general stock of provisions was cal culated only for a short period of consumption. Bonaparte, in the same bulletin, asserted, that large supplies of wine and brandy were found in the cellars: these could not be large, since these liquors are entirely confined to the highest classes in Russia.

The same causes which prevented him from finding any large stock of provisions in Moscow, threatened to render his retreat difficult and disastrous in the highest degree: about the end of October, immediately after the laying in of the supplies for the winter, there is a cessation of all intercourse between Moscow and the smaller towns, villages and estates; and this cessattion continues during the whole winter. But Moscow was not only in a great measure destitute of provisions when Bonaparte entered it, but its local situation rendered it extremely unhealthy, especially to an army not accustomed to the climate, and already worn down by fatigue, There are three rivers which surround and flow through the city; and the fogs and exhalations from them, just before the fall of snow commences, are extremely injurious to the health even of the inhabitants who are seasoned to the 'climate..

As Bonaparte had been disappointed in his hopes of inducing the peasantry to join him, so was he also disappointed in the expectation which he had formed respecting the old Russian nobility who constantly resided at Moscow: they chiefly consisted of those whose ancestors had objected to the removal of the seat of government to Peters burgh: their descendants nourished the same prejudice, and kept aloof, in a sullen and discontented mood, from the new noblesse of the em

peror in the new capital, the rapid growth of which they regarded with a jealous eye: but though they disliked the proceedings of the court, they were yet truly Russian in heart and sentiment: indeed they had about them even more nationality than the other classes of the Russian nobility, and consequently hated the French, and utterly disregard. ed the promises of Bonaparte.

From all this, it is apparent that the situation of the French army in Moscow was most critical, even if they had not been surrounded by numerous armies. Winter was fast approaching; the troops were already exhausted with fatigue; in Moscow they could not remain till spring opened the communication with the southern provinces; and if they retreated, how were they to obtain provisions, or endure a march of 500 or 600 miles, amidst the severe winter, the deep snows, and the almost hidden, and impassable roads of Russia? The Russian generals, in the mean time, were not idle their object was, to force Bonaparte from Moscow, by cutting off his supplies there; and when they had compelled him to retreat, to harass him continually: for this purpose, a great number of Cossacks, besides those which had been already employed, were collected : now was the season and the oppor tanity of their utility and triumph. Kutusoff, as has been already mentioned, took up a position to the south of Moscow, defending the fertile provinces from the foraging parties of the enemy. On the other side of the city Winzingerode was posted with a large body of troops, in order to exclude the French from the Petersburgh road and the north. ern provinces. Wittgenstein de fended the line of the Dwina, where he carried on an unremitted and generally

generally a successful contest with, Oudinot; but as soon as he learnt that the French were in Moscow, having been reinforced by 18,000 men from Finland, he began a movement upon that city, in the line which it would be necessary for Bonaparte to follow in his retreat. As it was of the utmost consequence to keep open this line, St. Cyr endeavoured to defend the important post of Polotsk against Wittgenstein; but he was completely routed, and driven beyond the Dwina: after this success, the Russian ge neral continued his march on Witepsk, and thus cut off the communication between the main French army and the west of Europe.

Bonaparte had hitherto by his intrigues prevented peace from being concluded between Russia and Turkey; but now, as it was of the utmost consequence for the former power to bring up all her forces, she agreed to give Turkey such favourable terms, that peace was agreed upon. In consequence of this event, the army which had been employed on the Turkish fromtiers immediately began its march through the south of Poland; and as it advanced it united with the corps wich had been stationed in Volhynia, forming altogether nearly 80,000 men. Their first object, after they were rendered so power ful by this union, was to attack the Austrian auxiliary army, under the prince of Schwartzenberg: the Austrian government, though oblig ed by the treaty which it concluded with Bonaparte to furnish 30,000 men, had not employed them in very active warfare; their sole object was to keep up the communication between the main French army and this part of Poland: this they effected till they were attacked by the Volhynian army, when they

were compelled to cross the Niemen and separate themselves entirely from the main body. As soon as the Volhynian army had driven the Austrians across this river, it formed a junction with the force under Wittgenstein, on the high road leading to Moscow.

