holder of the bonds in virtue of payments spect to the liability incurred by Capron made in persuance of the agreement with & Merriam to the defendant that there was that firm, the Court of Appeals remarked, no evidence impairing the title to the bonds in its opinion, given by Ruger, Ch. J., that acquired by the defendant through the transthe statute of the United States affirmed the fer of them to it by Capron & Merriam; that validity of the contract of certification, and the purpose for which the bonds were transexpressly provided the consequences which ferred by the testator of the plaintiffs to [248] should follow its violation; that the penalty Capron & Merriam contemplated their transincurred was impliedly limited to a for- fer and sale by the latter to third persons; feiture of the bank's charter and the winding that the defendant acquired a valid title to up of its affairs; that it was thus clearly them by their transfer to it; that the transimplied that no other consequences were in- action between Capron & Merriam and the tended to follow a violation of the statute; defendant was in the ordinary course of busiand that it would defeat the very policy of ness pursued by the latter; that it received an Act intended to promote the security and the bonds in good faith, for a valuable constrength of the national banking system, if its sideration, and within all the authorities this provisions should be so construed as to inflict gave it a good title to the bonds; that it was a loss upon the banks and a consequent im-authorized to deal with them for the purpose pairment of their financial responsibility. of effecting the object for which they were The court then cited, to support that view, transferred to it; that its right to hold the Union Nat. Bank of St. Louis v. Matthews, bonds continued so long as any part of its 98 U. S. 621 [25: 188]; National Bank of debt against Capron & Merriam remained Genesee v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99 [26: 443], unpaid; that the testator of the plaintiffs and First Nat. Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 107 could at any time have established his equit. U. S. 676 [27: 592]. able right to a return of the bonds, and could have procured their surrender, by paying the amount for which they were pledged, but he refrained from doing so, and impliedly denied any right in the defendant by demanding the unconditional surrender of the bonds; and that he never became entitled to such surrender, and of course was not authorized to recover possession of them. We regard those views as sound, and as covering this case. The agreement of December 2, 1873, between Capron & Merriam and the defendant, did not call for any act violating the statute. There was nothing illegal in providing that the securities which the bank might hold to secure the debt to it of Capron & Merriam should be available to make good such debt. The statute does not declare void a contract to secure a debt arising on the certifications which it prohibits. The Court of Appeals further said that it was of opinion that the statute in question had no application to the question involved in this suit, which concerned only the relations between Capron & Merriam and the defendant; that, by the deposit of the bonds, the former secured the promise of the defendant to protect their checks of a certain day for a specified amount; that the certification of the checks was entirely aside from the agreement between Capron & Merriam and the defendant, and was a contract between the defendant and the anticipated holders of the checks; that Capron & Merriam had received the consideration of their pledge, when the defendant agreed with them to honor their checks, and that would have been equally effectual, between the parties, without any certification; that the certification was simply a promise to such persons as might receive the checks that they should be paid on presentation to the defendant, in accordance with its previous agreement with Capron & Merriam; that the legal effect of the agreement was that the defendant should loan a certain amount to Capron & Merriam, and would pay it out on their checks to the persons holding such checks; that it was entirely legal for the defendant to contract to pay Capron & Merriam's checks, and it did not affect the legality of that transaction that the defendant also represented to third parties that it had made such an agreement and would pay such checks; that Capron & Merriam could not dispute their liability for the amount paid out in pursuance of such agreement, nor could any other party, standing in the shoes of Capron & Merriam; that the fact that the defendant, in connection with the agreement to pay such checks, had also [249] promised third parties to pay them, could not invalidate the liability previously incurred, or impair the security which had previously been given to the defendant upon If the testator of the