its road, etc. By section 15, provision was made for a second mortgage guaranteed by the State, and for bonds to be issued and made payable to the State or bearer. By section 16, the first mortgage that should be given was declared to be a prior lien upon the railroad within the State, including all the "real and personal estate within the State of Louisiana, appurtenant to, or necessary for the operation of said main line of railroad, owned by the company at the date of said mortgage, or which may be acquired by it thereafter; and upon the corporate franchises and privileges of said company, granted by the State of Louisiana, relative to the construction, operation and use of said main line of railroad within the State of Louisiana," etc. The mortgage did not differ materially from this Act, though its description of property covered by it is still more explicit, and is as follows: "About five hundred and one miles of railroad within the said State of Louisiana, together with the right of way, roadbed, rails, depots, stations, shops, buildings, machinery, tools, engines, cars, tenders and other rolling stock; also all the real and personal estate within the State of Louisiana owned by the said company at the date of [54] this mortgage, or which may be acquired by it thereafter, appurtenant to, or necessary for the operation of said main line of said railroad or any of said branches connected with the said main line, or to be connected therewith; also all other property, real and personal, of every kind and description whatsoever and wherever situated in the State of Louisiana which is now owned or which shall hereafter be acquired by the said company, and which shall be appurtenant to or necessary or used for the operation of said main line of railroad, or of any of said branches; also the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, and all of the estate, right, title, and interest, legal and equitable, of the said company and its successors and assigns therein, together with the corporate franchises and privileges of said company at any time granted or to be granted by the State of Louisiana relative to the construction, operation and use of said railroad within said State.' The bonds issued under this mortgage contained a similar description 143 U. S. U. S., Book 36. 5 of the property, the latter clause of such description, however, purporting to include "the corporate franchises and privileges of said company granted by the State of Louisiana or by Act of Congress, relative to the construction," etc. How these words, "or by Act of Congress," came to be inserted in the bonds does not appear; it may have been an oversight, or the company may have supposed that the land grant would be acquired and that the insertion of these words would impart additional currency to the bonds. It is not material, however, to determine why or how this was done, since neither the Act of the Legislature nor the mortgage itself assumed in terms to cover anything granted by the Act of Congress. The language of the Act of the Legislature and of the mortgage itself restricts its lien to real and personal property situated in the State of Louisiana, then owned, or which should thereafter be acquired, and which should be appurtenant to, or necessary, or used for the operation of the main line of said road, or any of its branches. The succeeding clause, which includes tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging, etc., was manifestly not intended as an expansion of the prior clause, and for the purposes of this case may be treated as superfluous. No argument is needed to show that a land grant is not necessary to the operation of a railroad; it may be a necessary aid in the construction of a road, but it is certainly not necessary in its operation. Plaintiffs' contention, then, if supportable at all, must be upon the theory that the land grant was appurtenant to the road, not necessarily to its operation, but to the road itself. The word "appurtenant," as ordinarily defined, is that which belongs to or is connected with something else to which it is subordinate [55] or less worthy, and with which it passes as an incident, such as an easement or servitude to land; the tackle, apparel, rigging and furniture to a ship; a right of common to a pasture; or barn, garden, or orchard to a house or message. In a strict legal sense it is said that land can never be appurtenant to land (Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447, 454; Leonard v. White, 7 Mass. 6; Woodhull v. Rosenthal, 61 N. Y. 382); but it was evidently contemplated by this mortgage that real as well as personal property subsequently acquired, such as land for stations, machine shops, or other purposes immediately connected with the road should pass under the lien of the mortgage. Property, however, not connected with what is ordinarily termed the plant, or not forming a part of the organic structure of the road, is never treated as appurtenant to it. Thus in Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 304, [35:473], decided at the last term of this court, it was held that a railroad company joining in the construction of an elevator