Bonaparte was now sensible of the dreadful error he had committed: unless he actually expected to dictate terms of peace at Moscow, it was the extreme of madness to have proceeded thither at the beginning of a Russian winter: and if he did expect either to dictate terms of peace, or to have his own offers accepted, he must have been ignorant of the determined hatred which all ranks in Russia bore towards him. The apology he offers, in his bulletins, for his military career in Russia, is a paltry one: according to him, the Russian winter,this year commenced earlier than usual; as if the circumstance of the frost setting in a very few days sooner or later. could have saved or destroyed his army! What must be the military prudence of that man, who calculates, for the safety of his army, and the success of his measures, so uncertain a thing as climate! The fact is, Bonaparte in all his former campaigns. had been indebted for his success to the boldness of his advances into the very heart of the enemy's country: that this boldness did not assume the character, deserve the name, and produce the consequences, of rashness, was less owing to his own foresight and circumspection than to the pusillanimity, treachery, and want of talents, of his opponents: without adverting to the different circumstances in which he was placed in Russia, from a difference of climate, and national character, he followed his

usual

usual plan, thus proving that he was defective in one great feature of a man of abilities, the adaptation of general principles and plans to particular circumstances.

Perceiving that, though he was in the heart of the Russian empire, and amidst the ruins of its ancient capital, no terms of peace were proposed, and that the Russians were gathering round him on all sides, he sent Lauriston to Kutusoff, to propose an accommodation, or at least an armistice: Kutusoff received the French negotiator in the midst of his generals, and replied to him with the utmost frankness: he told him that he was not authorised to receive any proposals either for peace or an armistice; that he would not send to Alexander, nor even receive the letter which Bonaparte had sent by Lauriston; and that with respect to an armistice, in particular, the Russian army had no occasion for it, and they were in possession of too many ad. vantages to throw them away by accepting it. Lauriston, perceiving that Kutusoff was absolutely determined to listen to no terms of accommodation, began to complain of the barbarous manner in which the war was conducted: to this Kutusoff replied in language which ought to be addressed to all invaders: the French had introduced the barbarities of which they complained; they had commenced hostilities without reason; had invaded Russia, which by nature was placed beyond the power of injuring them, and it might have been thought beyond the reach of their ambition; they had inflicted as much misery on its inhabitants as they could; and now, when vengeance and re

taliation were at hand, they wished for peace: peace could not be talked of till the French were beyond the Vistula: Bonaparte had nothing to do but get out of Moscow how he could, since he came thither without being invited: the Russians, he might depend upon it, would do their duty; and their duty to their sovereign, their country, their murdered or banished and wandering wives and children, demanded that they should make their invaders suffer as much misery as possible: Bonaparte had proclaimed the campaign terminated at Moscow, but with the Russians it was only commencing.

About the same time Murat com. plained to general Miloradovitch of the excesses committed by the Cossacks: it is evident, though the conference was begun on his part, that Murat, if he had found encouragement, would have changed the subject to peace; but he met with no encouragement: the Russian general told him that the Cossacks acted according to orders, when they fired on the French foraging parties; and when Murat complained that the flags of truce were also fired upon, the Russian replied, "We want not to hear of parleys; we want to fight, not to negotiate; take your measures accordingly."-Perceiving that there was no chance of peace, and that the Russians were fully sensible of the reduced strength and miserable state of the French army, and had formed their plans in such a manner as to take the utmost advantage of their own good fortune, Bonaparte, after having been upwards of a month in Moscow, prepared for his retreat.