plaintiffs had pledged a valid consideration; that the fact of the the bonds to the defendant, he could not, after certification was entirely immaterial in re-receiving the defendant's money, have re In addition to that, the statute expressly provides that a check certified by a duly au thorized officer of the bank, when the customer has not on deposit an amount of money [250] equal to the amount specified in the check certified, shall nevertheless be a good and valid obligation against the bank; and there is nothing in the statute which, expressly or by implication, prohibits the bank from taking security for the protection of its stockholders against the debt thus created. There is no prohibition against a contract by the bank for security for a debt which the statute contemplates as likely to come into existence, although the unlawful act of the officer of the bank in certifying may aid in creating the debt. In order to adjudge a contract unlawful, as prohibited by a statute, the prohibition must be found in the statute. The subjection of the bank to the penalty prescribed by the statute for its violation cannot operate to destroy the security for the debt created by the forbidden certification. plevied the bonds; and after possession of the LIPPMAN TOPLITZ ET AL., Plffs. in V. EDWARD L. HEDDEN, late Collector of the Port of New York. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 252-258,) Contradictory statements of witness-general 1. On cross-examination of a witness it may be 2. This construction of the statute in question is strengthened by the subsequent enactment, on July 12, 1882, of § 13 of the Act of that date, chap. 288, (22 Stat. at L. 166) making it a criminal offense in an officer, clerk, or agent of a national bank to violate the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1869. This shows that Congress only intended to impose, as penalties for over-certifying checks, a forfeiture of the franchises of the bank and a punishment of the delinquent officer or clerk, and did not intend to invalidate commercial transactions connected with forbidden certifications. As the defendant was bound to make good the checks to the holders of them, because the Act of 1869 declares that the checks shall be good and valid obligations against the defendant, it follows that Capron & Merriam were bound to make good the 4. amounts to the defendant. It necessarily results that the defendant, on paying the checks, was as much entitled to resort to the [251] securities which Capron & Merriam had put into its hands, as it would have been to apply money which they have deposited to meet the checks. Moreover, it has been held repeatedly by this court that where the provisions of the National Banking Act prohibit certain acts by banks or their officers, without imposing any penalty or forfeiture applicable to particular transactions which have been executed, their validity can be questioned only by the United States, and not by private parties. Union Nat. Bank of St. Louis v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621 [25: 188]; National Bank of Genesee v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99 [26: 443]; First Nat. Bank of Xenia v. Stewart, 107 U. S. 676 [27: 592]. Where no ground of objection to testimony is 3. Testimony of the commercial name of an ar- Words of common speech used in tariff statutes 5. Where at the close of the trial both parties Argued Nov. 16, 1892. Decided Nov. 28, 1892. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New See same case below 33 Fed. Rep. 617. The bonds in question came into the Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the U. S., Book 30. [252] This is an action at law brought by Lipp- note to United States v. Three hundred and fifty As to action to recover back duties paid under pro- 961 ¡254] District of New York. At the trial before Judge Lacombe and a jury, in January, 1888, the court directed a verdict for the defendant, which was rendered, and judgment was entered thereon against the plaintiffs in November, 1888, to review which the plaintiffs have brought a writ of error. 66 66 In the invoices of the articles imported. they were described as Scotch bonnets;" and in the entries thereon at the custom house they were, in some, described as worsted knit bonnets," and in others as "worsted caps." The collector assessed duties upon them as "knit goods, made on knitting frames," under the following provisions of "Schedule K.