upon land not belonging to it, and situated at some distance from its road, did not by its ownership of stock in the elevator company acquire such an interest in it as would pass as an appurtenance under the mortgage of the road, as constructed or to be constructed, and the "appurtenances thereunto belonging.' The court went further, and held that the elevator itself, if owned by the company, would not be appurtenant to 69 cum v. its road. In line with this are the earlier cases | Shamokin Valley R. Co. v. Lirermore, 47 Pa. of Harris v. Elliott, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 25 [9: 465; Dinsmore v. Racine & M. R. Co. 12 Wis. 333], holding that the soil and freehold of a 649; Farmers L. & T. Co. v. Commercial Bank, street did not pass as appurtenant to a lot of 11 Wis. 207, 15 Wis. 424; Morgan v. Donovan, land fronting upon such street. So in Linthi- 58 Ala. 241; Walsh v. Barton, 24 Ohio St. 28; Ray, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 241 [19:657], it Calhoun v. Memphis & P. R. Co. 2 Flipp. was said that the right to use a wharf would 442; Seymour v. Canandaigua & N. F. R. Co. not pass as appurtenant to a lot, as it was not 25 Barb. 284. in any way connected with the enjoyment or use of the lot, and a right not so connected could not be annexed as an incident to land so as to become appurtenant to it. In Smith v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 25 [26:637], a mortgage executed by a railroad company upon its then and thereafter to be acquired property contained a specific description of such prop[56] erty, and was held not to cover municipal bonds issued to it in building the road, which were not embraced in such description. And in Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493 [26:810], where a bank was required by its charter to pay a certain tax in lieu of all other taxes and was authorized to purchase and hold a lot of ground for its use "as a place of business," and hold such real property as might be conveyed to it to secure its debts, it was held that the immunity from taxation extended only to so much of the building as was required by the actual needs of the bank in carrying on its business. See also Tucker v. Ferguson, 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 527 [22:805]. A consideration of the circumstances attending and following the execution of this mortgage strengthens the inference that we have drawn from it, that the land grant was not intended to be included. There is no allega tion in the bill that the parties to this mortgage expected, or had any reason to expect that the land grant would be made; and had it been intended to include so important an item, it is scarcely possible that the mortgagor would have left such intention to be inferred from the indefinite and ambiguous language of this instrument. Nor is there any evidence that, after the Act of Congress was passed, the line of the road was ever definitely fixed, as contemplated by section 9 of the Act of March 3, 1871, (16 Stat. at L. 573, 576) although it had filed a map designating the general route of the road pursuant to sections 12 and 22, and obtained an order from the Secretary of the Interior with drawing from entry and sale the oddnumbered sections of land within the grant and indemnity limits. As the grant was, by Analogous cases in the state courts are nu- section 9 of lands not sold, reserved, or othermerous. Thus in Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. wise disposed of at the time the route of the 494, it was held that canal boats purchased with road was definitely fixed, it is settled in this the funds of a railroad company, and used and court that the title to any particular lands run by it in connection with its railroad, but would not pass until the line was so located, beyond its terminus, were not covered by a because until that time it could not be defi mortgage of its engines, cars, etc., "and all nitely ascertained what lands had been otherother personal property in any way belonging wise disposed of. Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 or appertaining to the railroad of said com- U. S. 360 [27: 201]; Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Dunpany." So in Boston & N. Y. A. L. R. Co. v. meyer, 113 U. S. 629 [28: 1.22]; Sioux City Coffin, 50 Conn. 150, the property mortgaged Land Co. v. Griffey, 143 U. S. 32 [35: 64]. by the railroad company was described very As to lands within the indemnity limits, it has nearly in the terms employed in the mortgage always been held that no title is acquired until [58] under consideration, and it was held that lands the specific parcels have been selected by the purchased by the company outside of the lay-grantee, and approved by the Secretary of the out of the road, and not needed for its use or Interior. Grinnell v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. construction, were not covered by the mort Co. 103 U. S. 739 [26: 456]; Kansas Pac. R. Co. gage. It was said in the opinion, that "lands v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. R. Co. 112 U. S. 414, purchased and sold at a profit, although the 421 [28: 794, 797]; St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. v. profit might be expended in the construction Winona & St. P. R. Co. 112 U. S. 720 [28: of the road, were never intended to be em 872]; Barney v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 117 braced by the phrase, acquired by the com- U. S. 228 [29: 858; United States v. Missouri, pany for the purposes of the railroad."" In K. & T. R. Co., 141 U. S. 358 [35:766]: St. Mississippi Valley Co. v. Chicago, St. L. & N. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 139 U. O. R. Co., 53 M ss. 846, a railroad mortgage S 1 [35: 77]. A definite location of this line covering property thereafter to be acquired was subsequently made by the Pacific Comwas confined to such as was appurtenant to or pany; but there is no evidence that such loca necessary for building or operating the road, tion coincided with the general route desig. and carrying out the purposes for which it nated by the Baton Rouge Company, and as was created, and was held not to include a no patents were ever issued for the lands hotel and brick store-house, some vacant town earned by the construction of the road until lots and a farm of three hundred acres: the March, 1881, when they were issued to the hotel being used as a railroad eating house, Pacific Company as assignee of the Baton and the other property being rented out for Rouge Company, it is difficult to see what the several purposes for which it was adapted. lands were ever “acquired” by the latter comIn Meyer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237, 64 Ala. pany, to which this mortgage would attach. 603, a mortgage of a railroad and all other [57] property now owned, and which may be hereafter owned by the railroad company," was held not to cover a land grant of the United States made by an Act of Congress subsequently passed. Other cases to the same purport are, Not only this, but there is no allegation or evidence that the Baton Rouge Company paid the cost of surveying, selecting and conveying these lands as required by the Act of July 31, 1876 (19 Stat. at L. 102, 121) as a preliminary to their conveyance. New Orleans Pac. R. Co. v. [59] [60] United States, 124 U. S. 124 [31: 393]; Deseret | hended, everyone interested should have no- THE NEW YORK, LAKE ERIE, & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY (Otherwise Called the Erie Railroad Company), Piff. in Err. D. DAVID T. WINTER'S Administrator. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 60-75.) Passengers on railroad train, when not presumed to know the rules-statements by ticket agent to passenger, when admissible-when railroad company is liable for act of conductor in expelling passenger-regulations of road, when not conclusire-reliance upon statements of conductor negligence of conductor-remedy for breach of contract-action for ejectment from train-refusal to charge jury-excessive verdict-questions of fact. In the view we have taken of the case it is (3) The decrees in this case were also fatally unnecessary to consider the other points made defective in ordering all the lands assumed to by the defense. We are satisfied, both from be covered by this mortgage to be sold, free the words of the mortgage itself, and from the from all liens, mortgages and incumbrances, circumstances attending its execution, that it to satisfy a claim of $2,400 in one case and should not be construed to include the land $6,000 in another, without making provision grant subsequently made to this company. for other bondholders, subsequent mortgagees The decrees of the court below must be reor other creditors of the road. Assuming for versed and the case remanded with instructhe purposes of this case that, under the pecutions to dismiss the bills of Parker and Hamlin, liar terms of this mortgage, these bondholders and for further proceedings in conformity had the right to file this bill without calling with this opinion. upon the trustee to act-a point upon which we express no opinion-they had no right to a decree for their exclusive benefit. If a single bondholder has any right at all to institute proceedings, he is bound to act for all standing in a similar position, and not only to permit other bondholders to intervene, but to see that their rights are protected in the final decree. Upon this principle it was held by this court, in Pennock v. Coe, 64 U. S. 23 How. 117 [16: 436), that a bondholder cannot, by getting a judgment at law, be permitted to sell a portion of the property devoted to the common security, as this would disturb the pro ratu distribution among the bondholders to which they are equitably entitled. "These bondholders," said Mr. Justice Nelson, "bave a common interest in this security, and are all equally entitled to the benefit of it; and in case of a deficiency of the fund to satisfy the whole of the debt, in equity, a distribution is made among the holders pro rata. . . To permit, therefore, one of the bondholders under the second mortgage to proceed at law in the collection of his debt upon execution would not only disturb the pro rata distribution in case of a deficiency, and give him an inequitable preference over his