СНАР

BOUT the 16th of October Bonapartehad made preparations for his retreat from Moscow. What reasons he assigned to his army for this measure, are not known: in his bulletins he endeavoured to persuade the people of France, that he was only about to make a lateral movement; and that by taking up a position at Smolensk, he should, in fact, be nearer Petersburgh than he was when at Moscow: but still it was necessary to assign some pretext for leaving Moscow; in the bulletins which he first issued from that place, though he acknowledged that nearly the whole of it was consumed, and that almost the whole population had deserted it, previously to the entrance of the French army, yet he asserted that sufficient of the city remained for their winter quarters, and that the inhabitants, intimidated or seduced to leave it by the threats or the misrepresentations of the governor, were soon encouraged to return; while the neighbouring peasantry brought in large supplies of provisions. These assertions were made at a time when he entertained hopes of being able to persuade the emperor Alexander to make peace; but as soon as he was convinced that this hope was fruitless, the account he gave in his bulletins, of the situation of Moscow, and the

disposition of the Russian people, underwent a remarkable change. The conflagration of the city ren dered it no longer a desirable or proper military station. It must therefore be abandoned, but not with an, intention of flying from Russia: a stronger position, and an untouched and fertile country were to be sought, in which the army having recruited itself, the campaign was to re-open in the spring with renewed vigour and fresh triumphs.

But the difficulty of fixing on a retreat was extremely great; if possible, the route by which he had advanced to Moscow was to be avoided; over it had already passed two large armies; the Russians had laid it so completely waste, that the French, when advancing, had found it almost impassable, and the country on all sides totally stript of provisions or accommodation for an army. Such was this route in the month of September, 'when the French were advancing; but now, in October, when the heavy rains. which precede the frosts were about to set in, the roads, already cut up by the passage of two armies, must be dreadful; and the Russian peasantry had been employed to destroy them still more. Nothing, therefore, but dire necessity could compel Bonaparte to retreat by this route; if

he

he chose one more to the east, it would not only lead him along roads little injured, but through a rich and fertile country; and though necessarily circuitous, yet if he could accomplish his retreat this way, he would in the end arrive much sooner in a friendly country than if he marched by Smolensk accordingly he determined, if possible, to penetrate by the route of Tula and Kalouga. After fixing on his plan, it was necessary to prepare his army for their long and dreadful march: this was much more difficult and embarrassing; for upwards of two months, two months of the most frightful season in Russia, he must expect they would be on their retreat. Even if the country were not laid waste, and stript of all that an army required, even if it were inhabited by a friendly people, it could scarcely expect, during this period, to receive, or collect provisions, as it retreated, since the roads would not permit them to be brought from any distance. To Moscow the army had brought little or no provision; to the capture of it, won by the battle of Borodino, Bonaparte had taught and encouraged them to look forward as the event that would supply them with provisions in abundance; but its conflagration had disappointed their hopes to such a degree, that some time before the French began their retreat, they were compelled to content themselves with very scanty fare. Even by the statement of the bulletin, they began their retreat with only 20 days provisions; and it is said that Bonaparte entered into contract with Polish Jews to supply his army on its march, and that these Jews, after receiving the stipulated money, did not fulfil their contract.

After Bonaparte had decided on the route that he would follow on his retreat, and made such prepa rations as his circumstances would admit, it was necessary, as a prelimi nary step, to beat and drive back the Russian grand army, which occupied and defended the Kalouga road. Kutusoff was aware of the intentions of the French; and as he knew that a strong rein forcement was marching from Smolensk, to help in extricating the main French army, he resolved to attack Murat, who commanded the advanced guard, before it arrived. This advanced guard consisted of 45,000 men: on the 18th of October it was attacked by Kutusoff, and completely beaten; 38 pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the Russians; 2000 men were left dead or wounded on the field of battle, and 1500 were made prisoners. On the same and the subsequent days an obstinate battle was fought on the banks of the Dwina. General Steingel proceedcd from Riga along the southern bank of that river, while general Wittgenstein marched along the opposite bank: their operations and plans were combined with so much judgement, that while the forner attacked the corps of Macdonald, the latter attacked St. Cyr. Steingel drove the army of Macdonald within a very few miles of Polotsk; and Wittgenstein on the 18th of October, after a bloody engagement of 12 hours, compelled the force that was opposed to him to seek safety in its entrenchments. On the following day the entrenchments were carried by storm, and~ soon afterwards the town of Polotsk was retaken. St.Cyr was surrounded; 2000 prisoners were taken, and the number of killed and wounded was proportionally great.

We have mentioned