-Wool and Woolen," of § 2502 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by S6 of the Act of March 3, 1883, chap. 1, (22 Stat. at L. 509): "Flannels, blankets, hats of wool, knit goods, and all made on knitting frames, balmorals, woolen and worsted yarns, and all manufactures of every description, composed wholly or in part of worsted, the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other animals, (except such as are composed in part of wool) not specially enumerated or provided for in this Act, valued at not exceeding thirty cents per pound, ten cents per pound; valued at above thirty cents per pound, and not exceeding forty cents per pound, twelve cents per pound; valued at above forty cents per pound, and not exceeding sixty cents per pound, eighteen cents per pound; valued at above sixty cents per pound, and not exceeding eighty cents per pound, twenty-four cents per pound; and in addition thereto upon all the above named articles, thirty-five per centum ad valorem; valued at above eighty cents per pound, thirty-five cents per pound, and in addition there to forty per centum ad valorem." The goods were shown to be made of wool, knitted on frames. The plaintiffs duly protested against the assessment of more than 30 per cent ad valorem, claiming that the goods were dutiable under the following provision of "Schedule N.-Sundries," of the same § 2502, page 511: "Bonnets, hats, and hoods for men, women, and children, composed of chip, grass, palmleaf, willow, or straw, or any other vegetable substance, hair, whalebone or other material, not specially enumerated or provided for in this Act, thirty per centum ad valorem." They contended that, under that provision, the articles were "bonnets for men." The court, in directing the verdict for the defendant, gave its reasons for doing so, which are reported in Toplitz v. Hedden, 33 Fed. Rep. 617. Various errors are assigned. The plaintiffs contend that the matter of a claim regarding similar goods under the different phraseology of an earlier tariff, was immaterial. We think that the question was a competent one, as affecting the credibility of the witness. He had testified in this case, Ion his direct examination, that the goods in question were Scotch bonnets, were known in this country as Scotch bonnet, and sold as such, and that they were called bonnets more frequently than caps. It was proper to show, on cross-examination of the witness, that he had made contradictory statements, oral or written, on the subject; and if he wished to appeal to the prior record, to refresh his recollection, he could call for it and do so. But the evidence as offered was competent, irrespectively of the prior record. (2) The same witness was asked, on cross- [255] examination, whether he remembered that, in the summer of 1882, when a bill was pending before Congress to amend the statutes by excluding wool goods from the provision for caps and other articles made on frames, his firin addressed a letter to Hon. S. S. Cox, a member of Congress from the city of New York, protesting against the passage of that law. The plaintiffs objected to that question as immaterial, and because the witness had no right to state the contents of the let ter, and because the letter itself would be the best evidence. The court overruled the objection, and the plaintiffs duly excepted. The witness answered that his firm wrote such a letter. He was then shown what purported to be a copy of that letter, and asked if it was a copy. This was objected to, on the ground that the original was not produced, but the objection was overruled, and the plaintiffs duly excepted. The defendant then offered the copy in evidence, and the plaintiffs objected; but the court over-ruled the objection, and the plaintiffs duly excepted. The copy was then read in evidence, and is set forth in the record. The plaintiffs contend that the copy was read in evidence without any proof that it was a copy. What was before said as to the first assignment of error is applicable here also. The objection that there was no proof that the copy was a copy is not taken in the bill of exceptions. The copy was treated br both sides as a copy, and the bill of excep tions merely states that when the defendant offered the copy in evidence, the plaintiffs objected; but no ground of objection is set forth. The exception, therefore, is unavail. ing. Camden v. Doremus, 44 U. S. 3 How. 515 [11: 705]; United States v. McMasters, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 680 [18: 311]; Burton v. Driggs, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 125 [22: 299]; Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U. S. 660 [25: 306]. (1) One of the plaintiffs, having been examined as a witness for them, testified, on cross-examination, that he had had a suit against the government other than the one on trial, under the old tariff; and he was further It appeared from the letter to Mr. Cox that asked on cross-examination: "Was the it was written when the Tariff Act of 1883 claim then that these goods are caps made on was pending before Congress; that the letter frames?" To this question the plaintiffs ob-related to woolen knitted caps, worn by men; jected, on the ground that the record was the and that it protested against the existing best evidence of the claim. The court over-duty on such articles, and against any inruled the objection, and the plaintiffs duly excepted. The witness