associates, but also have the effect to prejudice the superior equity of the bondholders under the first mortgage, which possesses the prior lien." Jones, Railroad Securities, sections 392, 393, 434; Fish v. New York W. P. Paper Co. 29 N. J. Eq. 16; Martin v. Mobile & O. R. Co. 7 Bush, 116. In Nashville & D. R. Co. v. Orr, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 471, 475 [21: 810, 811] a bill was filed by a bondholder, on behalf of himself and all others, against a county and a railroad comWhere, by the express conditions of the plaintiff's for the foreclosure of a mortgage given pany by the railroad company to secure the redemphis ticket, unless it bore the signature and stamp contract, he had no right to a return passage under tion of certain bouds issued by the county, and of the company's agent at the end of the route, no for a sale of the mortgaged property. The agent or employé of the company was authorized railroad company demurred for want of proper to alter or waive any condition of the contract, parties. It was held that the other bondhold- and therefore the action of the baggagemaster in ers should be parties to the suit, and in deliv- punching the ticket and checking plaintiff's bagering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice gage, and that of the gateman in admitting him to Hunt observed: "It is the interest of every the return train could not bind the company to bondholder to diminish the debt of every other carry him, nor estop it to deny his right to be bondholder. In so far as he succeeds in doing carried. Boylan v. Hot Springs R. Co. 132 U. S. 148 that, he adds to his own security. Each (35: 290) 40 Am. & Eng. R. Caɛ. 666. holder, therefore, should be present, both that he may defend his own claims and that he may attack the other claims should there be just occasion for it. If upon a fair adjustment of the amount of the debts there should be a deficiency in the security, real or appre 1. Passengers on railroad trains are not presumed to know the rules and regulations which are NOTE. That a carrier of persons, bound to accept all passengers; exceptions: when may exclude a passenger; must provide trains as advertised, see note to Pearson v. Duane, 18: 447. From what liability a contract that a common carrier is not to be responsible for loss or damage will exonerate, see note to New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank of Boston, 12: 465. As to liability of carrier for injury to passenger carried free or riding on a pass, see note to New York Cent. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 21: 627. Liability of railroad companies to passengers: who are passengers; ejection of passengers, when warranted; tickets, conditions. A stipulation in a railroad ticket at reduced rates, that it shall not be good for a return trip unless it is stamped by the agent at the terminus after the holder identities himself to the satisfaction of such agent, is not unreasonable or contrary to the policy of the law. Bethea v. Northeastern R. Co. 26S. C. 91. A contract requiring a passenger to identify made for the guidance of the conductors and other employés of railroad companies, as to the internal affairs of the company, nor are they required to know them. 2. Evidence of what was said by a ticket agent to a passenger upon the purchase of his ticket as to stop-over privileges is admissible in an action by him against the railroad company for forcible and unlawful ejection from the train, where the ticket was silent as to such privileges, and it does not appear that the passenger knew the rules of the company in that respect. 8. Where the ticket agent told the plaintiff, when he bought his ticket, that he would have to speak to the conductor about stopping off at an intermediate station, and plaintiff informed the conductor that he wished to stop over at such station, and the conductor instead of giving plaintiff a stop-over ticket, punched the plaintiff's ticket and told him that was sufficient to give him the right to stop over, and he did stop over, and on resuming his journey, was forcibly ejected from the train because he would not pay his fare, and he afterwards used the punched ticket between the same places, with another conductor,Held, that whatever the rules and regulations of the road were the plaintiff was rightfully a passenger on the train at the time of his expulsion, and the conductor had no right to put him off for not paying his fare, and the company was liable for the act of the conductor. 5. 6. 7. 