answered: "Yes; I think that is it. Similar goods were concerned in that." crease of duty upon them. It appears by the record that Mr. Schwarz, one of the plaintiffs, appeared before the tariff committee in October, 1882, and made a statement with regard to the duties on those articles, as an importer of "Scotch caps," "to speak in regard to the tariff on worsted and knitted goods," and stated that L. Toplitz & Co. [256] were importers of "worsted knitted caps," which were classed as worsted and knitted goods." It also appeared that the sign over the plaintiffs' place of business in New York city was "Importers of Scotch Caps." rectly: "Words used in these tariff statutes, (3) The defendant called a witness who was : It is contended by the plaintiffs that the phrase, “Bonnets, hats, and hoods for men, women, and children," is not a commercial designation, but is only descriptive; and the case of Barber v. Schell, 107 U. S. 617, 621 [27: 490, 492], is cited. But we think no error was committed in admitting the testimony and that it was important to ascertain the commercial name of the article in question. If no such term as "bonnets." applicable to bead coverings for men, was known or used in this country in March, 1883, and if, even though known before, the term was then obsolete, it would follow that it could not have been intended to apply the term to goods which were specifically [257] described elsewhere in the Act as "goods made on knitting frames." If the commercial designation of the article gave it its proper place in the classification of the statute, to resort to the common designation was unnecessary and improper. Arthur v. Lahey, 96 U. S. 112,| 118 [24: 766, 768]; Barber v. Schell, 107 U. S. 617, 623 [27: 490, 493]; Worthington v. Abbott, 124 U. S. 434, 436 [31: 494, 495]; Miller v. Butterfield, 125 U. S. 70, 75 [31: 643, 645]; Robertson v. Salomon, 130 U. S. 412, 415 [32: 995, 996]. The evidence shows that the goods in question were known commercially in the United States as "caps," and not as "bonnets," and that "caps" was also the common designation. It cannot be properly said that the statute uses the phrase "bonnets for men. The language is "bonnets, hats, and hoods for men, women and children." That expression is fully answered by the words "hats for men. " The circuit court, in its opinion, said cor cover goods of this kind. The plaintiffs (4) The other assignments of error are (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 258-271.) Law impairing the obligation of contract-city 1. A municipal ordinance not passed under sup NOTE. As to constitutionality of laws or of appeal or modification of statute, see note to Fletcher v. Peck, 3: 162. As to what laws are void as impairing obligation of contracts, see note to Fletcher v. Peck, 3: 162. As to constitutionality of ex post facto laws, see note to Calder v. Bull, 1: 654. As to retrospective statutes, when valid, see note to Otoe County v. Baldwin, 28: 331. As to effect of repeal of statute on pending action, As to repeal of statute by implication, see note to I posed legislative authority, cannot be regarded Is a law of the State within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against state laws impairing the obligations of contracts. Where a city grounded its right to enact an ordinance to maintain and erect gas works of its own, upon a state statute providing that the city council of any city should have power, whenever it was deemed expedient and for the public good, to erect gas-works, and the plaintiff contends that the statute impaired the obligation of its contract previously made with the State and the city, the circuit court has jurisdiction of the case. 8. A grant, under legislative authority by a city, of an exclusive privilege, for a term of years, of supplying the city and its people with gas, does not prevent the city from erecting its own gas works under a state law giving it power so to do. 4. A legislative grant to a corporation of special privileges, if not forbidden by the Constitution, may be a contract; but where one of the condi tions of the grant is that the legislature may alter or revoke it, a law altering or revoking it does not impair the obligation of the contract, whatever may be the motive of the legislature, or however harshly such legislation may operate. 5. The general reservation of the power to alter, revoke, or repeal a grant of special privileges necessarily implies that the power may be exerted at the pleasure of the legislature. Lima Gas Co. v. Lima, 4 Obio C. C. Rep. 22. A statute is not to be so interpreted as to interfere with, or injure the rights of persons without compensation, unless there is no escape from such construction. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, 25. State v. Cincinnati Gas Light & C. Co. 18 Ohio St. 301. Acts of municipal bodies may be impeached for fraud at the instance of persons injured thereby. Dill. Mun, Corp. § 311. Municipal corporations possess such powers only as are expressly granted by statute and such as may be implied as essential to carry into effect those which are expressly granted. Ravenna v. Pennsylvania Co. 45 Ohio St. 118; Minturn v. Larue, 64 U. S. 23 How. 435 (16: 574); Bloom v. Xenia, 32 Ohio St. 465. If the law authorizes defendant to erect Works, the conferring of such power is uncon stitutional, and, therefore void, being a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. 6 Cranch, 133 (3: 177); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 518 (4: 629); Green v. Biddle, 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 1(5: 547); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U. S. 4 Pet. 514 (7: 939); Planters Argued Nov. 2, 3, 1892. Decided Nov. 21, 1892. Bank of Mississippi v. Sharp, 47 U. S. 6 How. [No. 32.] 301 (12: 447); Vincennes University Trustees v. Indiana, 55 U. S. 14 How. 268 (14:416); Piqua APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Branch of State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U. Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, dismissing a suit for an injunction against the city of Hamilton, brought by the Hamilton Gas Light & Coke Co., to enjoin the city from erecting gas works, etc. Affirmed. See same case below, 37 Fed. Rep. 832. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. John F. Follett, John F. Neilan and T. II. Kelley, for appeliant: There is no law authorizing defendant to erect gas works. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, & 40; Green v. Com. 12 Allen, 155; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15. Acts in pari materia, and relating to the same subject are to be taken and comprised together in construing them. State v. Franklin County Comrs. 20 Ohio St. 421; Pancoast v. Ruffin, 1 Ohio, 381; Allen v. Parish, 3 Ohio, 188; State v. Blake, 2 Ohio St. 147; Dodge v. Gridley, 10 Ohio, 173; Roberts v. Wheeler, Wright (Ohio) 697; State v. Darke County, 43 Ohio St. 315; Warren v. Davis, 43 Ohio St. 447; Ash v. Ash, 9 Ohio St. 383; Van Camp v. Logan Board of Education, 9 Ohio St. 407, 418; Muskingum County Comrs. v. State Board of Public Works, 39 Ohio St. 628; Conger v. Barker, 11 Ohio St. 1; Schultz v. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St. 659. In construing statutes, general words, following particular and specific words, must, as a general rule, be confined to things of the same kind as those specified. State v. Cincinnati Cent. R. Co. 37 Ohio St. 157: State v. Jackson, 36 Ohio St. 281. The several sections of this statute must be so construed as to give force and effect to each of said sections. | S. 16 How. 369 (14: 977); Passaic & Hackensack R. Bridge Proprs, v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 116 (17: 571); Hawthorne v. Calef, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 10 (17: 776); The Binghampton Bridge, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 51 (18: 137); Miller v. New York, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 478 (21: 98); Delaware R. Tax Case, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 206 (21: 888); Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co. 105 U. S. 13 (26: 961); New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana L. & H. Co. 115 U. S. 650 (29: 616); New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674 (29: 525); Lincoln & K. Bank v. Richardson, 1 Me. 79; Yarmouth v. North Yarmouth, 34 Me. 411; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189, 205; Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19; Caledonia County Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Vt. 632; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 146; King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass. 447; Nichols v. Bertram, 3 Pick. 342; Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, 15 Gray, 106; Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2 Allen, 27; Washington Bridge Co. v. State, 18 Conn. 53; Lothrop v. Stedman, 42 Conn. 583; People v. Manhattan Co. 9 Wend. 351; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. 86; Com, v. Cullen, 13 Pa. 133; Iron City Bank v. Pittsburgh, 37 Pa. 340; Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N. Y. R. Co. 18 N. J. Eq. 178; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. McFarlan, 31 N. J. Eq. 706; Gorman v. Pacific R. Co. 26 Mo. 441; Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Dougl. (Mich.) 225; People v. Jackson & M. Plank Road Co. 9 Mich. 285; Flint & F. Plank Road Co. v. Woodhull, 25 Mich. 99; Mc Roberts v. Washburne, 10 Miun. 23; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (25: 1079); Union Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 99 U. S. 700 (25:496); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 325 (24:359); Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 436 (17: 173); Mechanics & T. Bank v. Debolt, 59 U. S. |