8. In an action for the expulsion of a passenger from a railroad train, the testimony of a very high official of the road, that stop-over checks were not absolutely necessary, and that other arrangements might be, and sometimes were made, and the fact that the passenger did afterwards travel on the road on the same ticket, which had previously been refused, and without 9. producing any stop-over check, show that the regulations of the road with respect to stop-over checks were not unbending and inviolable. Where the regulations of the railroad with reference to stop-over checks were not brought to the knowledge of a passenger, he had the right to rely upon the statement of the conductor of the train that he would "fix him all right" so he could stop over; and if the conductor was derelict in his duty in not providing the passenger with a stop-over check, but, instead thereof, only punched his ticket, the jury were justified in finding negligence on the part of the conductor, in an action for damages against the company for the forcible ejection of the passenger from the train for want of a stop-over check. Where a party does all that he is required to do, under the terms of a contract into which he has entered, and is only prevented from reaping the benefit of such a contract by the fault or wrongful act of the other party to it, the law gives him a remedy against the other party for such breach of contract. One rightfully on a railroad train as a passenger has a right to refuse to be ejected from it, and to make sufficient resistance to being put off to denote that he is being removed by compulsion and against his will; and the fact that, under such circumstances, he was put off the train, is of itself a good cause of action against the company, irrespective of any physical injury he may have received at the time, or which was caused thereby. Where the substance of requests to a jury has already been given by the court in its general charge, there is no error in refusing to give them in the language requested. It is not the province of this court to determine himself and have the ticket stamped by an agent | required to pay a higher rate than those who purat a particular place may be waived by parol. Taylor v. Seaboard & R. R. Co. 99 N. C. 185. A passenger who purchased a ticket at a reduced price for a continuous trip by a particular train, and, having been misdirected as to the train by an employé of the company,is put off by the conductor, is entitled to proceed on the right train when it comes along and the company is liable in case of his removal therefrom. Elliott v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. 53 Hun, 78. A person is not entitled to damages for ejection from a street car without unnecessary force or violence, where the ticket presented by him is a transfer ticket intended for use on another line and he himself was mainly in fault in regard to the mistake in such ticket. Carpenter v. Washington & G. R. Co. 121 U. S. 474 (30: 1015). A conductor is guilty of assault and battery for forcibly ejecting a passenger, without stopping the train, although the passenger was wrongfully thereon. State v. Kinney, 31 Minn. 311. chase tickets before entering the cars, is reasonable; and the company will be protected in its enforcement. Wilsey v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 83 Ky. 511. A passenger who has been unable to purchase a ticket because of the failure of the company to furnish him an opportunity to do so, may either pay the excess demanded on the train under protest, and afterward recover it by suit, or refuse to pay it, and hold the corporation liable in damages if he be ejected from the train. But exemplary damages can only be recovered where the expulsion is characterized by malice, recklessness, rudeness, or willful wrong. Forsee v. Alabama, G. S. R. Co. 63 Miss. 67. A railroad corporation is liable for all acts of wantonness, rudeness or force, done or caused to be done by its agents or servants, in or about the duties or business assigned to them, although in violation of the general rules or orders prescribed for their conduct; and the rule as to vindictive The burden of proof in an action against a rail- damages for such acts, in actions against the corroad company for putting the plaintiff on a train poration, is the same as in actions against natural was on the plaintiff, the petition and answer put-persons. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Whitman, 79 ting in issue whether the plaintiff voluntarily left | Ala. 328. the train, and what was the full and established rate of fare. Wilsey v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 83 Ky. 512. A trespasser may be expelled at any place, provided it will not expose him to serious danger, or result in wanton injury to him. ern Pac. R. Co. 34 Minn. 210. The purchase of a ticket before entering a railroad train is not necessary to constitute a person a passenger. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Groseclose, 15 Va. L. J. 645. A United States mail agent on a train in the perWyman v. North-formance of his duties in charge of the mail is a passenger. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wilson, 11 L R. A. 486, 79 Tex. 371. It is not required in this State that where a person may rightfully be ejected from a railroad train, it must be done at a station or public crossing. Everett v. Chicago.R.I. & P.R. Co.69 Iowa,15. A regulation of a railroad company, whereby passengers who pay their fare upon the train are A postal clerk in the service of the United States, and doing his duty in the mail car of a train, is a passenger. Mellor v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 10 L. R. A. 36, 105 Mo. 455; Magoffin v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 102 Mo. 540. |